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ABSTRACT
This research sets out clarifying theoretically the relations with two democratically relevant
concepts: political representation and deliberation. It does so by developing the idea of
‘deliberative representation’ and studying it empirically in a parliamentary context.
Recent scholarship of representation, namely the constructivist turn, sees the concept of
representation as dynamic and fluid. As such, this paradigm shift looks past the electoral
notion that highlights the premise of interests and preferences. Scholarship on deliberation
is similarly revising its focus. This research draws especially from the systemic approach to
deliberation. It implies that loosening traditional normative criteria will advance the study
of deliberation in politically charged settings such as legislatures. Both strands of theories
are gradually assuming context and function sensitive perspectives that are merged in my
reading of deliberative representation.
The under-theorised link between representation and deliberation has resulted in
shortage of empirical accounts of where representatives operate in. The research is
motivated by a simple question: what do representatives actually do when they represent?
Finding answers to this question helps in understanding what drives deliberation in
parliaments. The proposed framework of deliberative representation allows a more nuanced
outlook on representative activities and practices. Consequently, this refined perspective
allows addressing and re-assessing some prevailing assumptions of political science about
the strategic and adversarial incentives and orientations of elected representatives.
In this research, the dynamics of deliberative representation are studied in and illustrated
through a particular legislature, the Parliament of Finland. For this purpose, 60 Finnish
Members of Parliament (and 5 parliamentary committee chairs) were interviewed over the
period of 2008–2016.
The research illustrates that although institutional and procedural settings of legislature
incentivise representative practices, thus inducing deliberation in various ways, the
contextual and functional interplay argued by deliberative representation adds to the
analysis in novel ways. Three dominant contexts of representation are identified: the
affirmative, operative and performative context. Each discussed context specifies how the
functions of representation are established and carried out. Also, features relating to the
deliberative process are explored. Finally, three deliberative modes are detected in the
contexts of representation: what I call expressive-deliberative, strategic-deliberative and
expressive-partisan deliberative mode.
The novelty of this research lies in its aspiration to use the language of political theory
more closely in conducting empirical inquiry. While doing that, it has also contributed to
the scholarship on representative practices in parliaments. Finally, the research suggests that
the contexts of representation are generally recognisable, and therefore they may find
applications outside the parliamentary setting.
KEYWORDS: representation, deliberative democracy, political theory, legislatures,
elected representatives
TIIVISTELMÄ
Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on selventää edustuksellisen demokratian kannalta kahden
keskeisen käsitteen, polittisen edustamisen ja deliberaation, välistä suhdetta. Tämä
tarkastelu tapahtuu kehittelemällä ajatusta ’deliberatiivisesta edustamisesta’ ja tutkimalla
sitä empiirisesti parlamentaarisessa kontekstissa.
Edustamista käsittelevä viimeaikainen tutkimuskirjallisuus, erityisesti sen
konstruktivistinen käänne ymmärtää edustamisen käsitteen dynaamisena ja joustavana.
Tutkimusnäkökulman muutos ylittää perinteisen vaalikeskeisen ymmärryksen
edustamisesta, joka korostaa intressejä ja preferenssejä ennakko-oletuksina. Samoin myös
deliberatiivinen demokratiateoria uudelleenarvioi omia tarkastelunäkökulmiaan. Tässä
väitöskirjassa edustamisen ja deliberaation väliin avautuvaa teoreettista aluetta kartoitetaan
deliberaation systeemisen teorian insipiroimana. Systeeminen tarkastelunäkökulma
mahdollistaa deliberaation normatiivisten kriteereiden liudentumisen, mikä edesauttaa
deliberaation tutkimista poliittisesti jännittyneissä asetelmissa kuten parlamenteissa.
Väitöskirja nostaa esiin edustamista ja deliberaatiota käsittelevistä teoriakeskusteluista
konteksteja ja funktioita korostavia näkökulmia, jotka yhdistetään deliberatiivisen
edustamisen luentaan.
Johtuen siitä, että edustamisen ja deliberaation välinen suhde on aliteoretisoitu, on myös
tästä näkökulmasta tehtyjen, edustajien toiminnalliseen työympäristöön sijoittuvien
empiiristen tutkimusten määrä vähäinen.  Tutkimus lähtee liikkeelle hyvin yksinkertaisesta
ajatuksesta: mitä edustajat oikeastaan tekevät kun he edustavat?  Tutkimuksen tavoitteena
on myös paremmin ymmärtää, mitkä tekijät motivoivat deliberaatiota parlamenteissa.
Tutkimuksessa esitetty deliberatiivisen edustamisen tutkimusasetelma mahdollistaa
edustuksellisen toiminnan ja käytäntöjen hienojakoisemman tarkastelun. Samalla voidaan
kriittisesti tarkastella edustustoiminnasta tehtyjä olettamuksia siitä, että toimintaa ohjaa
pääsääntöisesti strategiset ja kilpailulliset (adversariaaliset) tavoitteet.
Tässä tutkimuksessa deliberatiivisen edustamisen dynamiikkoja tutkitaan ja
illustroidaan yhden konkreettisen esimerkin eli Suomen eduskunnan kautta. Tutkimusta
varten on haastateltu 60 kansanedustajaa (ja viittä valiokuntaneuvosta) aikavälillä 2008–
2016.
Väitöstutkimus osoittaa, että edustuslaitoksen institutionaaliset ja proseduraaliset tekijät
motivoivat edustustoimintaa ja näin ollen kannustaa deliberaatioon monin tavoin.
Deliberatiivisen edustamisen kontekstuaaliset ja funktionaaliset yhteistekijät lisäävät
uudella tavalla analyyttistä ymmärrystä edustustoiminnasta. Tutkimus hahmottaa kolme
edustamisen pääkontekstia: affirmatiisen, operatiivisen ja performatiivisen kontekstin.
Jokainen konteksti selittää, miten edustamisen funktiota eli tarkoitusta tuotetaan ja
toteutetaan. Toiseksi, tutkimuksessa kartoitetaan deliberatiivisen prosessin osa-alueita.
Kolmanneksi, edustamisen konteksteista johdetaan kolme toiminnallista orientaatiota eli
deliberatiivista moodia (deliberative mode), joita kutsun ekpressiivis-deliberatiiviseksi,
strategis-deliberatiiviseksi ja ekspressiivis-partisaaniseksi deliberatiiviseksi moodiksi.
Lopuksi, väitöstutkimuksen ansioksi voidaan laskea se, että se hyödyntää politiikan
teorian tulokulmaa empiirisessä tarkastelussa mutta kontribuoi myös edustamista ja
edustustoimintaa käsittelevään kotimaiseen ja kansainväliseen kirjallisuuteen. Tutkimus
ehdottaa, että edustamisen kontekstit ovat tunnistettavissa yleisemminkin, jolloin niiden
merkitys laajenee myös parlamentaarisen asetelman ulkopuolelle.
AVAINSANAT: edustaminen, deliberatiivinen demokratia, politiikan teoria,
edustuslaitokset, kansanedustajat
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I Introduction
i When representatives represent and deliberate: the point of departure
What do representatives do when they represent? This seemingly self-evident question
belongs to a more complex and intellectually appealing domain. Representatives do many
things when they represent. When they go about their daily lives in legislatures, often late
into the evenings, they spend time reading and preparing for various kinds of meetings.
They write speeches, legislative initiatives and newspaper columns, and reply to emails and
messages and requests from the public. They sit in parliamentary committees, hear experts
and lobbyists inside and outside the committee, and host various visitors. Representatives
negotiate with other representatives, bargain and make promises and commitments. They
plan and prepare future activities and aspirations individually and collectively. Most of these
activities include contact, association and communication with other people. Crucially,
these communicative encounters entail what democratic theory calls deliberation.
This research is about the construction of deliberation in these encounters. It asks how
different material contexts of democratic representation set conditions for different aspects
of deliberation. Deliberation anticipates and facilitates some kind of physical connection
with others, while also assuming reflection and interaction with other people, and with their
arguments, claims and reasoning. Deliberation is not only about reflection on ideas
presented during the deliberative process; it is also an activity that includes the physical
presence of others. This shows that although representation can and will in many instances
remain virtual and less tangible, it can be approached through accounts of activities. This
touches on physical and material notions that are relevant also for consideration of political
theory (Parkinson 2012). It is problematic if democratic theories would disregard the way
in which deliberative engagements take place in a physical and not virtual space (ibid., 8).
It is worth paying attention to activities that constitute democracy, as well as to the
conditions that allow them to emerge, and to fuse action and emotions.
As theoretical concepts, political representation and deliberation are deeply enmeshed,
making it difficult to pinpoint where and how these concepts enter the discussions. Despite
the differences in understandings of representative democracy and deliberative democracy
that are considered to be ‘merely an artefact of academic politics’ (Brown 2018, 172), the
dilemma persists. One of the most recent comprehensive attempts to clarify the relation
between representation and deliberation concludes that they are closely intertwined (Brown
2018, 181).
My argument in this study is that disentangling these two concepts in the context of
representative institutions, in what representatives do, helps in grasping questions about
what drives deliberation in parliaments. I propose an analytical tool for pinpointing and
addressing some of the dynamics that are evident in legislatures, in this case the Parliament
of Finland. The first research question of this study is, what is deliberative representation,
and how does it function in a parliamentary context? This question will connect the
emerging features of representation and deliberation instead of always assembling the
concepts as we go or treat them interchangeably. The utility of deliberative representation
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is in tracking and exploring the deliberative faculty of representation. Gaining a better and
more in-depth understanding about the ways in which deliberations occur in one particular
parliament can contribute to consequent proposals and ideas about democratic innovations
within the institutional design of legislatures. No prior relevant literature really exists.
Over a decade ago Dario Castiglione and Mark Warren (2006, 2) have argued that
democratic theorists have ‘embarrassingly little to offer by way of guidance or critique for
emerging issues of representation’. Their conclusion is still relatable from the starting point
of the necessity of examining empirical accounts such as the ones presented in this study
(Dario Castiglione and Warren 2019). My interest is in translating ideas posed by empirical
research on the conducts and practices of representatives (see e.g. Esaisson 2000 on the
process of defining the tasks of MPs) into the language of political theory. On these
assumptions, I treat representation as a praxis, a way of doing representation. As such, it has
an empirical appeal. As Michael Saward argues: ‘if representation is made and disputed in
real-world politics–then it happens daily and in detail below the standard-issue radar of
political theory and in a realm more akin to that of the political anthropologist’ (Saward
2019, 286, emphasis added). What can be gained from such a point of departure? Are these
activities relevant from the perspective of democratic theory–that is, do they somehow speak
to the emerging issues of representation? In this research, my argument is that they are and
they do, and I make this argument by exploring the representative activities that members
of parliament engage with daily and in detail. I explore real-world practices in light of new
conceptual scholarship. By eschewing the standard account of representation–which takes
political representation to be merely about preferences and interests–it is possible to retain
conceptual complexity and diversity, thereby making it possible to see the practices and
activities of representatives in a new light.
The starting point of this study is the ambiguity of the conceptual counterparts of
representation and deliberation. Deliberation, particularly when it occurs in the legislative
setting of parliaments, takes the presence of political representation for granted, and often
takes it at face value that elected representatives are non-deliberative actors. Matters of
democratic politics–power and interests, linking also to the themes of resistance and
disputation–have not been sufficiently addressed in deliberative theory. Therefore, it has
been said, provocatively, that deliberative theory has forgotten about democracy (Bächtiger
and Parkinson 2019, 4). Political representation seems to be a theme in deliberative
democracy that is shrugged off. This study addresses the need to re-politicise deliberation,
something that André Bächtiger and John Parkinson (2019, 82, 132) have also argued for.
Parliamentary deliberation is by default ‘political’, but this starting point does not render all
deliberative accounts strategic, coercive or manipulative. We can reasonably assume that
other action logics are also present, and that constructive politics is demonstrated by
parliamentary representatives. The juxtaposition of strategic and sincere motivations by
participants of deliberation has been a theme that early deliberative democracy struggled
with. What if actions and incentives of deliberative participants are not sincere or authentic,
despite demonstrating and endorsing deliberative styles that fulfil the deliberative
desiderata?
The analysis of institutional deliberation often takes its point of departure in treating
representatives as strategic and unitary actors with a unified purpose (Goodin 2005, 186).
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This is highly problematic. The prevalence of parliamentary rules and procedures highlight
this interpretation, namely that legislatures should operate according to the same standards
of logic, order, coherence, and so on, as a single and individual deliberative participant
would on the same matter (Goodin 2005, 187). This research is indebted to Robert E.
Goodin’s notion of distributed deliberation (2005; 2008b). Distributed deliberation rejects
the idea that actors in deliberation strive towards the same goals that would manifest
themselves in the way that deliberation is used. A similar argument for a sequential approach
to deliberation has also been put forward by Bächtiger and others (2010; also Bächtiger and
Parkinson 2019), calling for consideration of how deliberative (and representative) tasks are
dispersed and distributed throughout the legislature.
My research touches on this theme of the type or form of parliamentary deliberation–
even though it does not make it central–and contributes to it in two ways. First, by the
methodological choice of conducting research interviews with members of parliament I
have not acquired the skill to ‘read minds’ as a solution to uncovering the extent to which
representatives are ‘really motivated by a logic of common understanding’ (Bächtiger and
Beste 2017, 108). When the deliberation of representatives becomes the focus of study,
scholarship often turns to rhetorical styles or measuring the quality of deliberation, thus
making it an ‘ethical-evaluative’ enterprise (Schäfer 2017). Although it may be true that the
scholarship on parliamentary deliberations uses transcripts as a primary source of research
data that forces researchers to make rather far-reaching assumptions about representatives’
motivations and incentives, gaining a grasp of these through any research method remains
difficult. The profound universal question about why people do what they do can be to some
degree a mystery, even to oneself. In this case, however, extending the reach of deliberative
scholarship with research interview methods is a viable way to approach this question.
Secondly, the relevance of distributed deliberation does not only regard the incentives
of the actors and how it reflects the use of deliberation, but it also implies another critical
feature argued in this study that can also contribute to discussions about the type of
parliamentary deliberation. This is the role of contexts. It matters where and in what context
parliamentary deliberation occurs. Some of the institutionally and structurally facilitated
features that have an effect on the quality of deliberation have been systematically analysed
(Steiner et al. 2004). According to these studies, deliberation is likelier to be of high quality
(envisioned through Habermasian discourse ethics) when it takes place in a parliamentary
system (rather than a presidential system) with coalition governments and with issues that
are less polarised (as opposed to highly polarised) as well as behind closed doors.
Although the institutional and procedural structures of legislatures provide an overlay
informing and affecting parliamentary deliberations, I argue that there is room to push the
explanatory power of contexts further. As such, the qualitative features of deliberation
appear to be less an array of isolated cases of speech acts held together by the institutional
structure. To give more analytical depth to the question of the parliamentary deliberations
and respective representative activities, I propose turning to the concept of political
representation–more specifically, to the newer traditions and formulations of the concept,
following the work of Lisa Disch (2011; 2012; 2015; 2019), Jane Mansbridge (2003; 2009;
2011; 2016; 2019), Andrew Rehfeld (2005; 2006; 2009; 2011; 2016; 2018) and Michael
Saward (2010; 2014, 2017; 2019). These are authors associated with the representative turn
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in political theory. While this conceptualisation will be discussed later in chapter 2.1., we
can argue in short that proponents of the representative turn see the grounding of the concept
in the electoral connection, roles and typologies and interests to be insufficient. Instead,
representation turns out to be a more dynamic process, one that is not bound by the relations
with the representatives and the represented. This is also what is articulated further,
following the work of Disch and Saward, what is referred to as the ‘constructivist turn’ to
which this research also is intended to contribute (and which will be discussed more fully
in chapter 2.1. section iv). Resisting the Anglo-American tendency of reducing
representation into these electoral accounts the constructivist reconceptualisation
understands representation ‘”intrincit” to democracy’ (Disch 2019, 2–3).
For this research, what this new paradigm can offer is another contextual overlay to
supplement the institutional ones that can better explore and address the contingencies of
representative activities. From these discussions, I trace the argument that contexts offer
resources for, but also restrictions to, the practices with which members of parliament
engage. This brings us to the second research question: What are the contexts of
representation found in legislatures, in this case the Parliament of Finland?
Approaching deliberative representation provide a contextual overlay that helps explain
and illuminate the settings where deliberation takes place. Here I endorse the ‘contextual-
systemic’ approach that similarly distinguishes features constituting and facilitating
deliberations (Schäfer 2017). As such, I will offer a blueprint through which representatives’
activities can be read and interpreted. Deliberative representation, and the specific three
major contexts I trace it through, escapes the ‘ethical-evaluative paradigm’ of parliamentary
deliberations (Schäfer 2017) that focus on the form of deliberation in normative terms as a
question of deliberative quality.
To get to this, I will locate a further prevailing idea embedded in the argument for
context, namely functional representation. This idea has been developed by Andrew
Rehfeld (2006), but I will connect functional representation to more specific contexts of
representation and present an empirical inquiry to go along with it. For this purpose, and to
clarify the relevance of function, I will further consider the subject of motivations. If one
were to ask why representatives represent or deliberate, the simple answer might be that
they have no other choice. It is indeed correct to argue that representatives are bound by
‘deliberative mandate’ (Pekonen 2011, 110): they are forced to deliberate to make their case.
It would be difficult to envision a parliament that did not deliberate. This point already hints
at the next step in the argument. Not only is deliberation connected to representation, but by
deliberating representatives can make things happen. When representation is taken as a
praxis, representing has a function that representatives make use of in the contexts they find
available. Put simply, representatives deliberate to legislate–to argue, dispute and resist, but
they also represent when they compromise, when they seek to understand what the other is
trying to say and demand. This perspective  invites almost an endless number of accounts
of representing. But until one gets to the root of what representation actually is (Rehfeld
2017; 2018), alongside understanding its purposes (Saward 2010; 2006), we are left with
the tautological view whereby representatives represent when they represent.
Through deeper analysis, by breaking representing and deliberating into smaller parts,
they can be grasped as practical activities. Therefore, the second research question entails
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the idea that contexts of representation are functionally differentiated and therefore host
various deliberative acts. The same line of thought is present already in deliberative theory:
in the idea of distributed deliberation that predates the influential systemic view of
deliberation (Mansbridge et al. 2012), and more recently by André Bächtiger and Simon
Beste (2017). They propose a ‘functional approach’ to deliberation that resonates with the
idea presented in this research. For deliberative democrats, uncovering strategic behaviour
of representatives becomes less of a problem when we supplement the approach to
deliberation with the kind of contextual and functional understanding (Bächtiger and Beste
2017, 110). Based on this, the third and final research question is: How do representative
contexts facilitate and justify deliberative acts?
Before I develop in detail the argument presented in this introductory section, I will first
discuss it from the perspective of parliament. The argument about the relevance and
implications of convergence of representation and deliberation would be incomplete and
isolated were it not placed in the precise context.
ii The parliamentary arena of representation and deliberation
The puzzle of political representation and deliberation manifests itself in the notion of
representative government. Notably, the longstanding ‘formula of government of
discussion’ according to Bernard Manin, (1994, 143) is confused, as it does not precisely
indicate the role of discussion in government. Importantly, however, the link of deliberation
(or discussion) and representation ‘can be understood only by introducing the intermediary
notion of assembly’ (Manin 1994, 144; emphasis added). How do parliaments, as venues
for deliberation and representation, fit into the theoretical convergence of representation and
deliberation?
Consider a naive thought experiment. Imagine a parliament with elected representatives
who are completely silent. They would not associate with one another in any way. They
would neither discuss legislation, negotiate nor explain where they are coming from with
their reasons and justification, neither to each other nor to the public. They would just be
physically present. Would we say that such a mute parliament would not be representative,
and that those representatives would not represent? It would seem incorrect to say so. But
we could certainly cast some doubt on the legitimacy of the decision-making process if
matters would be dealt merely by counting heads. What this tells us is that while decisions
are ultimately made in legislatures, finalised through means of voting, there is something
additional that deliberation brings in.
From the very beginning of representative government, these concepts have found
shelter in the representative institutions that simultaneously protect and exercise democratic
principles such as political rights and rule of law. As Manin argues (1994; 1997), the link
between representation and deliberation–or discussion, as he calls the latter–puts the
assembly in the limelight, without which the proposed convergence of representation and
deliberation cannot be understood. Tracing the deliberativeness of representation, or
something of a representative deliberation, are valid themes in the literature on the premises
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of representative government, as set forth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by
James Madison, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Walter Bagehot and others.
The novelty of deliberation can be highlighted by studying these ideas of liberalism and
republicanism. In that tradition, republicanism can be regarded as the ‘high-minded sibling’
(Uhr 1998, 40) or the ‘conscience’ (ibid., 36) of modern liberalism. However, for Jürgen
Habermas (1994, 1), the republican view contains the flaw of imposing ‘ethical overload’
on citizens and legislators alike, transforming politics into a ‘hermeneutical process of self-
explication’ (ibid., 4).
So, what are parliaments to do in a system of representative government from the
perspective of democratic theory? The contemporary understanding of parliaments as
legislatures that embody popular sovereignty as the ‘integrating institution of the polity’,
and thus as being capable of law-making, is due to John Locke (Uhr 1998, 48). This liberal
view, according to Habermas (1994, 1), gives rise to the task of ‘programming the
government in the interests of the society’. Secondly, Mill paid special attention to the tasks
of the parliaments and how they bestow representative qualities in representative
government (Uhr 1998, 70).
What is noteworthy for present purposes, however, is that Mill did not appreciate
parliaments for their ability to make laws. On the contrary, he saw them as less than
competent in that role. The value of parliament for Mill was in the formation of a
representative assembly as a ‘community of opinions’. According to Uhr (1998, 72), Mill
consequently ‘remodels and republicanises the responsible government tradition’ while
maintaining that the function of parliament is to see that legislative issues go through ‘trial
by discussion’. Interestingly, the ‘trial’ is not meant in terms of finding out the ‘truth’ (as in
‘government by truth’, along the lines of Carl Schmitt) through deliberation. The reason
why, according to Manin, founders of representative government rarely discussed the exact
nature of what discussion should accomplish, was due to the ‘obviousness of the solution’:
namely, convergence of the wills can only be achieved though deliberation (Manin 1994,
143, 145). Equality of wills, as a profound principle of representative government, mandates
that ‘all participants must win the consent of others through persuasion’ (ibid., 145).
Leaving aside Habermas’ influential discourse theory and the corresponding
proceduralist view that supplements the briefly mentioned liberal and republican view, this
traditional binary setting influences how parliaments can be seen to function and operate.
Uhr, in his analysis of the Australian parliament as a deliberative assembly, endorses a
republican stance and combines ideas of the public voice and the public mind as put forward
by James Madison. These representative functions ascribes representation to ‘operate on
two levels’, as Uhr (1998, 86, 91) argues: on the first level, the public voice ‘ventilates and
provides’ (articulates) through representation, whereas the second level involves a
‘proactive role in re-presenting or reshaping’ (forming) public opinion. Representatives, as
a chosen body of citizens, can avoid ‘irregular passions’ and ‘temporary errors and
delusions’ for sustaining ‘the cool and deliberative sense of community’, to cite Madison
(cf. Manin 1994, 139). Notably, considering recent theoretical scholarship, the Madisonian
and republican understanding of the public mind is not far from the ‘constructivist turn’ and
its take on the concept of representation (to be discussed more fully in chapter 2.1., section
iv). Indeed, Manin (1994, 139) claims that the superiority of the representative system lies
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in the fact that it permits a distance between governmental decision and the popular will.
For the representative assembly, this entails that there is no alternative to deliberation.
However, as Walter Bagehot (1867, 118–120) noted, ruling–that is, the electoral
function–and the expressive functions do not exhaust all accounts of what parliaments do.
Thus, the deliberative flow can also be seen to flow from the legislative body to the
represented. Bagehot recognises the role of teaching and informing in this. However, his
view raises concerns about the elitist and paternalistic tendencies of representative rule:
electorates need to be ‘educated’, since their opinions and preferences may be ill-informed
or biased. In modern societies, however, the ‘teaching function’ that Bagehot saw
legislatures as also carrying out is less plausible (Strøm and Bergman 2011, 16, 22–3). On
the other hand, strategic incentives may overtake the deliberative functions of enlightening
and weighing of arguments, and therefore meddling with the public opinion-making
process. Since legislatures operate through elected legislators, the question of representation
and deliberation should also be posed by always keeping these actors close to the argument.
The roles of legislators, representatives and deliberators as distinctive characters will be
elaborated fully in the upcoming theoretical chapters, and illustrated in the empirical
chapters.
Contemporary parliaments and parliamentary systems are faced with challenges on
many fronts. Pressed in between ‘constituency advocacy’ and ‘government determination’,
parliamentary institutions struggle to find ground in its tasks of reflecting, refining and
enlarging views of the political community (Uhr 1998, 91). The position of legislatures
occupying this middle ground is becoming questionable. When provocatively asking
whether the parliamentary system in general has a future, David Beetham (2011) claims that
legislatures are being by-passed from two different representative fronts. The assembly does
not function as a sounding-board to the sentiments and grievances of the represented.
According to Beetham, targeted surveys and other methods are more viable for mapping
electoral opinions. From the citizens’ side, influencing cabinet policy-making seems more
effective and tangible through single-issue rallies and campaigns (Beetham 2011, 125–6).
David Judge et al. (2018) explicitly turn away from what they call the ‘futurology’ of
parliaments–that is, the attempt to predict what the future may bring for national
parliaments. Among other things, they recognise in the context of Westminster ‘the puzzle
of representation’ that includes the cross-cutting ‘representational forces’ spelled out in
MPs’ capacities to act as delegates and trustees. Perhaps more importantly, the authors
recognise the pressure of collective decision-making entailing legislative scrutiny in the face
of an overwhelming amount of information (Judge, Leston-Bandeira and Thompson 2018,
351–2). Legislatures are subject to ‘epistemic performance’ (Quirk, Bendix and Bächtiger
2018). Legislative matters are weighed and considered through gathering and sorting
relevant information which, in principle, should be reflected in the policies that legislatures
formulate and enact. The epistemic performance of legislatures is dependent on the
committee system. We can also think of committees as ‘creatures of the parent assembly’
(Goodin 2005, 40), and as such they enhance the deliberative capacities of the ‘parent’ when
deliberative tasks have been assigned to them.
It would be nearly impossible to comprehend how a parliament in contemporary
democracies would operate without the division of labour that is bestowed on committees
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(Strøm 1998, 21–22). The centrality of the committees is a defining feature of parliaments
that are labelled as ‘working parliaments’ and not ‘debating parliaments’, something that
applies to the Parliament of Finland as well as to other Nordic parliaments (Raunio and
Wiberg 2014, 16). A working parliament is defined by a committee system that reflects the
structures of policy-related fields in ministries, providing committees with a defined area of
expertise. Consequently, representatives focus their efforts more on the committee work and
the expertise it provides rather than the plenary sessions (ibid.). Secondly, in working
parliaments work is concentrated in the committees and the scrutiny is allotted accordingly.
Such institutional mechanisms support what committees are supposed to do: scrutinise
legislative bills. Where Finnish parliamentary committees lack in ability to set their own
political agenda, as they are bound to handling of the legislative and other official issues
(such as EU-related statements and reports), they gain in ‘drafting authority’ (Mattson and
Strøm 1995, 298–99). Finnish parliamentary committees have the power to modify and re-
write paragraphs of a bill, or propose to reject it entirely. The latter option seems only to be
rather formally available: nowadays in every parliamentary term one or two bills are
withdrawn (implying committee rejection of the government bill).
In summary, without committees the central parliamentary functions of oversight and
scrutiny of legislation would be hindered, as would the task of keeping the cabinet in check.
The sheer number of legislative tasks would be overwhelming. While the variables defining
their autonomy vary from one country to the next (Mickler 2017), it can be said that without
committees, representative democracy could not properly function and the democratic
implications would be severe (Mattson and Strøm 2004, 93–95; on the relevance of the
Finnish committee system see also Anckar 1992, 180–6).
Another issue undermining the deliberative tasks of parliaments relates to political
parties. What committees are to the parliament, political parties are to representative
democracy. Any discussion of representative democracy or representative institutions
would not be satisfactory without acknowledging the existence of political parties. Also, it
is hard to see how modern-day democratic representation could be organised were it not for
parties. While they might be claimed to be ‘on the side of angels’, as Nancy Rosenblum’s
(2008) volume title sympathetically suggests, they also play the role of the villain. Until
relatively recently, if there was a gap in research with democratic theorists studying
legislatures from the deliberative-representative perspective proposed above, similar half-
blind corners are to be found with political parties (Muirhead 2006, 715). When democratic
theorists address real-world politics, the analysis falls short without a sufficiently theoretical
approach to political parties. The present study will not attempt to alleviate this regrettable
situation. In the following, I try to briefly lay out some points that I see as valuable for
stating the argument of this research.
What is the position of political parties in the current theoretical revival of political
representation? And in what way, if any, can they be seen as vehicles for democratic
representation operating through individual representatives? Even though it is true, as
Rehfeld notes (2016, 31), that they insert an additional level, a ‘mediating step’, more
focused research on political parties is needed. The problem of treating them as a separate
issue (Rehfeld 2016, 31) could be eased by resorting to the selection model of representation
(Mansbridge 2009; 2016). Parties assign and enforce ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’
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accountability in the sense that representatives are monitored and disciplined. They also
orient actors towards and sensitise them to other incentives and align causes and themes of
representation supporting intrinsic motivation of representatives (Mansbridge 2016, 18).
If we shift the perspective of parties as enabling and restricting varying operations of
representative actors to their ontological stance in representative democracies, F.R.
Ankersmit’s work (2002) is illuminating. Rather than seeing them as theoretical or practical
nuisance, for Ankersmit the subsistence of political parties is a lifeline for modern
representative democracy. Political parties make claims and, as such, offer re-presentations
to the potential electorates for them to decide whether the rendition is accepted.
Goodin (2008c) also sees, as does Uhr, that ‘party is a requisite for representation’ (Uhr
1998, 83). ‘No-Party-Democracy’ would confine democracy to ‘clientelist politics’. What
parties do, then, is that they can order and translate collective action to a ratio, to a proportion
or a relation. Without such a coherent ratio (often in a form of a party programme), the
democratic determination as in ‘giving the laws to ourselves’ would not be applicable in the
first place (Goodin 2008c, 210, 212–3.) The urgency of this ratio spurs Uhr (1998, 83) to
argue that party is ‘one of the most important devices of deliberation available to the
supporters of deliberative democracy’. Empirical scholars of parliaments note that party
affiliations are informative cues to voters that can work along deliberative lines in
organising and highlighting representative claims and arguments (Strøm and Bergman
2011, 13). Interestingly, if we take a step back in time, Jeremy Bentham and Edmund Burke,
both known for their dislike for factions, defended political parties. Bentham saw them as
capable of invigorating parliamentary deliberation:
The member of the same party ought to possess every facility for concerting
operations and distributing their parts. Without this concert, it is impossible that
the arguments should be presented in the most suitable order and placed in the
most advantageous light… It is necessary for the public good that each party
should plead its cause with all its force (quoted in Uhr 1998, 83).
The originality of political parties lies in the fact that they can pose somewhat consistent
perspectives and inquiries about society. In practice, these are weighted by popular vote in
general elections where political parties and their ideological packages and proposals
compete against each other. From the perspective of representative theory, what they do is
make re-presentations. In doing so they play with the indirectness of representation
(Urbinati 2006) in their claims and offer these to the represented for judgement.
Despite his unique approach to political representation, Ankersmit fails to extend his
argument to the conformist and uniform tendency of logics of party representation (on party
democracy see Manin 1997, 206–18). Here, parties play the role of the villain, and not of
the angel. Extensive discussion of the effects of parties on their representatives holding
office can be found in parliamentary studies. Implications of party representation direct the
operation of representatives through positive and negative sanctioning mechanisms (gaining
positions in the former and being disciplined in the latter case), but they are also said to
displace the parliamentary tension of parliament and the government to that between
government (governing parties) and opposition (Wiberg 2014, 168). Political systems with
coalition governments further the challenges, and extend it to making it difficult to
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distinguish and assess the determination, outlined in the party programs, of enacted policies
(Goodin 2008c, 219). We can say that party influence is pervasive, extending to the central
parliamentary institution of the committee system. Committees exchange their ideal placing
as the agent of the parliament (‘universalist perspective’) to that of the political party
(‘partisan perspective’) (Mattson and Strøm 2004, 93–111).
To be more precise, the operating unit of political parties in the parliamentary context is
parliamentary party groups (PPGs). Their important role in Western parliaments (Heidar
and Koole 2000), including the Finnish Parliament (Wiberg 2000; 2014), makes it difficult
to assess the influence of the committee system, as Mattila argues (2014, 130; see also Arter
2003). PPGs also start taking a leading role in the Finnish parliamentary landscape, which
indicates that they exert pressure on committee work through their MPs, who act as the party
delegates (Raunio and Wiberg 2008, 592). Despite the significance of PPGs, it has been
found that Finnish parliamentary committees are very autonomous (ranking in the top third
of the 30 countries chosen) (Mickler 2017). There is a lack of research on the determination
of the relations between committees and PPGs.
The idea of party democracy and the urgency of PPGs give the impression that PPGs
operate rather cohesively (also through sanctioning). In reality, discussions and cooperative
measures take place outside the formal parliamentary platforms, thus making them difficult
to observe, and therefore ‘they tend to be neglected in political representation research’
(Thomassen and Esaisson 2006, 218–19). This research will fill some of the missing gaps
in the Finnish context, shedding light on the group dynamics within the PPGs, and especially
on conflict resolution (Wiberg 2000, 174). The aim is to explore the claimed decline of the
parliament by gaining a better understanding of what parties do to parliaments in terms of
democratic processes. I also examine the role of PPGs in this (Heidar and Koole 2000a, 5)
and the way parties control committee members (Damgaard 1995).
Adding to the body of knowledge about the workings of MPs and PPGs through a
considerable number of research interviews can illuminate the question of whether there can
be democracy within a party without losing the ability to be accountable. In parliamentary
studies, the theme is treated in terms of party discipline and group cohesion (Heidar and
Koole 2000b). In the extreme case, all members of a party (or, in practice, PPGs), given the
stabilising effect of party representation, are bound to deliberate according to the united
party platform.
Considering the centrality of committee system for the functioning of parliament as a
whole, party cohesion and committee cohesion are at odds: if members are whipped in
committees and obliged in practice to follow a party line determined, or at least formulated
in advance in the PPG, cooperative working between members of the committee will plainly
be threatened, notwithstanding common denominators of expertise, mutual respect and
longevity of service on the committee (Arter 2003, 78).
In the backdrop of the Finnish constitution, Wiberg (2000, 168) sees party discipline as
problematic from a legal point of view. Accordingly, theorists such as Anne Phillips (1995),
Jan Teorell (1999) and, more recently, Fabio Wolkenstein (2016) insist on the warranty of
intra-party deliberation. Depending also on the political system (e.g. consensual, adversary),
or perhaps more crucially on the electoral system (e.g. first-past-the post, proportional),
elected representatives in legislatures strive for these deliberative resources. To seek out
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these resources and make use of the deliberative capacities, representatives appear hesitant
when it comes to engaging in a more explicit and active contestation of the government.
The dynamic of governing party groups and their presumed support for government makes
the Parliament of Finland ‘rather weak or unwilling to use even those control mechanisms’
(Raunio and Wiberg 2008, 595). This tendency is often amplified by large oversized
governments, which is typical in Finland (Raunio and Wiberg 2014, 11).
Party discipline, and the positive sanctioning that is significant to political career-
building within the party, therefore relates to the larger issue of parliament holding the
executive accountable. Making representative institutions more representative through
applications of democratic innovations fail to fix democratic deficits if parliaments have
lost their democratic functions (Beetham 2011, 132).
iii Deliberative and strategic virtues in parliamentary assemblies
As with democratic representation, the idea of deliberation is to be institutionally embedded
in the functions of legislatures. By deliberating, legislatures act as representative
institutions, but more importantly (since institutions lack agency as such), representatives
reflect and foster a vital connection with the represented. The electoral connection by
popular vote is no longer seen as sufficient for the maintenance of this relationship.
Proponents of deliberative democracy argue for a shift from a ‘vote-centric’ to ‘talk-centric’
notion of representative democracy (Chambers 2003, 308). At best, this relationship forms
a dialogical, deliberative relationship between the representative and the represented.
The quality of public deliberation exercised by representatives is generally not held in
very high regard. Parliamentary deliberations are often seen as ‘ritualised performances’
(Bächtiger et al. 2018, 9), lacking many of the standards associated with good deliberation.
Arguably, many debates violate premises regarding respect, mutuality and the willingness
to listen to ‘the other side’. Representatives do not alter their preferences or positions after
engaging with each other. In that sense, they do not surrender themselves to the deliberative
process that would allow reflection, demonstration of mutual respect and yielding to the
force of the better argument. Plenary sessions are venues for ‘political talk’ (Pekonen 2008)
up for strategic purchase, for scoring points and paving the way for electoral success.
Socratic reasons lose out to ‘plebiscitary’ reasons, something that contributes to plebiscitary
rhetorics (Chambers 2004).
When elections approach, parliamentary debates transform even more into venues for
electoral campaigning, thus paying even more lip service to prospective voters. However,
the observation that publicity ensures that what Elster (1998, 111) calls ‘the civilising force
of hypocrisy’ restrains the formulation of the most self-interested aspirations. Further, going
public with an opinion or argument prescribes a path dependency. Consistency constraint
(ibid., 104) entails that failing in the premise of ‘talking the talk, walking the walk’ causes
politicians not only to lose face but also has negative effects in terms of accountability. In
the domain of democratic politics, electoral promises are often associated with the principles
of accountability and responsiveness.
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When seeking to understand legislatures as deliberative assemblies and the actors that
inhabit it, the strands of scholarship take quite different perspectives as their starting point.
The rationalist orientation of comparative scholars capture legislative behaviour exclusively
through institutional framework, with it consequently being seen as a formal structure or
endorsing strategic action. Arguably, it has ‘forestalled constructive engagement between
institutional scholars and classic deliberative democrats’ (Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010,
610; Thompson 2008; see also Sabl 2015). Studying deliberation as a legislative practice
obviously raises the question of pre-formed interests and opinions.
As I will argue, the maturation of deliberative democracy enables it to accommodate
features of democratic politics, which means that opinions may not result from the
deliberative process but are external to it1.  This has led to the very recent claim by Bächtiger
and Parkinson (2019, 82, 132) to repoliticise deliberation. This would entail a retreat from
administrative-oriented safe havens of deliberation, and recognising and using the analytical
toolkit of deliberative theory to also account for competitive political encounters (ibid.,
153). It also means that players enter the ‘deliberative game’ with various motives, hence
implying holding on to self-interested ones–at least to some extent. Generally, lacking the
idea of self-interest would obfuscate deliberative democracy–most deliberative processes in
plural societies would make no sense (Mansbridge 2015, 37). For this reason, the premise
of preference change is exchanged into an understanding of ‘preference structuration’
(Bächtiger et al. 2010, 46), ‘meta-consensus’ (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010) or ‘open-
mindedness’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 22). As noted by empirically-oriented theorists
of deliberation, a ‘weaker’ deliberative programme is needed to conceptualise deliberation
as a continuum and not as a binary opposition of true or false (Bächtiger and Steenbergen
2004, 3; Bächtiger 2005; Bächtiger et al. 2018; J. Mansbridge 2015).
Similar developments in the form of loosening normative desiderata take place in
discussion of political representation. The traditional rationalist orientation towards
representatives’ incentives takes a ‘sanctions model’ of representation as their starting point.
In this model, representatives’ legislative conducts are thought to be erratic, and for that
reason there is call for constant monitoring and surveillance by the represented. Along
liberal lines, representatives seek opportunities to maximise their personal gains and shirk
to attain those goals. Ex ante and ex post sanctions, an emphasis on electoral accountability,
and interest congruency are also part of the vocabulary of the sanctions model. This default
position has totalised the scholarship since the 1970s, narrowing the range of alternative
avenues and research designs to be considered. Referring to the traditionalist reading of
political representation, Mansbridge (2016, 14) has declared that this ‘eclipse’ is coming to
an end. Opening up the discussion to a full range of potential considerations of the
treatments of political representation should readily be embraced, as it would induce
intellectual interchange between empirical and theoretical scholars (see e.g. Bühlmann and
Fivaz 2016). The present research is part of this endeavour.
Furthermore, when it comes to deliberation, rationalist inclination to strategic-partisan
functions by the legislators cannot fully explain ‘why rationally motivated politicians would
be susceptible to deliberative virtues’ (Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010, 611). Viewed from
1 It would be difficult to think of any communicative action that would not entail at least some initial
understanding of basic interests and nurturing of some fundamental self-interest.
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this restrained strategic-partisan perspective, it makes no sense for legislators to commit to
deliberation when the same aims can be achieved regardless. What is needed, according to
Bächtiger, is a readiness to endorse a ‘deliberative approach’ to parliamentary debates. In
that, analysis would not be limited by the strategic incentives of legislators. The context of
legislature ‘may also create spaces for different action logics (including deliberation)’
(Bächtiger 2014, 151; emphasis in the original). This line of argumentation also resonates
methodologically with those proposing an interpretative approach to the study of
parliaments (Geddes and Rhodes 2018; also Bessette 1994). Finally, Bächtiger, Dryzek,
Mansbridge and Warren have argued against the false prevalence of these strategic features
of political speech, which accordingly denies that
actors can and often do influence one another with reasons and arguments, and
fail to identify the ideals embedded in these moments of speech. Indeed, by
flattening speech to its purely expressive and strategic elements, criticism
overlook not only instances in which politics is conducted through deliberation
(and there are many, once we look for them), but also strips democratic politics
of deliberative ideals altogether, leaving us with an impoverished landscape of
political possibility. Nor […] are aspirational deliberative ideals undermined by
the empirical fact that political actors do not instantiate them fully in practice
(Bächtiger et al. 2018, 18; emphasis added).
Regrettably, there are only a few empirical studies of legislatures that aim at
systematically exploring notions of deliberation from the distinct perspective of deliberative
theory (see Bächtiger 2005; Bessette 1994; Pekonen 2011; Uhr 1998). Together with
theoretical formulations such as distributed deliberation (Goodin 2005) or a sequential
approach to deliberation (Bächtiger et al. 2010), and the currently influential systemic
approach to deliberation (Mansbridge et al. 2012), these studies enable new insights into
such empirical inquiry. What is common to these few studies is that they can go after the
presumption that deliberation in legislatures does not only belong to textbooks but exists in
practice. In the following, I briefly lay out that particular yet relatively scarce scholarship
in chronological order. The theoretical implications are to be discussed in the forthcoming
subchapter (2.1.).
The Mild Voice of Reason by Joseph Bessette (1994) remains one of the few studies
that emphatically focuses on deliberation and the deliberative process within a single
legislature. Similarly, as the second such study, John Uhr considers in his volume
Deliberative Democracy in Australia (1998) how a representative government corresponds
to deliberative democracy. As with Bessette’s volume, the body of deliberative scholarship
was significantly thinner, which partly led Uhr to doubt the empirical feasibility of
deliberative democracy at that time. As such, it would be ill-suited to the study of
legislatures. In Uhr’s view, seeing deliberative democracy as a continuation of consensual
democracy, deliberative ideals give a better fit for judiciary institutions (Uhr 1998, 7, 11).
He explores a republican take on liberalism, a ‘Madisonian approach’, and applies it to the
Australian parliamentary system with numerous case studies. The results of the study are
presented in the form of tangible recommendations that would enhance deliberative
capacities (in this case) of the Australian parliament. But as Bächtiger (2005, 15) puts it,
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Uhr retreats to a position that treats parliaments as mere rubber stamps, therefore binding
its deliberative capacities only to reflect public policies, but not to refine them.
Bessette, for his part, builds up a convincing argument on the state of deliberation in the
US Congress by going through legislative material illustrated through selected legislative
cases. He relies on literature on legislative behaviour and suitable autobiographies and other
sources to portray the typical member of Congress. In doing this, Bessette takes his cue from
the ideas of the Founding Fathers of the United States as to how representative rule should
best be organised. He comes to the conclusion that the original emphasis of the framers of
the American constitution on deliberative functions and capacities of governing institutions
have now been eclipsed by ‘powerful and alternative interpretations of legislative and
governmental decision-making’ (Bessette 1994, 56). This relates to the point presented
above about the narrowness of deliberative reading. Bessette and Uhr turn to classical
writers such as Aristoteles and Madison partly due to the normative rigidity of deliberative
scholarship at that time.
Bessette sets out to uncover to what extent strategic practices existed in post-war
Congress. More precisely, he explores whether bargaining and other self-interested
motivation for getting re-elected explain politicians’ incentives for taking on deliberative
behaviour. Most famously, Richard Fenno (1973, see short overview in Bessette 1994, 108–
110), in his work on United States congressional committees, presented a view of members
of Congress who are driven by the prospect of re-election. Their secondary motivation,
according to Fenno, was to seek power and prestige within the legislative institution. As
stated before, the group interest theory perspective reduces politics to forms of bargaining,
but also ushers in a concentration on strategic (de)motivation of engaging in reflective
consideration on legislation. This has come with the cost of limiting the deliberative account
(Bessette 1994, 56–65), thus eventually overshadowing the third incentive Fenno found
with US Congress members. Aiming for good public policy Tendency to frame politics in
similar convenient manner is heightened by the media (see e.g. Gutmann and Thompson
2012; Habermas 2006). A careful reading of legislative portrayals allows Bessette to argue
for representative’s modus operandi that defy these premises, which conflict with
deliberation. For example, he finds the role of bargaining as a pejorative method of decision-
making to be less significant than is commonly assumed. While the narrative concerns the
overall legislative process within American political system and its implications to
deliberation, the ultimate question that Bessette proposes relates to the legislative actors:
can elected politicians confer to ‘lawmaking as a rational effort to do good’ (Bessette 1994,
99)?
Maxwell Cameron (2018) follows the same line of thought, arguing against the one-
sided utility-maximising perspective in politics. Exploration of the role of representatives
as practitioners who are capable of moral virtues in the exercise of practical wisdom,
Aristotelian phronesis, critically highlights the aspects of judgment. It requires from the
practitioner the ability to judge, weigh and balance goods and matters, and align
performance according to the preferred ends. Practical wisdom is about performing any
action well (Cameron 2018, 157). The argument invokes, or reinvokes, the moral side of
human activity, and in the case of politics connects the argument to the overall performance
and dignity of political institutions. If legislatures are stumped to the arena of party
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competition inhibited by ‘hyperpartisan’ representatives, the deliberative capacity, the most
essential role of legislator, is lost (Cameron 2018, 132). However, Cameron is not claiming
that political cause should be given up, but it is a matter of critical balancing acts between
‘fanatical devotion’ and hyperpartisanship, and ‘political indifference’ (ibid., 139). Political
parties play a role in this, which Cameron does not explicitly address. When it comes to
deliberative processes, corresponding partisanship should act as an energising and not
marginalising force (Uhr 1998, 82; see also e.g. Ankersmit 2002; Muirhead 2006;
Rosenblum 2008).
So, what Cameron seems to be asking is–as Mansbridge (2009; 2016) asks when
promoting intrinsically oriented agents–can representatives assume the role of practitioners
of practical wisdom? And, can they resist the most restraining dynamics of party democracy
and electoral politics? Similar questions were posed (and partly answered) by Pekonen
(2011) in his study of deliberation in the Finnish Parliament, focusing mainly on committee
work. Before that, the knowledge of what actually takes place in the committees was limited
in Finnish scholarship. The study concluded that while there are glimpses of deliberation,
especially to mutual respect, the party dynamics is overriding. When it comes to making
decisions, deliberation as persuasive speech, aiming to opinion-change is powerless. But
when one shifts the focus of analysis from decision-making to other processes of committee
work, collegial compromise-building and reciprocity prevail. As such, Pekonen’s study
provides a partial answer to the question of Bessette on the effects of persuasion, which he
believed to be ‘more common than is usually believed’ (Bessette 1994, 54).
Finally, a concise approach to measure the quality of deliberation has been developed
by Jürg Steiner and others (2004). Their Discourse Quality Index (DQI), which draws from
Habermasian discourse ethics, allows a systematic grasp on the components that affect the
quality of deliberation. It has been influential and widely used (e.g. Bächtiger 2005;
Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010; Himmelroos 2017; Roger and Schaal 2013) to measure the
quality of deliberation in various deliberative publics, ranging from mini-publics to different
level of representative assemblies. Also Pekonen’s study, presented above, drew its
understanding of deliberation from the DQI. In the original study by Steiner and others and
closely related studies (Bächtiger 2005; Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010; Bächtiger and
Steenbergen 2004), statistical analyses of an ample amount of legislative records (i.e.
plenary speeches and committee minutes) were conducted to give a refined picture of the
variables affecting deliberation.
Importantly, DQI allows comparative research regardless of the fact that institutional
frameworks differ from country to country, which allows an even more nuanced view of
these institutional implications (consensual vs. adversary democracies, parliamentary vs.
presidential systems). In a revised version of the original study, Bächtiger and Hangartner
(2010) claim that these institutional aspects affecting deliberation should be supplemented
with actor-centred, cultural and issue-specific variables, each with their own pattern of
logics. When measuring the level of respect distinguished by contextual level (coalition vs.
government-opposition setting, veto power, publicity of the arena, consensus vs. adversary
cultures, issue polarisation and timing) and the actor level (partisan dimensions, roles,
gender, age), they find that respectful behaviour is enhanced by coalition arrangements, low
issue polarisation, a longer time frame to next elections, and, not surprisingly, non-publicity
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(Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010, 622–23). These studies point out the conditions that enable
deliberation with different degrees in regard to justifying arguments (from no justification
whatsoever to sophisticated ones) (see also Landwehr and Holzinger 2010). As Bächtiger
foresees, this programme ‘makes the question whether and under which conditions real
world politicians enter argumentative processes extremely relevant for the further
development of deliberative theory’ (Bächtiger 2005, 15; emphasis added).
The general conclusion from studies of DQI is that aspects of deliberation are context-
specific and sensitive. This idea gets even more impetus when it is connected to ideas of
distributed deliberation (Goodin 2005; 2008b). What it means is that understanding
legislatures calls for ‘sequencing deliberative moments’ contrary to seeing deliberation (and
representation, as I argue) as a comprehensive activity extending over different sites
(Bächtiger et al. 2010). Also, as argued earlier, the systemic approach to deliberative
democracy (Mansbridge et al. 2012; see also Mansbridge et al. 2010) proposes and further
advances this kind of differentiated perspective on deliberation, something that
acknowledges the context-specificity. They spell out the general idea that parliaments and
parliamentary actors as non-unitary, hence there is no ‘deliberation of parliament’ as there
is no single ‘representation of parliament’.
Finally, the kind of approach to parliamentary deliberations that this research relates to
is emerging. Recently Andreas Schäfer (2017) proposed a similar analytical framework as
Rinne (2016), which seeks to differentiate the elements at play in parliamentary
deliberations. Schäfer’s model combines the institutional context (conditions), practices of
communication (processes) and functions between integration and contestation. He also
recognises how issue structures, the potential polarisation of issues, affect the kind of
practices of communications (e.g. cooperative or confrontational) are endorsed. The model
looks past the transformative nature of deliberation still present in earlier works of
Landwehr and Holzinger (2010, 376), who argue that ‘contextual parameters determine
different modes of interaction that are more or less favourable for preference changes’.
These new approaches also help refine the causal effects that institutional settings are often
assumed to have on the quality of deliberation (Ercan, Hendriks, and Boswell 2017, 204).
The next section steps back and looks at the discussion so far from a political theory-
sensitive perspective. I introduce the complete argument presented in this study, before
moving on to the literature outlining and framing further the convergence of representation
and deliberation.
iv The task ahead: deliberative representation
This research has two paramount objectives, the first being theoretical and the second being
an application of the proposed theoretical argument. The latter will show how elected
representatives deliberate and represent in a national legislature, in this case the Parliament
of Finland. Theoretically, this research addresses the complex yet joint role of deliberation
and representation–a relationship to be explored in a more rigorous manner. These two
internally complex concepts are usually treated as mutually exclusive, and therefore
discussions take place in isolation and ‘past each other’, as I have argued elsewhere (Rinne
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2016). The other common solution is to see them as profoundly enmeshed. Obviously,
democratic representation is somehow invoked, sustained and legitimised through
deliberation or deliberative process. Both are intrinsically present, but the ‘nuts and bolts’
of this configuration have not been adequately examined.
The elements for an initial roadmap are beginning to be in place (Rinne 2016; Schäfer
2017; Brown 2018). The revival of the concept of political representation in democratic
theory has opened plausible and promising avenues for studying and assessing the features
of contemporary representative democracy. It concerns the representative actors, conditions
for democratic representation and the overall dynamics affecting how political and
democratic representation is perceived and operated.
I take as my point of departure the idea that political representation is a ‘political
function’, and thus a praxis, in two of the following senses. First, as the discussions that
reconcile political representation and representative democracy state, political
representation carves out deliberation (and differentiates it from voting) because it renders
its powers to the activity of judgment (Ankersmit 2002; Urbinati 2006; Näsström 2006;
Disch 2011; 2012; 2019; Saward 2010). The notion of judgment states how ‘ideas are its
form’ and ‘voice its visibility’ (Urbinati 2006, 33). When political representation is cast
through the paradigm of deliberation, it manifests ‘presence through voice’ (ibid.). Second,
the reason for grasping representation as function, from this perspective, it becomes possible
to understand how deliberation can constitute, ‘make’ representation. Crucial to this process
is judgment; democratic participants make judgments and use their discretion to formulate
an understanding on the subject matter. Deliberation linked with representation involves
two different, and opposite kinds of activities: the positive one relates to activating and
proposing, and the negative to receptivity and surveillance (ibid., 5). As briefly discussed
earlier, parliaments as institutions importantly facilitate both of these functions.
The newly introduced paradigm of representation overlaps with the democratic demands
proposed by deliberative theory. Both strands of theory–theory of representation, and
deliberative theory–are currently undergoing thorough re-examinations. Most importantly,
these shifts provide the missing key feature that arms the argument for the dynamic interplay
of representation and deliberation: both strands of theory are moving from a normative to a
contextual approach.
Would we benefit from a conception that explicitly combined deliberation and
representation? What would come out from an understanding that seeks to capture the
interplay of these democratic principles? I propose that deliberative representation assumes
contextuality, performativity, and reflexivity. The benefits of such an understanding of
deliberative representation surpasses the complexity that would follow. I argue that there
are grounds for such a work that would explicitly address such an approach, and perhaps
more importantly, allow more thorough empirical investigation. I follow Bächtiger and
Parkinson (2019, 7, 107) in their view that ‘deliberativeness’ refers to a feature, a ‘timbre’,
a distinctive quality that resonates in various ways in deliberative democracy. Basing on
these assumptions we can begin locating deliberativeness also in political representation, as
well as in representative activities.
However, the idea of deliberative representation is neither new nor non-existent in the
literature. In the discussions that explicitly yet in a fleeting manner mention ‘deliberative
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representation’, selection and action seem to be the primary themes. In the case of selection,
representation is treated through the principle of inclusion. For this reason, the question of
selection forms grounds for arguments of making representation more inclusive. For
Parkinson (2003; 2006), elections form the basis through which accountability can be met.
In representative democracies then, the outcome is projected in legislatures that stand for
‘authorised representation’, as Saward (2008, 1007) defines it. Deliberative systems, in
which legislatures are part of, can nurture and strengthen deliberative representation, as
James Bohman (2012, 74) argues. He makes the important distinction for ‘functional role
of representation’ within deliberative systems. It is crucial how representation ‘makes the
emergence of communicative freedom and communicative power possible through
practices of inclusion’ (ibid.). To highlight the prospect of selection, through the division of
labour assumed by deliberative systems where deliberation takes on different tasks in each
of the parts of the system, there is a consistent need to differentiate between the electoral
and non-electoral conceptions of representation. Deficiencies in the inclusion of
perspectives make all representative settings, electoral or not, vulnerable to hierarchies and
other asymmetries of power. Fortunately, for democratic projects to live up to their
promises, each democratic function is not expected to accomplish everything at once. It may
be that a combination of representation, voting, inclusion and deliberation is needed to
maintain a balanced and legitimate democratic system (Warren 2017).
These discussions on the deliberative systems, to which this research also speaks to,
present the demand to explore the interlinkages between deliberative sites within the system.
As we have seen there are legislatures constituted by the inherently legitimate rule of the
people, and then there are other spheres of representation. Such ‘variability’ according to
Saward makes something like ‘complex representation’ to manifest itself ‘in a variety of
guises and institutional devices’ (Saward 2008, 1004, 1007). Deliberative representation, in
the few sections that mention it (Saward 2008; Parkinson 2003) becomes a question of
claim-making through institutional mechanisms such as democratic innovations.
Consequently, alongside with legislatures, citizen juries and deliberative polls ‘may in
different ways enact ideals of deliberative representation’ (Saward 2008, 1007).
Deliberative representation revolves around the problem of selectiveness, in the inherent
elitism of representative rule (Manin 1997) to which democratic innovations can bring
alleviation.
‘Pluralism of representation’ according to Bohman (2012) necessitates incorporation of
mini-publics and other participatory forms of democracy. The theme of selection then also
taps into the ‘all-affected principle’ that is arguably perhaps less complicated in established
electoral and national-bound democracies than it is in deliberative theory. However, as
Parkinson (2003) demonstrates, it imputes to a context-specificity. The all-affected principle
depends on distinctions about memberships and mechanisms of selection (e.g.
proportionality). What is important to note is that the selection discussed here anticipates
action.
The deliberative angle of representation comes to define the leeway that representatives
have in their activities. When Parkinson (2003) addresses the dual role of representatives,
he touches on the mandate–versus–independence controversy. The activity of representation
is reflected through the notions of trusteeship and delegated representation. When it comes
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to deliberation, the worry seems to be that representatives who endorse trusteeship and
independency lose touch with the represented. Delegates, on the contrary, are perhaps no
better when it comes to engaging in the deliberative process: when executing the will of the
represented they are unwilling to recognise and consider the merits of others’ arguments
and perspectives. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) helpfully anticipate the problematic nature
of the intersubjective positioning in defining the range of activities to which representatives
can subscribe. In ‘discursive representation’ instead of the represented, discourses are the
principle of a representative. Representatives align themselves with those discourses,
thereby assuming the saliency of reflexivity.
Unfortunately, these understandings are not enough. We would need a better grasp of
what deliberative representation could mean. Here it helps going back to the idea of
deliberativeness that distinguishes two features that take a somewhat different angle to the
question of deliberative quality. The first is an additive quality that is argued to be ‘injected’
into various settings like sites and forums from where deliberation is then ‘scaled-up’ ideally
to the systemic level. However, this research follows the other feature, the summative
quality. Deliberative representation, deliberativeness in political representation, is not so
much of ‘an ingredient that goes into a system’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 8). Instead
I argue that, indeed, the deliberative quality in representation appears in and accommodates
itself in dynamic and contingent ways. Therefore it is not so much of a specific ingredient
but a produced potentiality within the sites itself, that can understood in summative terms.
Each situation and location vibrates deliberativeness differently, and this is exactly what
deliberative representation in this research explores. (ibid.)
This crucial objective is embedded in the perspective of action (and agency) that is
articulated in the literature, hinting the prospect of deliberative representation. An important
cue comes again from Saward when he says that representative ‘is less a job title and more
a diffuse, aesthetic potentiality’ (Saward 2008, 1001). This introduces not only the idea of
performativity and context-sensitivity, which resonates with Parkinson (2003, 190) when
he argues that situations are decisive when distinguishing which parties are more relevant
in regard to the all-affected principle. This perspective renders not only the representative
actor and her doings context-sensitive but also the whole notion of political representation.
This idea of contexts bears powerful implications to the union of representation and
deliberation. I propose to examine different contexts of representation and deliberative acts
within them. This will help discern why representatives in varying contexts of
representation resort to different deliberative acts. I do not want to make this argument in
normative terms–although I am aware, as will be discussed, of the normative strands
regarding the preferable deliberative styles and elements that should prevail in deliberation.
Here I will not draw on what has been defined by Schäfer (2017) as the ‘ethical-evaluative’
paradigm of parliamentary deliberation but draw from the ‘contextual-systemic’ approach
(Schäfer 2017), to which I add some additional commentary. In either case, both approaches,
however, do not disprove the general argument to be furthered here; better knowledge is
needed of what drives deliberation (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; 2004; Williams 1998;
Bächtiger 2005; 2014; Parkinson 2006; Mutz 2006; Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010;
Bächtiger et al. 2010; Severs, Celis, and Meier 2014; Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019).
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What is important to note is that when it comes to parliamentary deliberations or any
deliberative performances, there is always an element of interaction involved. From this
perspective, as with the interpretative approach in social science, I am interested in how
representatives, as practitioners, make sense of and give meaning to their doings (Cameron
2018; Geddes and Rhodes 2018). Referring to this with the case of understanding political
compromises, Gutmann and Thompson (2012, 68) argue that ‘the mindsets of leaders are at
least as significant as the more-often-examined mindsets of citizens’.
On these assumptions about the nature of deliberative representation, deliberators or
representatives interact with each other. When we explore representation through the
abovementioned perspectives, and its link to deliberation, we come to realise that in
legislatures representatives also represent to each other. When I argue that representatives
represent to each other I claim that representation is always deliberative profoundly in the
sense that, apart from voting, they need to engage in collective endeavour while pursuing
their own preferred ends. Jürgen Habermas asserts that ‘deliberation and decision-making
take place face to face’ (regardless of the fact that the two-track model of democracy loosens
this desideratum between the public and the legislative bodies) to concern relations between
legislators (Habermas 1996, cf. Goodin 2005, 182). Deliberation can be defined as
‘cooperative game’ (Goodin 2005, 183, 186). It implies a profound ontological dimension
of sharing the same understanding that cannot be taken for granted: ‘it is a massive leap of
faith to suppose that all parties to a conversation-cum-deliberation share the same view of
the ‘purpose’ of the discussion, of “what it is about”’(Goodin 2008b, 190).
What this means in practice is that legislatures host various contexts which, in turn, serve
various purposes and functions of representation. This peculiar interpersonal and interactive
perspective can bring new insight as to how deliberation in parliament is incentivised.
Additionally, the proposed framing can also contribute to a more nuanced perception of
what usually is ascribed to ‘institutional deliberation’. In that representatives’ motives for
deliberation are captured as mainly strategic, but relatively scarce empirical research
suggest that other action logics are also plausible. I would add that in parliamentary setting,
to succeed in representing, other action logics are also necessary, as Richard Fenno has
pointed out (Bessette 1994, 108–110).
We need an overarching perspective that considers deliberation beyond the isolated
speech acts (see also Schäfer 2017). This dynamic puts judgment at the forefront. I tie this
argument into a context-specific and situated understanding of legislative practices which
simultaneously highlight the elements of reflexivity and performativity. Navigating in a
legislature calls for tact and judgment–an activity representatives bestow also upon each
other. It means that while democratic theory put the citizen-represented legitimately centre-
stage, to understand aspects of representative and deliberative conduct in legislatures, the
judgment of representatives be overlooked either.
This formula for deliberative representation can explain not only why ‘different agents
play different deliberative roles’, but why the same agents play different deliberative roles.
Robert Goodin (2005, 188) makes the manifesto of distributed deliberation very clear:
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In a world of delegated deliberation, where different parts of the deliberative
task are divided up and shared among various different agents, appropriate
behaviour within each component part of that distributed deliberation is not
necessarily the same as appropriate behaviour where one body is performing the
whole deliberative task on its own.
It follows from this that different deliberative and representative expectations are found
in different contexts of representation. I will argue that it is important to understand the
variety of motivations connected to acts of representation which are bound by and can be
investigated through what representation is thought to be accomplishing in each context.
The parts, as sites or forums of representation, imputes to a distinguishable function of
representation, to some deliberative practices. I will also include in my contexts of
representation temporal notions, following Goodin’s idea of ‘sequencing deliberative
moments’ included in the idea of distributed deliberation. Following Birch, Goodin singles
out authentic and sincere ‘caucus room’, argumentative ‘parliamentary debate’, competitive
‘election campaign’ and finally respective ‘post-election arguing and bargaining’ (Goodin
2005, 189–193). As seen, parliamentary stages can be seen to entertain different deliberative
action logics.
Recently, Schäfer (2017, 420) has defined these logics, calling them–following
Habermas–the discursive and positional logic. While discursive logic is derived from the
institutional and procedural setting (including normativised conduct like mutual
justification), the positional one is motivated by what Schäfer (ibid.) describes as ‘relations
of representation’. This means that MPs are expected to push their position and judged
accordingly by those represented (ibid. 425). Some others, such as Landwehr and Holzinger
(2010), formulate the dyad of discursiveness and coordinative. Further, Schäfer puts
forward an argument that resonates with what has been argued above: ‘Different
parliamentary arenas and conflict situations are characterized by a specific balance between
both logics, which in turn determines the form deliberation takes, its dynamics, and the
functions it fulfils’ (Schäfer 2017, 420).
To summarise, this research takes up the task of testing the above discussed analytical
plausibility of deliberative representation by using the Parliament of Finland as an
illustrative case.2 As such, it also adds to Schäfer’s proposal for ‘contextualized-systemic’
approach to parliamentary deliberation. However, by doing so, it goes beyond the
‘hypothetical analysis’ (Schäfer 2017, 431) and offers a concise empirical account. Finally,
this research re-states many of the important observations made by Pekonen (2011) in his
study on the meaning of deliberation in the Parliament of Finland (as well as the theme of
expertise in committee work presented in Holli and Saari 2009). However, I give an updated
and extended reading enabled by industrious scholars of deliberative theory, and by
translating these deliberative practices into questions about political representation.
With these ideas in mind, I approach the Finnish legislature in a way that addresses
actor-centred and contextual variables that supplement the institutional setting depicted in
the core DQI literature (Steiner et al. 2004; Bächtiger 2005, Bächtiger and Hangartner
2 A newer theoretical paradigm of democratic representation has been adapted earlier in the Finnish context
by Maija Mattila (2017). She also uses the research context of the Parliament of Finland and the Talvivaara
mining scandal as examples.
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2010). However, what DQI, as an empirical tool, cannot sufficiently address is what other
tasks legislatures facilitate. This study opens up the perspective to such considerations that
draw from other action logics than mostly strategic vantage point of positional or discursive
performance (Landewehr and Holzinger 2010; Rinne 2016; Schäfer 2017). As noted,
institutional structures invite debate and contestation but also constructive and cooperative
elements in democratic politics. Having legislatures as central arenas for settling
disagreements and making political decisions seem to escape from political theorists. To
alleviate the kind of theoretical gap formulations about ‘agreement-seeking solutions’ and
‘deliberative negotiations’ (Warren and Mansbridge 2013; Naurin and Reh 2018) have been
introduced. Importantly, these theoretical insights imply that representative actors as
legislators must overcome disagreements in order to get things done. From this perspective,
discussion thus performs the specific task of producing agreement and consent as Manin
(1987) argues, not to mention compromises.
Informed by the systemic approach of deliberative theory (Mansbridge et al. 2012), I
formulate an idea that there exists within the legislature a similar kind of division of labour
where the parts execute different deliberative tasks. In arguing for deliberative
representation the systemic approach remains focal because a) it allows invocation of
deliberative theory to representative institutions,3 where b) parties and actors are give-or-
take committed to their original opinions and stances. In this setting, actors are expected to
pursue these interests despite committing to the deliberative process. Consequently, they
may be less inclined to consider the arguments proposed by others, thus less open to
persuasion, not to mention preference-change. However, this does not rule out
demonstrating deliberative virtues and other action logics–something that is also enticed by
procedures and legislative norms. Then, c) a systemic view of deliberation invites the idea
of contextuality–something that my research argues to be the interlinking piece in the recent
discussion on political representation and deliberative democracy.
Turning to the concept of representation in the attempt to capture functionally
differentiated ‘reasons’ for the observable deliberative practices helps map the interrelations
between the parliamentary deliberations. We can treat the Parliament of Finland as a specific
‘deliberative ecology’ ‘in which different contexts facilitate some forms of deliberation and
avenues for information’ (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 6). While it would be tempting to see
parliamentary deliberation as one account–something that usually manifests in the public
plenary–in fact the legislature hosts many niches where deliberation and representation take
place. The way I make use of deliberative representation shows that contexts of
representation are interconnected, meaning that deliberative acts can resonate and echo
throughout the representative institution. When we add the argument of representative
interactions, the less isolated and random these accounts become.
3 From a larger perspective, the ‘systemic turn’ allows viewing representative democracies as deliberative
systems where each part (e.g. parliaments, public sphere, political parties, governmental institutions and
associations) has their share within the deliberative process. In addition, the dynamics of deliberation but
also representation, as I claim, can be seen in deliberative systems as non-monolithic: parties make use of
them differently.
33
In conclusion, I argue that analytically deliberative representation can be seen from at
least the following perspectives: Deliberative representation acknowledges the ways
interactions are facilitated in democratic processes, how these myriad manifestations of real
and assumed relationships and corresponding dynamics take place. Deliberative
representation can explore the faculty of deliberation in the forming and articulating
reasoned opinions and perspectives. These functions can take place through reflexive means
but also for various audiences. Both interactions and dealing with opinions and reason-
giving pay attention to the deliberative character of reflection and transformation. Finally,
deliberative representation is sensitive to how these functions may travel from one context
to another. Thus, it is aware of the institutional impetus that may invoke and restrain
deliberative faculties but is not bound by them.
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2 Convergence of political representation and
deliberation
2.1 Context of representation
Representation, as a concept and phenomenon, is highly complex and multidimensional
despite its common usage in everyday language. Although it ‘refuses to be pinned down’
(Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, 12), we continuously seek avenues for getting a better
grip of the concept itself and its implications. Due to this complexity, some (cf. Pitkin 1967,
6–7) have even proposed avoiding the concept altogether in political theory, or preferring
understanding democracy in very minimalist terms (Przeworski 1999). Also, same critics
continue to argue that special caution is advisable when using the concept in a non-political
sense. However, exploring the concept thoroughly requires terminology from other fields.
Indeed, as we will see in this subchapter, the conceptual evolution of representation has re-
introduced features that borrow understanding from judicial fields, aesthetics, theatrical and
theological studies. This process will never be completed which is what defines the
profound understanding of the concept. Therefore, political representation is a
transformative concept. This transformative nature is exactly what makes it also a vehicle
for representative politics and a site of struggle. And finally, the idea of deliberation
becomes possible to read into the narrative of political representation when conceptual re-
arranging is taking place.
Using this prevailing knowledge, I will use my analytical idea of deliberative
representation that assists in detecting and exploring the deliberative faculty in
representation. This exploration framing by my argument for the need to converge political
representation with deliberation calls for reviewing the literature somewhat extensively.
Building towards a ‘contextual-systemic’ understanding of representation (Schäfer 2017),
where deliberative representation is analytically appealing in the focus of this research,
many features in representation are called into question. First, when deliberative
representation states the assumption that representation is an ongoing process that facilitates
and constitutes the actors involved, we must look into ‘who’ the counterparts of
representation are. Implications of the traditional principal–agent –model are vast especially
in empirical political science. However, as I will show through reading the literature, full
reliance of the model undermines the character of judgment that crucially carves out
deliberation. It calls forth an investigation of what, and in more detail, through which
practices the representative and the represented are bound together.
This is the second assumption that deliberative representation articulates: it is informed
by a practical and functional perspective on what representation actually does and can do.
This notion takes us beyond the electoral account that political representation is associated
with in the standard reading of representation. Making this point in a research project that
situates itself in an institutional context of representation sounds curious. On the contrary,
the idea of deliberative representation is a good fit since it concentrates on the elements that
makes up opinions, interests and perspectives. I argue that the context of representation can,
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but it does not have to, take place in e.g. parliaments. The point of departure is in the
respective resources and capacities that contexts offer to practices and activities take their
cue from the act of representation itself and not only from the institutional setting.
Regardless of that, in this process of representation the exercise of judgment is key. I focus
on the preferred features in the conducts of the former, especially through representative
roles, can mitigate the prospect of deliberation. But the idea of deliberative representation
does not spell out (theoretically or otherwise) expectancy of discarding representative
commitments. Instead, it articulates a certain sensitivity to the fact of consideration and
reflection in the act of representation.
i Tracking representatives and keeping them in check
The most common way to approach the idea of representation is to see it as analogous to an
individualistic, person-to-person relationship. Defining such a relationship, which is
‘notoriously difficult to maintain’ (Urbinati and Warren 2008, 389), is a source of confusion.
The gap between the represented and the representatives is what can be seen either as the
weakness or the strength of the concept of political representation (Brito Vieira and
Runciman 2008, xii). For this reason, and due to the ambiguity that causes confusion and
distraction, many strands of political science have been wishing away the complexity or
have warned against opening the door to ‘foreign disciplines’ in the treatment of political
representation (ibid., 4; see also Disch 2012, 601–2). The debate highlights the ultimate
ontological differences between theorists of political representation.
The approach of capturing representation as a two-way relationship is influenced by
Hannah Pitkin, who was the first to comprehensively attempt to capture longstanding
‘theoretical confusions and controversies’ (Pitkin 1967, 2) around political representation.
Pitkin’s The Concept of Representation (1967) remains remarkably current, and it is almost
requisite that it is referred to when the concept of representation is discussed. As will be
observed later, a re-reading of Pitkin’s work is underway which is a testimonial of the
revival in political theory that the concept of representation has undergone in the mid-2000s.
By noting the fluctuating usage of the concept and by taking a ‘language-philosophical
approach’ (Pitkin 1967, 8) to finding relating word-families for representation, Pitkin is able
to trace one distinct and overlapping definition of representation. As she famously defines
it, representation is ‘the making present in some sense of something which nevertheless not
present literally or in fact’ (ibid., 8–9, emphasis in the original). The paradoxical dualism of
simultaneous presence and absence in the concept outlines the intuitive idea that
representation consists of two parts: the present representative and the absent represented.
Assuming the absence of the former the focus tends to fall upon the latter, i.e. who
represents the absent. This approach endorses the view of representation as an interpersonal
relationship that contains assumptions on the nature of that relationship. When discussing
this I assume that the dynamics of group representation are similar to individual
representation. To justify this necessary demarcation, I take it that the discussed and
criticised principal-agent model also applies to group representation. However, when
considering the implications of the representational relationship the ordering especially falls
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upon the agent, regardless of the number of principals. What is at stake is the relative scope
of freedom in action that the agent has. This normative constellation sets up what has been
called as the ‘standard account of political representation’ (Dario Castiglione and Warren
2006, 1; Rehfeld 2006, 3; Urbinati and Warren 2008, 389). It underlines that the distinctive
evaluation and judging of political representation is most commonly defined and validated
by the relationship between the one who is being represented and the one who represents.
Theoretically this relationship is discussed within terms of the principal-agent model which
assigns normative descriptions to both these actors.
The traditional controversy is about whether a representative-agent should act according
to the mandate given, authorised by the principle, or be free to roam as they please. The
mandate can be understood in a more or less binding manner (‘delegated representation’),
also in regard to the extent the representative relies on her own judgment (‘trustee
representation’). Edmund Burke’s (1774) definition of a ‘trustee’ form of representation has
proven to be remarkably enduring: ’Your representative owes you, not his industry, but his
judgment; and he betrays you, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.’
However, if the represented are seen as plain beneficiaries who are not treated as
autonomous subjects but passive objects of governance, the idea of democratic self-rule
dissolves (Dahl 1998). Such themes of elitism, paternalism and self-rule were reflected in
the debates between the Federalist and the anti-Federalists during the American Revolution
(see overview in Pitkin 1967, 190–98). The Founding Fathers had differing opinions on the
subject matter, which then has also come to be known as ‘mandate–independency
controversy’. Since then the treatment of political representation has been dominated by
normative criteria of the relationship between the representative and the represented. Before
picking up criticism regarding the static array that they imply, let us take a look at the ‘nuts
and bolts’ of representation.
Proponents of the ‘formalistic view’, which Pitkin calls the first approach she identifies
in her review of the literature on representation, underline the electoral connection to
representation. She finds two differing strands in this line of thought–the authorisation view
and the accountability view–both of which she finds equally insufficient. In general
comprehension, however, the connection between political representation and electoral
dynamic is intrinsic. Authorisation theorists see representation as transference of authority.
Authorisation describes an occurrence where someone is given the right to act on behalf of
someone else. Importantly, the burden of responsibility lies with the one who gives the right
to act, and where all rights and privileges dwell within the actor. This ensures that ‘a
representative is someone whose actions are not his ‘own’ but ascribed to ‘another’ (Pitkin
1967, 51), similar to the Hobbesian understanding of ‘ownership’ of actions. For example,
the attorney representing her client is not held responsible for her misguided or
unprofessional actions if the court’s ruling is unfavourable. This is because the only thing
that matters is the authority to act in the name of the represented. Consequently, and
somewhat paradoxically, the represented are bound, whereas the representative is free (ibid.,
16–20).
Lacking detail, the conception of authorisation theorists does not permit evaluation and
assessment. In this sense a representative, according to the formalistic view, may deliberate
as she pleases, thus exercising her judgment to the fullest. But there would be no connection
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to representation other than on the account of being authorised to do so. For this reason,
matters such as misrepresentation or ‘representativeness’ are beyond its vocabulary: none
of these instances genuinely exist. If the authorised representative surpasses one’s
authorisation, one does not represent (Pitkin 1967, 48–49). The accountability view tries to
patch up this deficiency (ibid., 55). Its definition turns upside-down the setting regarding
the rights and obligations of the representative. For Pitkin, a representative is ‘held
responsible in order that he may become responsible’ (ibid., 57, emphasis in the original).
Measures capable of invoking accountability and responsibility, the existence of elections,
become highlighted (Urbinati 2006, 30–31). However, ex ante and ex post control
mechanisms still do not sufficiently replenish the void of representation in the formalistic
views. Since ‘nothing follows about any kind of duty, obligation, or role for the
representative’ (Pitkin 1967, 58) the assessment of the performance of a representative is
conceptually missing. As long as the provision of re-calling the representative exists and it
can be exercised accordingly, representation holds ground. There can be no criticism as long
as an irresponsible representative is removed from office when re-election time comes
(ibid., 57, 59).
The attempt to capture representation by either type of formalistic view demarcates from
telling what goes on during the time of authorisation when a right or obligation is being
exercised (ibid., 58). The first, the authorisation view, is focused on how representation
commences (election salience) and the second, the accountability view, on how it ends (re-
election). There is no time in-between authorisation and accountability. Pitkin finds these
inadequate by themselves and discards these views as grasping only a part of what
representation is. Political scientists often see the formalistic mechanism of accountability
as a guiding principle in the treatment of political representation. Arguably, the triumph of
the idea of accountability is centrally puzzling in the paradigm as it draws a causal relation
between accountability and electoral sanctioning. As Mansbridge observes (2009, 384;
revised in 2016), the principal-agent model assumes the importance of sanctions in
appeasement of accountability. She calls this array the ‘sanctions model of representation’.
Likewise, in the standard account of political representation, the stress put on ex post control
mechanism as sanctioning via elections is based on the distrust of the MPs and on the
conviction that they will most likely shirk if an opportunity arises (cf. Mansbridge 2009).
Considering the argument for tracking the deliberative faculty in representation this gives
deliberation a meagre start.
Leaving relatively little room for the idea of deliberation has not only analytical but also
empirical implications. Mansbridge (2009, 371) notes the way political scientists have a
kind of ‘fetishism’ with the sanctions model that focuses on the ‘unruly’ behaviour of
elected representatives and their removal from office. Such orientation can also be seen to
derive from a critical division between empirical and theoretical scholarship that is
underscored also in the treatment of responsiveness criteria (Sabl 2015). Availability and
accessibility to relevant data sets highlights the applicability of theory to empirical inquiry.
Other than that, reaching out to other methodologies or theoretical formulations would
reveal other dynamics than merely sanctioning the agent in the name of accountability
(Mansbridge 2009, 371). On similar grounds, Rehfeld (2009, 219) argues that measuring
delegated representation is less demanding which consequently underestimates the
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complexity and multi-layered nature of representation. Simultaneously, an important
ontological remark is addressed to political scientists who should descriptively question the
relative balance of sanctioning and other motivations (e.g. intrinsic motivations for the
public good) in varying contexts of democratic representation. In addition, contemplation is
needed regarding what this ratio or balance should be (Mansbridge 2009, 371).
Pitkin’s rejection of formalistic views of representation as incomplete, or the concerns
of Mansbridge and Rehfeld about the premise of monitoring and sanctioning, and their
intrinsic connection to elections, importantly point to a feature that is still missing. This is
the temporal feature of representation. By electoral means, authorisation corresponds to the
‘beginning’ of forming the discussed interpersonal representative relationship and
accountability the ‘ending’ of it (Pitkin 1967, 59). It is not only that Pitkin is after filling the
concept with a tangible substance, what is lacking exactly is the perspective on what
happens during representation, when it is in action. I claim that as we move forward in
outlining my argument about the importance of capturing the context of representation we
have now traced on its sub-category, namely, that of the temporal context. When we analyse
representation in almost any form it needs to be kept in mind the way in which it is always
embedded in time. For Urbinati (2006, 6), this meant an unavoidable inclination to transcend
the present. Representation, then, is not only a matter of advancing and shifting perspectives
and of understanding meaning-making during the course of time (as with the Skinnerian
approach), but also of the way in which representation is assessed and judged through a
feature of temporality. This perspective is defended especially in regard to parliamentary
politics, thus granting parliaments various dynamics when it comes to functions (or ideals
according to Palonen 2018) representation, legislation and deliberation (Palonen 2018; see
also 2003).
Temporality can also refer to a tangible sense of existing in time, in a certain moment.
This is, for example, one of the critiques of normative theorists on issue-congruence fostered
by empirical research: notwithstanding their validity claims, data sources of issue-
congruence are only snapshots, and not dynamic, transformative processes (see Bühlmann
and Fivaz 2016). However, the transcending character of representation does not strip away
the impetus to incentivise action. For example, Pitkin (1967, 57) very briefly mentioned
another temporal notion connected with the control mechanisms associated with the
accountability view. The knowledge of being held accountable makes the representative
accountable, thus suggesting an anticipatory feature in representative activities. Mansbridge
(2003) defines this more precisely in her suggestion about critically supplementing the
promissory representation with anticipatory representation.
The anticipatory feature–that representatives ground their operations on anticipating
what the constituencies might want–foresees the upcoming transformation. It revolves
around the standard account where the represented provide the input to democratic politics,
and not the other way around. This paradigm shift raises also new worries about making the
representative turn an elitist project (Näsström 2011), thus obscuring the place and
significance of constituency in it (Disch 2012). To get a fuller picture of these elements, we
will shortly move on to what bridges this temporal and substantive ‘black box’. Until then,
we need to finish the story of who the counterparts of representative and represented are.
Coincidentally, the concept of representation slowly begins to untie and test its normative
39
boundaries, as we move forward towards what is transmitted in the act of representation and
finally arriving at the question of how this is being done. But for now, we will stay with the
interpersonal notion while starting to deconstruct the representative roles.
ii Assuming the role of a representative
If we accept the initial argument that representing refers to something that is a practice, then
we cannot discard formulations that aim at distinguishing the grounds from which those
actions would be derived. The conduct and behaviour of representatives can be viewed
through the literature of representative roles. Although they prescribe a dominant
understanding of political representation that is, insufficiently, articulated through the
principal-agent model, bypassing them altogether would be a mistake. Discussion of
legislators’ roles help in seeing the many normative layers embedded in the representative
roles. What these discussions bring to deliberative representation is that they implicitly
inform us to what extent and on what grounds judgment can be exercised when it comes to
deliberation. In more detail, representative roles assume the ways in which forming,
expressing or even transforming opinions and viewpoints can occur. Further, they also
articulate the functions and tasks representatives are assumed to take on, something that I
find relevant in the light of newer theoretical approaches supporting seeing representation
through practical activities (e.g. Saward 2017, Rehfeld 2018).
Many of these studies of representative roles subscribe to empirically observable or
otherwise precise legislative roles situated in the legislative setting (Oksanen 1972; Fenno
1973; Searing 1994; Strøm 1998; Esaisson 2000; Thomassen and Esaisson 2006; Bengtsson
2014; see overview in Andeweg 2014). The roots of these role studies are in the Anglo-
American context as in the classic study by Eulau et al. (1959). Authors locate different
representative relationships as to whether interviewed Congress members fell inside the
delegate-trustee model. For example Wahlke and others also developed a ‘role orientation
theory’ that specified representational, normative roles among other core roles like
consensual (rules and procedures shaping behaviour) and purposive (career aims and
orientation) roles (Andeweg 2014).
The cornerstone of these representational typologies is in the leeway ascribed to the
understanding of the representative mandate. They also pay attention to the impetus of
political parties and the possible overlapping of multiple principles. What this means is that
if we would want to find clear empirical accounts of ‘delegates’, ‘trustees’ or the
intermediary role of ‘politico’ originating from the study of Eulau and others (1959), they
might not be there4.  Conflicting demands are also grasped in regard to a political party,
adding to a role of ‘loyal partisan’, after Converse and Pierce (see Andeweg and Thomassen
2005, 508). Interestingly, the endorsed party delegate role is strikingly low (9 per cent) with
4 This is pointed out in one of the only role-oriented study conducted in the Finnish context. Oksanen
(1972) notes after analysing research interviews with 191 MPs (out of 200 MPs) in the 1969 legislative session,
the roles of trustees or delegates had not been consciously internalised by the Finnish elected representatives.
This observation was manifested in the results, where two-thirds of the MPs were identified endorsing the role
of ‘politico’. This result, according to Oksanen (ibid., 304), ‘is a natural response to the conflicting demands
made upon legislators’ (on the citizen perspective, see Bengtsson and Wass 2011; Harden and Clark 2016).
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Finnish MPs in comparison with other Nordic countries. The reason for this has been argued
to be in the individual-oriented voting system that differs from neighbouring countries
(Esaisson 2000, 61–62). In the most recent study (Bengtsson 2014), from data collected in
2010, slightly over half of Finnish MPs assumed the trustee role, every fifth party delegate
and every sixth found the ‘style of representation’ defined in the study ‘conflicting’.
On these assumptions, it is reasonable to expect that empirically these roles described
above are less rigid and therefore do not follow such role orientations. There are different
views for what are the motives for roles that go beyond the systemic effects that institutional
context warrants them, and to what extent they relate to motivational factors (Searing 1994)
or constitute behavioural strategies, as proposed by Strøm (1998). To get to the root of these
would require opening the scope of legislative studies to newer methodological and
theoretical approaches, as argued by Geddes and Rhodes (2018). For now, it is worth noting
that formulations in political theory also aim to engage with these discussions about roles.
These perspectives would add more nuance and texture to representing. Incorporation of
typological roles has been turned more profusely into questions on the concept of political
representation, and not only about the empirical applicability. Reaching beyond the
simplistic principal-agent model has led to the distinctive trustee–delegate dichotomy being
recognised as inadequate, if not completely suspect (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005; on the
same point, in the context of PPG leaders, see de Vet and Wauters 2018, 364). Claims have
been made to restrain from its further usage, and even dropping the whole term ‘trustee’
from legislative theory (Mansbridge 2011, 621). Many, such as Mansbridge (2003; 2009;
2011; 2016), Rehfeld (2009; 2011; 2017), Pettit (2009) and Saward (2014, 2019), have
challenged this common dichotomy.
There are a few reasons for this. First, the authors claim that the default of trustee-
delegate puts too much emphasis on the location of authority hence making it outdated also
in globalised and supra-territorial political reality (e.g. Rehfeld 2005; Urbinati and Warren
2008; Saward 2019; see also Teivainen and Trommer 2017). Secondly, as mentioned,
conceptual vagueness makes coherent, empirical analysis obscure. Are we even realistically
expecting to find such roles that the role orientation theory presumes? Moreover, one of the
main objections against outlining the domain of representative activity through the trustee-
delegate controversy is that it lumps together representative criteria that in fact should be
treated separately (see discussion of Mansbridge 2011 and Rehfeld 2011). Of these features
in the deconstruction of the dichotomy Rehfeld (Rehfeld 2009; revised 2017) finds three
distinctions that should be considered independently: source of judgment, aims of
legislation, and responsiveness to sanctions. Regarding the storyline of this research here
we start to see a glimpse of extending the question on representation of grasping it through
an activity–a direction Pitkin can be seen pushing towards. However, Rehfeld’s distinctions
correspond mainly to the activity of the representative. First, aims refer to representative’s
epistemic determination: whether he aspires for the good for all or good of a part. These can
also be depicted with universalist–republican or plural-particularistic perspectives. Second
distinction, source of judgment, relates to whom a representative turns to for making up her
mind on a matter: does she rely on her own discretion or depending on judgment of a third
party? The third aspect consists of responsiveness to sanctions: the degree which
representative is responsive to re-election or other sanctions (Rehfeld 2009, 215).
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Based on the schematic space founded on these three, in his theoretical account Rehfeld
increases the number of representative roles from two (Burkean trustee, pared-down
delegates) to eight (the first two, plus civil servants, Madisonian lawmakers, anti-federalists,
volunteers, ambassadors, and professionals) (Rehfeld 2009, 223–24; 2017, 38). For
example, the Burkean trustee is defined by being less responsive to sanctions, being self-
reliant in judgment, and supporting republican aims (good for the whole). On the other end
of the schematic space, pared-down delegate stands for the total opposite of Burkean trustee.
Each of these eight roles play out simultaneously regardless that they may not appear at all
in empirical inquiry (on this critique, see Mansbridge 2011).
Before I turn to these important formulations that advance the argument presented in
this research, I must continue on the chosen path marked by Pitkin. The idea about
representative roles helps to further differentiate not only the ‘who’ in representation, but
also the ‘what’ in the ‘who’. What are the features that facilitate the interpersonal link
between the representative and the represented? All these perspectives are needed, but none
is enough alone. What theoretically binds the representative and the represented together?
This question critically opens up the horizon that extends over the formalistic view traced
by Pitkin. It made it impossible to make any assertions beyond the act of authority-giving
thus, when turned also to the perspective of deliberation, lacks democratic inclination
towards commitments. However, the dominance of orthodox understanding of
representation through the electoral notion is profoundly set in the heart of contemporary
representative democracy. The ‘central normative problem of representation’ (Rehfeld
2006) assumes, as a premise, about the correspondence of interests and policies. How can
the correspondence of preferences and interests of the people and the output of these
institutions, i.e. laws, be ensured? Notably, the centrality of the normative problem of
representation forcefully affects the design and modus operandi of representative
institutions like national parliaments. Matters such as issue congruency and input-output
legitimacy are discussed under this heading. In sum, preferred correspondence, between
individual wills and the collective will resonate well with the ethos of direct democracy.
This setting corresponds to the similarity in the form of ‘standing for’ view of
representation. It makes a powerful yet contingent claim for a legitimate representative rule.
As we will see shortly, this view prescribes its vital connection to voicing out interests,
another central and contested feature in representation. This assumption has been criticised
forcefully in recent years. At this time, the ‘standing for’ idea advances the formalistic views
by penetrating the black box of authority: we can now ask what makes up representation.
Notably, this shift in focus gives more vitality to the function of the representative who
‘does not act for others; he “stands for” them, by virtue of a correspondence or connection
between them, a resemblance or reflection’ (Pitkin 1967, 61). For some others, like Vieira
and Runciman (2008, 6), this representative idiom can be referred to in pictorial terms.
There, characteristic, qualitative features take centre stage in the form of representation that
Pitkin (1967, 80) calls descriptive representation.
As social beings, we tend to take a liking to people who are in some sense similar to us.
Also, by being prone to empathy, the intuitive reason is perhaps that if someone resembles
ourselves, we tend to assume that they know how it feels to be us. The yearning and
motivation for this popular descriptive notion about the significance of shared experience is
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captured in the common proverb about walking a mile in someone else’s shoes. As William
Hakewell (quoted in Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, 19), a member of the Parliament of
Elisabeth I of England, put it in 1601:
We must lay down the respect of our persons, and put on others, and their
affections for whom we speak: for they speak by us. If the matter which is spoken
toucheth the poor, then think me a poor man. He that speaks, sometimes must be
a Lawyer, sometimes a Painter, sometime a Merchant, sometimes a mean
Artificer.
Notably, this thought intersects with Habermasian discourse ethics and its claim on
‘ideal role-taking’. It also precedes the shifting dynamic with representatives when they
endorse different positions or roles. Deliberative speech, according to Urbinati (2006, 46–
47), consists of faculties of ‘understanding’ and ‘hearing’. They imply to how
representatives use the ethos presented in deliberative representation when forming opinions
and reasoning with others. This theme is crucial in outlining the convergence with political
representation and deliberation. I will take this discussion later when I turn explicitly to
discuss deliberation in the next subchapter. For now, however, highlighting the authenticity
and genuine resemblance or reflection seen as a proof for ‘true’ representation proponents
of descriptive representation take that it is important to mimic the composition of the people
in the representative assembly. This idea of ‘microcosm’ is developed further in
proportional representation where the parliament stands for the exact copy or map of the
sovereign, the people (Pitkin 1967, 60–61). Quoting John Adams, a representative
legislature ‘should be an exact portrait, a miniature, of the people at large, as it should think,
feel, reason and act like them’ (ibid., 60). In addition to this empathetic notion of being able
to relate to someone’s personal experiences ‘genuinely’, the descriptive idea, more
importantly, emphasises the qualitative features as the foundation of representation (such as
gender, social class or ethnicity).
Along the same line of reasoning in descriptive representation, also defined ‘indicative
representation’ (Pettit 2009), political decision-making and its end product–legislation–
would be exactly as it would be if the people themselves would have been deciding it (Pitkin
1967, 84). This perspective is especially relevant when discussing the representation of
underprivileged groups and minorities (Phillips 1995; Williams 1998; Mansbridge 1999b).
From these, as the products of social identities, perhaps age, social class and gender could
be seen the most common reference points in the Finnish context when arguing for ‘better
representation’ from a descriptive viewpoint5.
The descriptive view allows representation to be seen in terms of information. The
sample, microcosm or map standing for portrayals of things to be represented may indeed
provide substantial and accurate information about the people, nation or the constituency.
This is one of the benefits of descriptive representation: to gather and provide information
5 The appeasement of descriptive representation rises also from its ability to transform social meanings.
In the case of democratic politics, having a female president, as Finland has had, can make a decisive
difference, inspiring females and other under-represented groups to rise to other leadership positions. The
second novelty of descriptive representation, according to Mansbridge, is the empirical de facto legitimacy it
produces. Having a descriptive representative can induce a ‘feeling of inclusion’, thus increasing the
legitimacy of the polity (Mansbridge 1999b, 648–51).
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on the nation for the use of the legislature and legitimate political decision-making with.
Importantly, the feature of perspectives and opinions hints the deliberative function of
representative democracy. Unlike the aggregative function, deliberative function highlights
the need to consider the orientation towards and justification of the common good, and to
understand and recognise the value of new insights and perspectives brought to the
legislative process (Mansbridge 1999b, 634). In this research we are not focusing on the
former that relates to the ethical-evaluative paradigm of parliamentary deliberation (Schäfer
2017). Instead, we are more interested in exploring the horizon of how perspectives and
possible insights are voiced and articulated not mainly vertically between the
representatives and their constituencies but horizontally between representatives
themselves.
Now, capturing the function of legislatures as a cross-section of the wills and desires of
the nation through the descriptive strand, or its detailed formulation of proportionality, poses
some significant impediments. With descriptive representation it becomes impossible to
judge the activity or passivity of this rather static ‘activity’ that this kind of concept brings
about. Moreover, it does not leave room for the idea of accountability: how could someone
be held accountable for their characteristics or features? In the words of Iris Marion Young
(cf. Mansbridge 1999, 630, emphasis added): ‘[h]aving such a relation of identity or
similarity with constituents says nothing about what the representative does’. There are no
institutional warrants or other that a descriptive representative would act according to the
embodied information, experience or any such she would somehow entail that constitutes
the kind of representation that is in question here. While it remains unclear how should those
representatives with high education, those with blue eyes, or those belonging to a sexual
minority perform these entailed qualitative features, there are undoubtedly legitimate claims
not to discard the descriptive notion fully. In addition to the creation of social meanings and
producing de facto legitimacy, descriptive idea can be seen relevant in the following way:
instead of accountability deficits it pertains the focus that is turned to the selection of those
representatives. As Mansbridge suggests (1999; 2003; 2009; 2016), the myriad qualitative
criteria provide hints and predictabilities for the electorates at the time of selection.
Discussion about descriptive representation points out that we are in fact capable of
mulling over something like ‘the representativeness of representation’. The concept of
representation implicitly does entail some stipulation and normative criteria on which it is
to be assessed. As seen, these criteria are open, as they are numerous and provisional:
implying that representativeness and representation are not synonymous notions. The
openness and contingent nature of the substance of representation upon which features of
the people or the nation or the represented is to be represented in fact, makes this notion of
representation vulnerable. The contingency of such perspective suggests that there is much
more to representation than the mimetic presentation, a causal relation by the representative
and the represented. Misleadingly, it underestimates the power of intentionality and the
specific role played by the audience. Here we find another lead that supports tracking the
idea of deliberative representation in these discussions. Even though a map may credibly
portray reality, it still requires reading (Pitkin 1967, 71). As Pitkin puts it: ‘what constitutes
a representative example (or sample) depends on what we want to know about the thing it
stands for; it depends on our purposes.’ (ibid., 80, emphasis added).
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All this implies the inherent dynamic within representation that assumes some kind of
interactions (be that virtual or physical). As such, representation carves out a domain for
judgment. Where descriptive representation goes wrong is exactly this intentionality in
depicting something but also in ‘reading’ it. The assumed denotation of descriptive
representative may not be recognised if one is not familiar with the ‘style’ in question. Here,
Pitkin makes an important remark by saying that ‘in politics, too, representation as “standing
for” by resemblance, as being a copy of an original, is always a question of which
characteristics are politically relevant for reproduction’ (Pitkin 1967, 87). In sum, the project
of what counts as relevant distinction in descriptive representation is a political one.
This notion marks a key turning point in tracing deliberative representation and the
contextuality it induces. The same dynamic–that can be viewed to anticipate the upcoming
constructivist turn in representation–is present also in symbolic representation. I want to
briefly mention this addition to the standing for –view of representation. Its relevance is that
the undertone is more subtle and less commanding than the above discussed descriptive
representation. Therefore, it is also valid for representing an inanimate (another feature that
has not been regarded in other forms of representation). In a symbol there is a relationship
between the referent it symbolises that is not built upon symmetry but is more of an arbitrary
nature. Arguably, a symbol that represents itself is not a symbol at all. Symbolic
representation manages to avoid the pitfall of disregarding the interpretative nature
embedded in the concept of representation: as if this reading is not affected by our varying
conscious and unconscious motivation.
The novelty of the ‘symbolisation’ view lies in its expansion of understanding
representation more as a dynamic process between the object and the referent of the signifier
and the signified (in de Saussurean terms). Some symbols are more conventional where
some demand more in-depth knowledge and awareness which tap into cultural and social
elements (Pitkin 1967, 93). Importantly, acknowledgment of the situational elements where
a symbol symbolises and where it does not propose the crucial contextual element of
representation that has not been explicitly addressed. It also gives a hint about the ways in
which representation is a two-way process that is not only about representative authorising,
standing for or even just acting for instead of the represented.
Additionally, symbolic representation re-introduces and exemplifies the built-in
fundamental dualism in the concept of representation where something that is non-visible
in nature is made present in the representation. This notion also led Hobbes, and almost a
hundred years later Rousseau, albeit for different reasons, to perceive and detect the artificial
nature of representation. For both, but with different consequences, representation is a
transformative idea. For Rousseau, as the general will cannot be represented, people remain
in slavery only to rise free on election day (Pitkin 2004, 339). Modern-day proponents of
direct democracy owe their idea to Rousseau, who claimed that it was the only genuine way
of securing self-rule. Neither did Hobbes particularly favour representation in his thesis on
Leviathan6, but he realised its potential for transforming diversity into (a political) unity that
6 The sovereign that went by the name of Leviathan was a construct that legitimately contained and tamed
the state of nature otherwise persisting among array of men. Similarly with political philosophers of the
Enlightenment, the major discovery was that of a contract: people willingly give up something to get
something in return. Contrary to the modern and liberal reading of contract theories, Hobbes’ Leviathan cannot
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is sustainable and durable. By recognising the transformative feature of representation,
Hobbes was surprisingly ahead of time even though his model on representation lacks
qualities that are come to be associated with political representation (see Runciman 2009).
Finally, we can start anticipating representation to turn out to be more fluid and not
necessarily constituted on the static setting of principal-agent model discussed and criticised
in this section.
iii Breaking away from the ‘standard account’ of representation
So far, we have advanced through the discussion on the concept of representation through
the theme of interpersonal relationship of the representative and the represented. The
emphasis in political science literature has been put on the former. This is not to suggest
that the role of the represented–the whole discussion of political equality and political rights
addresses the ongoing struggle on who is ‘entitled’ to representation and in what ways–
would be inferior. To a substantial degree, however, we are interested in the quality, nature
and characteristic of the representative in within the interpersonal relationship. As said,
these notions subscribe to a stipulation that outlines and justifies the boundaries for the
agent’s conducts. When we ask what ties these counterparts together, depicted in the default
of principal-agent model, we find the act of authorisation and reliance on symmetry. The
third aspect is the role of interests in the paradigm of representation. This is the ‘what’ of
representation: what is represented in representation? Descriptive representation inherently
accommodates interests and opinions as to the ‘what’ in the presupposition that descriptive
representatives embody them through the physical features or otherwise they endow. For
Pitkin, what is missing so far from the conceptual picture is the ways in which
representatives are ‘acting for’ for their constituents, not only standing in as assumingly
passive (yet transformative in the interpretative approach would suggest) proxies.
Formalistic and descriptive forms do not provide language for assessing the conscious
incentives and motives for ‘representing’. The terrain for deliberative representation, as an
activity, and not only as an internal reflective measure–regardless it being a crucial one–
begins opening up. However, this calls for re-assessing one of representation’s most
paramount element: interests.
 In the final and complete view of representation is formed when representative’s actions
are orienting advancing the interests of the represented (Pitkin 1967, 114, 209). What guides
the assessment of representation in this particular form is the content of that activity.
Notably, this raises the standard question of representative politics: whose interests are
echoed and advanced in representative politics? I will not spend much time in elaborating
Pitkin’s substantive representation, something that may be surprising for those who take this
be accused–let alone punished–for breach of the contract, for he is at the same time no-one and everyone.
Authorisation theorists such as Hobbes mistakenly find a representative dimension in all relations where
authorisation is being subscribed. They parallel authority with representation (Brito Vieira and Runciman
2008, 24-26, 30; see also Runciman 2009). This view suggests that representation is ultimately about power
(ibid., 29).
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as the crystallisation of what political representation is about. Central features in the acting
for -view was covered earlier by large part with the representational roles. They outline the
central features of substantive representation that spells out how representation is, in
Pitkin’s words, a ‘characteristic activity, defined by certain behavioural norms or certain
things a representative is expected to do’ (Pitkin 1967, 112, emphasis added). The
interpersonal perspective on representation articulates a relationship that is ‘fiduciary’,
‘involving trust and obligation on both sides’ (ibid., 128). As I will soon discuss, Pitkin was
advancing her conceptualisation further in the later part of her book that is significantly less
cited.
 Before we turn to these newer approaches let us recall the criticism about how the
delegate–trustee -dyad comprises of elements or features that should be treated separately.
If we look at this from the perspective of deliberation, the question about to what extent a
representative can operate freely or act merely as a voicebox of the principle becomes
analytically more appealing. The three dimensions about judgment, coercion and aspiration
form a link to deliberative democracy and the role of deliberation in representing. Rehfeld
(2011) does not explicitly spell out the deliberative potential in his reformulation as
Mansbridge (2003) does with her proposed forms of representation (anticipatory,
gyroscopic and surrogacy). In reality it might be difficult to clearly pinpoint ‘whose’
judgment is considered when a matter is reasoned and decided. Presumably it is a mix of
one’s own and a third party’s. However, in a legislative setting it formulates a valid
theoretical argument about the overlapping expectations derived from institutional ‘roles’
as party members and such, as well as from the electorate. Therefore, locating the source of
judgment helpfully extends the criticised mandate–independency -configuration.
Locating further the dynamics within deliberative representation the dimension of
responsiveness to sanctions is equally helpful. On the outset, agents in representative
government are always subject to democratic principle of facing elections where they can
be removed if the electorate so decides. Responsiveness is not applicable from this
perspective, but it is from some others. Keenness to engage in full-fledged deliberation
where opinions and viewpoints get contested and scrutinised can be affected and mitigated
by the logic of party representation. In any modern-day legislatures, representatives are
more or less subject to party discipline. This reality and the context in which representatives
operate might make them more careful and wary when it comes to deliberating. But again,
there must be variations to the extend this affects all representatives equally or if some others
are more ‘responsive’ to these disciplinary measures. The third dimension about the
universality and particularity of interests that representatives aspire for in their deliberation
is not relevant from now. Deliberative intent is a theme that will be addressed more fully in
2.2. For current purposes, it is noteworthy to acknowledge that the role of interest and its
implications in the theory of deliberation as well as in discussions on representation have
been under re-inspection.
 Summarising, we have covered the ground by following Pitkin’s footsteps in her quest
for finding a satisfactory form and substance to how this making-present-in-some-sense
come about. To sum up chronologically, we have discussed four views of representation: 1)
formalistic, where someone is given the ‘authority to act’ in someone’s name or is
accountable through the act of authorisation; 2) symbolic view, representing inanimate
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objects; and 3) descriptive view, where someone ‘stands for’ someone else as per
resemblance or mimetic sameness, and 4) substantive view, where someone ‘acts for’
somebody else in order to advance that somebody’s interests.
 For now, we can posit the frame of political representation through the frame of
‘standard account’: archetypical reading sustained by questions of authorisation,
accountability and looking out for another’s interests (Rehfeld 2006). Also depicted in the
‘sanctions model’ of representation (Mansbridge 2009; 2016), the standard account
emphasises the substantive obligation of the representative to ‘fulfil’ her role as a
representative in the purest sense: being mandated by free and fair elections, seeing to it that
constituency’s preferences are echoed within the representative institution and lastly,
performing consciously in way that potential sanctions may occur as per the principle of
accountability in the next elections where ‘rascals are kicked out’ (e.g. Norris 1999).
Representation is therefore a question of the functioning of representative institutions that
gain legitimacy through electoral means, as well as being responsive to the wants of
electorates.
  We can start seeing a fundamental shift in the paradigm articulated in the selection
model proposed by Mansbridge (2009; 2016). In that the supposition, that deliberation
follows representation, is starting to turn upside-down. In this regard in the selection model
of representation agents have ‘exogenous reasons for doing what the principle wants’,
contributing to a diminished need for constant surveillance. The model puts less emphasis
on the idea on sanctioning and more on features that facilitate the selection of
representatives. It contributes to a particular ‘contingency theory’ of representation that has
selection ‘core’ and sanctions ‘periphery’ (Mansbridge 2011, 622). Building blocks of this
model are found already in the idea of gyroscopic representation (Mansbridge 2003) that
presents one of three new legitimate forms of representation (anticipatory and surrogate) in
addition to the more conventional ‘promissory representation’. These forms are
acknowledged to be sensitive to deliberative encounters and deliberation in general. The
selection idea also takes the deliberative faculty in the constitution seriously, thereby
facilitating relations between the representative and the represented. The gyroscopic
representative is selected to act as a representative on the basis of being valued as a ‘nice
guy’ who simultaneously is in some way competent of acting as a representative.
Selecting ‘good types’ is more profound than ‘sanctioning poor performance’ as Fearon
(1999) also suggests. Competence during selection is evaluated in relation to
representative’s political preferences and goals (even concentration to a single political aim,
e.g. lowering taxes), moral values as well as to sincerity, honesty and societal background
(education, etc.). The blending of these qualitative features gives the gyroscopic
representative7 an ’internal orientation’ (like a ship’s gyroscope) that at the same time
ensures that the representative’s legislative conduct during the term in office is more or less
predictable (Mansbridge 2003, 521). Further, and more importantly, gyroscopic
7 According to Rehfeld, formulation of gyroscopic representation involuntarily merges the distinctions of
source of judgment and responsiveness to sanctions (gyroscope is less responsive to sanctions and relies on
her own judgment and not on the judgment of a third party). On the contrary, we should be aiming at
‘separating the three distinctions and keeping them separate’ (Rehfeld 2009, 221).
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representatives (as the ones in selection models) are prone to deliberative virtues while in
office.
A robust selection model insists on three necessary components. Firstly, there needs to
be a steady supply of self-motivated agents, meaning that there are citizens willing to place
themselves as electoral candidates. While in office this self-motivated spirit taps into the
logic of gyroscopic representation, as put by O’Neil (cf. Mansbridge 2009, 379) that ‘plants
don’t flourish when we pull them out too often to check how their roots are growing’. The
virtue of the selection model therefore benefits both the represented and the representative:
the electorate due to its cost-efficiency in comparison to sanctions model and the MP since
she is left doing what she can do best. ‘Extrinsic motivation drives out intrinsic motivation’,
writes Mansbridge (2016, 15), undermining the novelty of public spirited motivation that
selection model endorses. Therefore, this kind of motivation for the general good is
vulnerable to monitoring since it signals distrust when taking ‘self-interest as the primary
motivation’ of incumbency (ibid., 14). Secondly, shared interests and aligned objects are
necessary for the selection model but neither way to another extreme. The demand for self-
motivated electoral candidates with aligned but flexible objectives inherent in selections
model is higher when interests are vague and unfocused (Mansbridge 2009, 381). To
promote deliberation, principal should ‘tolerate some divergence’ regarding goals and
interests when needing of an agent ‘capable of flexible, adaptive and creative performance,
discretion in negotiation, and dedication to long-run aims’ (Mansbridge 2016, 16, emphasis
added).
Selection and sorting mechanisms are the third necessary component of a fully
functioning selection model. This brings the role of political parties and mass media to the
forefront. As in promissory representation or in the sanctions model in general, voters need
to have the means and the capacity to follow up political decision-making (Mansbridge
2009, 381–2). In this way, information on political decision-making system is mediated
through public media and other methods of personal communication (Habermas 2006;
Mansbridge 2003, 516; 2016, 17). As Manin (1997) notes when discussing the erosion of
party democracy, political communication has been shifted to commercial and non-partisan
channels of communication. This change is eminent in the way the functioning of
representative system is perceived and monitored, but also in ways which representatives
‘re-present themselves’ to the public, inviting contingency in frames through which
representatives are judged. In lieu of the representative’s partisan background, the
significance of her persona is highlighted (Manin 1997, 220). ‘The less a voter knows about
policies, the more rational it is to select on character’, writes Mansbridge (2016, 16). When
opinions and preferences are uncrystallised, cues derived from descriptive representation
may be needed (Mansbridge 1999b, 644).
To supplement the electoral account, political parties bear still a relevant significance in
placing electoral candidates, i.e. selecting and sorting prospective representatives
(Mansbridge 2009, 2016). Parliamentary studies carry an enormous body of literature on
this, to which I will not go into here. On a general level, representation, when mediated
through parties, is thought to be more stable, accountable and predictable since candidates
(as well as elected MPs) carry party labels. This form of representation has been described
as party democracy (Manin 1997). Party democracy also relates then also to indicating a
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personal track record or reputation, something that is also pivotal with gyroscopic
representatives.
Representation is not only a concept describing a static interpersonal relationship which
is specifically tied into normative stipulations. Instead, it is capable of many things: it opens
the door to features of judgment, conflict and interpretation. It has a plural nature that is
dynamic and reflective. To demonstrate this, Rehfeld (2011) insists on not using the term in
the singular but in the plural: concepts of representation. In a similar sense, Brito Vieira and
Runciman (2008, xi, emphasis added) have argued that ‘representation should be
understood as a concept that not only has a variety of different forms, but in all its different
forms is capable of various different emphasis’. Pitkin finds essential, defining features of
representation in all her views, but which cannot alone fulfil the criteria, external or
otherwise, for representing. She concludes that holding the representative mandate obligates
the representative to listen to the will of her constituency and take them into account when
advancing their interests. However, while the ‘representative must act independently’, how
this is done, the actual practice is left to the representative: ‘his action must involve
discretion and judgment’ (Pitkin 1967, 209). But in principle, the conflict between the
actions of the representative and the will of the represented should be avoided, and if this
not possible, the representative is expected to provide a reason and justification for going
against or diverting from those interests (Pitkin 1967, 209–10).
In addition to the principle of accountability, the idea of responsiveness is what comes
to define representation, thus guiding most investigations in political science. The definition
of ‘representing here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive
to them’ (Pitkin 1967, 209, emphasis added) could easily be one of the most paraphrased
caption in political science in addition to another formula, of the making present of
something that is absent (ibid., 81). Despite various perspectives and views contemporary
scholars hold, in a way or another they all come to the question of responsiveness that seems
almost inescapable.
Responsiveness can also be seen as the watershed that divides empirical and theoretical
scholar dealing with political representation. These differences in what is essentially an
ontological question appear throughout the scholarships that study political representation
in a form or another. Andrew Sabl (2015) illuminates this and other differences by critically
arguing the ways in which empirical scholars use democratic theory as a ‘rhetorical place-
holder’. Consequently, resorting to a ‘doctrine of responsiveness’ increases the chances for
random selection bias. Along the same lines, Disch (2012, 602) argues that, as with Pitkin
also, the classic Miller and Stokes study was appropriated ‘reductively’ by missing the point
of the relevance of specific institutional conditions ushering congruence that facilitated
responsiveness. Moreover, ideas of one-sided, ‘perfect’ and immediate, responsiveness of
preferences and the policies is in fact rejected by all democratic theorists. The reason is like
the observation that led Mansbridge (1999, 629) to conclude that descriptive representation
is not ‘popular with normative theorists’. For Urbinati, such a view of representation is
apolitical (Urbinati 2006, 43).
These two points about interests and responsiveness demonstrate the differences in the
understanding explains why discussions between theorists and empiricists turn out to be
problematic. Attempts to bridge these scholarships have so far proved to carve a deeper gap
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between mutual understandings (Bühlmann and Fivaz 2016). On the part of underscoring
the question of responsiveness, as Sabl (2015) argues, is a matter of conceptual treatment,
but also a difference in democratic underpinnings: where empirical research deem inquiries
falsifiable–as Mutz (2006) does with deliberation–democratic theorists resort to preserving
‘democratic hope’. For bridging measures, normative theorists should depart from the
‘realm of faith’ and acknowledge empiricists’ accounts of how democratic systems are able
to perform their tasks. Insisting on inquiring democratic practices through quality instead of
legitimacy would also inhibit the moral superiority of democratic theory acting as the ‘moral
guardians’ of democracy (Sabl 2015, 355–56).
ivThe constructivist turn: from aggregating interest to mobilising people
I have now shown how the functioning and realisation of political representation is more
complicated than the standard account of representation assumes. Bypassing the centrality
of elections as an important manifestation on how representatives are ‘made’, now seen as
a democratic way of transferal of representative mandate, and what representation comes to
stand for, many are now turning to explore other potentialities relating to the dynamics about
how representation is evoked, maintained and transformed.
I formulate the idea of deliberative representation–as a preliminary analytical tool–by
understanding political representation as a praxis that fundamentally resonates with the idea
of selection and choosing. Pitkin embraces this point in the later parts of her book when
arguing that political issues to be addressed, and questions to be tackled, are not closed.
They are open-ended, but not arbitrary (Pitkin 1967, 212). Moreover, if democratic politics
would be like a ‘choice between two foods’ (ibid., 211), offers a scenario where the one of
the choices would displease the principle and the other please the agent. Deliberative
representation, something that to me appears alluded in Pitkin’s understanding, captures
precisely the deliberative nature of representation that goes unnoticed. This is when it is
translated into ‘questions of action, about what should be done’ (ibid., 212, emphasis
added). Political life, succumbed to political representation, ‘is always a combination of
bargaining and compromise where there are irresolute and conflicting commitments, and
common deliberation about public policy, to which facts and rational arguments are
relevant’ (ibid.). Intertwined with arguments of deliberative democracy, political
representation is, therefore, about sorting out and overall exploration of perspectives to be
brought forward and articulated.
The contemporary reading of representation that begins to unfold with Pitkin underlines
the element of representation becoming more sensitive to context. It is also what this
research at hand resorts also to. Context-sensitivity that affects the ways in which political
representation is assumed to function connects to reviving interest in the reappraisal of
Pitkin’s conceptual work. The dominant view is that the ingredient or glue that sustains
political representation is reserved for preferences and interests. Arguably, this is most
evident in decoding representation through the interpersonal, principal-agent model. The
responsiveness principle, initially argued by Pitkin, was not in her intentions, according to
Disch (2012, 600). Reasons for this surface when Pitkin encounters a ‘constituency paradox’
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for which she lacks the necessary conceptual language. The paradox traces the constitutive,
‘entrepreneurial’ character of representation that on one hand takes interests of the
represented as its starting point while simultaneously seeing those interests being
constituted in the act of representation (Disch 2012). What this means is that for the
treatment of deliberative representation, ‘radical’ consideration about the precedence of
‘who’ and ‘what’ in representation becomes questionable.
On the contrary, as already brought up, the ‘bedrock norm’ of representation underlines
interests. This normative presupposition underlines the aggregative nature of interests to be
seen transmitted into political system and legislatures, respective. More importantly, the
bedrock norm takes for granted that interests exist, that they are ‘there’ to be represented.
(Disch 2011, 103).8 This new notion of interests, that empirical research (i.e. public opinion
research) supports, implies that they can be a product of a creative project. Moreover,
interests are malleable. All this makes the preference formation a context-dependent
phenomenon. Seen this way, any efforts to capture representative democracy and political
representation via studying solely preference-congruency is left short-handed (ibid., 101–4;
see also Hayward 2009; Rehfeld 2017; 2018).
Notwithstanding, re-reading Pitkin’s work ensue Disch (2011; 2012; see also 2019) to
state that contemporary ‘radical’, constructivist reading of political representation owes
much more to Pitkin than is credited. Acknowledging the impact of Pitkin’s contribution to
these discussions it is true how little has been paid attention to the final part of the Concept
of Representation. Namely, this is where Pitkin starts unravelling the conceptual framework
by introducing many aspects familiar to representative politics which have been outlined
above. By the end of the book, Pitkin proposes some criteria for unravelling the remaining
questions with representation. Firstly, who is being represented and with what interests?
Secondly, what are the capacities, most often cognitive, of the representative and the
represented? Thirdly and finally, how are the political issues and decision-making situations
portrayed? To the first criteria for assessing representation (i.e. the question on interests)
she notes that the will of the constituency can be very difficult to determine among varied
political issues. This is due to the observation that many remain inactive outside electoral
participation. Additionally, some may not vote at all, and therefore don’t express their ‘will’
or opinions between elections (Pitkin 1967, 210–19).
In the following, I discuss two of the remaining criteria that will lead us to the steps of
constructivist understanding of the concept of representation. The remaining of the
theoretical chapter will discern this topic and introduce some of the most prominent
theoretical applications. The question of the contexts of decision-making is discussed in the
final subsection regarding political representation.
The ambiguity of opinions and interests of the constituency highlights the risks caused
by informational asymmetries between the representative and the represented. Contrary to
the doxa of promissory representation, the anticipatory nature of preferences and interests
calls forth the idea that representatives can modify ‘the stuff that makes up representation’.
Dilemma of democratic competence illustrates the tricky interplay between political
8 Downs approached the question about the existence of the will of the people by stating that if there were no
such will, there would be nothing to represent (Pitkin 1967, 83).
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learning and preference-formation of the people, and the communication of self-interested
elites (Disch 2011, 101).
All in all, people tend to form opinions as well as interests to a great degree as a result
of electoral competition between parties and representatives in this respect. This raises the
worry that the will of the people can be distorted through manipulation and spin-doctoring
(Chambers 2004; Goodin and Saward 2005). These tasks, I claim, can specifically be
viewed through parliamentary deliberations, and as such, something that deliberative
representation should attend to. In addition to feeding off anti-democratic sentiments like
lack of toleration, respect and inclusion, harmful plebiscitary rhetorics (Chambers 2004)
fundamentally undermines their ability to uphold nexus to democratic principles.
Importantly, the ‘entrepreneurial’ character of representation substantiates how the concept
of responsiveness is indeed a ‘false friend’ (Disch 2012, 600) when it comes to tapping into
democratic credentials of representative politics. It seems unclear how representatives
should be responsive for something that does not exist prior to the act of representation.
Alternatively, when the perspective is shifted to the notion of responsibility obligations
become better discernible. ‘Claims and functions that follow from them [...] constitute and
mobilize […] by the “biases” they tap: the identifications they activate, the conflicts they
prioritize, and even the stereotypes they call forth’ (Disch 2012, 608). The democratic
implications are profound considering the ways in which deliberation in the public sphere
facilitates the process of collective reasoning. Consequently, deliberative representation
seen this way does not merely impute constituting identities, non-crystallised viewpoints
and perspectives that can translate into action, but it is essential in the context of keeping
matters off the public agenda. The tendency of such non-articulation can contribute to ‘non-
decision-making’, a term associated with Bachrach and Baratz (Disch 2012, 608). When
political issues are not worded by any actor in the political system they do not become
detected and decided upon.
As said, by the end of her book Pitkin starts wavering in her argument for the forms of
representation. Importantly to this research at hand, she also acknowledges that special
considerations are needed when approaching actual legislative behaviour that contains
‘great complexity and plurality of determinants’ (Pitkin 1967, 220). As Urbinati notes, with
her concept of political representation Pitkin fails at making a sufficient connection to
democracy and democratic politics. This point is something she herself admitted in her later
works. She treated representation analogous to democracy (Pitkin 2004). This gap in
understanding leaves out several questions, such as the question of how political
representation induces political participation through what Pitkin describes as political
activity of political representatives (Urbinati 2006, 10). When representatives are expected
to advance and pursue the good of their principles ‘leads us to expect of or demand features
in representative relationship which are not there and need not be there’ (Pitkin 1967, 221,
emphasis added).9
9 The eloquent statement implies, again, the perpetual theme of degree of freedom of representatives. By re-
reading Hobbes, Runciman (2009) proposes a solution on how to square a circle, i.e. how to dodge stark
choices on the dependence and independence of representatives. “Either democracy abandons the language
of representation and employs other terms to describe the relationship between governments and electorates
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Contrary to the previous conception that representation defines a single action, it should
be seen in a context as embodied in a whole political system. Pitkin continues by arguing
that representation could be seen as an ‘overall structure and functioning of the system, the
patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people’ (Pitkin 1967, 221–2,
emphasis added). This is what Disch (2011, 107) traces from Pitkin’s argumentation, and
therefore goes about defining representation as a ‘mobilization concept’. As such,
representation contains constitutive elements which enable representatives to present as well
re-present societal issues, cleavages and problems to be addressed and deliberated on. Along
the same lines, Dryzek (see Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008) has anticipated the problematic
nature of interests. Instead of interests that oversimplify political representation, deliberative
process can be constituted by discourses and not by ‘people’. By discourses he means ‘a set
of concepts, categories, and ideas that will always feature particular assumptions,
judgments, contentions, dispositions, intentions, and capabilities’ (Dryzek 2010, 31).
Discursive representation induces a sphere where consistent ideas, perspectives and
viewpoints can be communicated and contested.
On these assumptions, interests may not exist prior to representation, prior to
deliberation. For this reason, it makes the bedrock norm of interests unstable. According to
Disch, ‘[Pitkin] effectively redefines democratic representation from an interpersonal
relationship to a systemic process that is anonymous, impersonal, and not seated in intent.’
(Disch 2011, 107). Notably, in representation there is implicitly something more than a mere
aggregation of interest. Instead, it can be regarded as loci for action. As such, it then allows
also an activist reading on representation, grasping the nuances of power and representation
more fully (Disch 2019). As such, it underlines the inherent function of judgment embedded
in the activity of representation. Brito Vieira and Runciman (2008, 67) point out that
interconnecting representation with interests in a manner depicted in principal-agent model
ends up overemphasising the side of interests with the cost of leaving out the presence of
the represented in the action itself (Runciman 2007 illuminates this point by giving an
example of the ‘Not In My Name' anti-war movement). Therefore, Pitkin’s “point is not that
representation invents constituencies–but that it draws them together: it imputes to them a
unity that they discover only through being represented’ (Disch 2011, 107, emphasis
added). It is hard not to hear the echo of Hobbes here. What this tells us is that representation
deems an interpretative nature (Pettit 2009), something that also connects with an argument
in deliberative theory about its incomplete consideration about mass democracy. Here,
Chambers (2009) argues that deliberative democracy should pay more attention to the ways
in which citizens form their opinions and not perceiving these as ‘a wasteland of
nondeliberation’ (Chambers 2009, 333). Keeping this point in mind, we can start
unravelling the ways that deliberative performance and acts, assumed in deliberative
representation, occupies the act of representation. The picture of ‘how’ representation
comes about starts emerging. Representation starts claiming things.
The constructivist turn and the mobilisation feature of representation introduced above
originate to a large extent from Michael Saward’s (2006; 2010) work. For him,
[…] or representation abandons the idea of national collective identity and looks for other outlets for
representation of individuals […].’ (Runciman 2009, 33–4, emphasis added.).
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representation is an activity defined essentially by a dynamic process of representative
claim-making. The general formula of representative claims is defined as the following: “A
maker of representations („M‟) puts forward a subject („S‟) which stands for an object
(„O‟) that is related to a referent10 („R‟) and is offered to an audience („A‟) (Saward 2010,
36, emphasis original). By introducing the now-influential idea of claim-making, Saward
insists on turning back from the ongoing tendency for exploring ontological questions such
as “what representation is’ and turning into asking “what can be done with representation’.
It permits a better look into the “black box’ of representation. It is worth noting how the
current discussions now going on in deliberative democracy have taken on this same
position that sets to understand deliberation through as activity-centred perspective, when
deliberation is ‘in action’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019). To continue, claim-making
eludes the normative trap of capturing representation from an interpersonal viewpoint and
solely from a democratic constellation, since representative claim-making is not bound only
to the electoral notion. Secondly, it expands the act of claim-making into a ‘systemic’ sphere
of re-presentation, contestation and judgment.
Similar performative nature of representation–tracked already with Pitkin–comes up in
the aesthetic theory of Ankersmit (2002) where he argues for a vital ‘aesthetic gap’ between
the representative and the represented. Only under the auspiciousness of this critical
aesthetic distance representations can be created: the emphasis is put on the first syllable of
the word re-presentation. Representation is representing presentation. Along with Pitkin’s
definition, in representation something is made and constructed, not just in a temporal sense
(bringing back to present something which is absent, i.e. the represented) but the essence
lies in understanding something being made again (Disch 2011, 109). The constructivist
turn in disguise of performative act ‘creates’ as well as ‘recruits constituents’ (Disch 2011,
102).11 Mimesis, the aesthetic closeness, does not permit representations to be created nor
evaluated since there is nothing ‘there’ to re-present. For example, a photograph depicts
reality ‘as it is’. In similar vein, descriptive representation as a form of pictorial
understanding of what representation is, or mimesis as Ankersmit would prefer, lacks the
feature rendition. Consequently, since there is nothing to re-present, there is nothing to
assess or make judgments of. And, perhaps more fundamentally, there is nothing to be
accounted for.
Continuing on a philosophical note, when seeing that representative democracy is not a
‘second best’ solution for or a substitute due to the practical impossibility of direct rule, we
are left with a view that ‘perspectives are all there is’ (Näsström 2006, 326).12 Therefore, it
10 The need for a referent in political representation has been questioned by Decreus (2013).
11 Representation understood as a mobilization concept enables us, for example, to capture in a new light the
controversial connotation of Burke’s (1774) famous postulation that parliament is ‘a deliberative assembly
of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole’. From this perspective not that parliament is standing for
an idealist unity and uniformity (however, we cannot wish away Burke’s conservatism and elitism) but by
shifting around the formulation as per constitutive turn, we can claim that through indispensable contestation
and framing provisional unity can be sought or called upon. All representatives, when offering a
representation, assert that there could be some kind of collective reality to be represented.
12 Justification of a representative’s arguments is derived and drawn from the act of representation itself. To
collapse the whole argument to the fullest allows us to come to the point where the standard articulation of
sovereignty and popular rule can be seen misguided. It is that representation precedes the people and not the
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is futile to try to seek unity between the represented and the representative. The same goes
with truth and consensus in that matter. Political world needs to be left ‘broken’, as
Ankersmit insists. On these grounds the vitality of representative democracy relies on this
perspectiveness where representatives are able to re-present via deliberation something: be
they values, preferences, ideas, perspectives, and that those representations are subordinated
to the judgment of the represented (and/or audiences). Representation can be seen as a
proposal, as Samuel Hayat (2019) argues. In the Ankersmitian and Sawardian formula
representation is about judging and assessing this ‘artistic’ interpretation. Accordingly, in
the wake of the representative turn and the associated constitutive conception, some, such
as Severs and others (2014, 619), have referred to representatives as ‘political artists’.
Finally, we can argue that Saward’s formulation of representative claims (maker-object-
referent-audience) fills in the blanks of Ankersmit’s idea, since it specifically amplifies the
elements rendered to judgment.13 Arguably, judgment has been regarded as a neglected
feature of political representation, perhaps most clearly so by Nadia Urbinati (2006) in her
genealogical argument for representative government and the centrality of judgment to it.
Pointing out correctly how the will of the people is non-representable, she urges attention
to the ‘indirectness’ of representation that lays the basis for judgment. Contrary to the will
of the people, judgment can be represented. It is exactly the indirectness that calls for
judgment, in essence, that makes room for deliberation. Additionally, as such, it
differentiates the activity from voting (Urbinati 2006, 16; see also 2014).
Judgment, therefore, calls upon presence through speech, through voice (ibid., 5, 24). It
is a reflective and reflexive process of articulation that has particular objectives rendered to
judgment: ‘for principals to be present in the actions of agents, they have to be present for
someone else […]. As well as principals and agents, representation also requires an audience
of some kind’ (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, 69, emphasis original). In addition, claim-
making in a more concise manner can show how the ontological counterparts of
representation or Ankersmittian re-presentations are simultaneously present in multitudes.
This argument highlights the notion that representation is judged not necessarily by the
represented, but that the audiences may very well be a third party altogether. The vitality
and influence of representative claims rest on whether the audience–whom the claim is
offered to–resonate with the claim in the first place.14
other way around. As David Plotke (1997) puts it: “Representation is democracy’ (emphasis in the original;
see also Näsström 2006, 322).
13 In an earlier publication (Rinne 2016) I argued for treating judgment as a separate analytical unit when
approaching the convergence of political representation and deliberation. In this research, this position has
not changed, but it has been revised in the sense that judgment is now embedded in the discussions outlined
in the theoretical part.
14 However, this ambiguity re-introduces the worries of blatant rhetorical demagoguery (Chambers 2004)
and ‘dog-whistle politics’ (Goodin and Saward 2005). Evidently, these democratic implications of the
‘representative turn’ bring forward troubling notes questioning ‘where representative turn is going’
(Näsström 2011b)– whether, as Pitkin (1967: 221) says, ‘representation in politics is only a fiction, a myth
of forming part of the folklore of our society’, or becoming (yet again) an elitist project leading to a
‘normative dead end’ (Disch 2015). Perhaps the elitist nature of representation depicted well in the dilemma
of democratic competence cannot completely be warded off for many reasons but in the clearest sense as we
refrain from electing our representatives by lot (Manin 1994, 137).
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For the prospect of deliberative representation argued here, it is worth noting how there
is a constant contingent interplay between the maker of a representative claim and the
audience (Saward 2010, 47–8). This, in turn, makes political representation a sequential
process that bear implications also to what representation as a practical phenomenon can be
thought to be aspiring. When representation has this kind of intrinsic orientation that
presumably aspires at succeeding since it would be counterintuitive to build a representative
claim only to be failing and rejected, it spells out the functional character of representation.
This observation, to be continued in the next subsection, is powerful to the central argument
of this research. Namely, it outlines the context-sensitivity of representation as a praxis that
is presented through the theoretical lens of deliberative representation. Representation is
performed through different deliberative practices that are intended and posited towards
different audiences. Hence, assessment of this deriving performance made by the audience
can be demarcated by the function of representation and vice versa.
In practice, parliamentary deliberations occur in various sites where concrete audience
can also refer to other parliamentarians. Considering the contingency of not only who is
judging the performance but also on which element this judgment falls upon in claim-
making is important. For example, assessment can focus upon the ethos (e.g. credibility of
the claim-maker) or logos (reasonability of the argument). But, perhaps most importantly,
as suggested by Rehfeld, the judgment can apply also to the function of representation. To
get to where we want to go, into tracing the deliberative faculty of representation and how
the new conceptualisation of representation make room for it, we need to revisit
representational roles. Their relevance derives not from the respective expectations on the
part of the agent but from the particular consideration and interplay with the surroundings
where they manifest in. The structures that legislators inhabit also suggest some of the
‘special considerations’ that Pitkin (1967, 220) acknowledged in her theorising.
v Performing representing with context-sensitivity
The argument about the epistemic grounds for interest-formation projected in mobilisation
concept, and its corresponding aesthetic, performative and surfacing contextual features beg
for more elaboration. It can help us map the activities and functions that revolve around
representing. Breaking away from the individualist ‘single action’ approach and moving
towards a systemic view where representation comprises of various forms of activities and
dynamic processes opens up a promising inter-related domain. This domain of contexts of
representation can be thought to provide resources for representative activities (such as
deliberation) and arm representatives with various capacities and resources. Consequently,
it also clarifies the motivational aspect of representation that extends beyond the proxy of
sanctions model assuming the goal of election or re-election (Bühlmann and Fivaz 2016;
Mansbridge 2009; 2016). As discussed, the perspectives spelled out by the standard account
of representation and the sanction model narrow the incentives for representation as it
downplays the dynamic and dialogical nature of processes where representation is created,
sustained and challenged: when all representatives are thought to care about it securing their
seat in the next elections.
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To advance the argument about the expansion of the conception of representation,
Pitkin’s ideas about the conditions and circumstances that representatives operate in needs
to be further developed. When this picture about what Pitkin reduces to legislative behaviour
is supplemented with some more recent theoretical orientations about the more profound
substance of representation and re-formulation of representational roles, we can start to
grasp the argument for capturing representation as a practice that takes place in interplay
with contexts. And in this case, we discuss the institutional context of a legislature.
However, I tentatively suggest that the idea of deliberative representation that I am after,
and its interplay with certain functionally ascribed contexts, extends over the legislative
context. This aspiration is in line with the recent re-orientation within parliamentary studies
that has been reigned by traditional institutionalist approaches featuring ‘limited theoretical
and methodological approach to the study of Parliament’ as Geddes and Rhodes (2018, 91)
argue. This research here aspires to bridge political theory with empirical research on
parliament that usually remains outside the reach of political theory.
Political denotations of representation were also acknowledged by Pitkin in what she
calls ‘realities of legislative behaviour’ (Pitkin 1967, 219, emphasis added). Namely, there
is ‘a great complexity and plurality of determinants are at work, any number of which may
enter into a legislative decision’ (ibid., 220). What she finds is that instead of principal,
representative-agents have constituencies, in the plural. Secondly, the institutional setting
where legislators operate in attaches ‘obligations and expectations’ also in correspondence
with traditions and rules of the legislatures. Finally, Pitkin concludes that representatives
have their own ‘views and opinions’ that may take shape in the interactions with other
representatives and other key players (lobbyists, party leaders, etc.) as well as information
that is passed through the legislature.
To someone familiar with the body of literature on parliaments and parliamentary actors,
these insights seem self-evident, but from the perspective of political theory they are not.
Remember, we are after gaining a more nuanced and analytical take on inquiry that
comfortably could sit also to the field of institutionalism or neo-institutionalism in political
science. For deliberative representation, through theoretical outlook, we would need to
retain a certain connection to the idea of substantive representation. In the light of
contemporary constructivist reading, what are representatives doing? Here I find Urbinati’s
argument most helpful. Carefully positing her argument for a political theory of
representation, Urbinati (2006, 50) balances out the constructivist perspective without fully
erasing, as it seems to me, the criticised individual-to-individual rendition of
representational relationship. She builds upon the ideas of representativity and advocacy.
Urbinati helpfully steps into the domain where one cannot dodge from the straightforward
encounter with the normative premises of representation. Similar to parliaments,
representation inherently contains the two features of adhesion (of social differences): re-
produced direct and produced reflected adhesion. Parliaments, for the apolitical perspective
of the former, stand for the aggregative notion where communication is not needed between
the ‘separate enclaves’ (ibid., 49). Adhesion is direct and unmediated, recalling themes of
responsiveness and congruency. On the other hand, parliaments and its actors take part in
the producing of conditions that allow adhesion in the first place. We have reflective
adhesion that Urbinati prefers to define in terms of representativity (ibid., 47–9).
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When taken as a certain kind of activity that inherently occupies functions of judgment
and deliberation (without which there would be no need for advocacy) Urbinati proposes
for understanding representation as an advocacy. As advocates, representatives are
deliberators, and in deliberative speech the main faculties at work are the understanding and
the hearing (Urbinati 2006, 46–7). Urbinati continues:
They express the complex nature of the work of the representative, which should
adhere to her cause but not be driven by it. Advocates believe in their cause but
understand the reasoning of others to the point of being able to reconstruct it in
their minds. They must “feel’ the force of others’ arguments in order to envision
the path toward the best possible outcome (ibid., 47).
Representation as advocacy locates the feature of deliberation necessary in political
representation. As such, it demonstrates that political theory-driven approach to political
representatives is plausible. It also reaches out to Pitkin’s realisation about representatives
having a mind of their own as to the ways in which they are forced to accommodate the
views of others. As we will see in the next subchapter, deliberative theory can deepen our
insight in this regard. However, to advance further into the contextual argument appearing
here in the literature on representation, we must find variables, also structural ones, to the
advocacy representation and thus embrace the political nature of representatives.
Almost as re-visiting the past, theoretical implications of representative roles are
ongoing in political theory. Following the detected trustee and mandate representative roles
in the original work by Eulau and others (1959) a third role of ‘politico’ is now being evoked
in the idea of ‘shape-shifting representation’ (Saward 2014). Proposition springs from the
incapacity of political theory to address the ‘unnerving figure in the shadow’ (Saward 2014,
723). It refers to professional politicians, to what the standard account of representation and
discussed sanctions model assume for a pejorative, self-interested actor whose actions are
directed towards getting re-elected. Importantly, this shape-shifting idea furthers even more
of the arguments of advancing the veracity of political theory engaging with empirical
accounts of representation. The core criticism by Saward against these representative
typologies and corresponding formulations is that it ascribes to consistency, be that in a
moral and practical sense, in legislative behaviour. The appeal of consistency derives from
the notion that breaching from it implies to shirking’ and breaking of electoral promises.
Moreover, it grants MPs the feature of a Machiavellian cunningness of the prince. What we
have to expect, warranted by democratic measures, is that representatives ‘shift’, in good
and in bad (see Dovi 2007).
Detaching from earlier restrictive dyadic dichotomies and developing the notion of
representative roles that makes way for the emerging ideas of variability of representative
domains; contingency and dynamism of representative behaviour and its ‘aesthetic and
cultural character‘ (Saward 2014, 725–6). Saward argues for seeing roles in terms of
‘mobility rather than occupancy’ (ibid., 726, emphasis original). For this reason, he proposes
to displace the concept and abandon the language of roles which are seen consequential the
mixture of po¬litical reality (ibid., 727). Despite the myriad ways of performing ‘a
representative’, role as an activity ascribes to the occupation of a pre-ordained course of
action. In contrast, choosing to talk in terms of positions, these roles ‘become (in principle)
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malleable resources for would-be representatives who position themselves to exploit those
resources’ (Saward 2014, 727, emphasis original). Further elaborating, Saward grants as
‘subject positions that are intersubjective, culturally and discursively constituted stances
that are (differentially) available for adoption for actors’ (ibid., emphasis added). Four
representative positions based on the actor’s willingness to shape-shift and the extent the
structures enable it are then derived: shape-accorder (lacking in both dimensions); shape-
retainer (lacking willingness, structures allowing); shape-confined (will¬ing but confined
structures); and finally shape-shifter (including both dimensions) (ibid., 728).
Argument for representation as advocacy seems unanswerable whether advocates
perform from such advocate position in all situations and contexts. And further, if they
retain, which feature of advocacy would they retain from? Moreover, Saward’s insistence
on positions and not roles, explicitly highlights not only the willingness of the
representatives to alter her ‘roles’, but also the corresponding situation where shape-shifting
takes place. This restates the urgency of interaction between the actor and the context,
consistent also with the claim-making view (Saward 2010). What is noteworthy here is the
potentiality of these shape-shifting stances that relies on intentions15 by the representative
and the structures allowing this conscious activity. This sophisticated notion allows further
explanation to my formula of deliberative representation that aims at analysing the reasons
and ways why same agents play different deliberative roles. Therefore, the analytical
approach enabled by deliberative representation must include the motivation and judgment
by the representative vis-á-vis the contexts (also implying judgment of the audience) in
which the activity takes place. In sum, these notions suggest that political representation is
not a transient but a sequential process where claims, shape-shifting and deliberation are all
constantly judged and assessed16.
Saward’s (2017) idea of performative representation is a clear follow-up on his previous
argumentation on shape-shifting. Briefly outlining earlier scholarly work on the
performative elements of representation, referring to thinkers like Judith Butler and Jacques
Rancière, he claims that the idea of performativity explains ‘range of ways in which actions
[…] produce effects and affects for subjects, audiences and observers’ (Saward 2017, 76,
emphasis added) bundles these previous discussions together. In performative
representation the constitutive character becomes ever more cemented in the understanding
of representation. Importantly, however, without an audience of some kind the activity of
representation, e.g. claim-making as a deliberative practice (Saward does not use this term),
is a void: a performance is not a performance in an empty room. It is a rehearsal. Saward
also confirms a rather long tradition of transcendental and indirectness of political
15 The mobility and fluidity of these positions advances some of the reserva¬tions about the constitutive
and mobilisation notion of representation. When preferences are seen indigenous to political processes,
representative claim-making may take democrati¬cally turn for the worse. Acknowledging people’s agnostic
if not apathetic perception of political participation raises legitimate worries that interests and preferences
could be manipulated and exploited (Chambers 2004; 2009). Granting that the domain of claim-making
establishes plurality, reflexivity, equal access and variability, Saward (2014, 734) asserts that shape-shifting
representation dodges the puzzlement of endogenous or exogenous preferences in regard to democratic
processes.
16 But this, as mark of authorisation, as a signal of acceptance or denouncing perhaps more potentially is
always done in retrospect, as Montanaro (2012, 1101) points out.
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representation by stating ‘the simple fact of the activity of rule–the doing of it–cannot
readily be sustained as a rule without being shown to be done.’ (Saward 2017, 81, emphasis
added).
Performative representation is inherently unstable and unpredictable due to it being tied
to visibility, perceivability and accessibility. Moreover, performances have an inherent
temporal quality, something called ‘set pieces’. Performative representation demands that
cultural and socially comprehensive components produced are readable. This point was
briefly mentioned when we discussed the critiques of descriptive and symbolic
representation17. But Saward uses the concept of performativity to discuss effective
performance: the production of it (what can be produced, and how) as well as corresponding
techniques (ibid., 79) for it. Through roles (and other notions that bear similar theatrical
references like staging, scripting) as techniques, performances can produce effects that are
affective and affirmative (ibid., 83–4).
To what extent can consent or acceptance of representative claims or performances be
validated (or studied)?18  When it comes to empirical inquiries, representative claim-making
has been used as a viable tool that can offer insight into practical democratic politics (e.g.
de Wilde 2013; Severs 2012). Critical tones have mostly been focusing on the constitutive
character of representation but due to the recentness of its latest addition, the performative
representation, scholarly discussion on it is still underway.
Another perspective that relates to the mitigation of diffuse distrust calls for extending
the scope of representative claim-making to institutions. Recently, Judge and Leston-
Bandeira (2018, 154) have acknowledged how claim-making describes the intersubjective
‘first dimension of parliamentary representation’ that implies that the interlocutor is the
representative. Looking beyond this would allow revealing a neglected dimension of ‘what
parliaments “are’’ and ‘what claims are made on their behalf’ (ibid., 155). The kind of
institutional representation of parliament, what authors suggest, offers an interesting scope
of empirical inquiry to representative claim-making. As such, it supplements the
constructivist perspective towards representing institutions and especially detachment from
a more familiar partisan oriented agency.
But all this still fails to answer the question of what defines the substance of
representation as an activity. What is a performance of representation–what is being done?
17 Consider inanimate representation, symbols of rule like insignias and such, as constant reminders of
that rule. The similarity with performative representation (e.g. as claim-making) is that as for symbols there is
no concept of misrepresentation. If a symbol or representative claim-maker, fails to invoke an intended
relationship, it is not a case of misrepresentation but there is simply no case of representation at all.
18 For determining and evaluating good representation in terms of preserving the autonomy of the
represented Dovi (2018) finds also proponents of ‘procedural approach’ like Disch and Saward as well as the
more traditional and discussed ‘interest approach’ insufficient. Where the latter adopts the ‘currency of
interest’ (ibid., 324), the former, when putting emphasis on the openness of process is ‘outcome-blind’, as
Dovi (ibid.) puts it. The ‘autonomy approach’, proposed by the author, argues that good representation, which
as a normative question is beyond the scope of this research at hand, must acknowledge the fact that policy
outcomes may in reality reduce opportunities for those in the most vulnerable position to resist representative
claims. Also, taking the ‘making of’ perspective to politics risks reducing the role of the represented, however
central in consenting and constituting, to spectators and politics to ‘spectator sport’. Consequently, the
democratic polity as an ideally robust site for discursive struggle and debate confine into logics of ‘audience
democracy’ (Manin 1997). It can affect the appeal for the types of representative candidates that hold various
positions in regard to their ‘role morality’ (Hardin 2004).
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And finally, how can we detect and make judgments on activities of representation if there
are no criteria allowing us to do so? We have one more point to make before closing this
subchapter. Under these questions most recently Rehfeld has put a reminder for spelling out
the boundaries for representation, or representing in accordance to his argumentation. Its
significance relies on the fact that he ushers the idea that representing denotes a particular
activity. While doing so, and unlike Pitkin (1967), Rehfeld does not see political
representation as a family of concepts. Rather, he sees it as ‘multiple and very different
concepts that may be related but are not the same kinds of things’ (Rehfeld 2017, 51, also
in 2011). Analytical ‘fuzziness’ or the ‘impressionistic manner’ of treatment of discussed
concepts of representation as in mobilisation (Disch 2011), advocacy (Urbinati 2006),
democracy (Plotke 1997) are all, for him, metaphorical excuses for bypassing the to-the-
point question on what political representation actually is (Rehfeld 2018, 219). For now,
then it seems striking that after all the discussions presented so far, we would be still be
lacking the answer to the basic question that Rehfeld poses: what does it mean to represent?
(ibid., 216). Especially claim-making and shape-shifting fail in this, however convincingly
characterising political behaviour of representatives, but still only circulating around the
question on what representation is (contra to what can be done with it). Conceptual unclarity
that Rehfeld sustained argumentation illuminates is connected to the normative desiderata
that are treated through implications of political representation.
As with others whose ideas have been previously discussed, Rehfeld finds the ‘interest
and responsiveness approach’ to representation to be insufficient for providing the criteria
called for above. Whether some activity is or is not counted as representation fails since it
views the normative standards analogical to the activity itself. Representation becomes
tautological. Instead, he argues for a constructive proposal for representing that emphasises
the exercise, or potential exercise of a particular social power in a specific context (Rehfeld
2018, 213). So, what becomes highlighted is the social power ascribed to the representative.
Using a depiction of ‘representative Tom’ throughout the article, Rehfeld shows that while
the democratic principle of responsiveness provides qualitative criteria for evaluating
representation, he demonstrates that any kind of activity that advances someone else’s
interests cannot count as representing. The formula Rehfeld proposes is intuitively so self-
evident, the examples he provides seem almost naïve.
In the first sense, representing is refers to the activity associated with the exercise of the
specific social power that any individual representative has on account of being a
representative in that context (ibid., 235). Tom the congressman represents his constituency
when voting, but if a man-on-the-street would be pressing that button in the plenary session,
that would not make him a representative. Exercise and possession of social power ascribes
to certain functions which then draw the boundaries for representing. In the second sense, a
derivation of the former, Tom, the representative, is a representative by possessing the
mandate, even while he is sleeping. Yet, him sleeping does not in itself count as an act of
representation. The third sense is that representing is ‘separate act of ‘conveying one thing
for another’ and conducted through language. The reference is validated through acceptance
of the relationship between the signifier and the signified (as in the Statue of Liberty
signifying freedom) (ibid., 217–8).
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What is interesting is the importance of the intentionality of such actions–voting,
deliberating, negotiating–in the exercise of that social power. We can think of how
representatives engage in variety of assessments and judgments with regard to those
activities that can be connected to considerations of principal–agent relations. But they
might not. For example, when we think of representation in legislatures, a lot of activities
are not visible or accessible to the represented who cannot at that instance judge that activity
as a representative performance. Therefore, by default, we should accept that representatives
can advance interests (if any) by engaging in surprising and first and foremost practical
activities. What matters is the particular functional domain which allows the activity and/or
possession of social power to define cases of representation.
This idea falls back to my reading that invokes the idea of seeing representation through
notions of functions as interplay of motivational activity, contexts and audiences. This was
evident in Rehfeld’s earlier work, where function of representation ‘explains what kind of
activity a representative will be engaged in and defines audience by context’ (Rehfeld 2006,
10). It indicates that contexts of representation in fact essentially frame what can be viewed
as varying and contingent activities defining representation, and arm those activities with
resources. They also impose limitations. Consequently we can see how representatives are
object of various obligations and duties that draw from them being representatives. But what
Rehfeld (2018) is able to show is that representing contains the element of function upon
which representation is used in that particular case. This critical perspective that I would
claim to embody something of a functional approach to representation underscores the
faculty of judgment. As Rehfeld (2006, 18, emphasis added) writes: ‘This means that our
judgments about the quality of representation are in fact judgments about the quality of a
particular activity specified by the function given a particular context.’
This is important, as we have arrived at the core of the theoretical argument. We can try
to draw together from these seemingly isolated and rich discussions a few points relevant to
this research at hand. To start off from the most recent, firstly, representation is functionally
differentiated, and functions are connected to the contexts in which it is being used.
Activities that representatives engage in have different representational aims and
aspirations. This idea derives from the systemic approach to deliberative democracy
(Mansbridge et al. 2012) that implies how distribution of deliberative work is at play
(already available Goodin 2005; Bächtiger et al. 2010). The audiences (not as a monolith
but as in plural), referring to their exercise of judgment, are embedded in the contexts. This
is partly related to the connection between the actor who is engaging in a certain
representative activity and the audience to whom that action is directed at.
Secondly, representation puts forward the idea that representation, as an activity, is
motivational (excluding the Rehfeld’s second sense where a representative retains
‘representativity’ also when e.g. sleeping). More specifically with the case of performative
representation, it is motivated in so that it becomes successful and hence reaches the
achievements set for the task of performance. When collapsed on the level of a legislature
it naturally fuses the premise of strategic measures taken by the representatives. Drawing
straight from this point, thirdly, in order to be successful in representing requires contextual
and situational sensitivity on the part of the representative. Pitkin was aware of these
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complexities that political representation summons and puts forward when considering
representative politics (and politics of representation).
As said, Pitkin raises the question of the type of issues and matters representatives are
expected to take on and take care of, to which the institutional framework can provide more
explanation. For such, obligations and expectations of the representatives derive also from
the rules and norms of the legislative institution (Pitkin 1967, 224–5). Finally, still following
the same line of argumentation presented above, when representation is captured through
the idea of deliberative representation, it renders special attention to the function of
association with others for the purpose of affirming and accommodating different
perspectives. Especially to this last point, taking representation as an activity that involves
accommodation of various representative claims, deliberative democracy has provided
commentary that should be addressed.
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2.2 Deliberative acts
The ‘deliberative turn’ (Dryzek 2000, 1) had a major impact on political theory in the late
1990s. It had profound implications not only in shaping democratic theory, but it also
spurred other considerations as well as practical applications. If political representation has,
provocatively, been called ‘a rather dowdy Cinderella topic’ in political science (Tormey
2015, 3), the same could be said of legislatures in the case of deliberative democracy. Their
place in the theoretical paradigm of deliberation remains somewhat ambiguous: in the
search for democratic hopes in mitigating legitimacy deficits, commentators have often
overlooked them. On the other hand, studies discerning the quality and form of
parliamentary deliberations have concentrated on the tangible outputs of parliaments: verbal
speeches. Here, I will try to shed light on the question of the contextual relevance that the
institutional setting assumes but, more importantly, on what the practice of representation
adds to the picture. Considering the hints available in deliberative speech, we need a better
grasp of the nature of understanding and listening in the ‘faculties at work’ (Urbinati 2006,
46–47).
Deliberative democracy can critically supplement this understanding. Notwithstanding
that deliberation prescribes the legitimacy of a vote that eventually finalises the deliberative
process (Goodin 2008a), it is necessary to add elements regarding the process of decision-
making also through the attributes that some values like ‘listening’ and ‘understanding’ refer
to. But they make reconciliation and settling political conflicts and disagreements
meaningful not only through some ideal deliberative virtue but also through mechanisms
deliberative theory is more attuned to discuss. For a definition of deliberative democracy,
we could turn to Dryzek’s (2010a, 3) notion of how democracy is, instead of simply an
aggregation of interests, ‘also about processes of judgment and preference formation and
transformation within informed, respectful and competent dialogue’.
The question on feasibility of deliberative democracy as a normative theory (e.g.
Bohman 1998; Thompson 2008) has been following the discussions on deliberation
basically as long as there has been a particular meaning for such a thing as deliberation (see
also Shapiro 1999; Przeworski 1998). Etymologically, the term refers to a scale (libra) that
captures neatly the idea of weighing (librare), and more specifically, weighing ‘pros and
cons’(Mansbridge 2015, 28). Also, it implies to ‘deliverance’ and ‘bringing to life’,
connotations to a process that aspires to achievement of a decision (Urbinati 2006, 198). Its
particular modern meaning surpassed the usage in American constitutional debates by the
founders (Manin 1994, 143–45). Deliberation was coupled with discussion. As such, it
lacked distinctive normative characters which began to form between 1980’s and 1990’s.
Arguably, one of the first to use the term in its current understanding was Joseph Bessette
in his 1978 PhD dissertation Deliberation in Congress: A Preliminary Investigation, which
was turned to a paper in 1980 and later published as The Mild Voice of Reason (1994). To
Bessette, while taking into account the legislative context of his study, deliberation was
defined in broad terms as ‘reasoning on the merits of public policy’ (Bessette 1994, 74). To
contemporary readers, his usage of the concept may seem too rigid, thus lacking
philosophical underpinnings. However, it should be remembered that the scholarship on this
topic was almost non-existent at that time.
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On these assumptions, when we turn to deliberative democracy it is important to
consider the place of political representation in it. This is especially evident in the recently
discovered systemic approach of deliberative democracy, which subscribes to an
understanding of deliberative systems (Mansbridge et al. 2010; Parkinson and Mansbridge
2012). It postulates a macro-level examination about the role of deliberation on a large scale,
consisting of various different sites where deliberation occurs. Deliberative democracy,
extending now to a large scale, continues to seek after the pertinent question about the
legitimacy of people’s self-rule–a task that calls for exploring the role of deliberation and
political representation more fully. This subchapter takes on the discussion of the previous
chapter by critically adding the deliberative component to political representation. Or,
better, adding the notion of representation to deliberative democracy–a theme much evaded
and bypassed. Also, the question about what deliberation is expected to do–ranging from
e.g. formulations of opinion and preference-formation and change, role of decision-making
and having participants of deliberation informed about and emancipated–is discussed and
revised. The scholarship of deliberation stretches long and far, making room for many
arguments about the contributions of deliberative democracy.
This chapter narrates the story of deliberation, not in straightforwardly chronological
terms but by covering some of the questions that are theoretically relevant when we are
looking to study deliberation in the context of representation. Before we reach the thematic
sub-sections, I find it necessary first to re-state some of the main arguments in the rich body
of literature. It sets the field that deliberative democracy has carved out in political theory.
i The promise of deliberative democracy: Between the real and ideal
By the end of the 1990s, it was declared–perhaps prematurely–that deliberative theory had
‘come of age’ (Bohman 1998). Specifically committed to advocating for deliberative rule
as a ‘stronger democratic ideal’ (ibid., 401), the field of study has even since then evolved
towards a notable ‘working theory’ (Chambers 2003, 307). These ongoing developments
have opened up the theory to a wider scope of enquiry (ibid.) as well as openness to
multitude of research design and methods (Curato et al. 2017, 34, Bächtiger and Parkinson
2019, 75, 138-145). The triumph of deliberative democracy has left a trail of nearly
overwhelming, yet rigorous and nuanced collection of literature. Shifts such as ‘turns’
(Dryzek 2010a), or ‘generations’ (Elstub 2010; Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016) have
been retrospectively distinguished. Arguably, the boundaries of these developments are not
clear or detectable: they should not be regarded as ‘camps’. Notwithstanding that ‘normative
theorist make a living in large part by disagreeing with and criticizing each other’ (Curato
et al. 2017, 28) the general perception should capture them more as a flow of overlapping
discussions, rather than adversarial ones.
As said, deliberative theorists disagree, or perhaps more accurately have different
perspectives and approaches to deliberation. Steiner (2012, 9–11) identifies at least seven
‘disagreements’ regarding the concept. First there remain differing perspectives to who
should be included in deliberation? The prevalent answer is the citizens, but the question is
to what extent should they be involved? Is providing a fair opportunity enough or should we
66
aim at a more idealistic inclusion of all, as per the all-affected principle (see Näsström
2011a)? Second and third disagreements spring from the comparison to real-world
conditions that may not offer room for genuinely deliberative politics: what counts as
deliberation? Only rational, argumentative modes of deliberation delivered from neutral
(dis)position or can deliberation accommodate other forms of communication? Can
deliberation be partial in the sense that the participants carry ulterior motives to public
interest like self and group interests? Fourth, in proving arguments, where to draw the line
to what qualitative feature in relation to coercion and power? Fifth disagreement relates to
the assumption of a ‘basic core of rationality’ (Steiner 2012, 10) supporting the prospect of
deliberation ending with consensus. Notwithstanding irreconcilable values or interests, is it
also unrealistic under pragmatic constraints to expect deliberation to reach a consensual
agreement? Sixth, should all deliberation be public, or can some deliberations be shielded
from the public glare to allow some delicate perspectives to be induced, and have
participants persuaded? And finally, bridging to the disagreement over positional standing
of deliberative actors: how genuine and truthful should the motives for deliberation be?
Let us try briefly to respond to these disagreements. If retaining the argument on the
‘indirectness of representation’, that representation creates as well as mobilises the
represented, then the inclusion as well as participation of citizens is less clear. To some
extent, we cannot engage in Steiner’s first observation, but retreat here to the myriad
dynamics of claim-making that takes place in the representative institution. Claim-making
generates communicative transmissions between the institution and the public. The second
and third disagreements ring more bells. Empirical inquiry into legislatures attenuates the
deliberative requirements, especially since most inquiries concentrate on the public
deliberations, i.e. plenary debates. Legislatures also include other functions than the
democratic one which seeks for the inclusion of arguments and policies. When doing this,
legislatures fail on deliberative standards. As such, legislatures are sites of power where
subtleness regarding coercion is negotiated. In democratic politics, the institutionalised way
to settle disagreements cannot be aligned with the ideal of consensus. Relating to the former,
the way legislatures are currently set up, striving for a partial and provisional resolution
entails venues where deliberations are not public.
Studies that endorse deliberative approach informed by deliberative theory are often
forum-focused, either on a small or large scale (Pateman 2012 makes this point welll). What
we are discussing in this research, what we evidently have here is a forum-bound one.
Following Bessette (1994), Bächtiger (2005), Pekonen (2011) and Steiner et al. (2004), I
claim that to perceive configuration of deliberation and legitimacy of representation also
within an orthodox institutional context, such as parliamentary assemblies, should not be
completely overshadowed by these other possible contexts. Retreating into mini-publics in
the search for robust justification and reflection undermines the potentiality of legislatures
to provide a place for such deliberative virtues. Often forgotten by theorists is the notion
that legislatures establish also other functions than the ones empirical research seeks to
understand. Although it may hold true that parliaments may indeed suffer from ‘reflection
deficit’ (Dryzek 2017, 613), however, committing fully to this observation can undermine
other effects and elements embedded in deliberative practices of legislatures. Better
understanding of internal functions and the way deliberation is sequenced within the
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legislature can illuminate the considerations given to these reflections. This aspiration also
touches, if not pertaining disagreements, but remaining hesitations and unsettled positions
about features that political deliberation induce to the deliberative process.
Furthermore, more understanding is needed of the part of the political actors, of the
representatives, what are the drivers for deliberation for them. This inquiry, to which I want
to contribute with this research, is not available through legislative debates even though it
provides meaningful insight to the ways in which representatives formulate justifications
and portray reciprocal attitudes. When the impetus of institutional and procedural features
on the quality of deliberation (e.g. Steiner et al. 2004; Bächtiger 2005; Bächtiger and
Hangartner 2010) are considered, it tends to be concentrated on the formal structures of
representation but leaves open many of the questions about representation as a practice.
When thinking of MPs not only as representatives but as practitioners and deliberators, the
interpretative connection of representation and deliberation to the legislative institution is
made. For this reason, it is also important to consider institutions that enable practitioners
to ‘understand and value the goals and aims that are intrinsic to the institution’ (Cameron
2018, 3).
And finally, even though this research focuses on elected, formal representatives,
members of parliament, I claim that the suggested analytical idea of deliberative
representation is applicable also to deliberations in other forums and sites that carry notions
of representation too. Outside the nation-state sphere with democratically elected
representatives in modern polities there exist actors whose mandate or authority to claims
for representation vary–ranging from the rock musician Bono to supranational organisations
(e.g. Parkinson 2006; Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008; Saward 2010; Montanaro 2012; Kuyper
2016). Arguably, this refutes the appreciation of deliberation to the surroundings of
representation, and in that it affirms how representation and deliberation has complex yet
joint affiliation. Isolating and treating these strands of theory apart is where a wide variety
of actors ascribe to deliberation and representation in their own way while forming myriad
associations with others. The act of deliberation makes representation visible but also
enforces participants of deliberation to address and recognise subjects and issues involved.
As is well known, the story of deliberative theory usually begins with thinkers like John
Rawls and Jürgen Habermas who in their work were both induced into developing a distinct
model, a complete system to tackle such universally underscoring democratic questions as
justice, rights, and aspirations for common good. These theorists are regarded as ‘the first
generation’ of deliberative democrats (Elstub 2010; also Bächtiger et al. 2018, 3–4) since
they laid the normative foundations to the aim and scope of deliberation which was to be
seen through norms of reasoned and impartial argumentation, that of ‘forceless force of the
better argument’ (Flynn 2004, 436). Providing that necessary conditions and procedures for
deliberation were in place, and were essentially public in nature, communicative rationality
could be produced. This procedure of public deliberation on the common good argued
through universal reasons entail equal treatment of all on reasons everyone can accept,
referring to what some scholars have been defined as ‘type I’ deliberation (Bächtiger et al.
2010). The first generation of deliberative theory underscored the aspirational feature of
deliberative democracy when aiming for consensus and unanimity were heightened through
the process of reasoning. This process ensured the legitimacy of the outcome in which
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everyone has had equal opportunity to take part. The public sphere is to remain ‘wild’ (to
use Habermas’ terminology), but it also functions in a way that Chambers (2017, 270)
describe as ‘laundering’: public sphere revises and refines arguments and reasoning to be
put under public discussion again.
Deemed too idealistic, ‘the second generation’, such as James Bohman (1998), Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996), recognised the challenges that deliberative theory
faces when it turns into practical world of contemporary plural and globalised societies
where contexts of deliberation are far more complex and intertwined. The second generation
maintained the undeniable thrust on advocating citizen perspective as in the form of ‘middle
democracy’ in the face of sources of ‘moral disagreements’: self-interest, scarcity, limited
generosity, incompatible values and incomplete understanding (Gutmann and Thompson
1996, 16–26). According to Gutmann and Thompson (ibid., 41–44) deliberative democracy
offer solutions to these disagreements by, for example, promoting mutual respect via
‘economy of moral disagreement’, as in finding the smallest common denominator that
participants can agree on, despite remaining incompatible values. Deliberative democracy
also help in clarifying the nature of the conflict while detecting and identifying self-
interested claims from public-spirited ones, and by involving spheres promoting these
public-oriented claims.
Deliberative democracy offers a compelling account on refusal of aggregative models
of democracy and social choice theory. It originates its reasoning for collective action by
holding on to ‘its promise to go beyond the limits of liberalism and to recapture the stronger
democratic ideal that government should embody the will of the people formed through the
public reasoning of citizens’ (Bohman 1998, 401). Its novelty lies in its ability to deal with
conflicting moral disagreements uncovered by ‘first-order theories’ (like theories of justice)
and in that ‘make room for continuing moral conflicts that first-order theories purport to
eliminate them’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 13). Amongst its great many definitions,
deliberative democracy has been defined as ‘any one of a family of views according to
which the public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political
decision making and self-government’ (ibid.).
Regardless of the formidable reach of the second generation of deliberative theories,
according to critics ‘they offered little substantive detail in terms of the types of institutions
required to ensure that deliberative democracy could be actualised’ (Elstub 2010, 291–92;
see also Macedo 1999b). This gave rise to a set of third-generation projects, containing
references to ‘realness’, to underline the perspective shift towards institutionalised
deliberation. Can deliberative democracy, and if so, to what extent, purchase its claims and
principles when brought down from theory to practice? For example, John Parkinson’s
Deliberating in the Real World (2006) depicts a case study on national health care plan in
UK, focusing on the legitimacy of deliberative process involving various (representative
and non-representative) actors, including citizens’ panels and other forms of democratic
innovations. For Dryzek (2010) these advancements mark ‘the ‘institutional turn’ since it
emphasised the study on particular forums of deliberation in a way that connects citizen
participation into political decision-making. As mentioned, a few studies focused on
institutions such as parliaments (Bessette 1994; Uhr 1998).
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Various forms of participatory mechanisms are presented in democratic innovations
such as ‘mini-publics’ and citizen’s assemblies, juries and panels (see extensive overview
in Grönlund, Bächtiger, and Setälä 2014; also Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Warren and Pearse
2008). These innovations have often a rather clear objective and defined motivation of the
deliberative tasks such as advocating, discussing, proposing and deciding on an issue.
Pateman (2012) defends the distinctiveness of participatory democracy (by discussing the
famous case of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre) from deliberative democracy
claiming that only the former can operate as a genuine tool for democratisation while the
latter is inherently bound onto specific forums.
The institutional turn bleeds into the ‘practical’ one, something that aspires in designing
those forums (e.g. deliberative polls; see Fishkin, Luskin, and Jowell 2000). Through these
mechanisms the prospect of citizens having a tangible impact on policy-making process is
thought to critically increase the legitimacy of representative rule, highlighting the mission
statement of deliberative democracy. These novel participatory, democratic innovations
currently taking centre-stage in the applications of deliberative theory proposes a partial
antidote to the alleged ‘legitimation crisis’ of modern representative democracy.
Criticism of democratic innovations19 demonstrate how unclear and undefined is the
macro-level impact of the outputs by these micro-deliberations: an open question remains,
to what extent democratic innovations and their outcomes are to be ‘scaled-up’? Such
themes are touched in the empirical turn when refining ‘claims about what deliberative
democracy can and cannot do, and how its better practice might be informed by
understanding of what is and what is not possible under particular condition’ (Dryzek 2010,
6–9). Being defined as the ‘fourth generation’ (Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016, 144),
the ‘systemic turn’ can be seen as the offspring of the previous turns, aiming at connecting
the theoretical and empirical, negotiating the relation between the ideal and the actual, while
refining the dynamics of deliberation which is distributed and dwells in various sites and
forums. While the picture of deliberative systems (which also conjure comparative research
to be undertaken, see e.g. Boswell and Corbett 2017; Dryzek 2016) on a large scale becomes
more absolvent and some pertaining hesitations are diminished, new ones appear.
Deliberative theory might be on the verge of yet another turn, the epistemic turn (Landemore
2017b).
19 As important and salutatory as citizens’ juries and other deliberative experiments are, they cannot solely
cover the ground for democratic representation and decision-making. Dryzek (2016, 210) puts it bluntly
when noting their methodological parsimoniousness to ‘innovate piece-meal rather than changing the whole
system’. In all fairness democratic innovations have not been offered or even claimed to fully substitute
democratic decision-making in contemporary representative institutions such as parliaments. Instead they
legitimately supplement the decision-making, as Maija Setälä (2017) has been proposing when advocating
for including mini-publics to the work of parliamentary committees. Open question remains whether mini-
publics are best suited shaping public policies or should they remain vital (institutionalised) practice to
inform and spur public opinion (Lafont 2015; in connection with political parties, see Kuyper and
Wolkenstein 2019). As in the case of citizens’ initiatives, belonging to the democratic innovation family, has
had also the novelty of putting issues on the political agenda that the elected political actors, politicians and
political parties, have for reason or another been unwilling to advance. On a long shot, these views echo with
the potential unwillingness of deliberative representatives to create political agendas and insights through
means of representative claim-making and generally through discursive politics (Disch 2012; see also
Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010, Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008).
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I have briefly introduced the vast sphere of discussions that deliberative democracy has
undergone over the past few decades. Going through them is necessary, as it allows digging
our way towards the intersection with the concept of political representation. Another
motivation lays in exploring the elements that drive deliberation. Vibrancy of these debates
and furthering developments of the theory also inherently concern the identity of
deliberative democracy. Which values and principles are indispensable when seeing
deliberative theory as an ongoing democratic project? Also, when wanting to decipher
conceptually what ‘deliberative’ in deliberative representation might mean and imply to in
action, it is necessary to address the question between the ideal and the real outlined in this
sub-section. The struggle of deliberative theory’s empirical applicability in political
contexts becomes more distinguishable when advancing next towards substantial features
of democratic politics: representation, interests and power.
ii Deliberative politics, dispositional deliberation and power
Democratically chosen representatives deal with what Gutmann and Thompson call moral
disagreements in what they define as ‘middle democracy’.
Middle democracy is the land of everyday politics, where legislators, executives,
administrators, and judges make and apply policies and laws, sometimes arguing
among themselves and listening to citizens, other times not. Middle democracy
is also the land of interest groups, civic associations, and schools […] sometimes
arguing among themselves and listening to people with differing points of view,
other times not (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 40).
We can say in representative terms that on behalf of citizens as writers reserve their
discussion on moral disagreements mainly taking place between citizens as reason-givers
and reason-demanders (Macedo 1999b, 5). When doing this, they deal with conflicts,
values, interests of many sort in a political world defined by scarcity of resources such as
material goods, wealth, and time. The range of interests travel from self-interests or vested
interests all the way to ‘general’ or public interests. Deliberative politics, the domain where
political representatives also dwell, contain attributes such as vision, judgment and
understanding. Democratic politics belong to ‘a land that democrats can scarcely afford to
bypass’ (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 40). Representatives can be thought as deliberators
who negotiate between ‘the forum’ and ‘the market’; between ideals of commonality and
aggregative self-interested preferences (Elster 1997). To be able to do this (or whichever
task they are set to do for reason or another), representatives travel up and down the
spectrum of dispositional and positional deliberation. This is reflected in what is done with
deliberation. We will return to this point of intermediation in the next sub-section, when we
discuss the issue of deliberative accountability.
What the study of political representatives and political representation in general bring
to the study of deliberative democracy is that it serves the question of power–something that
has escaped from deliberative theory. Here deliberative democrats made a ‘mistake’, as
Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 1) recently argue. By doing this, ‘they forgot about
democracy’ (ibid, 4). Early deliberative democrats understood questions of power as being
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too simplified, if not irrelevant. Namely, in Habermasian discourse theory there is no ‘self’
in the public will-forming processes but that ‘self-organizing legal community disappears
in the subjectless forms of communication’ (Habermas 1994, 10, emphasis added). Thus, no
individual holds personal ‘communicative power’ but it is dispersed in the collective public
reasoning process. Henceforth, the public sphere entails a self-correcting function
(Chambers 2017, 270; Flynn 2004) aiming at dissolving the matter of power. However, as
it remains, attempts to affect opinion-building, reasoning or position-taking in other ways
than on the basis of respectful and reciprocal exchange of reasons, justification and
arguments are generally not well received. Coercive measures, threats and manipulation
have no place in deliberative process since they produce asymmetry of power regardless of
how ‘minimally’ deliberation is defined (Mansbridge 2015; Bächtiger et al. 2018, 5). Not
only in terms of the ethical function of deliberative democracy defending the autonomy of
subjects, but principles of inclusion as the democratic function becomes questionable when
faced with coercion (Mansbridge et al. 2012).
Power is to some extent an undeniable factor in all social relations. Mansbridge (2015,
36) makes this clear by arguing that the absence of power is a regulative ideal. Nonetheless,
in deliberative theory the question of power raises the question about the principle of
equality of wills in democratic politics. For the founders of representative government the
idea of equality of wills was so evident that the detailed link of discussion and representation
was largely dismissed (Manin 1994, 143–45). Moreover, the function of deliberation was
in producing agreement in inherent diversity that was produced by the social fact that
everyone (every man) is equal. The outcome, the resolution is therefore founded on consent:
the idea that people yield ‘their will’. This is often accomplished through persuasive
measures, since there is ultimately no other legitimate way to provisionally settle
disagreements. For these early thinkers, then, any kind of coercion violates the autonomy
of subjects to willingly consent or transform their preferences spelled out within the
democratic (deliberative) process.
Unfortunately, the principle of political equality of representative government uncovers
a deeper contradiction in deliberative democracy that is not explainable only by rejecting
coercion (see also the defence of equity in Moscrop and Warren 2016). It gives grounds to
further consider when interlinking deliberation to political representation. Against the idea
of liberal democracy supporting political equality in aggregative terms which is safeguarded
by the principle of one person - one vote (and backed up by constitutionally derived formal
processes and political rights), in deliberative democracy the ideal that everybody’s voice
bears equal weight is less self-evident. The idea of ‘counting heads’ as per the liberal notion
is not applicable, as it immanently gives way to the justification ‘by’ those heads in
deliberative democracy. Seeing voting as an ‘attempt to give ideas weight’ and ‘not make
them identical in weight or with weight’ explains the difference in logic with voting and
deliberation (Urbinati 2006, 31). Consequently, deliberative democracy demands more: the
content and merits of deliberation by each deliberator should be weighted equally. Thus we
are left with a dilemma: we simultaneously want to retain the ‘all affected’ principle, that
everyone who are affected gets their say, but at the same time give priority to deliberative
claims and justifications ascribing to reasonability and acceptability.
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Secondly, the democratic function of deliberative democracy–defending inclusion of
arguments and voices–become more negotiable when being introduced to democratic
politics. As summarised by Parkinson (2006, 26–41), these problems with deliberative
legitimacy when it comes to addressing questions of power are defined as the scale problem
and motivational problems. Democratic deliberation addresses the question of ‘who gets to
be at the table’ (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 12). Ultimately, the so called ‘scale issue’ is evoked:
to live up to the all-affected principle that secures legitimacy, everyone should be included.
Due to practical, physical constraints not everyone can deliberate at the same time. Also
distance and time, as reasoning together takes time, is an issue (Goodin 2000, 82).
Distinguishing who should be included would be ‘an imprecise art at best, entirely arbitrary
at worst’ (Parkinson 2006, 5).
For Parkinson (ibid., 29), the idea of representation ‘offers a way out’ the scale-problem.
Bohman (2012) shares the same position when concluding that all deliberation is
representative. Then, if this argument holds ground–that deliberation is necessarily
representative–then deliberative theory is facing the exact same question as discussions
presented in the previous subchapter on political representation: how to ensure that
deliberators assume in their deliberations of those they represent? Let us elaborate some of
the observations available in the literature that point towards tackling this normative
expectation. For one, deliberative democracy renders an ‘external-collective’ focus that
makes it vulnerable to legitimacy deficits mentioned above. Can a collective reason and
justify matters in such a manner that it would at least satisfy the individual perspectives and
viewpoints? For this Goodin (2000) offers a supplement of ‘internal-reflective’ mode where
deliberative actors deliberate ‘within’, as in their heads. The novelty of Goodin’s intuitive
proposal is that internal-reflective perspective, unlike external-collective, can extend
beyond physical boundaries of space and time. Therefore, it also allows for the inclusion of
future generations (ibid., 99).
Internal-reflective mode relies on the idea of ‘ideal role-taking’ in discourse ethics. Note
here the echo of claims for descriptive representation when invoking ‘intersubjectivity’ as
a form of bringing someone to presence by imagination (ibid., 94). Relating to their
descriptive features, one could sense what that person would be feeling and thinking, thus
acting as a catalyst for empathy, a vital element of deliberative democracy. The argument
for empathy has been explicitly pushed by Michael Morrell (2010). The claim of standing
for -view of representation has a strong take on legitimacy despite the theoretical criticism
discussed earlier.
For the few deliberative democrats explicitly touching the theme of representation, when
a subset deliberates instead of the whole community, presents what Goodin (2000, 87–88)
calls ‘ersatz deliberation’. It raises a representative dilemma, defined as ‘Grandview
problem’, in reference to Fishkin’s deliberative polling (Parkinson 2006). The basic set-up
is this: if representatives change their minds due to deliberative process, their legitimacy as
representatives become doubtful. Representativeness disappears since they are no longer
like the represented. Lafont (2015) correctly points out a parallel problem of legitimacy
within deliberative polling. When representatives should prefer to follow a judgment
(refined through deliberative poll) of the constituency instead of representative’s own
judgment (or the ‘raw’ opinions of the represented), the representative criteria implied in
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the Grandview problem does not apply in the sense that it ‘accrues no additional legitimacy’.
The counterfactual setting, when people deliberate and opinion change occurs, according to
this criteria, fails to explain why the representative will not choose to act according to one’s
own (better) judgment (Lafont 2015, 51). Reasoning about claims of representativeness and
legitimacy is shorthanded, which demonstrates one of the difficulties with endorsing
descriptive, ‘micro-cosmos’ type of ideas of representation, as discussed in previous
subchapter.
If we move on from the scale problem to the other problem that representation invokes
within deliberative democracy according to Parkinson (2003; 2006), we arrive at
motivational problems. If scale-problem is treated in terms of standing for -view of
descriptive representation (‘who’ is represented), the motivational problem applies to the
question of substantive representation (‘what’ is represented). Representatives might be
holding what Parkinson (2006) calls ‘pre-deliberative commitments’. They can turn out both
ways: by not being interested in hearing what the others are saying, or by demonstrating too
much keenness to the extent that deliberative commitments to the represented are lost. What
is noteworthy here is the discursive overlap with discussions on representation and
deliberative theory that also show how the struggle over normative inclinations in them goes
actually towards the opposite ways: as we have seen, theory of representation is retreating
from the centrality of interests as the core and the standard account of political
representation.
The prognosis of representation shows that preferences are in fact endogenous of the
process of will-formation.  With deliberative democracy this position is the complete
opposite of the former: deliberators, especially if they are representatives acting in a
representative compound, hold pre-deliberative commitments. This is merely a euphemism
for interests. This implies that deliberators, regardless of how controlled and moderated the
deliberative setting might be20, are never Rawlsian tabula rasae but always bring something
to the shared table, also power and interest. The composition of the deliberative assembly
importantly affects scope and content of the deliberation that takes place
These notions speak to the contextual conditions, something that scholars working both
with deliberation and representation should explicitly consider (Bächtiger and Parkinson
2019, 40–42). These conditions affect how we interact with each other but also impact
motives for deliberative interaction in the first place. On one account, Shapiro (1999) argues
in his catchy-titled article ‘Enough of deliberation’ that incentives for engaging in
deliberative process may differ across the participants. As the title sub-header refers–
‘deliberation is about interest and power’–according to Shapiro, Gutmann and Thompson’s
thesis on deliberative democracy critically leaves out the liberal aspect. From this
perspective, even self-interested actors like corporations and the like can contribute to the
20 Deliberative experiments aim at creating favorable environment for deliberation where possible
inequalities of many kinds such as knowledge resources are diminished or at least controlled. It has also
been noted that the role of moderator is crucial as moderating discussion tend to limit the group polarization
tendency (Grönlund, Herne, and Setälä 2015). Social capital and social and economic inequalities may not
be completely erased despite paying attention to these factors in the research design. Deliberative
experiments demonstrate worryingly that for example, less-educated and females take less part in
deliberation. Females get also more often interrupted when speaking than men (Mendelberg, Karpowitz, and
Oliphant 2014).
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deliberative process by introducing relevant information. As such, they can clarify about the
nature of conflict and what is at stake in the handling of the disagreement (Mansbridge
1992). Instead, deliberative scholarship has been concentrating only on the morality of
disagreements, which, as their endeavour, is to underline the moral nature of democratic
questions. By using an example of couple’s therapy Shapiro demonstrates how a
deliberative process with unclear or unformed interests take shape. This results in ever-
deepening swamp of conflicting interests or perspectives (Shapiro 1999, 32).
Along the same lines, the ‘difference democrats’ such as Anne Phillips (1995) and Iris
Marion Young (2001) have criticised deliberative theory for being naïve for assuming that
‘power can be bracketed by the soft tones of the seminar room’ (Young 2001, 675). These
critics also bring up that those better off, who have more advantageous socio-economic
background, are favoured by the intrinsic qualitative criteria within argumentation. It can
relate to upright asymmetry of power between deliberators or they can relate to deliberative
capacities like speech skills.21 Those with higher societal status endorse a distinct propriety
for deliberation, a jargon of their own, which may not be similarly applicable to others who
do not share the same background. What this also indicates is that references to coercive
power can be more subtle. Moreover, its relation to affecting the principle self-autonomy is
less clear. Violating the autonomy of deliberating subjects’ rationalising and decision-
making puts a question mark on persuasive measures such as rhetorics, pleading and other
than logos-derived forms of communication.
These critiques have shaped how deliberative democracy departs from dispositional and
non-emotional ideals of deliberation and give way also to other forms of communication
like story-telling, testimonials, and rhetoric (Young 2002). These can be regarded as
legitimate justifications for argumentation, despite their shortcomings from a pure epistemic
perspective. Rhetoric may, however, also crucially generate ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’
measures that enhance the reason-giving of participants (Dryzek 2010b). In sum, what these
discussions portray is that it is not only external inclusion but internal inclusion that
proponents of deliberative democracy must also attend to. It bears significance also in
relation to political representation and to what extent differences in resources and capacities
are in the use of representatives. Before we can complete this argument, we need to look at
postulations that extend towards politics, thus enhancing the reach of deliberative
democracy.
iii Deliberative accountability and political representation
Fundamentally, democratic deliberation aims at altering the epistemic conditions for
decision-making and bringing about a change in the pre-deliberative commitments of
participants (Parkinson 2006; Elstub 2010). This is done, for example, through bringing in
new information on provided facts, defended positions and other relevant insights. One
interpretation would pose democratic deliberation as the enemy of representation since it
21 Also Shapiro (1999, 34) points out that deliberative democracy is underdeveloped when failing to pay
attention that those with better financial resources can advance their cause by framing the deliberation in
their favour (Przeworski 1998; see also Habermas 2006).
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can cause preference change. As such, it implies giving up original representative
commitments. This said, we should distinguish deliberation from its democratic
implications which ties the meaning of binding collective decision-making processes.
Democratic deliberation ‘should not be disconnected from questions of agendas, decisions,
and actions’ (Parkinson 2006, 3). Sometimes to defend this interpretation the formula of
‘first talk, then vote’ has been endorsed (Goodin 2008a). To underscore the importance of
this conceptual distinction it should be explicitly addressed here that this research, when
talking about deliberation, is using it as synonymous to democratic deliberation. However,
this reading does not rule out the necessary articulation, construction and contestation of
democratic identities and packages, generating salient reasoning as well as reflection.
The connection of deliberation to democratic politics sets certain preconditions that are
discussed partly in contradiction to the theoretical deliberative paradigm as a whole. When
doing this, some neglected elements in regard to representation are explicitly brought up.
Admittedly, while this chosen positioning may not fully and fairly reflect the ongoing
maturing of deliberative democracy, I still find it necessary for the sake of teasing out the
implications of political representation. One such account is the previously discussed
perspective argued by difference democrats who capture the value of deliberation through
in terms of inclusion but also self-actualisation, autonomy and respect. All this then,
resonating again with representation, relates to the question of what is to be done with
deliberation? Clearly, the motivation with story-telling might differ from those who want to
see deliberation in a more restrictive manner, as Joshua Cohen does, ‘in close proximity to
binding collective decision-making’ (Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016, 143). Also others,
like Parkinson or Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004), endorse this position while others
see the value of deliberation as a procedure that produces other things. Shared
understanding, meta-consensus or clarification of the perspectives causing disagreements
are such reflective transformations that deliberation can bring about, something that may
not per se translate into the decision itself. What this variability tells us is that we cannot
realistically expect deliberativeness to check all the boxes yet its distinctiveness should be
preserved to some extent. Most recently, two core components of deliberation are defined,
namely reason-giving and listening (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 23).
When democratic deliberation is brought together with realities of political
representation not only such ontological consequences but also other features are
established. Urbinati’s (2006) idea of political representation as ‘presence through voice’
together with the constructivist turn assumes the deliberative act that puts things (be they
people, interests, discourses and such) into being and sets them in motion. This process of
creating and making the grounds for representative relationships visible is where Bächtiger
and Parkinson (2019, 11–13) interlink the relevance of political representation with
deliberative democracy. For them, representation ‘closes the gap between the real and the
ideal deliberative democracy’ (ibid., 11) since through established visibility, democratic
processes can be traced and assessed vis-à-vis ideals of deliberative democracy.
Deliberation’s orientation to decision-making calls forth questions of representation
that, as well known, translate into the language of accountability. Along these lines,
Gutmann and Thompson (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 132; see follow-up discussions in
Macedo 1999a) pose the haunting question: ‘how can deliberative accountability be
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consistent with democratic representation? When discussing the scope of accountability
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 128) the authors advance their argument on the tensions
that political representation brings to the idea of universal accountability. Reading this side
by side with what was discussed in the previous subchapter illuminates the attempts within
deliberative theory to tackle questions relating to democratic politics. When it comes to
‘universal accountability’, that representatives are accountable to all, authors fall back to
the representative spin-off of the scale-problem. The basic tension then ‘implies to a
comprehensive constituency while representation supposes a circumscribed one’ (ibid.,
129). Since the authors are one of the few who take on these discussions in close connection
with political representation, I will next go through them in more detail. They give us the
stepping-stone into approaching parallel impediments in the maintenance of the
intersubjective electoral connection. Accordingly, they find two difficulties with
accommodating deliberative principle of accountability and actual politics.
The first is the specialisation in the form of division of labour that political representation
enforces and necessitates, i.e. that one deliberates for many as the solution for the discussed
scale-problem assumes. Further, representatives in representative institutions accrue also
specialised knowledge due to the availability of extensive resources (e.g. time, information
and money). This leads to the supposition that deliberation turns out elitist (Gutmann and
Thompson 1996, 129, 132; see also Manin 1997). The lack of marginalised and
disadvantaged group in politics is not due to ‘deliberative deficit’ but ‘lack of power’
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 133). To counterbalance the social injustice and
background inequalities, in the ‘deliberative playing field’ the marginalised have moral
arguments on their side as ‘moral appeals are the weapon of the weak’ (ibid.).22
Second problem of deliberative accountability is termed the ‘challenge of the
constituency’ (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 128, 144). Opposite to the previous case of
deliberative accountability which worked on a vertical dimension, here the problem arises
from giving too much to a horizontal constituency: to the many constituencies that
representatives have. In addition to electorate constituencies, representatives have what
Gutmann and Thompson call moral constituency. In the example of a controversial abortion
bill in South Dakota in the 1990s, the writers find similar dilemma as in the mandate-
independency -controversy. In the treatment of the second accountability problem that
derives from the multitude of constituencies Gutmann and Thompson see the burning
deliberative question in a manner that strikes odd. For the authors, the setting is connected
to whom the justifications for one’s actions should be given. In this particular real-world
22 To demonstrate this point, writers use an example of Carol Moseley Braun, a black congresswoman, who
was able to overturn the minds of fellow congress members, on the case of renewal of patent on the
Confederate flag in the United States. The value of testimony (regarded here also as rhetorical use of
language), drawing from social background and in this case from historical wrong-doings, in a deliberative
sense is that it can force an issue on the agenda thus spur deliberative process (without this action in the
example, the decision would’ve been made without hesitation). Secondly, by expanding mental horizons of
the listeners testimony can advance agreement by parties who do not share the same opinion or perspectives.
However, even though the purpose of deliberative democracy is to mitigate and correct background
inequalities (e.g. race, gender, wealth) testimony lacks the two-way, reciprocal communication that
deliberation enforces. It bypasses the idea of reciprocity, to seek agreement in fair terms and with mutual
respect (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 135–7).
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example (where close pro-choice majority won) representative’s ‘position seems to force
him to choose between an account that would satisfy more qualified deliberators and one
that would appeal to less qualified deliberators’ (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 130,
emphasis added).
In the suggested frame of accountability problem facing the option of restraining from
deliberation altogether due to being caught ‘between elitism and demagoguery’ (ibid., 130)
I do not see why it would be such a strain to address and reason to multiple audiences, or
constituencies, and sensibly and deliberately tailor justifications to them. This particular
dynamic comes up with elected representatives who bear responsibility through their
mandate, but also through their specialised practice that teaches them to navigate among
overlapping and contingent legitimacy claims. Even though Gutmann and Thompson extend
the discussion on accountability to cover multiple constituencies, their understanding of the
accountability function is very electoral-centred (as in their terminology of procedural
democracy). However, they are correct in their worries of the demagogic, populist
tendencies that the deliberative principle may produce the legitimate need to please
supporters and to gain new ones. The worry resonates with ‘dilemma of democratic
competence’: political elites, when creating and invoking representative claims and
constituencies, respectively, make use of apathy and disinterestedness of the public that may
be prone to accept claims that lack factual basis (Chambers 2004; Goodin and Saward 2005;
Disch 2011).
The treatment of audience (regardless of their idea of horizontal constituency) in
Gutmann and Thompson’s reading assumes that the receiving party of these deliberations
to be a single monolith or a clearly defined unit. The concept of constituency is messy (e.g.
Rehfeld 2005). For deliberative democrats, when approaching political representation, it
may not be fruitful to even try to trace and focus on who the constituency is, to whom one
should practically be accountable and to whom one is to address the justifications. Instead,
discursive representatives, as Dryzek (2010a) helpfully proposes, can sustain legitimacy
through discourses that they claim to represent. Namely, discursive accountability is
established when the discursive premises are tapped into and engaged with (similar to
deliberative accountability, see Mansbridge 2009). The problem of the multitude of
constituencies outlined by Gutmann and Thompson dissolves when the corresponding
discourses amalgamate discursive accountability. For that reason, ‘discursive
representatives do not have to be ’delegates’ of discourses, unable to reflect and change
their minds. But if they change their minds, they must justify the change in terms set by the
discourse(s) they represent’ (Dryzek 2010, 61, emphasis added). Along with Dryzek, the
constructivist turn and representative claim-making is better equipped to acknowledge that
audiences of deliberative acts may be plural.
Despite the ambiguity of their section on accountability Gutmann and Thompson does
not diminish the relevance of the following point they make. Crucially, they state that
deliberative democracy does not specify a single form of representation. In their view it
‘searches for modes of representation that support give-and-take of serious and sustained
moral argument within legislative bodies, between legislators and the citizens, and among
citizens themselves’ (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 131, emphasis added). Two things in
this quotation are worth noting. First, in my understanding of deliberative politics and
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representative institutions I am not convinced that all questions or practical legislative issues
can be collapsed into moral arguments. However, I agree with the fundamentals of
continuous reiterated deliberation for providing reasons and justifications, but I doubt the
foundational substance of morality claims. Also, the question of deliberative accountability
remains unsolved: how to resolve and deal with colliding viewpoints (Gutmann and
Thompson 1996, 142, 163)?
Admittedly, this tension is built within representative democracy itself, and by
advancing the arguments of deliberative theory this question of arbitration can be put on the
table perhaps in a more robust manner than with the concept of representation alone.
Conjoining these discussions on deliberation and representation in the idea of deliberative
representation, as I argue, can offer valuable insight reflecting the theoretical claims made.
The second point to note in the quotation is perhaps more intriguing as it specifically
commits deliberative democracy to interweaving political representation, or modes of
representation, to the sphere of inquiry. Work of a deliberative representative is certainly
more difficult than that of a ‘procedural representative’ who defers to her constituency’s
wishes or that by ‘constitutional democrat’ who relies solely on reasoning of legislative
justice (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 163).
These critiques have shaped how deliberative democracy departs from dispositional and
non-emotional ideals of deliberation and give way also to other forms of communication
like story-telling, testimonials, and rhetoric (Young 2002). These can be regarded as
legitimate justifications for argumentation, despite their shortcomings from a pure epistemic
perspective. Rhetoric may, however, also crucially generate ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’
measures that enhance the reason-giving of participants (Dryzek 2010b). In sum, what these
discussions portray is that it is not only external inclusion but internal inclusion that
proponents of deliberative democracy must also attend to. It bears significance also in
relation to political representation and to what extent differences in resources and capacities
are in the use of representatives. Before we can complete this argument, we need to look at
postulations that extend towards politics, thus enhancing the reach of deliberative
democracy.
iv Deliberative ecologies hosting and sustaining various deliberative acts
The outcomes of the search for modes of representation by Gutmann and Thompson over
twenty years ago have been relatively modest. Arguably, it seems that the playing field for
exploring the possibilities and prospects for deliberative representation is substantially open
for further formulations. In this final section, I revisit the themes already discussed in a way
that supports my argument for deliberative representation. Moreover, it responds to the
proposition for the search for a mode of representation Gutmann and Thompson were after.
As such, as argued earlier, the idea of deliberative representation can also be supported by
Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 7–8) when they see deliberativeness to be used as a
summative quality that resonates with the constructive perspective on political
representation. Both views are responsive to the general idea of deliberative representation
that perceives the qualities to be ‘effects of complex interactions’ (ibid. 11–12). Setting out
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to examining, mapping and measuring deliberation in this sense gains its purchase from
such a notion that does not make us stop every time just to ask: ‘is this proper deliberation?’
Therefore, arguing for a perception of ‘deliberative timbre’ critically advances the reach of
deliberative democracy (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 7–9).
While this research does not measure deliberation in parliaments as such, it does map
and more precisely, seek to point out the origins of deliberative accounts, of situations and
occasion when deliberation is at play. Therefore, this research speaks also to the deliberative
democrats. However, when we follow newer formulations in deliberative theory, we find
that the necessary trade-offs embedded in the inquiries of representation and deliberation
lessen the worries of concept-stretching. Deliberative actors assume both strategic and
deliberative goals as explained earlier in the parliamentary context (chapter I, section iii).
Most importantly, I have proposed, deliberative theory is now paying attention to the
functional character of deliberation (Bächtiger and Beste 2017). Further, the argument for
deliberative representation in this research and the way it will be empirically investigated
situates itself among the conceptions of deliberation and deliberativeness: performativity,
distribution and contingency (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 16). Importantly, these
conceptions lessen the leap of faith that is taken when representation and deliberation are
converged so that they can set out for a dialogue and contribute to further developments.
This final section will be structured to reflect this helpful three-fold distinction vis-à-vis the
earlier discussions on representation.
Deliberation when seen it terms of performativity relates to the loosening normative
parameters of deliberation. Arguably, deliberative democracy has been subject to injustice
when some of its central literature has been regarded as blueprints for the type of acceptable
and legitimated deliberation to which empirical considerations on institutional designs
should be contrasted (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 86). Ideals of impartiality and common
good orientation, distinguished in ‘old deliberation’ (Bächtiger and Beste 2017) or ‘type I’
deliberation by the ‘first generation’ theorists (e.g. Habermas, Cohen), could be seen as one
of the relevant standards at stake when democratic politics is considered (Bächtiger et al.
2010, 34). In the earlier attempts at positing deliberative theory with questions of political
representation Parkinson made a convincing start by conferring that representatives play a
‘dual role’ of delegates and trustees when acting as deliberators (Parkinson 2006, 35). While
the binary setting of principal–agent model is now seen somewhat outdated (also for the
reason that parliamentary studies about representatives do not in reality resonate with
typologies of representative roles), the motivational issues (i.e. pre-deliberative
commitments) that political representation brings along are current.
 When thinking of political representatives operating in legislatures, exchanging the
premise of preference-change to ‘open-mindness’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 22),
seems valid. As such, the argument for performativity increases the appeal to robust
empirical inquiry. It is more likely that we will find MPs who foster the kind of open-
mindedness discussed here than those who would readily give up a prior stance, especially
principled ones. However, as Gutmann and Thompson (2012) show, representatives are
forced to balance between accountable governing and credible campaigning to which the
necessity of compromise relates. Hypothetically, the proposal for open-mindedness and the
implied readiness to hear out arguments and proposals made by others, especially by
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political adversaries (Manin 2017), are qualities fostered by representatives who mix
strategic and common good orientations.
The idea of discretion that representatives assumingly exercise connects with the second
feature of deliberativeness argued by Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 44): distribution. We
can see how its earlier formulations in the so-called ‘sequential approach’ help in
‘integrating different forms of communication while at the same time relaxing the idea that
each moment of the communicative process must fully embody rational discourse’
(Bächtiger et al. 2010, 34–35; see also Goodin 2005; 2008b). Further, deliberative
democracy can ‘accommodate different aspects or dimensions of deliberation’ (as having
‘many principles’) instead of trying to ‘capture them all in a single set of principles’
(Bohman 1998, 404, 408).
As Curato and others (2017) claim, and on what many other current collaborators to
deliberative democracy most likely agree, the juxtaposition of ideal and realist tendencies
of deliberative theory is dated. It is considered as one of resolved key findings of
deliberative democracy. In representative politics power and coercion are hard not to come
by, and these features are difficult to erase from corresponding political processes and
communication. Considering that representatives whose trade is ‘the art of feasible’ may
indeed foster instrumental goals, as mentioned before (Bohman 1998, 412, 416). Such
variability also puts aside the juxtaposition of strategic and authentic or sincere, non-
manipulative incentives of deliberative participants that early scholars struggled with. Now,
incorporating the notion of interests (Mansbridge 1992; Mansbridge et al. 2010; Mansbridge
2006; Warren and Mansbridge 2013) bear implications to how deliberative processes can
be assessed in democratic terms. This is also a matter of need. The developing new
approaches to deliberation help not only through measuring but also by mapping and
pinpointing the moments and places in democratic processes where high-quality
deliberation is needed the most. (Bächtiger and Beste 2017.) In democratic politics, we
should not expect to find high-quality deliberation in every corner we study. However, as
argued earlier, merging the concepts of representation and deliberation encourages making
these democratic processes visible, forcing participants to address and respond to claims
and arguments, weighing them sometimes in public and sometimes behind closed doors.
Additionally, I argue that while the institutionalised setting and the controversy in public–
versus–private deliberation cannot fully be settled, more consideration should be given on
the perspective on how the function of deliberation and representation changes when
operating within these settings. Futhermore, the ‘need-oriented’ perspective to deliberation
(ibid.) helps clarify how representatives choose adversary style that may undermine
qualification of respectful conduct for the justificatory benefit. In the plenary debates
members of parliament may choose to ‘hit hard’ to ensure that the legislation is sufficiently
scrutinised and argued for.
Similarly, Manin (2017) has put forward recently a related formula for adversarial
political deliberation that has many virtues. Political deliberation assumes a setting that
bears epistemic credentials through the fact of criticism. Decisions that have been
surrendered to criticism tend to be better. Secondly and thirdly, whilst adversarial
deliberation clarifies the positions in terms of comprehension of choices, it fights back the
fragmentation of the public sphere (see empirical counterargument in the study of Mutz
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2006). This kind of deliberation can also help understanding and clarifying of the political
conflicts. And finally, dynamics of arguing for and against establishes respect of the
minority. (Manin 2017, 42.)
Increasing the appeal of deliberative representation, deliberative democracy can be
seen now to hold a ‘nuanced view of power’ (Curato et al. 2017, 31). Regardless of the
limitations imposed by these consequences, political processes can and should embrace
deliberation:
Decision-making in deliberative democracy can involve voting, negotiation, or
workable agreements that entail agreement on a course or action, but not on the
reasons for it. All of these benefit from deliberation, which can involve
clarification of the sources of disagreement, and understanding the reasons of
others. Rather than consensus, deliberation should recognize pluralism and strive
for metaconsensus, which involves mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the
different values, preferences, judgments, and discourses held by other
participants (ibid.).
All this tells us that deliberative theory is enhancing its empirical applicability with
variety of methodological approaches (Curato et al. 2017, 34; Bächtiger and Parkinson
2019, 18, 75). Such methodological choices should not be fixed to a set of standards that
deliberation should meet on each account. Refining and critically adjusting normative ideals
vis-à-vis contextual conditions where actual deliberation takes place calls for different
approaches to capturing the meaning of deliberative quality (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019,
18, 75).
    Simply, legitimacy cannot be fully accomplished in a single institution or as a unitary set
of standards. Instead ‘democratic deliberation should be the result of several different
processes, because different processes motivate different kinds of representatives to take
part’ (Parkinson 2006: 165, emphasis added). Noteworthy here is that here Parkinson, along
with Goodin (2005; 2008b), sets in motion the idea of systemic approach to deliberative
democracy when he argues that legitimacy should be sought on a macro level rather than on
a single, bounded forum. And in terms of decision-making processes he distinguishes the
corresponding steps to see ‘how different institutions might make useful contributions to
each’ of the function (ibid., 165, on similar accounts Warren 2017).
     This argument took full form in the mission statement proposed by a group of leading
scholars of deliberative democracy who suggested approaching deliberation from a systemic
viewpoint (Mansbridge et al. 2012). Deliberation is dispersed within a deliberative system
conceding that deliberation has many functions and motivations within these individual
sites. The system operates with distribution of work. Some sites may be more deliberative
in reaching deliberative ideals and solutions (ibid, 2–3). The parts of the system, as
‘deliberative ecologies’ (ibid., 6), are interconnected, and interchangeable, also in the way
that if deliberation fails in one part, it does not render the whole deliberative process futile
on a large scale. Diverted forms of deliberation or otherwise skewed deliberative process in
some parts of the system can be still regarded acceptable on the systemic level. For example,
protests and other actions that are not considered to entail deliberative credentials can still
accrue and spring deliberative outcomes on a large scale. The ‘two wrongs make a right’
type of rationalisation is found only distantly plausible (Bächtiger and Beste 2017, 114), but
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worries remain that it is used as an excuse to accommodate and accept accounts of various
deliberative sorts for the sake of maintaining the cohesiveness and comprehensiveness of
the ‘system’ (Owen and Smith 2015). In other words, nondeliberative acts are not rejected
but included in the deliberative system. On the other hand, while the picture of the
deliberative system is getting clearer, Dryzek (2016, 211; 2017) reminds that it is better to
comprehend the system ‘as being potentially deliberative’ and not to go, as William Smith
(2016) does, to search for the boundaries of deliberative systems.
These may sound like accusations of concept-stretching. To what extent can the theory
and the concept of deliberation be outstretched before it loses not only its analytical impact,
but more importantly its credibility, as intrinsically normative project and become
indistinguishable? (Thompson 2008; Elstub 2010; Owen and Smith 2015; Elstub, Ercan,
and Mendonça 2016). Also, detaching deliberation from its philosophical prescriptions that
underline prospect of preference change, justification and respect causes some to urge that
the concept of deliberation ‘should be used with care’ (Steiner 2008, 3). In a more
substantial argument, Landemore (2017a), while acknowledging that the linkage between
deliberative democracy and representative democracy has been ‘undertheorized’ (ibid., 52),
argues that deliberative democracy should ‘dissociate itself’ completely from the paradigm
of representative democracy. Fearing that the crisis of representative democracy will drag
deliberative democracy down to the pits of non-democratic despair she calls for an ‘open
democracy’ that sets the basis of setting up new standards for democratic deliberative
associations.
     The argument that the systemic approach puts forward is important, as is its critique.
However, the distributive idea–that deliberative acts are to be found across various sites and
can be sequenced–points out also to division of labour not only with deliberation but also
with representation. In the future, projects that set out to outline something similar in terms
of systemic representation would be valuable.
Something like a systemic view of representation is not original in the sense that
Jonathan Kyuper (2016) has argued for it in the case of non-electoral representatives. Recall,
the idea was originally suggested by Pitkin but surprisingly neglected by scholarship that
followed her (Disch 2011). In her work Pitkin came to a radical conclusion after considering
the implications of democratic politics that in many ways conflict with her forms of
representation. She writes suggestively: ‘Political representation is not any single action by
any one participant, but the over-all structure and functioning of the system, the patterns
emerging from the multiple activities of many people’ (Pitkin 1967, 221–2, emphasis
added).
Presume that we would adopt the systemic approach from deliberative democracy and
use that framework to a representative institution. What would come out of it? Based on
how the constructivist turn understands the concept of political representation it is possible
to comprehend representation in a similar way deliberative theory has done with its central
conceptualisation. Naturally, to attain a complete and cohesive system of representation one
would need to extend the level of analysis accordingly and acquire new, cross-disciplinary
research data. This task would be immense but potentially fruitful. In deliberative
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democracy, research on systemic level is slowly emerging after the ‘calls for arms’ initial
piece was published in 2012 (on such methodologies see Boswell and Corbett 2017; Holdo
2018). It is hard to encapsulate how a ‘representative system’ would look like as the sites of
representation are plenty especially when including the non-electoral representatives, to
which Kuyper (2016) focuses in his research. It would also take the concept of
representation even further to the theoretical outskirts, thus pushing the boundaries and
inducing liminality (Saward 2019) and recursiveness (Mansbridge 2019).
Returning from this minor but relevant sidestep, the distributive element defining
deliberativeness allows us to appreciate a site, venue or any such ‘micro-deliberative’ forum
from macro perspective. What we can do, for instance, is that we see legislatures as
particular deliberative ecologies consisting of smaller parts and venues. They take on
different tasks and thus entertain various deliberative acts within a deliberative system. This
line of thought finally brings us to the third element of deliberativeness proposed by
Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 44, 153): contingency. Now, what is extremely important
to note here is how the argument for the variety of goals and intentions in deliberation
speaks to the idea of the function of representation. In that representative acts align
themselves according to this functional aspiration that also simultaneously orients towards
a particular audience. Along these lines, circumstances and conditions where deliberative
acts–like opinion-building, reasoning, negotiating, listening and such–take place, should be
considered every time when considering the claims of deliberative democracy.
In the case of deliberative democracy these new approaches now underscore similar
ideas of functionality and contextuality, something that strongly resonate with deliberative
representation. ‘The functional perspective’, proposed by Bächtiger and Beste (2017, 107,
emphasis added), introduces a ‘new approach to deliberation–emphasizing that the various
forms that deliberation can take should depend on the goals of that deliberation and the
contexts in which it takes place’.
Importantly, as Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 2, emphasis original) write: ‘Context,
too, can alter the meaning of deliberative acts’. This point is valuable when considering
practices that take place in the political world which handles the dynamics that political
representation necessarily invokes. The context-sensitivity of deliberation, analogous now
with political representation, starts with the notion that the meaning of deliberative acts is,
in a way, proportionate or regulative to the situation where it occurs. The styles or forms of
deliberation become meaningful through this context-sensitive understanding (ibid., 40–
42). Through this new horizon of deliberative understanding, it is possible to trace how
deliberation is ‘transformed by creative agents, in situ’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 15,
emphasis added). Further, when deliberation is associated with shape-shifting
representation, as Bächtiger and Beste (2017, 107) do, representatives endorse various
subject-positions for their deliberative performances. Following Rehfeld (2006), Rinne
(2016, 31) proposes an idea of functional representation that ‘explains how representation
in a given context can have different aims and functions that are then reflected in
deliberative performance’. Deliberation remains part of its context, and some of these
contexts are far from the ideal-normative situations generally associated with its democratic
applications.’
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If it is the case that much rests on the capacities of representatives as deliberative
participants to alter the meaning of deliberative performances in the interplay of
representative contexts then ‘we should desire creative political actors who can engage in
deliberation when deeded and where contextually possible and appropriate’ (Bächtiger and
Beste 2017, 110). Moreover, the motivation embedded in reciprocity or in any attempts to
reach out toward the other interlocutor, signalling for ideals of respect, recognition of
autonomy and such, appear very different let us say in everyday deliberation (Mansbridge
1999a) than in a polarised political negotiation. Also, when the meaning of these
deliberative acts alters, a shift, a transformation may occur hence changing the course of the
deliberative process. But then again, they may not. My idea of deliberative representation
meets these claims about the contingency, distribution and performativity of deliberation.
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3 Methdology
3.1 Elite interviews with members of parliament
The data used in this research consists of 60 elite interviews with MPs. For background,
five interviews with committee secretaries were conducted. The interviews are organised in
three sets collected between 2008 and 2016. The last interview set, collected in two separate
rounds, is specifically for the present study. All interviewees were promised full anonymity.
I will introduce the interviews next, but more detailed information can be found in the
Appendix.
The first set of interviews were collected by professor Anne Maria Holli and researcher
Milja Saari on the committees of the Finnish parliament. The results are published in Gender
in Expert Consultations of the Parliament of Finland (2009). Altogether 15 semi-structured
interviews with MPs (and three with committee secretaries) were conducted by Holli and
Saari during 2008. The interviewed MPs were selected from three committees: the Legal
Affairs Committee, the Employment and Equality Committee and the Social Affairs and
Welfare Committee. The main focus in the semi-structured interviews was on gender issues
in the committee (committee assignments by the parliamentary party groups, effects of
gender balance in committee deliberation), internal rankings of committees (which
committees MPs are most eager to join, and which are least popular), and selection and
diversity of external committee experts (see also Holli 2012). Overall, the interviews relate
to the deliberative culture of committees and tasks of MPs regarding informational
capacities and use of expert knowledge. The responses regarding gender balance and
diversity were included for the present study. In the analysis, interviews belonging to this
set are marked with the Roman numeral I. Only the interview transcripts were made
available instead of the recordings therefore the length of the interviews is given in number
of transcript pages. The overall number of pages in this interview set (excluding committee
secretary interviews) is 486 sheets (font 12; spacing 1,15), where the average length of
interview transcript is 27 pages long.
The second set of interviews were conducted by Kyösti Pekonen for the project The role
of talk in the Parliament of Finland and the problem of representation in which I was
involved as a research assistant. Most of the MPs interviewed were members of the same
parliamentary committee (kept confidential). In total 15 MPs and two committee secretaries
were interviewed. The interviews were carried out by me during winter 2008–2009. In total,
18 hours of interviews were recorded (excluding the two committee secretary interviews).
The average length of one interview was approximately one hour and 10 minutes, but they
ranged from about 40 minutes to one hour and 40 minutes.
The focus was mainly on committee work. The semi-structured interviews were based
on the themes of the Discourse Quality Index (Steiner et al. 2004), with questions on the
themes of content and level of justifications, showing respect and demonstrating reciprocity,
as well as general questions about participation and the working atmosphere in the
committees. The interviews give a glimpse into previously uncovered territory of what goes
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on inside the Finnish parliamentary committees and how committee reports are drafted in
practical terms. The interviews collected for this study were part of the research data in the
Finnish monograph Talk in Eduskunta (Puhe eduskunnassa) by Pekonen (2011). In the
analysis, citations and quotations from these interviews are marked with the Roman numeral
II.
The third and final set of interviews was conducted in two rounds: in summer of 2015
and 2016. In the first round, I interviewed 16 MPs, all except one of whom had given up or
lost their seat in the general parliamentary elections in April 2015. There were two reasons
for choosing former members of parliament. The first reason relates to acknowledgment of
some particulars in conducting elite interviews. Currently serving MPs tend to be busy,
reaching them might be more difficult than reaching those who are not anymore serving as
MPs. The second, more important reason also relates to elite interviews. Since elites, by
virtue of their status and profession, have discreet information that they might prefer to
withhold, I decided that interviewing former members might mitigate the problem. The
decisive reason for my choice, however, was that former representatives might be more
willing to reflect on the dynamics of parliamentary work and especially its less-positive
aspects. Simultaneously, I was interested in exploring the idea of understanding
‘representing’ as a practice tied to wielding social power (Rehfeld 2017; 2018). When a
person no longer has the status of MP, do they no longer represent, in Rehfeld’s sense of
that term? Whatever ex-representatives do in their private lives can be taken as a token of
representation (perhaps in the form of macro-level institutional representation of some sort),
for which reason they might still be able to initiate notions of representing.
Conducting this kind of ‘exit-interview’ turned out to be a good decision. Not only had
these former MPs more time in their hands to participate in the study, they also showed a
lot of dedication in terms of reflection and concession. Interviews in this set were long: on
average a bit less than two hours. The shortest one was a test interview with an MP in office
(bit over an hour) but otherwise they ranged from one hour and 20 minutes to a staggering
three-hour marathon. In total 31 hours and 10 minutes were recorded.
As said, the third interview set was collected in two parts. To secure the anonymity of
the interviewees, the two parts are merged as one (under the heading in Roman numeral III)
and the dates of the interviews are withheld. Also the coded order of the interviews is
shuffled (1–29). After the initial analysis of the collected interviews in the 2015, I decided
to supplement the research data with more interviews. For such, I wanted to include MPs
that are currently in office at the time of interviewing them in the summer of 2016. I ended
up conducting 14 more interviews out of which one was not a sitting member of the
parliament and who specifically wanted to appear in this research non-anonymously
(perhaps most known former Speaker of the House, Riitta Uosukainen). In comparison to
the interviews done a year earlier these were shorter but still considerable in length: on
average one hour and 15 minutes. In total 17 hours were recorded, and the shortest interview
lasted 30 minutes and the longest an hour and 50 minutes.
The themes in these interviews were roughly divided into five sections. First, the
motivations for becoming and acting as an MP were asked about, before turning, second, to
the interviewee’s particular experiences and reflections on the practicalities of holding the
office. Third, I wanted to determine whether one’s representing is differentiated in the
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forums within the Parliament, and what functions they entail for one’s practices.
Perspectives and opinions about the role of the media were also inquired about. Fourth, I
wanted to specify some aspects of committee work that were not explored in in the second
set of interviews (Pekonen 2011).
 Among such themes were compromise-building and coordination with parliamentary
party groups. Questions about grounds and possibilities for cooperation, in particular in
terms of coalition government dynamics, supplemented the interviews collected in the first
set (Holli and Saari 2009). Finally, I extended the themes to the role of Parliament as a
representative institution, something that also helped highlight some of the frictions with
party democracy undermining the role of parliaments. Both these two last interview rounds
included a short questionnaire to the MPs, something I will discuss shortly.
It is helpful to discuss briefly what it means to conduct what the literature calls ‘elite
interviews’. I find it valuable to outline the discussion through my own observations and
experiences having myself interviewed 45 Finnish MPs (the interviews marked II-III). In
general, all interview methods rely on the interaction between the interviewer and the
interviewee. Some types of interviews, such as ‘in-depth interviews’ (Aalto 2001), are more
sensitive to these interactions, since typically lengthy interview experiences allow sharing
of information that can be difficult for the interviewee to discuss. The defining feature of
elite interviews, of course, is that elites hold higher positions of power than most others.
Distinguishing and defining who the elites actually are is a question that has not been
extensively explored or theorised (Harvey 2011). For present purposes, it is appropriate to
define elites simply: a person belongs to an elite when he or she holds a position and status
of exclusion that is societally and politically relevant. In the case of elected members of
national parliament, there is less room for misconceptions about such positions of power.
The success of interview methods depends on the amount and level of interaction and
communication that can be achieved; and in the case of elites, the first challenge is initiating
this interaction. Some researchers, such as Goldstein (2002), have discussed the challenge
of gaining access to elites. In the Finnish context, this is less daunting than in some other
countries, judging from the fact that almost all the MPs who were approached and
subsequently interviewed by myself responded very quickly. Only a small number of MPs
who were approached declined to be interviewed. The invitations were also designed to
establish trust and the credibility of the research project, as well as outlining the basic
themes for the proposed interviews (Mykkänen 2001a). The invitations also emphasised that
the anonymity of the interviewees would be ensured (see also Goldstein 2002).
As mentioned, research interview settings differ significantly from more everyday forms
of social interaction, regardless of how relaxed or chatty the atmosphere turns out to be
during the course of the interview. What most obviously distinguishes interviews from other
kinds of social interaction is the motivation of the researcher to glean specific information
from the interviewee. This setting automatically forms a distinct frame within the social
interaction, one that is hierarchical in nature. As mentioned, the motivation of conducting
research interviews in the first place draws elementarily from the respective research and its
objectives. Often, the interviewee is in effect an informant. This is especially true in the
Finnish case, since not many of the practices that take place behind closed doors (in
committees and PPGs) have been explored in the literature.
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It is crucial to the success of interviews that enough time be reserved for advance
preparation. Such preparations include doing background searches about the organisation
or institutions (in addition to being familiar with the research literature), while at the same
time carefully formulating the interview question framework and deciding on the order of
the questions (Leech 2002, 666), and other such matters. Understanding the context in which
the interviewee operates in is important, something that also helps when interviewing those
who may be wary of or especially sensitive to certain questions or approaches (Woliver
2002).
Bearing in mind the information-seeking incentive in the context of elite interviews, the
interviewed people usually are the best experts on the subject, as they also have access to
undisclosed information. Warranted by that elite position enables the research to obtain, at
best, valuable notions and perspectives that may have larger societal implications. Because
elites often hold exclusive and discreet information and experiences, they may not want to
share it. Here, we return to the feature of interaction that is essential in any research
interview setting. However, with elites, it needs to be recognised that most often elites are
also professionals in public relations, and experts in arguing and convincing. The validity
and reliability of research interviews can be severely hindered if the interviewer were to
‘fall under the spell’ of the interviewee. Open-ended questions typical to semi-structured
interviews always entail the danger that the interviewer loses control of the interview
situation especially if the interviewed elite member is persuasive and articulate. (Berry
2002, 681.) Doing MP interviews for this study, I also came to realise the complex dynamics
of their incentive to keep up appearances as parliamentary representatives, and on the other
hand their sincere willingness to engage with me and this research. While they may feel
obliged to take part in various studies and surveys, many elites, especially elected
representatives, most likely consider the PR aspect as well.
Sometimes, the MPs tried to ‘charm’ me by their smooth and jovial behaviour and smart
answers. Therefore, recognising the hierarchy issue–that elites are elite because of their
status, good manners and expert skills–is prevalent when conducting elite interviews
(Mykkänen 2001a, 117). Many have received media training (Harvey 2011, 438).
Presumably this is true with those interviewed MPs who have acted as cabinet ministers or
party leaders. To diminish the potential threat of getting mainly glossy and analytically poor
answers (such as ‘democracy must be defended’), being pushed a certain agenda (Mykkänen
2001a, 118) and falling into the unequal power trap, interviewers need to be well prepared
on many levels. First, a researcher has at least theoretical knowledge of the field in which
they are conducting the interviews, and perhaps also practical experience. These experiences
and prior knowledge can be used as assets. Referring to some piece of knowledge that may
not be available to outsiders can create a sense of companionship with the respondent, but
may also lead to a higher standard of responses when the researcher is able to specify and
clarify a response in the moment (ibid., 111). Here I personally benefitted from working in
the Parliament of Finland in the early 2000s.
Semi-structured interviews also allow the researcher to deviate from the question frame
to explore where the interviewee is taking them. Going further along the uncharted grounds
and asking for analytical elaborations is called ‘probing’ (Berry 2002). It entails striking a
delicate balance between open-ended and close-ended questions, as elites don’t usually like
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to be confined as to how they can answer (Harvey 2011, 434–35). But again, consideration
about whether or not encourage the interviewee to continue relies on the researcher’s
expertise and advance preparation (Berry 2002).
Notwithstanding the sincere willingness of trying to help an outsider to understand life
within a representative institution and practices accordingly, some themes were found
sensitive, as already discussed above. Some themes are bound by internal norms: there are
certain ‘house rules’ about how certain matters are to be discussed or not discussed, as is
the case here. To this latter point, the initial idea was to set this research as a case study by
focusing on a few carefully selected legislative bills. These bills would have been exemplary
on cases where coalition party dynamics, such as cohesion and discipline, were put to the
test. There would have been many features of what can be seen as decision-making
paradoxes, overlapping and conflicting obligations and expectations which could have
easily been tapped into by the interviewed MPs. After trying this out in the first few
interviews in 2015, it turned out that the case study idea will fail. MPs, even those who were
not in office anymore, were noticeably uneasy and reserved with the questions. As a
researcher and interviewer in that situation I soon realised that norms of disclosure hold
even after some time has passed. And if enough time would’ve passed, the details and
memories of the exact legislative process could be fading leading to an obscure and
imprecise study.
Other sensitivities and taboo subjects were detected also in the interviews by Holli and
Saari (I), as well as by Pekonen (II). Both these semi-structured interviews contained
questions about participation and attendances to committee meetings, from which
respondents did their best to squirm away from replying. Also, elected representatives seem
very hesitant to talk badly of others. This may come as a surprise, as politicians are often
perceived as self-seeking Machiavellian characters. One explanation of this hesitancy could
be that tightly exclusive groups, such as elites, out of courtesy or general loyalty do not feel
comfortable criticising practitioners of the same profession behind their backs. As I will
discuss in the analysis, being considered as trustworthy is one of the best currencies an MP
can acquire. On the other hand, interestingly, many also avoided mentioning people by name
in a positive instance or context. Many times I encouraged a hesitating interviewee by
explicitly stating that I simply wanted to understand various incentives for representing. To
overcome some sensitivities or taboo issues such as party discipline and other internal PPG-
related topics, a useful interview technique was to formulate questions in a way that takes
for granted such conditions tacitly; instead of asking, for example, ‘does your PPG have
party discipline?’ or ‘does your PPG endorse sanctions as a disciplining measure?’, the
preferred approach was to ask ‘what kind of experiences do you have with differing from
your own PPG on some issue, and what consequences did this have?’ However, questions
involving significant presumptions should be used sparingly (Leech 2002, 666).
Another, practical procedure relating to overcoming such sensitivities that I used in both
sets was a simple survey format sheet with 14 articulated claims (presented in the
Appendix), asking interviewees to reply to them on a scale from 1 to 10 depending how
strongly they disagree or agree, respectively, with each claim. The claims were purposely
blunt (as in ‘party discipline is a necessity’ or ‘members of parliament are estranged from
90
the general public’),23 something that received criticism from the MPs. The purpose was
not, as I explained, to argue that the claims would bear truth-base or that I would make a
quantitative study (with a small number of subjects). The survey proved to be useful for
paving the way to the relevant themes, and–depending on how knowledgeable the
respondent was of the topics–I sometimes administered the survey exercise early on and
sometimes at the end. With difficult themes it is usually advisable to place them somewhere
in the middle of the interview (Harvey 2011, 437). Returning to a tricky theme at a later
point in the interview is also useful, even though it might be unwise to leave them right to
the end and risk getting relevant information too late in the course of interviews (Bailer
2014, 175).
23 In the survey I also included the famous caption by Edmund Burke’s Speech to the Electorates of Bristol
(1774); the MPs generally felt it resonated with them. All found the caption intriguing also because it
offered many points of departure that each reflected from their own position. In hindsight, it would have
been useful to have given more time to dwell on this issue.
91
3.2 Interpretative approach to parliamentary practices of
representation and deliberation
What defines representation, and how can one operationalise a phenomenon that resists
many of the labels and descriptions that are bestowed upon it? Moreover, how can
representation be coded? Answers to these questions rely on the newer understanding and
conceptualising of representation that takes us beyond electoral, interest-centred accounts.
The empirical work provided in this research is illustrative and descriptive regarding the
context of representation. It will steer away from the ‘ethical-evaluative paradigm’ that is
often applied when studying parliamentary deliberations (Schäfer 2017). This evaluative
approach also tends to embrace the individual level, thus making assumptions about
individuals’ motivations and aspirations. Rather, the contexts of representation should be
recognised–that deliberations always take place in a time and place, ridden and combined
with implicit and explicit rules, institutional and inter-subjective expectations as well as
actor-centred aspirations and motivations. As quoted earlier, contexts change the meaning
of deliberative acts (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 2).
An alternative approach that steers away from the ethical-evaluative paradigm supports
Schäfer’s proposal for a contextualised systemic approach. His theoretical model has three
features: conditions (‘institutional context’), processes (as ‘practices of communication’)
and functions (‘integration–contestation’). Instead of the institutional context that describes
positional and discursive logics in roles, rules and resources (Schäfer 2017, 426), I
differentiate in more detail what the contexts could look like, also in a way that surpasses
the institutional setting. However, the institutional effect is included in what I would call
the spatial context. We can expect different tasks from different venues, as long as we
distribute them accordingly.
Obviously, institutional and especially parliamentary procedures are temporal matters.
This is implied in Schäfer’s (ibid.) idea of institutional context where the rules ascribe to
‘guidelines for situational contexts’. The idea behind the temporal context follows the idea
of seeing deliberation sequenced, thus something that is conveyed as dynamics of
representation. Parliamentary procedures are prime examples of this. For this reason, the
temporal quality nods also to political artistry and mastery of playing with time, as Palonen
(2003) has shown. Finally, and more centrally, I locate the functional context that also draws
from institutional context but is not bound by it: I claim that a more nuanced understanding
is rendered when representative practices (of which deliberation is the most central) are also
viewed from the functional perspective.
There are more to the functions than in the dyadic setting of contestation and integration
in Schäfer’s model: that representatives are incentivised to challenge and criticise political
opponents while simultaneously also seeking compromise and cooperation. The same dyad
is present in the positional and discursive logic within the institutional context. These
functional features may correctly reflect the internal orientations of parliamentary
deliberation that balances between disagreements and agreements. However, when
associating deliberation more explicitly with representation, but remaining within the
institutional context, we also find other functions that manifest in practical actions that
representatives engage in. These practices may linger somewhere in between demonstration
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of adversary and constructive capabilities, but they are often connected to interpersonal
practices to which the legislature sets the backdrop. Because political actors show both,
adversarial and constructive capabilities, in their line of work we must also include in our
analysis some social features. These social aspects may also turn to deliberative resources
that may convey political currency but also to attain deliberative ends. These include
different levels of compromise and even consensus, clarification of conflicts, as well as
empowerment and sentiments of legitimacy.
When analysing the interviews the features of contexts, spatial, temporal and functional,
were coded into the Atlas.ti programme. Code groups for contexts were thus formed. The
main spatial contexts used for the spatial code were the parliamentary party group, the
committee and the plenary, all coded individually under the ‘spatial’ heading. Other referred
spatial contexts were the informal venues of hallways, cafeteria and, for example, the sauna
where the so-called ‘sauna committee’ convenes. The spatial codes operated as a sort of
background variable, and therefore many of the code entries in Atlas.ti include this spatial
code (for example, the plenary spatial context code had over 200 entries).
There were less than 100 entries in the temporal context code, significantly less than for
the two other context codes. The entries entailed descriptions regarding the temporal
ordering of things, as well as the game that is played with them within a legislature. This
coding was also used when MPs observed or discussed time, for example how some aspect
in their line of work has changed over time.
The functional code is more varied. Evidently, that became the main theme through
which the proposed contexts emerged. The functional codes were the ones that were merged
and redefined during course of analysis. Following Rehfeld (2006), the idea of functionality
defines the kind of representative activity a representative is engaged in, consequent also to
his view of representing (Rehfeld 2018). It allows us to grasp the question of what actions
constitute representation. I began coding the functional context in a detailed manner,
detecting descriptions in the interviews through an interpretation of what is to be done or
what is being done in each situation. For example, I used codes such as “functional:
committee report”, “functional: knowledge” and “functional: opposition functions”.
To provide a backdrop to the context codes, and especially the functional codes, I
formulated three additional code groups: institutional, political and social. These pin down
the corresponding structures that state some of the restrictions and incentives that may affect
the given activity. They were valuable in supplementing the similar, yet undefined features
already included in the functional context. The combination of these was crucial in
articulating the contexts of representation that began to surface through the rounds of
recursive and re-iterated analysis. Importantly, the contexts argued in this study are not
exhaustive but merely illustrative of plausible contexts that are at play when looking at
deliberative representation. Each of the “structural” code groups of institutional, political
and social were further collapsed into more detailed codes. For example, there codes such
as “social: informal norms”, “social: networks”, “political: sanctions”, “political: party
dynamics” and “institutional: procedures”, just to give an impression of them. In addition
to these, I used a code group for roles, for example, for tracing the roles of committee chairs,
senior MPs and head of the committee group (valiokuntavastaava in Finnish).
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When there is an interest to understand how actors give meaning to their actions, the
interpretative approach becomes available (Bevir and Rhodes 2006; Geddes and Rhodes
2018). At the outset, the claim that interpretative research starts with a puzzle applies to the
research paradigm of parliamentary deliberation thus relevant in this project as well. Indeed,
there is friction between prior expectations and observation (Yanow 2006b; Schwartz-Shea
and Yanow 2012). It is reasonable to expect that representatives, in their deliberations,
entertain other action logics that do not speak to the strategic orientations (see e.g. Bessette
1994; Bächtiger 2014; Bächtiger and Beste 2017). In short, parliamentary deliberations are
not unitary and neither are the actors who construct and give meanings to them. Deliberative
representation in the contexts of representation help mapping out the shifts in the practices
and functions, therefore mitigating the puzzle. Moreover, the idea that the understanding of
the phenomenon develops as the analytical process progresses is the one of the key
arguments of interpretative approach. Consequently, although the original puzzle may be
resolved, new ones appear (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 27).
To develop a study that focuses on actors who inhabit representative institutions, such
as parliaments, requires a standpoint that is attentive to situated agency. Recently,
interpretative and ethnographical methodologies have emerged that come to the aid of
normatively oriented research. What has been advocated as ‘ethnographical sensitivity’
sustains that goal, when indeed, ‘trying to understand practices of politics’ as they ‘actually
exist’ (Herzog and Zacka 2017, 764). According to the authors, such sensitivity does not
require fieldwork, something that is associated with ethnographic research, but engaging
with interviews meets similar purpose and requires only the kind of ‘frame of mind’ (ibid.,
765). Similarly, Saward (2019, 286) has recently argued that democratic politics happens
every day and in varied practices embedded in myriad interactions. This position was
already defended and its democratic underpinnings stated in landmark studies, for example
by Mansbridge (1983) and Gutmann and Thompson (1996).
The ethnographical sensitivity tied to these claims and values, to be compared to the
extent that the empirical meets the requirement of the theory, are relevant. Insight into the
construction of meaning through the practices that MPs adopt, for example, and the
normative undergird spelled out in institutional rules and orders, are elements that need to
be considered. Lending such sensitivity to actions that are often routinized, like many
parliamentary practices are, permits new readings and interpretations to these accounts. On
these assumptions, parliamentary deliberations become less and less ritualised (as the
accusation often goes about the lack of deliberative orientation). Therefore, the institutional
conditions set out through the positional versus the discursive frame is central but too rigid,
as is the functions of integration and contestation too (Schäfer 2017). Parliamentary
deliberations entail other horizons than just communicative practices that orient either
towards adversarial or the deliberative, discursive side. Henceforth, additional layers and
dimensions are added when endorsing the kind of ethnographic take that grants new
meanings and insights to the role of parliamentary deliberations.
Notably, the definition of parliamentary deliberation can also be taken out of the
institutional premises (that rules and orders guide them) and capture it in action, for example
in social interactions reinforced by deliberation. Doing this requires a certain openness from
the researcher: ‘a readiness to be surprised by ruptures’ as well as ‘to abandon one’s tacit
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assumptions and pre-conceived ideas’ (Herzog and Zacka 2017, 777). Endorsing this
position helped me deal with the three separate interview datasets introduced in the previous
section. My theoretical treatment of representation as a praxis, as something that is being
conveyed, communicated and constituted in the activities by representatives, allowed me to
tie together valuable insights embedded in interviews. Characteristic of the interpretative
approach is the tendency towards abductive rather than deductive analysis, where the
process goes back and forth between the empirical and theoretical aspects recursively and
iteratively (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 28–29).
Drawing together the multiplicity of activities and actors in varied locations and context
there is a push towards ‘interpretative parliamentary studies’ suggested recently by Marc
Geddes and R.A.W. Rhodes (2018). This change has been initiated by the observation that
‘legislative studies has been curiously immune to theoretical or empirical innovations found
elsewhere in political science’ (Geddes and Rhodes 2018, 88). While this study offered on
these pages does not locate itself in the tradition of legislative or parliamentary studies, it
still does speak to them in a way that might curate some theoretical implications, thus
reorienting future enquiries into the legislative setting. As argued, wider theoretical grasp
on dynamics of political representation can achieve bringing new perspectives to the
traditional institutionalist approaches on how parliaments operate. This research paradigm
requires taking ‘seriously the way in which political actors interpret the world around them’
(Geddes and Rhodes 2018, 94), which therefore calls for ‘decentring’ the concepts and
interpretations that are available.
Such a decentred approach is suitable for studying how representative actors interpret
their roles, and has implications not only for accountability in representative democracy but
also since those interpretations affect MPs’ priorities and consequent behaviour (ibid., 99).
Similar attention should be given to practices by representatives, that can become basic units
of analysis and thus capable of adding ‘much greater nuance and depth to accounts of
parliamentary scrutiny’ (ibid., 100; see e.g. studies of Loat and MacMillan 2014; Crewe
2015). Namely, authors suggest turning to semi-structured interviews, among others, as
promising empirical methods in attaining the goal for a deeper texture in legislative studies
(Geddes and Rhodes 2018, 102).
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4 Deliberative representation in parliament
This chapter presents the context-dependent empirical analysis of deliberative
representation. As the main argument of this study claims, deliberative practices take shape
in a dynamic interplay with contexts, hence I will first describe the dominant contexts of
representation, which will be called affirmative (discussed in 4.1.), operative (4.2.) and
performative (4.3.). These contexts do not exhaust, if any would, all contexts of
representation available in any legislature, but, as I will show, they are well justified given
the way representation unfolds within a parliament.
I will look at deliberative representation and the way it plays out in the three contexts
through elements which relate to different aspects of deliberative representation I find
relevant. They concern, first, the democratic functions that representatives serve while
deliberating. Each deliberative act prescribes to different deliberative expectations.
Consequently, when deliberation in one setting is ‘”appropriate behavior”’ it is ‘not
feasible in another’ (Goodin 2008b, 194, emphasis added). Second, I will look at the overall
deliberative process in which deliberative representation takes part and concentrate on
features regarding understanding and hearing, following Urbinati’s (2006, 46) idea of
‘deliberative speech’. Third, I take this as referring to ‘open-mindedness’ in the way that
relates to the transformative character of deliberative processes. Openness to the
transformative nature of deliberation is now seen as sufficient (Bächtiger & Parkinson 2019,
22). Fourth, to dissect the deliberative process, I pinpoint how opinion-making is affected
and conditioned by the context. Since deliberative representation bases on the idea that
while representation can be understood through various activities and practices, it therefore
also concerns human interactions and communications. For this reason, they are relevant for
the exercise of judgment which forms the backdrop of the initial idea of deliberative
representation. For this purpose, I have included a fifth element, one that is derived
straightforwardly from deliberative theory, namely authenticity. To what extent are the
opinions, perspectives and reasons revealed to the participants? Importantly, authenticity as
an element through which deliberative representation is explored does not imply a moral
standing. Instead, tying the dynamics of information related deliberative practices to
contexts can help understand legislators’ context-dependent reasons for not being inclined
to sharing all the information they have or deliberate sincerely.
This brings us to the last observed element that help locate deliberative representation
in action: deliberative mode. Even though I have systematically argued throughout this
research that the quality of deliberation is not of primary importance I found it relevant to
include some reference to how deliberation occurs. Calling styles as modes takes also into
account the element regarding incentives that representatives endorse. They relate to the
specific functions spelled out in the contexts that overall align differently with strategic,
partisan, expressive and deliberative aspirations. In the end of this introductory section the
reader will find a table summarizing the different elements of deliberative practices
discussed here and which are to be fully elaborated in the empirical analysis that follows.
Next, let us look at the contexts of representation that form the outline for the analysis
in a more detailed manner. The adjective affirmative describes practices that refer to
validating or confirming; asserting something as valid or confirmed; and finally showing of
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expressing a strong belief in or dedication. The adjective, affirmative, means asserting a
fact; relating to positive (as in affirmative approach); and finally, favouring or supporting a
proposition or motion. These definitions resonate with contexts where representatives
actively seek support from each other, also of emotional kind. I will call this the affirmative
context.
As argued many times, parliamentary deliberation is not a unitary entity. Regardless of
its essential processual features–that in legislatures deliberation is reserved and controlled
by institutional aspects of time, place and form– it can still be seen to contain certain fluidity.
Moreover, parliamentary deliberation serves many purposes: in myriad deliberative
moments while deliberating, MPs also make sense of each other. They make judgments on
their capacities and abilities in order to form an understanding not only about legislative
issues, but also of each other. It should be remembered that deliberation is as much about
arguing and justifying as it is about listening and understanding. It can entail a
transformative property but also a reflective and affirmative one: becoming certain about
e.g. a position or a perspective that can go against another position or perspective.
Affirmative context also reveals the degree of self-sufficiency of actors: willingness to learn
and hear out others’ points assumes a relatively high degree of open-mindedness. It concerns
opinions not fully formed or in the making through reflection and contestation. In order to
live up to these expectations, a certain level of sincerity is expected from the participants.
What I call the expressive-deliberative24 mode contributes to managing collective actions
as in allowing coordination to take place. The affirmative context will be presented first in
the analysis because many of the most profound reflective activities belong to that context.
Also, this order of presentation helps demonstrate how deliberation is ‘sequenced’ (Goodin
2005, 2008b; Bächtiger et al. 2010).
Operative context describes parliamentary activities and practices when representatives
set out to work. This is often the non-visible side of parliamentary work for which many
MPs crave more recognition and appreciation. Here, democratic politics, the way it takes
place in legislatures, is made manageable and goal-oriented. The latter feature is embedded
in the function of representation that practically disassembles and orients the representative
activities towards something. Also, the institutional emphasis on this is significant:
especially when considering how the committee system facilitates the practical operative
measures that bestow resources such as expertise on representatives. When it comes to
individual representatives, efficacy and decisiveness are important. In short, representatives
want to ‘get things done’. To get things done requires the ability and knowledge to navigate
within the institution. Democratic politics is often driven by disagreement and, therefore,
the operative context highlights the urgency of compromise (Gutmann and Thompson 2012,
Rostbøll and Scavenius 2017). It means that representatives need skills to work and
negotiate with others. Aspiration for agreement and negotiation are often reflected through
institutional positions and ‘roles’. They give the actors resources when it comes to managing
deliberative representation, but they also limit the way representatives can go about doing
it.
24 I thank Mark E. Warren for suggestions for the naming of the earlier versions of deliberative modes.
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Especially the operative context resonates with governing and campaigning dynamics
discussed by Gutmann and Thompson (2012) as the basic action modes of legislative
practices. In a well-functioning democracy, both are needed: agreements and decisions need
to be made, and they need to be contested and debated in and between elections. In my
overall treatment of deliberative representation, however, these governing and campaigning
functions are translated also into other representative functions than compromising and
other agreement-seeking procedures like ‘deliberative negotiation’ (Warren & Mansbridge
2013, see also Naurin and Reh 2018). The operative context hosts a strategic-deliberative
mode of deliberation, which requires a certain level of adaptiveness when it comes to
orienting towards decision-making in legislative matters. This recalls the fact that
representatives’ opinions may be set in advance, but they are not always carved in stone,
and as such, representatives are sometimes sensitive to the reasoning of others. Moreover,
when we add the role of expert-knowledge prevailing especially in the committee stages
this consideration makes the deliberative process not predetermined but rather a contingent
one. Positional logics can yield to such epistemic reasoning.
Performative context outlines the prevailing idea in democratic politics that all
operations, representative or otherwise, need to be presented. This is the underlying ethos
of the performative context. However, it is not only about ‘presentability’ of representative
acts. Although they get articulated through well-defined stances as well as the general
rigidness in showcasing open-mindedness towards adversaries, the performative context
also relates to a more principled, inherent performativity that brings forth more clearly the
question of audience. Performative context carves out a sphere where representation of
‘what has been done’ is being ‘shown’ (Saward 2017). Despite the negative connotation of
falsifiability and adversity in political deliberation prevalent in public forums, performative
context entails a commitment to democratic principles of publicity and accountability that
ground legitimatisation of representative rule. Performative context underlines the elements
of deliberative representation that acknowledges how politics is about justifying decisions,
contesting discursive frames and providing avenues for new ideas and agendas. For this
reason, I propose we call the prevailing style of deliberation in the performative context the
expressive-partisan mode of deliberation.
The distributive or sequenced idea of deliberation (Goodin 2005; 2008b; Bächtiger and
others 2010) forms the broad theoretical background in the analysis of deliberative
representation that I approach through the affirmative, operative and performative contexts.
The approach is supported by the timely view that deliberative theory makes ‘a common
mistake’ if it tries to ‘”box” specific situations and institutional arrangements into fixed
action logics’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 42). Curiously, even though Goodin briefly
mentions legislative committees he leaves them out from his exploration of sequenced
deliberative tasks. I will fill this gap and place most of my discussion on the operative
context into the committee stage. Within a legislature, I argue that the governing functions
as ‘getting things done’ also find home in the committee room. The affirmative context
handles the caucus room deliberation, which in this case translates into parliamentary party
group meetings. Finally, the performative context mainly circulates around the plenary that
is dominated by the campaigning and partisan oriented functions. Downside of these neat
typologies is that real-life accounts are much messier. But the basic outline is applicable and
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aligned: when representatives talk about the many trade-offs and contingencies that they are
bound to meet and negotiate with others (and inside one’s own head), the proposed contexts
provide an analytical frame through which these actions can be described and explained.
Finally, the analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates the interconnectedness of
these contexts. Approaching deliberative representation through contexts allows capturing
the “flow” of deliberative processes within a legislature. As such, it provides much needed
understanding of institutional deliberation. Representative contexts are not only linked to
spatial (i.e. public–private) or institutional (differences in political and electoral system)
references, but also to functional considerations: what is representation expected to ‘do’ in
each context? While the performative context will restate much of what is already known
about pejorative strategic orientation of political deliberation, many important legislative
processes escape from this rigid view but are then captured by the affirmative and operative
contexts. What is regarded as strategic use of deliberation may echo or resonate differently
in these other contexts. It also tells us how the institutional settings guide deliberation in
different ways. At the same time, we can expect a kind of ‘path dependency’ to manifest
between the spatial contexts–something that representatives utilise in different ways
depending on their purposes and aims. Intentions that are not necessarily deliberative in the
first place ‘can produce dynamics that are deliberative in function’, as Warren (2007, 278,
rf. Bächtiger et al. 2010, 44) nicely puts it. It is important to acknowledge that while contexts
can accommodate different kinds of political practices (deliberation being one of them)
(Warren 2017, 39), not all actors use them for same purposes. Often, the most interesting
accounts arise when a representative interprets contexts and situations differently and breaks
away from what is usually expected.
For the time being, the analytical dimensions of deliberative representation can be
summarized in the following table:
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Table 1. Deliberative representation in parliament
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4.1 Affirmative context
Affirmative context enables us to get a grip on the character of judgment and the part it
plays in legislative practices. It makes it possible to pay attention to the uncertainties of
policy-making and to show the appropriate discretion by also allowing unwavering devotion
and duty to shine through; politics, after all, is a passionate sport. This context is also the
domain of moral and value-based convictions, and of questions of conscience to which party
discipline does not apply. The process of affirmation entails taking a deliberative position
most clearly when it involves scrutiny of how opinions are formed. It concerns what Goodin
(2000) describes as ‘deliberation within’–that is, weighing matters in one’s own mind. This
is not inertia but rather its opposite, as it affirms the inclusion of others by acknowledging
and recognizing perspectives and opinions of others. It also indicates open-mindedness
when it comes to considering the value of these other opinions.
The affirmative context of deliberative representation leads us to consider a less-noticed
perspective of democratic representation, which is that in specific legislative settings
representative actors also represent to each other as well as representing each other. This
notion allows us to approach legislative behaviour and parliamentary deliberation from an
alternative and somewhat provocative perspective. What this indicates, and what affirmative
context offers up for analysis, is that deliberative representation is a constructivist praxis
rendered to others for judgment. As such, the idea of deliberative representation affirms and
assumes the presence of other people whom one deliberates with, and whose contributions
to the deliberation one listens to. Moreover, deliberative representation articulates an
interpersonal setting, despite also involving what Habermas called ‘ideal role-taking’. Put
briefly, it forces a person to put themselves in another person’s place, figuratively speaking,
as an imaginative operation that also paves the way for virtues such as empathy and respect.
If one wishes to think in temporal sequences, affirmative context often precedes
operative and performative contexts. However, contexts are overlapping and inclusive in
the sense that in their work members of parliament make use of and toggle between the
features available within the various contexts each according to their own best, and
sometimes worst, judgment and discretion. The way I treat affirmative context is perhaps
most central in looking at individual capabilities and capacities for reflection. For this
reason, in this subchapter I will discuss the role of expertise and committee memberships,
which both bring forward particular epistemic credentials. As such, this knowledge and the
facilitated interactions highlight the functions of affirmation, validation and
accommodation. And from an institutional perspective, we know that this kind of reflective
character of legislatures is not only functionally, but also spatially dispersed. As I will show,
parliamentary party groups (PPGs) are central actors within this context, emphasising the
need to get everybody on board.
Even though rationalist and liberal approaches take strategic and interest maximising
orientation to democratic politics as their starting point, not everything will be acceptable:
“offers”, in relation to bargaining or other kinds of collective interactions, can be turned
down. The affirmative context addresses deliberative interactions, but also collective action
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problems, from the perspective of how political opinions and viewpoints in some cases can
be rather non-existent or nascent.
In democratic politics and legislation, deliberation reifies choosing, or at least limiting
the available options and reducing the amount of contingency. Deliberation is a matter of
which opinions and positions are taken after they have been brought up, argued and
considered, preferably in an equal and balanced manner. In some sense, representation in
its simplest, liberal sense can be argued by taking a shortcut and avoid contingencies that
remain with deliberation (Przeworski 1998; Shapiro 1999). Through the novelty of
affirmative context, it becomes possible to theoretically satisfy the understanding about
deliberative representation by offering analysis on how collective dynamics, on one hand,
offer support to the representative. On the other hand, it imposes a considerable strain –
something that every MP needs to decipher and come in terms within their own work. The
final subsection will discuss the paradoxes of decision-making in more detail.
i Halls and walls
I want to begin with something that may seem odd, by explicitly acknowledging the spatial
feature in representative context as a physical structure. Democratic theory, often situates
discussions about discursive engagements in the virtual rather than in physical space
(Parkinson 2012). Both consciously and subconsciously, physical structuring and
organisation affect our behaviour and attitudes. Physical space can also be interpreted
(Yanow 2006a). Profoundly, halls and walls tell us who we are (Parkinson 2012; Judge and
Leston-Bandeira 2017).
The term ‘built environment’ or ‘built space’ is used when discussing matters of, for
example, how power relations are mediated in the physical world (Yanow 2006a). This is
evident in the way in which institutions (in the areas of education, healthcare, and also
political and administrative institutions) are physically designed to express and order power
relations and hierarchies (Judge and Leston-Bandeira 2017). Judge and Leston-Bandeira
(2017) argue that institutional representation is a neglected theme in the theorising of
political representation. They refer to the interpretative condition in symbolic representation
which makes it possible to understand how legislatures as buildings have various
connotations. Conveying the idea of something by reference to something else, as in the
case of a parliament standing for ‘the people’ or ‘the nation,’ is as one form of representing
(Rehfeld 2018).
Against this backdrop, it becomes evident how parliaments, understood as built
environments, connote similar symbolic features of power and hierarchy. An examination
of plenary venues, such as the plenary hall of Eduskuntatalo, the Finnish Parliament House,
shows that they are laid out in a way that serves a particular purpose. As the etymology of
the word parliament suggests, the archetypal function of representation comes from the
French parler or the Italian parlare: to induce talking, discussion and debate (on rhetorical
understanding of parliamentarism see Palonen 2004, 274). Here, the institutional
arrangements can arguably affect the ways the design of the plenary space is set out. For
example, the epitome of the Westminster parliamentary system of government, the British
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Houses of Parliament, have two opposing blocks of seats, hence showcasing the systemic
dynamics within the built environment. This design can be seen to promote or at least invoke
adversarial deliberation between the government and the opposition.
In contrast, the Eduskunta adopted a rather standard semi-circular seating model where
the political parties are seated directionally according to their position within the Left-Right
-scale (e.g., the Left Alliance is in the left from the Speaker of the House). In the Swedish
seat of parliament, the Riksdag, the overall floor plan is similar to the Finnish model except
that the members of parliament are seated according to their electoral districts (Strøm 1997,
169). Physical structuring encourages cross-party encounters and communication, as
members of opposing parties may be seated side by side. The Speaker of the Parliament is
physically segregated to the front of the plenary space (or in the middle), to highlight their
impartial role as well as their authority to control and monitor the deliberations. In general,
physical ordering of space and its inherent linkage to the status of the speaker is evident, for
example in the case of the ‘back-benchers’ in the Westminster system, the rank-and-file
representatives (who may include previously high-ranked MPs who have fallen out of
favour) and sit at the back. In the Eduskuntatalo, the seating order is organised so that new
MPs are first seated at the back, and advance towards the front, if they serve further terms.
Senior MPs can request to be seated elsewhere if they do not wish to sit in the front.
In the interviews conducted with the Finnish MPs, spatial notions of the plenary forum
were not mentioned at length. Some junior MPs, those seated at the back, speculated that
perhaps one reason for not being granted a turn to speak is that they sit too far back for the
Speaker of Parliament to be able to see them. However, the physical structures in committee
work were briefly indicated in the interviews by using phrases such as ‘being around the
same table’ and ‘shared table’. All the committees of the Finnish parliament, which typically
have 17 permanent members, have a large table with members of the government on one
side and members of the opposition on the other. In larger committees, such as the Finance
Committee, which has 40 members (deputy members also take part), the floor plan is similar
to the plenary hall, and the 25 members of the Grand Committee sit in a large circular
formation. External experts invited to give their testimony and statement on issues come
and sit at the same table with the Grand committee members, whereas in all other
committees they are seated outside the deliberating group. It seems natural to assume that
deliberation while seated at the same table enhances the sense of commonality and
cohesiveness.
Returning to the issue of the plenary hall, there were few descriptions by Finnish MPs
of feelings of excitement when entering the plenary hall for the first time after taking office.
Several interviewees described being impressed by their initial experience of the plenary
hall and, more importantly, by gaining the mandate to be present in the space were
something that some fondly reminisced. It must be noted that access to the floor of the
plenary hall is highly restricted in Eduskunta (apart from the opening and closing of the
annual sessions when the president delivers her speech): only elected MPs and a few
authorised parliament officials serving the plenary are allowed to enter the hall. This rule
applies to all other personnel, also when the parliament is not in session.
I want to read the above description as a short illustration of the spatially potentially
constitutive components of what makes representative a representative. For the MPs who
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recognised this notion, the mere presence in a physical space constituted them as elected
representatives. In this case, passive presence means that in limited cases an ‘act’ of political
representation does not require any particular activity–only presence suffices to legitimise
that position. The audience who knows the ‘rules’ of excluded entry, and by reading the
clues of built environment, recognises and acknowledges those people as legal and
legitimate representatives. The reading of the built environment enhances this notion as
many recognise the floor design of representative institutions regardless of the institutions
in question. Here, the notion of representation also draws from Pitkin’s (1967) standing for
-form since these relevant markers need to be ‘read’ to make sense. However, unlike in
descriptive representation, in symbolic representation there is a specific conveyance in the
physical features as markers of representation. A symbol fails or ceases to be a symbol; it
represents nothing if the signifiers are unknown.
The spatial notion of representation was not explicitly asked in the research interview
questions. However, it appeared in two different senses in the interview round conducted in
2016. Some MPs pointed out that because the plenary hall was under renovation until the
end of 2017, plenary sessions were held in a nearby location, on the premises of Sibelius
Academy, a music academy. It is situated in the adjacent building from the Finnish
Parliament. The design of the temporary plenary hall was considered inadequate, and was
considered not to permit the natural flow of discussion and debate. As the design was similar
to a large lecture room, addresses were not given from the podium at the front were hard to
follow or even hear. Another remark regarding the deficiencies of the temporary plenary
was that the non-elevated, flat floor made it even more difficult to be granted a turn to speak
from the Speaker.
In addition, the lack of a semi-circular design was considered to prohibit the flow of
natural debate, since addressing fellow MPs is more difficult (officially, of course, all
addresses are directed to the Speaker). In most cases speakers ended up having to talk from
behind the backs of other MPs. A few of the MPs interviewed felt that the reason for the
lowering of deliberative standards in the plenary was partly due to the substitute plenary
hall. The classroom type and plain surroundings were thought to encourage restless and
disrespectful behaviour which more readily polarise positional deliberation.
Regardless of the scarcity of these accounts in the interviews themselves what is
valuable is that they support the argument that spatial context also lends resources for and
guides deliberative acts. The spatial structure entails an affirming feature. It is a worthy yet
neglected task to also pay attention to the physical place where deliberation takes place. It
can incentivise action and guide our operational attitudes. In this research it is indicated in
the sentiments that are drawn from being in the plenary hall, and in social interactions within
the premises of the Finnish Parliament (e.g., sharing a table in a committee or a canteen;
taking a sauna; partaking in clubs). On the large democratic scale physical structures most
likely are relevant since they affect political participation and opinions about others. For our
current purposes, the idea that spatial context often entails cues for reading off
representation from the walls and halls ushers us forward to the next interrelated topic. It
addresses further constitutive character available in notions of becoming a representative.
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ii Representing to and with each other
The plenary hall discussed above as a spatial structure was tied to constituting the role of
democratic representative as an elected member of the parliament. How to go about after
this affirmative moment is, however, left open. One MP (III: 22: 2:19) put it figuratively:
‘Every parliamentary term there are 200 different stories, everyone does it [i.e. plays the
role of MP] on their own terms, and there is no one right way to do it’. Despite this
diversified existential condition–something that is touched on in other interviews as well–
relating to how MPs themselves define their task, institutional norms and practices set some
standards for and expectations of their conduct. I will discuss these throughout this research.
Even though the kind of ‘rules and procedure-centred view’ can be criticised, it helps us to
understand why some positions in institutional deliberations are captured as if actors would
be unitary, thus acting with a unified purpose (Goodin 2005, 186). The assumption
reflecting the ‘unitary model of deliberation’ are to some extent in place when we discuss
some of the institutionalised roles later. Additionally, however, there exists a certain kind
of affirmative representative ethos that can be explored and analysed through the idea of
context.
For example, the constitutive setting described and perceived through the plenary hall
shows us that MPs can be treated as a unitary actor in some restricted cases. Here, just by
being allowed in the space they are not distinguished from one another but are treated
equally as elected representatives. This implicit understanding among MPs forms a crucial
“meta-consensus”, a deep-down shared view of the appreciation of each mandate that is
bestowed on MPs by the electorate. This analysis reflects the profound principle of equality
of wills of representative government: all representatives are equal regarding their
representation. It gives deliberation an agreement- and consent-seeking role, which comes
together in the institution of a representative assembly (Manin 1994; 1997). Despite the
political conflicts and pressures that MPs are subject to, this meta-consensus of equality
seems to affect how democratic conflict is dealt with in a legislature (see also Kontula 2018).
I want to show that there is more tangible evidence for the unitary view in the interviews.
It derives from the elemental recognition that authorised representative mandate to rule is
inalienable and indivisible. One of the most tangible demonstrations of this is the practice
of always addressing representatives by their surname. Doing this and preceding it with
‘representative’ (similar to ‘honourable’) indicates that the person being addressed or
referred to is a member of the parliament and a representative of the people. Without much
exception, it is in place throughout the house. We could argue that it has an illocutionary
capacity. Following Pitkin’s definition, invoking the notion of ‘representative’ gives the
otherwise absent represented presence in the action itself. For this reason, as equals, they
are also the tokens for representative ideas, interests, and constituencies: as representatives,
they represent the people, not themselves. While doing this, they represent the institution to
each other as well as to the public.
It is not a major revelation to say that formality in legislative conduct is an institutional
practice that aims at detaching the persona from the position. Explicit reference to the
position of a representative also ascribes to those certain expectations that being a
representative entails. Therefore, in the backdrop of the democratic task of ruling in the state
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of disagreement typical to pluralist societies, representatives are expected to carry out many
sorts of tasks that relate to negotiating and settling those disagreements through the
legislative process. When deliberating, they cannot completely cut off these premises of
governing that include dealing with interests and preferences. It is up to every MP to decide
how to acknowledge, treat or allow these to affect the forming and articulation of their own
opinions. As briefly mentioned above, some formal positions within the legislature form
institutionalised internal expectations. They are more rigid in the sense that they guide and
restrict the actions of those holding these positions. For example, committee chairs are
expected to deliberate with impartial tones in the plenary sessions, but it also applies to
some extent to the committee as well. This overlapping setting is prone to some tensions
that derive from these differing expectations.
Expectations regarding forms of conduct are significant in public appearances also. For
this reason, disrespectful language, pandering, and features of plebiscitary rhetoric caused
some MPs to worry about the impression this gives to the public. When representatives
misbehave, whether in or out of the parliament, they can be thought to represent the
institution badly.
What we need to remember […] is that every MP represents the Parliament
[Eduskunta]. We are not only representing ourselves and our own party, but also
the Parliament as an institution25. The rougher the language we use, the more
graceless we are towards each other, the more it labels the whole institution, the
Parliament in this case. Everyone should understand that you don’t just represent
so that me-me-me as an MP, and me-me-me as member of this group, and me-
me-me-as the chair of this committee. But when you represent that whole folk
that has been before me and who comes after me, then everyone carries a
responsibility for that piece of history that is written about it. You can use
colourful language, but you cannot be distasteful, and you cannot purposely
offend anyone. (III: 22: 15:02)
These brief descriptions seemed to hide the unspoken question that is linked to
reflections about institutional representation. MPs seem to give some thought to what does
tells of the state of the country’s democracy when representatives behave and talk the way
they do. Also, in describing the lack of appreciation for politicians, while at the same time
endorsing polarised and pejorative deliberative modes, they contribute to reinforcing this
negative image. For the representatives, these dynamics involve and can be explained by
the role of the media. The performative context in which I situate these elements into will
be discussed in 4.3. but related notions are examined throughout the text.
What else is referred to by the official recognition of each Finnish parliamentarian
(kansanedustaja, literally ‘representative of the people’)? When analysed through the
internal practice but considered on a general level, reliance on the formal status explicitly
indicates that instead of ‘Tom’, to utilize Rehfeld’s example again, it is ‘representative
Tomsson’ who is expected to consider and deliberate on the legislative matter. This view is
available in the interview captions where MPs underline the sustenance of civilised and
25 All underlined sentences in all citations presented in this research are my emphasis, and do not suggest
an original emphasis made by the interviewee in the interview situations. These are only meant for assisting
the reader to find the relevant point efficiently, especially with longer citations.
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respectful conduct. Ideally, premises of legislative deliberation concur with what
deliberative democracy is also advocating in terms of equality and respect. When
underlining the significance of respect, one MP (II: 9-2: 3:48) specified it in terms of
[R]especting other’s opinions, give other a turn to speak and address each other formally.
The deliberative norm of respectfulness postulates the democratic stance that makes the
person a tool for representative rule. The norms are also constant reminders to the MPs that
when they represent and deliberate with one and another, they are at the same time
representing the representative democratic institution (in the thinnest sense of seeing
representation as authorisation).
Regardless of the expected normativised conduct, what kind of ‘mindset’ (Gutmann and
Thompson 2012) a representative operates with makes a difference. In this, personality
counts a lot, according to the interviews. One MP (II: 4: 15:47) emphasised, contrary to
some others’ remarks, that the saying ‘issues argue against each other, not people’ could not
be more wrong. Deliberation and representation take place in a dynamic interaction with
contexts and more importantly, with people. Therefore, if one is engaging in the legislative
process with people who are ready to put up a fight immediately, the constructive and
discursive type of politics is highly constricted. And vice versa: if people get along,
cooperation comes easy. Most likely this kind of adversarial mindset would not be open to
hearing others’ arguments or otherwise demonstrate reciprocity in accommodating others’
perspectives in forming opinions. Affirmative context would not be applicable if legislators
did not feel that their perspectives or opinions should become revised or reaffirmed when
hearing what others have to say. In other words, the institutional context that differentiates
between the discursive and positional logics holds ground in incentivising actors (Schäfer
2017). However, it cannot exhaust the analysis when taking into account the interactive
perspective. In order to grasp what the dynamics with ‘practices of communication (ibid.,
427) are, the contextual feature needs more clarification.
I propose two less-discussed perspectives on democratic representation that can be found
in the idea of deliberative representation. The first states a specific dynamic available within
representative institutions, and the second discusses the facilitation of it. When operating in
legislatures, representatives also represent to each other. This perspective does not discredit
or bypass democratic inclinations of rule of the people. On the contrary, it provides an
analytical layer for further inquiries into political deliberation in a concrete legislative
forum. What does it mean when representatives represent to each other? One way to argue
for this somewhat provocative claim is by following the argumentation of ‘politics of
presence’ put forward by Anne Phillips (1995). It is not an endorsement for descriptive
representation but a stepping-stone for explaining how, through presence, ‘politics of ideas’
come to be. This view is transferable to a practical legislative setting when we think of
representative ‘bodies’. The kind of ‘materialism’ is perhaps more recognised in
deliberative theory. Deliberation is thought of as an intersubjective act that takes between
two or more people. The whole ethos of deliberative theory is built on addressing and
recognising this relationship which facilitates the whole deliberative process and adds an
ethical perspective to it.
For the assembly to succeed in its tasks of legislating, its members must be able to
associate and to cooperate with one another, at least to some minimum degree. Accordingly,
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within these institutional boundaries the question of to whom representation is made, and
who judges it, are not always the represented but instead other representatives. In general,
passing issues, attaining consent as an assembly as a whole (through legitimate procedures),
requires that one is willing to engage with others. ‘This is work between people’, as one
interviewee summarised it (III: 26: 1:07:48).
This leads to my second suggestion, already stated: instead of exploring the more
common question of what is represented, here we are after analysing how a certain thing is
represented. I claim that the question of how something or someone is represented is
immanent in the criteria for judging political representation: the represented warrant a
presence in the action of democratic representation. What the represented want that
(presence) to be or manifest, differs, naturally. Whatever that may be, presumably the desire
is for it to be done well. We want our representatives to strive in their office. From a
democratic standpoint it would be self-contradictory to choose a representative only to want
to see them act poorly and fail. Crucially, this kind of ‘normative’ viewpoint adds a plausible
level to the current discussions on representation. It also connects with deliberation when
seeing it as the main medium through which representation is carried out. I also suggest that
this aspirational idea is already included in all the new theorising: ‘mobilising’,
‘representing’ or ‘claim-making’ which as activities, are taken on for the simple reason of
hoping it, as accounts of representation, to be successful. This goal-oriented perspective or
incentive, to be discussed further in the next subchapter on operative context, is not well
articulated in the current theory.
However, a results-based understanding of democratic legitimacy, available for example
in the issue congruency idea of representation, is not what I have in mind here. Instead of
such, what could be called ‘output representation’, what I am after when arguing for the
perspective of performance is more what Mansbridge (2009; 2016) envisions with her
selection model of representation. To me, the foundations for performance derive from
selection of representatives that also highlights the persona of the representative. Therefore,
the selection model of representation places more theoretical emphasis on the premise of
‘what goes in’ rather than ‘what comes out’. When electorates choose their representatives,
the process of sorting and selecting plausible candidates involves many kinds of scrutiny
and judgment. Getting a sense of what kind of a person a representative candidate is can be
a viable indicator of one’s legislative performance. The novelty of selection model also
reaches well beyond the trustee-delegate dyad. As such, it pays attention to assessing
candidate’s capabilities for deliberation in which, for example, gyroscopic representatives
would most likely excel (Mansbridge 2003).
In practice, when MPs go about representing in the legislature, they become subject to
other representatives’ scrutiny and judgment–just as they would be to the electorate,
represented. For this reason, these interactions also assume the meaning of deliberative
accounts accordingly: that representatives reason with each other and provide justifications,
and at best, in ways that can contribute to constructive politics. However, it is the power-
seeking aspect of political life that tends to reduce the scholarship on legislative behaviour
and consequent deliberation to mere strategic-partisan operations. Along these lines,
institutional framework is often highlighted. It is seen to counterbalance and restrain most
severe positional and contestant power plays when it forces actors to deliberate as a unitary
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actor, and thus according to the rules. In any case, taking strategic (or even manipulative)
orientations as face value can disregard or overshadow other factors that relate to integrating
and accommodating policy-making. For this reason I have specifically raised the notion of
affirmation under exploration. However, the institutional context within which the
availability of discursive and positional logics can be negotiated should be complemented
also with views that are sensitive to which functions are to be accomplished in each.
Representatives are very attuned with functional differentiation of representative
contexts. The contexts relate to the question of how one carries on representing. Outside the
plenary hall and when the media is not present Eduskunta is ‘such a collegial and friendly
institution’, where staff and representatives ‘across the party lines are very friendly to each
other’ (III: 9: 8:50). Adopting the ‘mindless plenary rhetoric’ in one-on-one situations or in
the committee raises criticism as it challenges  the inexplicit understanding of what is
achievable  in each context. Persuasion and convincing others do take place within
legislatures but not with the kind of style that is ‘theatrical and flat’ (ibid.)
Representatives understand the pressure-filled environment that they work in. One MP
(III: 22: 13:22) explained that the Parliament forms a ‘curious world’ that makes it possible
to relate to each other’s positions, spurring solidarity: ‘[y]ou shouldn’t laugh when your
neighbour’s sauna is on fire, when it could be your sauna catching fire next’. It must be
noted, however, that this kind of gesture of sympathy can also demonstrate a strategically
wise move in a political system that creates large coalition governments. Cross-partisan and
interparty cooperation is a necessity, and therefore knowingly lessening your desirability as
a coalition partner is something that is kept in check. Rejoicing over others’ failures and
corresponding ridicule as an argumentative, rhetorical tactic is part of adversary discourse
that is difficult to erase from public deliberative venues. However, if the performative
element of ridicule and the like is transferred to other legislative settings, which I discuss as
questions of affirmative and operative context–the consequences are different.
Awareness of such an ethos as an application of successful representing converge with
Cameron’s (2018) argument on the value of practical wisdom. A prudent representative can
and should pursue one’s goals, but can also put these matters in perspective. As with
compromises in politics, this kind of weighing and accommodation can easily invite
accusations of abandoning or selling out principles. Here, it is meant that choosing the best
practice how to mediate and judge the course of action. Inhabiting a political office does not
come with a guidebook, as Cameron (2018) notes. ‘Effectiveness’, writes Cameron (2018,
153, emphasis added) ‘is a matter of converting capabilities […] into functionings.’ It means
knowing when to do what and how. Crucially, it is also very much about putting one’s
expertise to good use, learning the ‘ways of the house’ but also being mindful and respectful
of others. Display of respect is also a matter of rationing the time one spends talking. As
Pekonen (2011, 184–86) rightly notes, silence also ‘talks’. It means that some people ‘take
a lot of space’ (II: 8: 10:04) which can make it difficult for others to listen to them. Some
MPs are more extensive in their deliberations, which is a plainly a euphemism for saying
that some simply talk too much. Here this notion refers to the committee sessions where
short and concise argumentation is preferred, but the same analysis is available also in the
performative context. According to the MPs, when presenting opinions and arguments there
is a delicate balancing act between the affirmative and performative context, between one’s
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contribution being interpreted as mutually beneficial and modest, thus seeking affirmation,
or its being interpreted as merely making a case for oneself.
Of course we have people everywhere who always want to make themselves
heard all the time and always tell what their opinion is. But in politics I’ve also
noticed that sometimes you must just listen what the other has to say and
comment on that, rather than making a huge deal about how knowledgeable you
are in this area. (I: 1: 1:27:05)
**
And also, those personal relations have an effect there [in the committee]. Those
people who have driven themselves onto the political sidelines in some
committees have it really difficult regardless of how they present fact-based
arguments. No-one cares anymore, and no-one notices them. (II: 1: 3:41)
While it may be too much to suggest that in a particular, theoretical sense, as argued
above, a representative fails in their task when they refuse to recognise other people (or
otherwise don’t comply with the implicit norms), how representatives operate socially with
one another–how they represent, in practice–is not democratically insignificant. As one
interviewee put it (III: 14: 53:35):
Even though all MPs have the same mandate, inevitable dynamics appear where
someone has more power than others. And it doesn’t necessarily relate to your
formal position but to how you use that talk. And how you act.
Ending up on the sidelines is not only a question of social skills but also a signal of one’s
ability to work in a group. As said, while interviewed MPs were very reserved in criticising
their colleagues out of solidarity, they give a lot of thought to in what manner they proceed
towards their political goals.
Succeeding in the affirmative context, using it as a venue for building up your expertise
as well as career, might not be enough. Being popular and respected by your colleagues,
considering the perspectives of adversaries and deliberating with them respectfully, do not
in themselves get you re-elected. Aspects of affirmative context, discursive practices of
building up opinions and reaffirming them through the interchange of perspectives with
other MPs, do not automatically transform into votes. This is a paradox all representatives
face to some extent, and especially those who are not in the public limelight daily. One must
be able to penetrate the opaqueness of parliamentary work. This is one of the biggest
dilemmas many representatives face: gaining credibility within the legislature while
succeeding in communicating the fruits of one’s work publicly. Arguably, considered from
a strategic point of view the logics of affirmative and performative context are mutually
somewhat exclusive. Both these notions are brought up in the following exchanges:
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Respondent: If you gain a reputable status in the committee, use it right and
tactfully and are worthy of colleagues’ trust, then you succeed in the Parliament.
It is not in the plenary but in the committees where you create your prestige, in
my opinion. And which is in fact the most important thing if you want to advance
your own political goals.
Interviewer: What skills or abilities do you need to obtain that prestige?
Respondent: Personal skills, social skills, trustworthiness, stoutness and
expertise. (I: 10: 13:16)
**
Interviewer: But isn’t it a bit challenging when you know that within the house
there are those ‘workhorses’ who work a lot and are appreciated by colleagues
across party lines. But they are not those who would be re-elected… or those
who don’t get those positions?
Respondent: Yes, yes, there are a lot of problems there. Or then they get them
those good positions in those trusted places, but they are necessarily those who
are those so-called media-sexy people who present themselves to the media
outside Parliament House. And it’s really a pity, when you learn to know people
inside the Parliament, and you get to know whom you can trust, and who you
can collaborate with across party lines. Then someone happens to lose their seat
in the elections. It feels like, “how could the voters not have noticed this person
who’s absolutely fabulous and who should have definitely been re-elected for
another term?” Then comes in someone–without judging these representatives–
someone who is not at all in the same league, who has jumped on the media
wagon, but everyone knows that you don’t see them much in the committees,
for example. (III: 20: 1:30:53)
In this subsection, I have introduced the basic deliberative setting in place within
legislature where representatives practically engage with each other. It highlights how in
social interactions respect and recognising one another facilitate the representing we discuss
here. The analysis offered resonates with Fenno’s original argument, something that
Bessette (1994) and Cameron (2018) also point to: legislative influence is not merely a
matter of power plays oriented towards re-election. More importantly, gaining prestige and
trust within the house is a question of how one manages these crucial deliberative
interactions with others. Before moving on to party dynamics and cooperative aspects of
legislative work, the notion of expertise needs to be analysed, because together with the
concept of trust it lays the foundation for the division of labour. For the MPs, gaining
expertise is an asset that benefits multiple partners, and not only the individual.
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iii Expertise and credibility
The vital parliamentary functions of oversight and control over the executive require that
legislatures have sufficient informational capacities. Recently, the notion of ‘institutional
deliberation’ was connected to the ‘epistemic performance’ of the legislature (Quirk,
Bendix, and Bächtiger 2018). Touching on the significance of information and expertise
bear significance regarding deliberative representation: they can point out the ways in which
opinions, interests and perspectives come to being.
The kind of interdependency corresponds to the legislature as a whole. Building up the
expertise through specialised committee system help resisting the asymmetry in resources
also regarding drafting legislation. As we know, parliaments differ in their institutional
prerogative to alter bills proposed by the government. Parliament of Finland has been
classified as ‘policy-influencing legislature’. Unlike ‘policy-making legislature’, it
practically cannot completely revise bills and substitute them with its own proposals. But it
has enough powers to modify them unlike those legislatures that cannot ensue policy effects.
(Raunio and Wiberg 2014, 31.) The drafting authority of the Parliament of Finland is,
however, considerate (Mattson and Strøm 1995, 298–99). In any case, Finnish
parliamentary politics is very much ‘led from the front’, that is, the executive holds agenda-
setting power over the Parliament. We could argue that the citizens’ initiative, in effect since
2012, can be seen as a way to introduce issues on the political agenda of the parliament,
thus bypassing the executive.
Within this backdrop, expertise provided by the work done in specialised committees is
not only instrumental to parliamentary functions but is also meaningful to parliamentary
parties, not to mention the individual representative. What motivates MPs to become a
member of particular committees? For individual MPs, committee memberships are
important for their representative identity-building capacities. Committee memberships
boost the activity of representing and affirming in many ways. Gaining substantial
knowledge and understanding of the policy field and ongoing legislative processes are
resources to be applied in legislation. Committee work provides at its best an invigorating
sphere to become an expert and use the accumulated knowledge in all the instances when
MPs are expected to deliver, justify and defend opinions and political stances.
In addition, through committees MPs can advance the interests their supporters find
important. From an individualist perspective, since detailed drafting legislation takes place
in committees, influencing it from the outside is very difficult for an individual MP. Unless
supported by a powerful network, one needs to become a member of the committee.
Memberships and the knowledge brought along can be a valuable resource when
communicating to the public about a particular legislative matter. As members can also
obtain detailed knowledge of the administrative plans regarding policy processes in the
future, MPs can develop a profile in the media as experts in that field. Expertise such as this
can benefit also the political party in question thus attract new supporters.
The first set of interviews (marked I) set out to ask after the (gendered) dynamics of
committee assignments and placements. They reveal that the ‘wish lists’ by the
representatives turned in at the beginning of the parliamentary term favour the high-profile
committees, most notably the Finance Committee (in charge of the budget), the Grand
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Committee (responsible for Finland’s EU policy), or the Constitutional Law Committee (a
‘non-political’ yet respected committee scrutinising the constitutional validity of
legislation). According to the interviewees, the desirability of the committee is not only
linked to the overall status of the committee but also to the function of allocation of funds
or resources. Summarising the criteria for the most-valued committees, one interviewee
stated that the Grand Committee and Finance Committee were the two most important
regarding decision-making on the allocation of funds or Finland’s relations with other
countries or its status in the world. (I: 14: 64:22). It makes some committees more attractive
from a partisan perspective.
These circumstances shed some light on the undeniable internal hierarchy that exists
between the committees. The Legal Affairs Committee, referred to in the interviews as the
‘Siberia of the Finnish Parliament’ (III: 2) or ‘the sweatshop’, partly due to its high workload
and ‘schooling’ of new MPs, remains one of the least popular choices. At the other extreme
is the Finance Committee, which one interviewer referred to ‘the crown jewel’ of
parliamentary committees (I: 1). The Finance Committee oversees the budget, and even
though the parameters up to which the budget can be altered are very much dictated by the
Ministry of Finance, there is some small amount of leeway for Parliament to influence
spending. The Finance Committee decides on the allocation of these funds (based on budget
proposals by the MPs–interestingly, some government MPs were advised to abstain from
proposing them in order to not to dismantle the united government front.).
By contrast, the Legal Affairs Committee produces very little legislation that involves
allocating funds. Two of parliamentary committees produce no legislation, which gives
them their own places in the hierarchy in the eyes of parliamentarians. Interviewees who
have worked in the Committee for the Future found it invigorating, but added that the
committee attracts ‘daydreamers’ (I: 8), whereas the Audit Committee, which in the words
of one interviewee acts as the ‘conscience of the Parliament’ (III: 29), nowadays appeals to
senior politicians also.
To portray the urgency and societal significance of particular policy areas that
committees are responsible for–how their imposed legislation affects the citizen–one MP
(II: 10: 11:32) contrasted the role of the Social and Health Committee by stating that ‘we
don’t make decisions on whether the seatbelt is put on from this side or that side’. This
representative narrates the idea that notwithstanding the epistemic gratification in partaking
in whichever committee an MP finds personal or other interest due to prior working life
experience (attributes that build up one’s expert reputation within the house), there is this
endemic drive to make a difference. Making an impact can be viewed through linkage to
constituencies. Some committees, like the Grand Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee
and the Defence Committee to some extent, operate more on the basis of general ‘national
interests’. But many others handle policies that have tangible geographic implications thus
district-bound interests. Decisions on educative institutions, health care units, as well as
traffic and transportation, have grasping effect on citizens. There is a clear division in the
modus operandi with MPs from ‘counties’, i.e. outside capital region (or other major city
hubs), and those who are not.
In general, specialisation and selection seem to be tenets for credible legislative work.
Also, what MPs describe ‘prioritisation’ is just a euphemism for what you can neglect, was
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how one interviewee (III: 28: 17:30) put it. My general impression is that many
representatives are shadowed by constant guilt and frustration of not getting enough work
done regardless of pulling very long days. As with rationing one’s deliberation in terms of
not being vocal all the time, the same kind of judgement seems advisable with issues in
general. What is essential is to ‘choose your battles’, as one MP (III: 26: 1:03:12) said,
‘since you cannot have an influence on everything. Instead you must choose the issues where
you want to make an impact. And then do that work to the maximum’.
Acceptance of the practically constricted and confined nature of representing is the best
currency in a legislature. Aiming to have an impact on all matters, and seizing all
opportunities for deliberating on them, translates into an action logics that prefers quantity
over quality. The main argument here is that in order to do your work well, you need to be
able to focus, otherwise there is a risk of losing credibility among colleagues: ‘it’s no use
scurrying around in every direction’ (III: 15: 32:33). Of course, here one must also consider
the alternative, opposite interpretation: that interviewees are creating a consistent argument
for not doing their work properly when in between the lines criticise those who do not.
Instead, I read it as an occurrence of overlapping contexts of representation that are always
available. Performative context is the domain that mainly attends the public and partisan
features. It serves the reasonable expectation of the general public that their representatives
are doing their work to the fullest. The performative context, to which the kind of hustling
mentioned above refers to, enables testifying and affirming that representing is ‘being done’.
It gives out an impression of an effective representative. Within the house, however, it can
be a sign of a hyperpartisan representative. As we will see later, the internal affirmation
functions of seeking assurance and weighing arguments in a non-strategic manner are most
often discarded in the performative context. However, the affirmative context ascribes to a
more considerate and prudent take on deliberations. Consideration to which this mindset
implies to necessitate that one deliberatively controls showing off: being more mindful and
selective in what and when issues are brought up, and the manner of doing do.
This bears resemblance to how expertise can be demonstrated. From the perspective of
representatives, there is a normative difference in being a representative and performing (as
one even though everyone recognises the necessity and urgency of the latter). Similarly,
there is a difference in being an expert and pretending to be one. The distinction is
perceivable mainly only by other representatives, in the sense that they represent to each
other. Unfortunately we do not have authentic recordings from legislative venues to pinpoint
addresses where this distinction would be available. However, the following citation shows
that the contexts of representation are connected, and the notion of expertise travel through
them. Overall, the interviews acknowledge that expertise needs to be adjusted according to
the context and that justifications need to be elaborated publicly. However, when taking the
perspective of representatives representing to each other, one cannot expect to get away
with flimsy argumentation, even if that works in other settings.
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To me it’s perfectly clear that one who doesn’t do any work in the committee,
and a representative is not doing his job if he fails in that work or neglects to do
it. He is not knowledgeable in any area. He doesn’t know anything; he just talks
hot air when speaking in the plenary sessions. He doesn’t even understand his
own district’s issues. He jumps straight into an obscure question or is completely
off, to be honest. And it’s evident that [MPs] like that haven’t actually done any
committee work, and have never done any preparation–other than babbling on
about the same things as always. But you can get by with that, of course. I do
take it as a profound question. What remains from the work that MPs do, when
thinking of its substance, if these activities are not carried out? (III: 4: 1:23)
Although several interviewees duly highlighted the fact that expertise benefits multiple
parties, also some reservations were brought up. There are limits to expertise. The
accumulation of certain professions in a committee, by one’s own personal choice or by
PPG assignment, orbiting towards the corresponding committee is not unconditionally
perceived only as a positive tendency. When discussing the implication of committee
composition in such an accumulation of specialised expertise supports the gathering of
policy-specific information and often first-hand knowledge and experience. The downside
is that centralisation may go too far to the detriment of the range of perspectives. The
vertical, in-depth expertise may be significant but the horizontal direction, the breadth of
perspectives can be modest. What this means is that the scope of representation narrows
down while the quality of deliberative justifications might be expansive. According to the
MPs, the handling of legislative issues should not be limited only to the scrutiny of those
professional, vertical perspectives since the goal would be about reaching of general
understanding of all possible perspectives and implications that the law influences. As one
said, ‘professionals usually get entangled in their own area… they start circulating around
their own noses (I: 8: 11:4).
On a different level, yet along the same lines, sympathies towards ‘epistocracy’ are faced
with counterarguments that touch the core of democratic parliamentary politics.
Parliamentary politics is about reason-giving and weighing perspectives and not truths, as
epistemic tenants. When MPs argue with each other, each perspective should be backed up
by and justified through factual knowledge. Even though here the respective argument is
more empirically grounded, on theoretical level operating with ‘truths’ (as Ankermittian
descriptive mimesis) leave no conceptual space for representation. Representations, as
claims or re-presentations, facilitate the process of weighing and debating. The affirmative
context would become dispensable if no reflexivity were necessary. Regardless of
Landemore’s (2017b) convincing analysis of deliberative theory’s mixed inclination
towards truth-claims, from the perspective of what we are arguing here for the constitutive
nature of representation, the aspiration for truth is incompatible. This theme is far too
expansive to discuss in detail within this research, but it is worthwhile to acknowledge it as
we move on to discuss the committee sessions, how this epistemic backdrop becomes even
more pressing.
When political realities are negotiable in the absence of truths, but at the same time
expertise is valued, what is thought of as being ‘political’ is even more strongly conveyed
in parliamentary work. This notion is something that should be kept in the back of one’s
mind as we advance further in the analysis. The constitutive conception subscribes to a sense
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of ‘political artistry’ (Severs, Celis, and Meier 2014, 619). One first-term MP spontaneously
began the interview by mentioning the creative work that representatives engage in. Instead
of the framing of expert work more commonly assumed in the interviews, this MP
delightedly described:
It has amazed me as well, when I had thought that poets, stage and visual artists,
writers and rock musicians are those who do creative work. But the work of a
representative, that is truly creative! You can pretty far define yourself how you
do it, using your own persona. You can showcase your strengths in all possible
ways. I have often compared the Parliament of Finland to a theatre, because it
really is one, when you want to consider it that way. It’s a kind of improvising.
(III: 25: 36:48)
What is interesting in this above citation is the understanding that does not adhere to the
negative connotations of plenary as a theatre. Instead of making the common reference to
faking, the MP implies here to the idea that when it comes to political artistry the
‘performance’ is as real as any other. Therefore, it fits nicely to the constructivist and
aesthetic paradigm of representation when rendering representative practices, claims and
performances to the judgment of the audience. Through the process of assessment and
judgment the others–represented, the audience or the other representatives–have a
constitutive and legitimising quality to it, without which there would not be such a thing as
an artistry.
Another conveyed image brought up in the interviews regarded an ideal parliamentarian,
refined by knowledge and often by experience as well as long committee incumbency. Such
refinement often tends to refer to seniority. However, it tells us that representatives can
become experts in the field of representation which is enabled by parliamentary politics.
This ‘beauty of transformation’ is depicted on a positive note in the following citation:
[…] And I think that in parliamentarism, if we talk about this estrangement26 or
if it [Eduskunta] is a bubble or an institution, one of the most beautiful
[emphasised] aspects is that you can become a professional in being a
parliamentarian. Here I don’t mean a professional politician who can smile but
is a professional from the perspective of know-how. To me there is such beauty
in I when somebody in a wrong package, could be a nurse, could a ‘hayseed’ [a
farmer] or what not, and she has a tremendous ability to perceive the legislation
very broadly. […] MP [name withheld, committee chair]. Comes from a manual
worker background and is the most cultivated legislator. Absolutely magnificent.
The ability, when he gets a new document in front, the ability of perceive the
entirety and take everybody along to work on it. There is something scrumptious
about it when you have been refined there, that you have come from a factory or
behind a taxicab wheel or wherever you’ve come from, to the ways [of the
house] you become refined. To me that is what is brilliant about it. Then you get
to talk in the plenary, if there something to say. In that case it’s not empty talk.
(III: 20: 2:17:29)
26 The topic of estrangement relates to the questionnaire the MPs were delivered in the interviews.
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Arguably, committee memberships boost representation in the sense that MPs become
better and more refined as parliamentarians. This resource or capacity to represent extends
beyond the plebiscitary or geographically bound constituents’ preferences more towards
independent judgment on the public good or general interest. This discretion portrays, even
in its limitedness, a sort of impartiality or at least the ability to treat competing viewpoints
and implications in a more fair and balanced manner. This refinement crucially enables and
enforces deliberation that is grounded on the merits as well as demerits of legislation, and
is not partial or one-sided, either professionally or politically. As such, it does not fully yield
to strategic consideration of party and constituency dynamics. Relating to what Bessette
(1994, 135, emphasis added) writes, the mere strategic incentive of re-election lacks the
‘vocabulary’ of explaining why ‘legislators would choose substance over symbols, hard
work over posturing, or responsibility over popularity’.
Presumably, a few underlying reasons for any theoretical framework to give up on the
deliberative aspect of legislative activities could be relating to the following. Firstly, in the
case of deliberative democracy, parliamentary deliberations embedded in the respective
practices have been treated as a unitary phenomenon (Goodin 2005). With the aid of a
systems approach to deliberation combined with the sensitivity to context, deliberative
practices can be analysed in a manifold. Legislatures and other ‘parts’ of the deliberative
systems form their own deliberative ecologies within. Secondly, many of the dynamics of
judgment and discretion come to define the deliberative practices between the
representatives that are available for the represented. Representatives do not single-
handedly operate in an adversary setting that impoverish the deliberative landscape in
exchange for a strategic one. Instead, they systematically seek support and cooperation as
well from one another, also across the division of government and opposition. Arguably,
deliberative faculties are systemic when it comes to representing. Deliberative
representation covers this missing perspective, where representatives are drawn together for
the need of affirming and making up minds.
One very showcasing example of the differentiation that has implications to the
substance of deliberation is expertise. According to the interviews, the significance of
expertise hinges somewhere in between two extremes: one being ignorant and ditching
‘homework’ discussed earlier in a citation, and the other as too pure, hypopartisan expert.
The former does not need others thus comes out as self-sufficient which is not thought
credible, therefore counts as ‘posturing’. Another plausible viewpoint to expertise here is
hyperpartisanship, to use terminology by Cameron (2018). Hyperpartisan representative
might not be inclined to consider the viewpoints deriving from expertise, in the case it
hinders the chances of scoring a political point. The latter kind of representative lacks
necessary representative incentives and thus dismisses relevant orientations regarding
political representation within the legislature.
Conversely, the ideal parliamentarian who singles out the refining feature of
incumbency shows how the ability to reflect and negotiate various perspectives is deemed
important. Such endorsement does not mean that partisanship is rejected, but it is more
subtle. Those regarded as parliamentarians enjoy respect throughout the house, but skilled
and balanced use of expertise enable also deliberative accountability. Deliberative
accountability, or ‘discursive accountability’ as preferred by Dryzek (2010), hinges on the
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ability to communicate and justify made decisions and opinions to the constituencies. It
relies on experience but also subject-specific knowledge and expertise. Reasoning and
justifications are more legitimate when they are more considerate of the varying
perspectives and matters that are at stake, respectively.
In addition, expertise and endorsement of a relatively impartial perspective can affect
the dynamics of party representation, thus potentially reducing party allegiances. In the
framework of committee system committees can advance a ‘universalist’ position, acting as
the agent of the whole parliament (Mattson and Strøm 2004). So far this discussion has been
taken without the comprehensive and dictating notion of collective action. In practice,
however, the legislative performance and the successfulness of representing are also in the
hands of other representatives and political collectives. The dynamics of affirmation
regarding dealing with opinion-making gains more depth as we advance further. In the next
section, collective dynamics are brought together with expertise and experience–with the
potential for both cooperation and conflict.
iv Relying on others
When carrying out representative tasks, representatives also represent each other, which
heavily implies in practice that they deliberate on behalf of each other. This is plausible
point of departure that is not always considered. It is circumstantial to the fact that
representatives cannot attend to all matters they encounter while holding office. The
committee system is an institutional example of such a division of labour where part of the
whole institution takes on the task on behalf of the whole institution. As such, it becomes a
matter of delegation.
In the political science literature, the theme of delegation is often discussed in terms of
chains of delegation. Such a chain runs up to the ministerial officers, and through the
legislature to the executive (Müller 2000). For some, this is the defining feature of
parliamentary democracy, understood as ‘a particular way to structure political delegation’
(Strøm and Bergman 2011, 5). As such, this setting prescribes representatives a role as
delegates of the parliamentary party groups to which they are accountable, and who enforce
the principle of accountability on behalf of the represented (Heidar 2000, 185–86; see also
Damgaard 1995; Wiberg 2003). Party representation is generally thought to stabilise the
otherwise fickle representational relationship between the representative and the
represented. However, the representational relation between the political party and its
corresponding PPG is not as sound as is assumed, as I aim to show. Even though the MPs
interviewed for this research have given much thought to where they stand in this
representational constellation, analysis must go beyond these delegated accounts.
The argument to be presented here is that the building blocks for these delegate accounts
of representation are founded on the circumstances and conditions stipulating them–that is,
on the need for specialisation and expertise. Also, the political parties represented in the
legislatures and the PPGs practically managing this representing need information (and
ideas and viewpoints) that are available through the committees. The depth of justifications
provided by the MPs depends heavily on their prior knowledge and accrued information.
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The second strand of the argument presented here opens the domain of intraparty group
dynamics. When it comes to giving their opinions, MPs cannot affirm all the political
matters that are on the table but must instead rely on the judgment of others. The MPs
interviewed referred to challenges in their day-to-day work time-management and to
extremely demanding workloads. It is when faced with such difficulties, the importance of
one’s own group comes most strongly to light. Taking into account the complexity of
legislative issues and the sheer number of them, it is not surprising that no single
representative can become familiar with all of them. As one interviewee noted: ‘There is
absolutely no time to read all the papers that come to the committees. Whoever claims
otherwise is lying [laughs]. No-one reads every single page, at the moment’ (I: 16: 64:25).
As a solution for the informational overload, this interviewee proposed that each MP would
serve on one committee only instead of two. Being so constrained with time and the volume
of information to be digested seems to suggest that there are many occasions where
representatives make political decisions in plenary sessions simply by pushing the ‘yay’ or
‘nay’ button, without much knowledge of what is actually being decided.
Epistemic deficits in the face of the ever-growing number of legislative issues are
alleviated by dispersing responsibility. The institutional setting enables the division of
labour. The interviews conducted provide a glimpse of how legislative burden is evened out
and work is distributed between MPs from the same group. These practices, also covered
by parliamentary studies, can and should be also read in the language of representation, as
portrayals of accounts for representatives representing each other through these
arrangements. For this reason, representatives must rely on their colleagues’ discretion
when it comes to forming opinions, policies and legislation, in cases when they did not exist.
Reliance on deliberative abilities required that a variety of perspectives is allowed enough
consideration.
Delegation is a necessity in a parliamentary context. Representatives cannot be members
of all committees. Firstly, it would be an impossible endeavour not only because
committees’ meetings overlap but also the sheer amount of work would be overwhelming.
The second reason is that committee memberships are allocated proportionally according to
party size, and as a result not all parties are represented in all the 16 parliamentary
committees (17 as of spring 2019, when the Surveillance Committee was established). In
committee assignments, the PPG leadership are the ones who decide which MPs get which
committee memberships (Holli and Saari 2009, 30–37; see also Forsten 2005; Hagevi 2000).
The sovereignty of PPGs to allocate committee memberships can be thought rather
unquestionable, and according to one interviewee it would not be ‘fair play’ to meddle with
them from the outside (I: 1: 4:20). Each MP’s own wishes are taken into account, but in the
allocation of positions seniority and other factors such as prior work experience are also
emphasised. As with individual MPs, representation-based considerations also apply to
PPGs not to mention the political parties. In addition to the ‘office-seeking’ party goal,
parties foster also ‘policy-seeking’ goals (Damgaard 1995, 309). In practice, then, this
second goal collapses on the committee structure where different policy areas are handled
in corresponding parliamentary committees to which parties get “access” through their MPs.
Arguably, smaller political parties are forced to consider aspects of political
representation more than the big parties. Whereas bigger parties have enough
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representatives to serve on all the committees, smaller PPGs need to weigh which policy
fields are more relevant to their political platforms. When allocations to the committees are
not favourable to their priorities parties can trade and switch memberships (I: 9, I: 10). In
smaller groups, questions of representation are more pressing, highlighting the need for
intraparty deliberation (intraparty deliberation has been defended most recently by
Wolkenstein 2016; see also Phillips 1995; Teorell 1999). The reason for this is simply that
having a presence on a committee is practically the only way to affect the type of legislation
for which that committee is responsible. This is emphasised in the partisan perspective to
committees, transforming committees into agents of the political parties (Mattson and Strøm
2004). Moreover, without committee representation it is more difficult to understand and
remain informed of the opinion-making process and related justifications, since the
committees convene behind closed doors. When a policy area is discussed in the plenary
committee, committee members are given priority, which also adds to their legitimised
expertise in a specific policy. Even though PPG and party leaders can always have their say
in the plenary, they cannot always cover all policy corners, at least not credibly. In
comparison to the committee members the leadership may lack the detailed and up-to-date
information available only through the committee meetings.
The best-informed parliamentarians are those who serve on the committees. They can
be assumed to have the relevant information to make convincing fact-based arguments on
the subject matter to their colleagues as well as to the public. Acknowledgment of expertise
is also connected with long incumbency in the committee. There is also the feature of cross-
partisanship to be considered: some representatives are and can be recognised as a particular
expert of a policy field, whose viewpoints are appreciated and counselled. When an MP
wants to form an informed opinion on some item of legislation, there are usually PPG
colleagues that they can turn to. ‘There are certain people whom I can definitely trust, one
hundred percent’, as one MP (I: 8:10) commented. Being considered a specialist in each
area and to have the latest, most current information ensures that those people can be relied
on to provide precise answers to substantial questions. Generally, when forming one’s
opinions it would be unwise not to consider others’ perspectives.
Representatives allow themselves to be represented by others, and according to the
interviewees, however, there are specific instances when MPs also become surrogacies. The
concept of surrogate representation refers more often to geographically confined
constituencies that lack representation within a representative institution, in which case a
‘surrogate’ legislator takes on their cause despite it being outside the legislator’s voting
district. (Mansbridge 2003.) Since the newer conceptual framework for representation
allows analytical extensions reaching out to unconventional designs, and even over
territorial-based constituencies (Rehfeld 2005; Castiglione and Warren 2006; Urbinati and
Warren 2008; Saward 2019), it seems justified here to briefly explore the concept of
surrogate representation through observed parliamentary practices.
When representatives were asked in the first set of interviews about their networks as an
indicator of policy influence they stated that cross-party collaborations do happen. What
unites these representatives can be a common interest in pushing some policy forward.
Additionally, alliances emerge not only through shared interests but also through friendships
being formed. Such friendships can extend over many parliamentary terms, thereby also
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increasing the chances that the political alignments shift as power positions are re-allocated.
When an ally and a friend is a member of the government, not to mention a cabinet minister,
influencing specific and well-defined case become possible.
When taking a more specific look into the group dynamics of PPGs, committee groups
are often the holders of the most nuanced and enlightened perspectives and informative,
factual details regarding specific legislation. Committee members of the same party form a
committee group that often hold weekly meetings to recap and go through the legislative
issues that are being handled and of which they are assumingly most knowledgeable (e.g.
Arter 2003). Committee group is led by the head of the committee group
(valiokuntavastaava in Finnish) who articulates the formal opinion of the party within the
committee. In one survey, it was found that over half of Finnish MPs consider their power
to influence the decision-making of their own PPG to be very good, provided that the issue
is within their own area.
Committee groups enjoy considerable autonomy. It relates to the building up expert
knowledge as discussed previously but it is also linked to practical matters: especially in
larger groups there is limited time to embrace full-fledged deliberation for the purpose of
forming collectively standing on a legislative issue. Also, it would take too much time to go
through and have updates on all committee issues. The committee groups, and especially
the head of the committee group, use their judgment regarding to which issues and
legislative points are important enough to be presented to the whole PPG (also in Mykkänen
2001b).27 Partly for these reasons, the head of the committee group can be referred to a
trustee (Wiberg 2000, 161).
According to one MP from a large group, ‘In our party, it’s the committee group that
grinds. […]’ (II: 10: 29:12). ‘They have the mandate and responsibility. And we trust them’.
When ‘power is delegated and allocated to the committee level’, another MP (I: 10: 16:4)
also from a large group explained, means simultaneously that formal and practical opinion-
taking and decision-making in Parliament (by each political party) rests on relatively few
shoulders. When smaller PPGs have only one member in the committee highlights the
significance and responsibility of one single MP. As one interviewee explained, ‘to be frank,
you need to assess for yourself what those questions are that could generate wider political
passions, and act accordingly’ (I: 9: 12:6) are.
The considerable autonomy and responsibility that MPs have remind us how political
decision-making is practically operated. Most often standings and decisions are preordained
by the party platforms, not to mention the government platform. As such, in the cases of
some ‘large and difficult’ (as the Eduskunta jargon goes) bills these platforms are firmly
enforced which limits the deliberative appeal of reconsidering the set premises. This appeal
comes from the parliamentary setting of the government and the opposition, thus assigning
MPs certain tentative but contested roles. Therefore, when the interviews suggest that when
a committee group unanimously arrives at a resolution that goes against the position taken
by the party, and the PPG will not hamper it, the interpretation is mixed, at least in the case
of governing parties. Other dynamics can be called upon that may overturn the committee
27 Deliberative authority, authority to decide through deliberative process occurring elsewhere, is
delegated in PPGs. Also smaller policy specific intra-PPG working groups are established and are open to all
interested.
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group stance. For one, the informal rule that secures coalition government cooperation ‘by
the book’ may take effect. When by the book is called out, the decision is to reflect what
has been agreed in the government platform. I will later address this in the context of
compromise-building that takes place in the committee, but it suffices to acknowledge here
that the idea of party democracy can be more precarious than is theoretically assumed. To
continue, we need to take a closer look at collective representative efforts and group
dynamics revolving around the operative centre of party representation, which is
parliamentary party groups.
v Deliberation in parliamentary party groups
PPGs organise and coordinate democratic representation and tasks accordingly so that
legislative work and outputs are efficient, anticipated and responsive. However, when
approaching representation theoretically from a deliberative angle, group dynamics also
consist of other elements that usher discussion towards interactions between representatives
and to the representative resources they enable regarding affirmation. Learning to trust their
peers’ judgment as well as their character,28 and getting to know each other, takes place in
committee work but also–and perhaps more centrally–through party group membership.
Party affiliation forms a natural bond with trust.
For many interviewees, the PPG forms the most important reference group for their
work, and it centres in the weekly PPG meetings. On the other hand, the meetings are not
exclusively reserved for features relating to affirmative context, as in ascertaining and
coordination, but for some it is also a venue for posturing. An observation made in the
interviews also highlights the need for ‘keeping up appearances’ in relation to emphasising
one’s expertise or highlighting relations to the parliamentarian’s constituency and ‘home
turf’. Next, I will distinguish functions concerning developing, testing and criticising
opinions and platforms. I will also discuss functions of forming collective bonds as well as
coordinating and planning legislative work and gaining information. Whereas the latter
feature differs strikingly as to whether the group is in government or opposition, overall the
size of the group seems to impact how thoroughly these tasks can be handled in PPG
meetings.
Studies of PPGs in the Nordic countries (Heidar 2000; Damgaard 1995; Heidar and
Koole 2000b) highlight their relevance and power as central parliamentary actors. Notably,
28 The interviews illuminate how the discussions and encounters that take place outside the formal settings
are important. For one, committee travels allow time for its members to get to know each other more deeply,
not only as politicians but as persons. One MP described how spending eight hours on a plane next to a
colleague gave a glimpse into that person’s thinking. Even though the interviews do not extensively cover
these informal accounts, it is nonetheless clear that in legislatures there should be opportunities for
deliberation that is not strictly tied to argumentation and justifications about matters that are on the
parliamentary agenda. Deliberation should also allow for disclosure and sharing of privately held views and
reasoning and reflection, since it is inevitable that in their decision-making MPs will contextualise their
opinions and viewpoints to their life stories and political aspirations. This may not make it more likely for
MPs to accept each other’s future claims and arguments, but it is at least likely to deepen their understanding
of why they hold the views that they do and how they justify them. In general, committees allow too little
time for these kinds of deliberations.
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their centrality can be seen in relation seeing Nordic parliaments as ‘working parliaments’
instead of the ‘debating’ ones, more akin to Westminster model. Working parliaments put
more effort on the legislative stage of scrutiny that takes place within the committees.
(Raunio and Wiberg 2014, 16). Concentration on the committee work and the expertise that
follows from being a member of a committee can be seen to project also to the inner
workings of PPGs. It can be assumed that deliberation has a critical role to play if some
consent-seeking measures are sought within those meetings. In the Finnish context, not
much is known of the inner life of PPGs (Mykkänen 2001b; Wiberg 2000), even though
they are argued to enjoy ‘de facto control over parliamentary work (Heidar 2000, 187). From
a deliberative standpoint, PPGs can resemble ‘caucus room’ deliberation, which can be
thought to function towards what I want to argue in the affirmative context. As such, caucus
room deliberation emphasises ‘authenticity, without deception’, according to Goodin (2005,
189). For him, authenticity is the ‘principal deliberative virtue’ and the caucus room is the
‘principal place in the deliberative process where it is found’ (ibid.).
The interviews resonate with this description. Indeed, even though much of the time in
the PPG meetings are reserved for management and briefing tasks, and less on deliberating
on matters, the idea that people ‘put down their guard’ does have an effect. In my view, this
is where the affirmative context embedded in the features of sincerity and authenticity
comes in. Dealing with these two (normative) ideals of deliberative democracy within a
context does not solve the puzzlement of their relevance that is attached to the rationalist-
oriented Habermasian ‘type I’ deliberation (Bächtiger et al. 2010) that differentiates
between the strategic and communicative intent. Even though questions of sincerity and
authenticity are more relaxed in the ‘type II’ deliberation (ibid.), the present study can
contribute in explaining the contextual circumstances that affect the prevalence of such
accounts. Taking this approach can illuminate the ‘deliberative functions of institutional
norms, rules, and constraints’ (Warren 2007, cf. Bächtiger et al. 2010, 44). Here, the
intentions of deliberators may get overlooked as drastic strategic aspirations, but the
outcome still may be deliberative in function (ibid.).
If one accepts the idea that the PPG meetings operate with the logic of caucus
deliberation, characterised by authenticity and sincerity, then this may enable
parliamentarians to test their own ideas and thoughts. This reflexive attitude was referred to
by one interviewee in terms of ‘brain work’:
It is in the group where you can ponder things and pitch rough, untested ideas to
the others. Would there be any sense in this, could we solve it like that? And it
is actually where you develop your own thinking [aivotyötä, literally ‘brain
work’] and your relation to some matter. PPG meetings are also the kind where
you get the kind of information that is not available anywhere else. (III: 14:
46:11)
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[…] the best kinds of revelations are those where you realise that I previously
thought this could have been the best solution, until I learned additional
information and came to see another perspective on the matter. It is exactly that
you get to hear and reflect these also with your PPG is immensely important.
What I’ve come to understand in politics and with people in it is how differently
people perceive the world. One person can see things as being very
straightforward, whereas another sees things very diversely. And when different
people meet and communicate, we don’t genuinely communicate–we can come
to a conclusion without sharing the same understanding. We use the same words,
but we’re talking about completely different things. (III: 13: 37:27)
The ability to pitch undeveloped ideas assumes at least relative openness of the
deliberative process. The willingness to learn and listen are virtues encompassed by
deliberative processes that are potentially open-ended and transformative. What the second
quotation above portrays is the idea that deliberation is ‘a cooperative game’ which aims
profoundly at making sense of the world (Goodin 2008b, 189). Without sharing at least the
minimum level of understanding on things and meaning the substances of these interactions
become meaningless (ibid.). What is being discussed remains an open question.
Nonetheless, as this MP hesitantly says, political decisions can be carried out.
Revealing that one’s opinions and stances are not permanently fixed is easier in a setting
from where institutionally ascribed ‘enemies’ are absent. Sharing of some rough political
ideology and corresponding vague opinions is assumed by the very fact that MPs belong to
the same political party and have voluntarily decided to be members of the PPG. For some,
relying on justifications derived from this shared value basis makes listening to
argumentation enjoyable and interesting (III: 28: 1:19:39). When deliberation takes place
only among peers it affects how argumentative practices are adopted.
In argumentation, for one thing, the party stance and platform can be endorsed without
elaborate justifications. In this setting, justifications are not ‘owed’ as they would be with
opponents, or in particular the general public. Consequently, orientation towards common
good can be downplayed in argumentation and consideration to particular interests can be
more readily exposed in reason-giving. Authenticity can also be thought to be manifested
when justifications of opinions are drawn from the ‘home turf’ (Mykkänen 2001b). In PPGs
this is a legitimate reason-giving, whereas in other contexts it would be more suspect and in
need of more general ‘representative’ glossing. ‘My constituency does not like this’ or ‘I
heard this from my home turf’ would hardly be a justifiable or credible claim in a committee
room. The implicit continuation of this statement–‘it would be politically harmful to me to
support this legislation’–is an entirely legitimate and acceptable claim in a PPG. In those
situations notwithstanding demonstrated sincerity–voicing concerns about personal political
losses–does not count credible if used to justify diverging from the party line. These implicit
norms about self-interested motivations can be thought to guide deliberations towards other-
regarding direction, but with a strategical twist: reasoning from a collective point of view
where lost votes are not only personal but can affect everybody who ‘sails under the same
flag’.
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United party standing is neither carved in stone nor unison. The opinion-building
function is also politically reflected in retrospect, but it can also reveal great differences in
how things and their importance are perceived:We are not controlled by any party office. That is why PPG meetings are likea small sampling and sounding out of ideas. Do we at all think the same onmatters? In some cases yes, and in some you in fact note that this issue hasnot been critically handled in ages in this party. (III: 9: 39:24)
Intragroup deliberation, and especially its critical forms, is so important that one MP
(III: 12: 36:53) referred to it as a ‘life insurance’ to the party. It means that PPG meetings
should be the place where uncertainties and disagreements are publicly voiced. When asked
about why bringing up dissident voices more openly in a group, one MP replied that it is the
party that ‘carries the political responsibility’ (III: 20: 1:01:16). Governing takes a toll on
party support and individual support: ‘what it will cost me, in my districts’ (ibid.).
In particular, these concerns embody governing coalition parties, which give up part of
their ‘representational autonomy’ in exchange for governing. Opposition parties and their
representatives are entitled to larger freedoms when it comes to taking dissenting opinions
all the way through the deliberative process, i.e. by pressing the ‘wrong’ button in voting.
Representatives are entitled to have dissenting opinions–which are after all inherent to
democratic politics–but they also need outlets for voicing those disagreements that are
directed to one’s own political group. In general, however, the expressive-deliberative mode
discussed here assumed in the affirmative context states the following: when endorsing the
expressive-deliberative mode participants are encouraged that uncertainties, including those
that articulate ideological and other commitments, are voiced out and expressed. Entailing
a reflective understanding of what kind of representative one takes one to be or aspires to
be are often inherently posited, not always against but towards ideas of democratic
governing.
From the perspective of group dynamics it is the individual representative’s
responsibility is to share those concerns–if not for the purpose of trying to persuade others,
then at least for the purpose of informing others and especially the leadership about them.
Letting others know of one’s opinions is thought to be one of the most central
responsibilities when operating within a collective. There is also that perspective that not
keeping the PPG leadership informed is very much frowned upon at least when being asked
by the MPs who act in those positions (party leader, PPG leader, head of the committee
group).
When these utterances are treated as representative claims, they are in effect submitted
to others for judgement, and if these claims fail to persuade and win a majority the opinion
is not accepted. If the representative happens to convince their colleagues of their opinion
in the PPG, ‘it’s a big thing’: ‘it matters, and then we talk about general politics’ (III: 4:
20:24). But if the representative’s opinion ‘gets heard and appreciated’ (ibid.: 7:30) but
turned down after the process, it is then up to the MP to decide what to do and how to
advance. In general, however, ‘nobody cooperates with a fist’, as one interviewee put it (III:
29: 2:27:02).
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Loyalty is measured also in terms of not acting behind the back (of the PPG). What
deliberation does from the perspective of the leadership, and of the collective, is revealing
members’ positions, which makes it possible to ensure and secure the cohesiveness of future
action. Most importantly, only intra-party deliberation that is sufficiently able to bring
hesitations and concerns to light can verify that representatives can submit and commit
themselves to the decision that is collectively taken. One MP who has acted in leadership
position explains:
You gain people’s commitment when everyone can discuss things and everyone
gets a say, which is important. It is considered when we take a decision and move
forward with it. Afterwards, people accept that it doesn’t happen 100 percent but
80 percent when everyone has been taking part in modifying it and everyone
feels that they have been heard. (III: 3: 36:16)
This contributes to the ability for compromise and gaining and demonstrating loyalty.
Although there is a need for a greater focus on the intraparty perspective on deliberation, it
is clear that the scale issue of deliberation, as it has been called (Parkinson 2006), is a
concern also in legislatures. In larger PPGs, the opportunities for thoughtful and satisfactory
deliberation are more difficult than in smaller ones. These observations were brought up by
members from smaller groups, but I would argue that the benefits are the same regardless
of group size:
[…] when we are a small group it is pretty easy to say that we’ve always had the
tradition, and I’ve always thought that on a personal and psychological level it’s
easier to be a member of a smaller group because you have more time for
arguing. You can argue back and forth and be angry, and you have the time to
make up. And find some common ground. This contrasts with big groups, where
everyone only gets a minute or no time at all in a meeting to say what they want
to say. And you go through things in a hierarchy and influence in other ways. I
could imagine that it is frustrating. We are spoiled in that sense, as we
communicate quite a lot in our group. Sometimes it has been quite dramatic, and
sometimes less so. But, if you compare to other groups, it shows in some ways,
it ties people together and people appear as loyal to the outside. Just the fact that
you can go through each other’s thoughts and find out why someone else thinks
the way they do. (III: 7: 06:00)
The interviews attest to the fact that deliberation is conditioned by tangible elements like
the number of participants and time. Temporal significance of representation and
deliberation is therefore evident in the practices that make up collective opinion-making and
articulating them by which I mean situations in which the premises of party standing restrict
the transformative character of deliberative processes. In any case, what many of the MPs
interviewed hoped for was more time to dwell on and immerse themselves in discussions in
PPGs and in committees. Notably, even though only a few of the MPs interviewed
specifically recognised or used the term ‘deliberation’ when talking about the merits of
discussion and having time for it, what they mean by it comes very close to definitions of
deliberation.
A clear example of this is that no one really wished for more time for plenary
discussions. The other spatial venues of deliberation in the parliament seem congested with
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legislative matters on the political agenda ‘for getting to the root’ of matters, and learning
from others’ perspectives become limited. Some of the MPs interviewed expressed worries
about the lack of time for deliberation, especially in committee settings.
Another temporal feature relating to the functions of representation in a PPG meeting
concerns political self-understanding of the party as a collective. An inclination towards
self-criticism and reflection is generally welcomed, but is unnecessary if too much focus is
given to analysis of past performances. This also relates to general strategic considerations
on with what ‘angles’ different PPGs and parties enter the plenary debates on upcoming
bills.29
Factors affecting personal and party support are never far away. Ultimately, neither
PPGs as political collectives nor individual MPs cannot completely escape the reality of
electoral competition. For some early deliberative theorists, for example Bessette (1994,
48), any discussion of planning or strategy would not even count as deliberation, since the
reasoning is based on ulterior aspects and not on the matter itself. However, deliberating
about different strategic positions and respective implications does not erase underlying
capabilities. An experienced, refined parliamentarian can grasp the reasons for colleagues’
dissenting and conflicting perspectives and positions, and may very well come up with novel
solutions through strategic reasoning–and despite the strategic reasoning of colleagues. For
one, accommodating perspectives can form bridging outcomes for practical disagreements
among coalition partners.
Regardless of this relative appeasement on the strategic attributes of legislative
behaviour, according to some MPs the necessary collective understanding of ‘who we are’
and ‘where are we going’ are overshadowed by assessments of recent public plenary
performances and overall management (III: 12). Another experienced MP (III: 27: 1:21:44)
feared that their PPG was losing their vision of the future: their group was excessively
‘backward-leaning’. This failing, in the MP’s view, can take the form of ‘self-flagellation’
in PPG meetings, with considerable time being taken up with mulling over past failures.
However, these differences may also relate to differences in the work mode that depends
on whether the party is in government or in opposition. The ‘rhythm is completely different’,
according to one MP (III: 10: 8:12). It affects what practices can be discussed in the PPG
meetings:
29 One MP (IV: 9: 51:02) described this aspiration embedded in the idea of capturing deliberation as a
cooperative game ‘for me, it’s more valuable to talk to XX [name of the opposition party leader removed]
than with XX [name of own party leader removed] if I want to understand how things are and why people
think what they think’. All this requires, in general, more time for deliberation, which was something
explicitly brought up in some of the interviews (III: 9, III: 10, III: 17, IV: 9). The travel and excursions that
committees make together during the parliamentary term are valued not only for the opportunity to
experience and learn, but also because of the social aspect. As one claimed (I: 4: 7:13) and I think that this
interpretation can be generalised, the ‘group’s interest can become apparent in a stronger manner in reality
than when we just sit in a formal setting together and concentrate on where the comma should be put
somewhere in a bill’.
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In opposition, you have time to analyse the political situation all the time and
ponder where we are and where we are going, and do we have a good course.
[…] The rhythm of opposition is laid-back where you can yourself decide what
you do and pay attention to rhetoric, to the display: to which kind of wrapping
you place that issue? Versus to government that just tries to survive. At worst,
you try to survive from day to day, one hour to the next, one day to the next,
week after week. Government lives only just in that moment when in the
opposition you can look a year ahead, five years ahead. (III: 10: 8:12)
Ensuring the survival of the government imposes a strain that appears in the trade-off,
in the exchange of ruling and governing. Here, the discussed critical deliberations and
voicing out disagreements are also portrayals of the struggles on PPG’s autonomy over the
political party. This is the case with governing PPGs. With legislation that is conflictual or
‘big and difficult’ support for the bill is dependent on PPG members becoming convinced
that the law should be passed. Detailed information and refined perspectives deriving from
the committee can contradict with what the bill proposes, and here the opinion of the
respective committee group can be crucial. The same kind of affirmative function is not
similarly necessary with opposition parties (since ‘crossing the floor’ is more acceptable
since it lacks the dangers associated with overturning the government). Conversation can
turn out heated within the governing PPGs, and disagreeing opinions are willingly, even
aggressively brought forward:
But then, usually, on general politics we can have a rather hard-hitting
discussion. There we have people who have a completely [emphasised] different
opinion about some party line or government bill. Although there have not been
fist fights, it has come close to it every now and then. The atmosphere has been
very heated. And I’ve been in a bad mood there many times. […] It’s the only
place where you could say ‘hell no’ about some legislation that has been
proposed–that we must do something about it now, we have to go and negotiate
with the minister. (III: 6: 1:02:17)
If the party is in the government, the ministers are expected to be present in the weekly
PPG meetings. This practice seems to be enforced, portraying that strive for classic
parliamentarism is not entirely exhausted regardless of the dominance of government vs.
opposition -setting. Governing party PPGs can inflict significant pressure to their ministers–
a relationship described in terms of ‘creative tension’ (III: 12) and a theme worthy of a
scholarly study, as suggested by another (III: 11). Overall, the studies find PPGs in Finland
to be elite-centred, with strong emphasis on personal relations to the party leadership
(Heidar 2000)30. On these assumptions, and what this analysis also suggests, there is much
to investigate (in another study) when the intraparty dynamics of governing party PPGs and
the cabinet ministers are in question.
All interviews highlight the observation that regardless of deliberative moments in
legislatures being sequenced and distributed; they are not atomised or isolated. There is a
dependency on the past that shows that legislative issues and bills do not come as a surprise.
30 Now a bit dated comparative studies on the Nordic parliaments (Heidar 2000, 201) showed that Finnish
PPGs are being influenced by government ministers the most (91 points on a scale of 0 to 100), party leaders
coming second (79) and PPG leadership (76) third.
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For this reason, the role of the governing PPG meeting includes ‘getting information on
what important issues are coming and what kind of contradictions or conflicts there maybe
has been and how to relate to it’ (III: 6: 26:13). This is also again where the difference with
being in a government and being in opposition equals as much ‘a day differs from the night’
(III: 15: 20:5)–opposition PPGs operate in the dark, whereas government PPGs have access
through their ministers to the plans and justifications of the cabinet for the legislation. In
terms of capacities for opinion-building, the opposition is reactionary whereas government
needs to worry about securing support for the proposed legislation. When opposition lacks
access to this information, they get this information through the media or through other
sources (e.g. leakages that do take place every now and then). In this comparison having
this prior information makes working more coherent, whereas in the opposition ‘you don’t
really know which direction you should be boxing’ (III: 5: 16:05). However, the epistemic
asymmetry can be tackled:
When you’re in the opposition you are in darkness when it comes to information.
[…] If you don’t have, regardless of your own status, trusted relationships to the
governing party people who will shed light on why this thing was made this way,
what it has been prepared that way; who’s behind it and who’s not, you cannot
with full force tap into the decision-making. You talk nonsense: you talk about
trees when others talk about forest. [..] This is basic fundament that you know
why it has been taken care of the way it has. Otherwise it’s just redundant, the
opposition talk. But you must set yourself into a completely other level in those
discussions, and when you know are informed and the background has been
analysed for you, then surely you will have a better impact. But you can never
tell who your source is. Otherwise you break the trust. (III: 27: 1:05:23)
There is a lot of pre-deliberation and negotiation taking place even before the
governmental bill is sent to Parliament. ‘There is a lot of that wrangling being done’, one
government MP (III: 24: 1:05:24) said. The MP continued: ‘We went through certain issues
beforehand and made ministers change them before they even arrive to us’. Here is one
demonstration on how the role of the PPG has become more important than the political
party in the Finnish political landscape. The kind of practice shown here that aims at
securing smoother and less conflictual handling in the legislature can be thought to enmesh
the institutional boundaries between the legislature and the executive. Here it suffices to
note how this political practice, typical to large coalition formations, of impacting legislative
issues upfront and prior to parliamentary handling, avoids deliberation by the entire
parliament. Some issues that are unfavourable to a coalition partner, regardless of the
demonstrated deliberative virtues within the PPG, never appear on the political agenda of
the parliament and never gets argued pro et contra by the parliament.
Another related thing that was brought up, was how the opinion-formation function on
the collective level is further dispersed in the PPG. As the interviews show, many entrusted
representatives take part in negotiating and writing the government platform or program.
This means that some of the bills have already been receiving a ‘stamp of approval’ by the
leadership and PPG members that have been involved in writing the script, so to speak.
Some members are out and need to adhere to these decisions and perspectives. The inner
hierarchy, resonating with the relevance of being close to the leadership, can also dictate the
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opinions expressed in the meetings. Due to this argued asymmetry ever so elevate the need
for deliberation: to allow time to go through the relevant information and arguments.
Acknowledging this contested inclusion present in the governing PPGs the opposition
groups can start out with a cleaner slate.
vi Managing torment
Deliberations in the PPG meetings facilitate many functions that have been outlined in the
previous section and continue in this one. These deliberations often form the bedrock when
it comes to position- taking as a collective but ideally, what also happens is that
representation becomes refined in the process of opinion-formation. These resolutions and
provisional outcomes about what is to be represented and what makes up the particular
reasons and justifications echo in the other two formal spatial contexts of Parliament, the
committee and the plenary. However, unlike this formal locus, PPG meetings lack
institutionalised status and format. Arguably, what is to be done within those meetings is
more up in the air when it comes to ascribing tasks.
Therefore, the purpose and function of PPGs is an open question, something into which
individual MPs may have more to say also in defining them. It is also part of the reason why
PPG meetings tap into all contexts of representation proposed in this research. Even though
I see the affirmative functions the most significant here, PPG meetings also result in
decisions being issued when things are “getting done”. As such, the operative context is also
invoked, which has real consequences in the other venues within the parliament. When
matters have been handled profusely enough in the PPG meetings it enables the kind of
hitching together which usually translates into unity. Finally, some accounts also conjure
performative context when features of posturing, campaigning and purchasing principled
and adversary positions are taken on by MPs. What this further tells us is that political
parties and PPGs are not ‘monoliths’ but consist of MPs who in democratic politics compete
against each other. This feature is heightened by the Finnish electoral system with its open
party lists emphasising personal constituency connection (and service).
Expertise that PPG members possess through intensive labouring in the committees is
an essential representative resource to the group as well as to the MP themselves, in the way
discussed earlier. Connected to the commitment that develops during the long committee
incumbency entails the possibility that representatives shift their general position on specific
policy issues. This demonstrates the most essential, transformative features that deliberation
assumes and illuminates the institutionally built-in friction vis-à-vis party representation. In
the case of a certain committee one admitted that working in the committee’ made that MP
sympathetic to the policy area and aligned some personal objectives accordingly,
‘something I don’t deny’ (III: 15: 20:19). This suggestive re-orienting of prior opinions and
attitudes entails the prospect that committee members begin to ‘take sides’ of the policy area
within the PPG. In those situations the represented interests implicitly embedded in the
collectives start mixing and blending which may turn out sources of disagreement and
conflict. This relates to also to how trust–MPs in relation to their committees and their
PPGs–affects deliberation (Mykkänen 2001b; 2010).
130
When it comes to the level of cohesion, descriptions of PPGs will differ from group to
group. Parliamentary studies take the feature of group cohesion as one of the variables
explaining the maintenance of intra-party conflict (Heidar and Koole 2000a; 2000b). Further
acknowledging what is defined as ‘collective action problem’–how to prevent
representatives from ‘shirking’ from the party line –keeping everybody on board is essential.
In this research setting these notions turn into a question of deliberation that arguably can
facilitate cohesion better than sanctions imposed by the party leadership. This perspective
also offers a glimpse into how Finnish PPGs deal with internal disagreement and resistance,
and–more importantly–how they can be manifested and dealt with through means of
deliberation?
When PPGs are comprised of supposedly politically like-minded representatives, it is
not entirely misinformed to note how in some sense PPG meetings or ‘caucus deliberations’
share some aspects with what deliberative theorists would call ‘enclave deliberations’. As
has been argued most famously by Sunstein (2002), in a closed setting homogenous groups
become prone to group polarisation. If not exposed to different and conflicting arguments
and viewpoints during the deliberative process, pre-deliberative commitments can become
polarised and opinions shift to the other end. This is not what I am claiming what could be
happening with Finnish PPGs, and recent empirical studies have provided a counterclaim to
the group polarisation hypothesis in face-to-face encounters (Grönlund, Herne, and Setälä
2015). Neither am I arguing that representatives would be in a disempowered and societally
vulnerable position, and therefore would necessitate that their deliberations should retreat
to protected enclaves.
 However, research in experimental social phycology can show how social comparison
affects the modification and articulation of group deliberation. Through social comparison,
‘members fear loss of reputation by being in the minority or because the majority can supply
more arguments for their position and thereby strengthen their confidence in their views,
win over the undecided, and silence opponents’ (Karpowitz, Raphael, and Hammond 2009,
580). When advocating for political deliberation, conformism deems a problem that
circumscribes criticism (Manin 2017).
Overall, this does not seem to be the case with Finnish representatives, since many
interviewees emphasised that representatives should be ready and capable to announce
opinions, also disagreeing and unpopular ones. Taking into the account the pressure that
MPs work under, having the chance to voice one’s frustrations is important, but the function
also extends to reflection, as one interviewee explained:
In a parliamentary group, you can genuinely express disagreements. You don’t
need to worry about anybody there mocking you for taking that position. And I
think that’s really wise, since you have to be able to speak your mind somewhere,
after all, and the atmosphere must be one where that can be done–it must be
possible to go against the grain within your own group. And this is just how I
want it; it would be a terrible situation if you had to bottle it all up inside you.
Voicing disagreement does make things easier, even if your opposing view
doesn’t win out after all. In my opinion, that’s still better than keeping silent
about it. And I think it’s also a really good thing for those who disagree with you
to hear your position, and for them to listen to your reasons for it. And then to
weigh up their own perspective in light of that. (II: 12: 26:53)
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The opportunity for reflection and inherent persuasive character that reasoned
justifications of disagreeing opinions imply salutary effects also from a group perspective.
As mentioned earlier, if disagreements are buried within the party it becomes ‘demented’
(III: 12: 36:53). Also, it can be argued that regardless of the level of group cohesion
deliberation has a conjunctive rather than disruptive impact. What the interviews underscore
is that deliberation (having the time for it and allowing sincerity and critical voices to be
heard) has a profound legitimising character that purchases trust and loyalty. The
atmosphere that grants sincere affirmation and display of uncertainties ushers a deliberative
process.
Arguably, however, discretion is advised, especially so in the case of junior MPs when
‘it is important that you conform to the group rather than going solo’ (III: 15: 21:37), as
one senior MP said. Questions of reputation and trust, within enclave deliberations can
indeed stifle dissent. Even though all representatives need to regulate these in the sense that
discretion and judgment is ascribed to situations, it is even more of a concern for junior
MPs. This balancing act in the context of governing party dynamics is given a lot of
thought–in this case, every day:
[…] It’s good that you asked this. To me, this is the decisive and difficult
demarcation when acting as a governing party MP. A tough deliberation
[referring here in terms of balancing], to what extent you comment the bills, as
supporting them. […] An MP who doesn’t act as a team member is started to
think a weakling, for good reasons. No party benefits from a soloist. You must
stay in the team. On the other hand, you must be able to maintain, when I think
of myself, a certain kind of a profile of a critical intellect, so that you maintain
your own profile and say honestly what you think. For this reason this question,
about how to comment about matters, one must think almost on daily basis. I try
to do it so that when I want to present a differing nuance from the government
decision, I do that seldom. Those are the kind of moments you don’t want to use
too often. You let the smallest weaknesses pass… I don’t interfere the small
things. I use the occasion when there’s a burning desire but I try to do it, base it
on the government programme. […] But this conflict is real. You must be honest
to be credible but support the government. I don’t know how other MPs resolve
this question, supposedly in various ways. (III: 9: 1:10:45)
This ‘tough deliberation’, as cited above, governing party dynamics that assumes
cohesion with other significance and consequences than with the opposition parties.
However, even to those who would like to undermine the collective potential of operating
in unison and instead emphasise individualistic elements of representative work, seeing
PPGs as ‘collections of self-employed’ (III: 9: 39:24), the group cannot go unnoticed. When
being introduced to what Warren (2017, 49) defines as ‘two- and three-level games’, the
overlapping representative commitments are consequential to the ways in which
deliberative representation takes shape.
The way individual and collective aspirations are prioritised when working in a group
are displayed in many ways. For one, attendance to the meetings was not being asked in the
interviews but it was hinted that not attending them gives a clear signal to one’s colleagues.
In general, the basic ethos is that if one is not interested in others, others have no reason to
reciprocate. ‘When they have some important thing they want to move forward with, they
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don’t get support’ (III: 18: 1:21:37) Elaborating on this another MP (III: 21: 39:15)
pondered that ‘those who cling only to the matters of one’s own district and care little or
not at all about other matters is left on the political sidelines’. Having a ‘broader
perspective’ (meaning taking responsibility for the whole nation’s causes) ‘ensures that you
can more credibly raise issues that are important to your voters or yourself’ (ibid.).
Notwithstanding the reciprocal setting, it also follows from this that dissenting and
conflicting opinions are read from an angle where representatives treat each other as
strategic, political players. MPs keep close check of what motives lie behind disagreements
that are raised with the PPG:
Interviewer: What are the kinds of situations in which MP goes against their own
group on some issue?
Respondent: Well, you must be convinced of your own stance and have very
good justifications for your opinion. If you are [disagreeing] just for the sake of
disagreeing, or because it would be good publicity, people will see that you are
seeking support at the expense of others. (III: 18: 1:22:13)
**
There are, of course, certain members in the PPGs, who regardless of what is
being discussed or done, just go their own ways. Regardless of what has been
agreed. Then you also make a mental note that they cannot be [trusted], if they
come and ask that could we, as a group, put this forward. No one necessarily
goes with it. But, yeah, ‘you’re only after your own issues, but you are not ready
to commit or support anyone else’s issues’. It’s a significant weighing to be made
among themselves. Where the line is drawn, what is so ultimately important that
you’re ready to against your own group. (III: 13: 32:49)
Dissent is kept in check due to the partisan and electoral elements of politics. Authorship
of claims is the battleground of politics, and is vigilantly guarded and monitored. In joint
efforts that often include compromise (even in its bitter forms), the authorship is commonly
shared. When the burden is shared, the ‘torment’ (tuska, a Finnish Parliament jargon word
to describe making difficult decisions that are often against your opinions and often against
the interests you claim to represent), becomes more tolerable. It also mitigates questions
with justifications of the torment when it is shared by the whole group. Now, if the
deliberative process ends in a resolution that overcomes the initial disagreement and features
contributing to it are settled, a certain principle of fairness and mutuality guard
communication about the outcome. It means that representatives refrain from publicly
commenting about the hardships of committing to a compromise. This observation will be
revisited later in the operative and performative contexts.
Many of the aforementioned observations circulate around trust and loyalty, an
underlying general theme in the interviews. Two levels of implications that trust entails can
be found in the interviews: the micro-level and the micro-level ones. Starting from the
former, as a maxim, trust is the most important capital an MP can acquire. It can be a
resource that at the same time combines overlapping instances of reciprocity, loyalty,
coercion and internal compromise. It is also the cohesive element that sustains complex
relations within a party. Therefore, qualifications ensued by the affirmative context, how
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you manage and negotiate this process of judgment with others, and reveal it to others, are
tell-tale signs that are read into the affirmative context. These virtues can translate into
currency that helps push matters forward, with the aid of others.
The notion of trust has many levels, as in the case of forming collaborations that enable
getting things done. Consequently, it may be to some extent inaccessible in the language of
political theory; as Saward (2019) has argued, many features in political representation and
democratic politics happen outside the scope of political theory. When taking the
perspective of a ‘political anthropologist’ (ibid., 286), we seem to lack theoretical language
that would explain the observation from the interviews about why some people, such as
MPs who are colleagues, can work well together. As in any workplace, those working in the
Finnish Parliament establish real friendships in the course of their work. Within the
committees in particular these companionships can benefit in the making of good and
coherent public policies.
From the macro-level impact that trust can have on deliberation, discussed above, from
the processual stance the impact can be different. Mykkänen (2010) makes an important
claim that trust not only can improve but actually inhibits deliberation in the Finnish
Parliament. Many central mechanisms of delegation that are viable conditions for operations
of a ‘working parliament’ rely on trust, as well as to shielding deliberations from the public
like with committee sessions. In addition to these functions that trust supports, it can also
induce the kind of discretion and judgment that consequently reduces deliberative accounts
(Mykkänen 2010). What happens is that highly enforced distribution of work in PPGs,
founded on trusted relations among the members, discussions are not brought forward to be
discussed by all participants in the group. Committee groups are selective in deciding which
themes are important enough to become dissected and scrutinised by all.
On these assumptions, from the perspective of collective action trust is also a more
disguised coercive measure, an unspoken expectation of what one is expected to do. We can
say that trustworthiness then, has a retrospective feature upon which forecasting future
conduct or action is compared to. As such, it reduces the ‘transaction costs’ since it lessens
uncertainty embedded in all human interactions. A bad track record on past behaviour, such
as not keeping a promise, is taken as a guarantee that the same will happen again. Curiously,
it seems that the idea of gyroscopic representation (Mansbridge 2003) is applicable also
within the legislature, in the way that features of gyroscopic representatives are assessed by
the MP colleagues. But perhaps unlike with electoral bonds, defects among parliamentarians
can bring trust to a sudden end. The way that the MPs interviewed discuss trust suggests
that once trust is lost it is very difficult to regain. ‘Trust is something you can lose only once’
(III: 29: 2:30:26) was a maxim echoed in many of the interviewees.
Loyalty translates into trustworthiness in the parliamentary ecology. These notions
become applicable in the committee that poses a potential risk that legislating behind closed
doors pose to parliamentary party groups as an actor for group representation. As shown,
PPGs delegate deliberative authority to their members. It can also manifest how, as ‘warriors
of the party’ quietly accept poor decisions in the hope for reciprocity. This reciprocity could
materialise in the form of being granted a position (of trust) within the PPG and in the
committee. As already discussed, another reason for abiding by difficult group decisions is
the expectation that the loyalty and trust can one day be capitalised on: the others will come
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to your aid, and back you up on a matter of importance to you. And in extraordinary
circumstances, when a governing party member decides to go all in and refuses to support
the bill, it may end up that ‘the group gives cover’ (III: 17: 1:09:40). The whole group turns
against the piece of legislation.
When it comes to argument about trust reducing deliberation within legislatures
(Mykkänen 2010), there could be a counter-claim made here. Some of the smaller PPGs
seem to foster an atmosphere than depends on expressed mutual trust and respect. This helps
ensure that those deliberations are not disclosed to outsiders. If these circumstances are met,
a genuine and frank exchange of opinions can take place. In addition, it is not only that these
deliberations are not leaked outside but that if there is trust you can vent. You can be sure
that your grievances will get heard even if they do not affect, i.e. you are unable to make
others change their minds on the matter. Trust-based deliberations that also reside in the
committee are apt for demonstrations of sincerity and authenticity, as Goodin (2005; 2008b)
argued with reference to caucus-room deliberations.
To summarize this subchapter we can argue the following: deliberative representation
in the affirmative context pinpoints to features in opinion-formation when matters may not
be settled yet. The idea of affirmation entails the inherent assumption that, while actors often
hold views and opinions exogenously to the deliberative process they engage in, opinions
and such are not merely ‘checked’ with others but also rendered for inspection and
consideration. Henceforth, participants will be keener to ‘feel the force of others’
arguments’ (Urbinati 2006, 47). I also briefly pointed out how the physical institutional
setting and the acknowledgment of being an elected member of the parliament force a shared
understanding that speaks to institutional representation. The mandate to represent is equal.
This sensitivity can be though to explain also the functions of cooperation and concessions
available in the affirmative context.
Deliberative representation can also be a matter of contestation. These practices may
support epistemic function but when it comes to disseminating information and articulating
opinions it is about sharing with others. The kind of sincerity is also somewhat expected
from MPs in PPGs. For this reason, I use the term expressive-deliberative to describe the
dominant deliberative mode available in the affirmative context. It highlights the notions of
identity and moral character expressed in the deliberations by the MPs. In the practical
parliamentary setting, as we have seen, PPGs can operate cohesively when scrutinising tasks
are distributed mainly to committee groups. Deliberation can also purchase the kind of
affirmation needed to revise and refine positions, and bringing forward new ones.
Consequently, also adding to the lack of clear institutional structures and procedures, the
definition, target and outcome of the deliberative process remains open in the affirmative
context.
135
4.2 Operative context
Many parliamentary activities and practices take place in a context that can be described as
operative. By operative I mean MPs’ references to efficacy, consciously moving forward in
a way that produces effects and outcomes. Simply put, the overall impetus is to make a
difference, to which the institutional setting also gives support. This desire seems to be
uppermost in the mindset of MPs when they describe and justify their conduct as elected
representatives.
In this subchapter I discuss in more detail how the functions related to forming and
holding opinions and standings translate into action. Democratic politics require decisions
to be made, or otherwise representative governance would be unnecessary. Within the
backdrop of plurality, decisions translate into agreements. Just as political representation
entails the feature of provisionality, democratic agreements achieved within a legislature
are also binding (although they may get overturned later). Theoretically, when it comes to
decision-making the scholarship in deliberative theory is divided, but the rationale of ending
with a consensual agreement has been discarded as an ideal of deliberation. Amongst others,
Cohen (1997), Gutmann and Thompson (1996; 2004; 2012) and Parkinson (2003, 2006)
strive for a decision-making orientation in their understanding of deliberative democracy.
More recently, the problem of deadlocks has been addressed in the US political system,
where representative institutions are unable to produce effects (Warren and Mansbridge
2013). Lack of decision-making and impotence in executing them is a recurrent democratic
problem, undermining legitimacy of representative government and authority of rule of the
people, and something that can guide the framing of research problems by democratic
theories (Warren 2017). Notably, as ‘agreement seeking procedures’ proposal of
deliberative negotiation by Warren and Mansbridge (2013; see also Naurin & Reh 2018) as
well as distinguishing elements for nurturing a spirit of compromise (Gutmann and
Thompson 2012) are welcomed. These insights prove helpful in discerning the operative
context of representation.
The operative context that I mainly locate in the committee stage of the institutional
setting of legislature also offers a different perspective that highlights the question of the
goal of the deliberative process that respective deliberations should aim at. As argued,
institutional rules do not guide caucus deliberations the same way as with practices in
committees and the plenary. This allows targeting of the deliberative process differently,
whereas in committee and plenary work the process follows a set course of action, resulting
in a report or a vote.
In what follows, I will go through notions that I read into the operative context. I will
start by describing how getting things done translate into theoretical language on
representation. Then I move on to discussing the agreements and novelty of compromise–
practices that I anchor mainly to committee work. This leads us to an important feature of
expert hearings. They form, in many ways, the bedrock for drafting of the committee reports
and statements. In addition to this game of expertise I will include some discussion on
institutional positions or ‘roles’. These positions, assisting the operative context, allow
representatives additional resources for making an impact, but then at the same time restrict
the carrying out of some representative activities.
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i On making a difference (and representing)
Considering their highly select position as being chosen through electoral competition, it is
not surprising why one MP (III: 20: 2:27:26) characterised how ‘blandness doesn’t slip in’
to the house. Elected representatives have presumably some certain capacities or
representative qualities that permitted them being elected. As the MP quoted above
suggests, representatives need to have an edge and be willing and capable of responding to
a wide variety of substantial issues and in a wide variety of situations, many of which may
arise without warning. As discussed in the theoretical part, in distinguishing the criteria for
the selection more orthodox descriptive and substantive representation notions are
superseded by a broader mix of features related to gyroscopic representatives. Relying on a
combination of characteristics such a ‘likeability’ and feeling of aligned interest not only
fuse trust on the part of the represented, but–and perhaps more importantly–also allow for
the formation of deliberative relations between the representative and the represented
(Mansbridge 2003; 2009; 2016).
When working within a legislature, representatives draw on these standpoints as
resources that reflect the changing dynamics of representation. Research on legislative roles
also tries to grasp the operative orientations from different sociological (motivational
theories) and rational choice standpoints (see e.g. Andeweg 2014). On a general level, it
becomes possible to read into this frame the ways in which actions and deliberations are
performed to be obviously oriented towards certain representative goals and aspirations.
‘You are in politics to make an impact. […] In elections you aim to win, you aim to gain
power, at being in the government, at having influence. This chain is clear and is completely
natural in politics’ (III: 12: 10:16.) Reflecting on losing power, as happens to many on
election night, reinforces the idea that ‘politicians go [into the legislature] to get to use that
power’ (III: 6: 18:4).
The argument about the foundational motivation for making an impact on societal issues
is also reinforced through its negation: not making it into the government leaves the aspirant
with limited resources when it comes to wielding power. When relegate to the opposition,
the possibilities for exerting a tangible influence are far more limited. In majoritarian
parliamentary systems legislative power is almost exclusively reserved to the government
(and the governing parties).
While in opposition, claiming to have written ‘about 50 objections on a policy [specifics
withheld]’ and ‘50 columns and held 150 influential speeches, and NOTHING [emphasised]
has helped’ (III: 29: 24:37). The only legislation-related impact that this MP was able to
make was having a typographical error removed from one legislative proposal. This lack of
executive power when in opposition explains why, in the Finnish political landscape, all
parties strive for a position in the government regardless of the cost. Support for the
governing parties tends to drop in subsequent elections (most recent information in Pitkänen
and Westinen 2019; Raunio 2011, 138).
Although parliamentary work in the opposition comes with limited resources of
executive power, life in the government is a struggle of a different kind. For some, this can
come as a surprise:
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When I thought that when we got into the government–now life begins, so to
speak, as you don’t have to scribble [waste time with writing] these objections.
But no, this is truly work here because now you need to be on-board,
anticipatorily (II: 10: 33:11).
As discussed before, keeping everybody on board is the challenge for the governing
parties in way that members ‘would read little as possible about things from the papers and
hear about them as much as possible beforehand’ (III: 10: 8:12). Here we also see that
contexts of representation have the temporal faculty that makes it also relevant regarding
operative context. Generally, when interviewed MPs describe political processes they
outline a compound where influencing and the general ethos of getting things done manifest
in various representative activities and pinpoint certain temporal points. For this reason,
although in practice the operative context is institutionally situated to the committee
handling in this research, in reality, for the governing parties, the operative context precedes
all. Making an impact on legislation slips beyond the stage of parliamentary handling, that
is before the bill is introduced to parliament. Often the opposition has no access to this
knowledge.
Analysed through research interviews this implementation-centred notion becomes very
clear regardless of government-opposition divide: ‘Of course I aim at advancing those
[interests] in those instances I’m involved in, because it’s my job to do so’ (II: 12: 23:59).
On the surface the citation above would support the conventional definition of political
representation known as the interest and responsiveness approach’: that definitive functions
of political representation are advancing of interests and being responsive to the
constituency (Rehfeld 2018). However, the theoretical perspective that I take enables a
clearer view of the dispersion or dissolution of representation through MPs intersubjective
concentration on the functionally differentiated task their case of representation is used. In
each particular account the orientation articulated through ‘in order to’ is implied and
performed through the task (Rehfeld 2018, 231–33). Which practical activities and tasks
MPs take on in their line of work that defines representation is not only a theoretically
aligned question but also an empirically valid one. When MPs refer to their role as
representatives, they seem to be addressing descriptions of which representative tasks
should take priority, something that they connect with being a representative in the first
place. Secondly, this interpretation is also linked to the capacities to function as an MP.
Managing stress and fatigue tell a story of the highly demanding nature of representation,
since–as several representatives put it (e.g. III: 22, III: 20, III: 23, III: 27)–MPs are in effect
‘on call’ all the time.31
There is a further functional contingency in the way that representatives seem to have
not sought office in the Parliament of Finland for the purpose of ‘talking’ but for ‘doing’,
31 In addition, when representation is perceived from the perspective of communication seeing
representative practices as communicating and deliberating with various audiences (who also contribute to
defining of the tasks) makes the actual carrying out representation problematic. There are different
perspectives that MPs endorse in supporting representative performance which seem to blend the boundaries
of what (activities) counts as representing. For one, when a representative appears in magazines or appear on
television, would that, as an activity, count as representing? Or when representative act as ‘post offices,
taking care of individual people’s cases regarding e.g. issues with social security and legal rights, advocating
and directing them forward to relevant authorities?
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to borrow Mill’s words (Pekonen 2008). In parliamentary studies this idea is also reflected
in the difference between debating and working parliament, with the Finnish Parliament
belonging to the latter (Raunio and Wiberg 2014, 16). Formally, it means that as an
institution Parliament has significant legislative powers, including budgetary powers.32 As
discussed earlier, committees have a major significance in relation to MPs’ toolbox in
becoming informed and knowledgeable about specific policy fields but arguably also that
‘real work’ takes place there. It outlines a general principle that highlights, again, the
expertise that committees crucially enable: ‘for real, in order to influence you must delve
deep into those issues’ (I: 7: 10:21). Partaking actively in highly valued committee work,
but also having prior experience and knowledge, makes it possible to make a difference: ‘It
is, for real, the place where you can have a substantive impact on the handling of an issue
and also on the content of the report’ (III: 21: 57:13). This process involves external expert
hearings as well as drafting of the committee report (or statement, if another committee has
been assigned to give the report) where committee members individually or jointly
formulate the text arguing for the committee’s opinion.
Committee work is about taking care of issues. Regardless of whether you are
in Government or in Opposition, in the committee your possibilities to influence
are the highest. Going meticulously through the issues and listening to the
experts, a representative has a big possibility to have an effect to the paragraphs
and justifications [formal ones in the committee report or statement] and through
the changes in the budget. (III: 19: 56:10)
Oversight and scrutiny of legislation in committee work beholds a curious mix of
harnessing your individual capacities and capabilities for the collective use of the
committee. However, it is also mirrored through the party membership. But then again, in
the committee one is alone with one’s expertise. What this seem to imply is that while in
performative context of the plenary it is ‘possible to fake it until you make it’, as one MP
put it (III: 7: 15:41), in the operative context when the function of representation include
also specific problem-solving tasks that also test reasoning, ‘faking it’ does not get one very
far. In the operative context when the audience and participants are the same, you need to
convince them to have an impact. This notion, again, is critical with those MPs who are the
only member in the committee from that (small) party, thus representing alone the whole
PPG and making judgments on behalf of the whole group. When there are many members
from the same party, not all have to invest in or commit to committee work equally in
addition to the fact that distribution of policy areas of responsibilities is often exercised with
bigger PPGs.
Committee work also spells out more specifically a requirement for deliberative
representation that contributes to the functioning of the legislature as a deliberating
institution. As such, it ideally also promotes the articulation and clarification of the elements
32 In reality, however, Parliament formally decides on the state budget but less than one percent is actually
allocated by discretion of Parliament. Arguments to enhance Parliament’s powers over deciding on the
budget (through committee handling) to correct the defect are brought up usually once a year in the media
(see also Luomala and Puumala 2010).
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that make up politics in the first place. Importantly, it can also reveal that ‘fundaments’ that
parties and political actors disagree upon can be more adaptive than assumed.
Committee discussions are absolutely necessary. It is parliament work at its
finest because it is quality monitoring of legislation and sensible articulation of
political value difference and fundamental information. (III: 9: 37:12)
**
Well, the main influencing in the committee is not about getting bills changed
because that is, in the end, pretty rare irrespective of committee. Instead it is
more about affecting the discussion and committee members’ general
understanding, something that can manifest so that in the statement or report
there are some entries formulated in some certain way. And also those, of course,
I laboured with over the years. (III: 28: 1:02)
The deliberative stance and willingness to learn and understand what others have to say,
what this interviewed MP cited below underlined throughout the interview, is interwoven
in the mutual recognition that everyone is in Parliament for a reason, for making a
difference. And it calls for understanding the nature of work that takes place between
people:
We are given an enormous [emphasis] bundle of strings in our hand. Like in
Linnanmäki [an amusement park in Helsinki], where pulling the string a present
moves. My job is to recognise those strings so that I know which string to pull
at which moment. It takes time, and knowing who thinks what and who has
influence on what. This is work between people. (III: 26: 1:07:48)
The performance-centred understanding of representation highlighted in the capacities
for reflexivity as well as in strategical thinking is crucial in the redemption of democratic
promises. More importantly, in MP’s own words, ‘redeeming takes place also through how
we operate here within this house’ (II: 12: 23:59). The ways in which representatives can
manage conflict inherent to the representative institution bear significance to their overall
performance that recapitulates the impact that one MP can make (see also Kontula 2018).
Resonating with what has been discussed earlier, also in the light of theory, representation
is not merely about what but also about how. Deliberative representation downplays the idea
that representation just ‘happens’ and instead emphasises the particular intentionality of
such a phenomenon when analysed from an activity- and context-sensitive perspective. To
me, institutional explanations–as to which ways this framework prompt legislative activity–
are insufficient, since it expects similarly these activities to be automatic, thus merely
‘happening’. Therefore, when the idea of representation is transplanted into tangible actions
within a legislature, we can see that representation becomes an interpersonal phenomenon,
making it inherently deliberative in its basic standing.
This relates to the second point about how representative practices are informed by the
contexts. Cameron (2018, 152, emphasis added) connects this idea to the activities of the
representatives: ‘[R]oles and offices foster functionally differentiated clusters of activities
that demand different excellences’. Being able to legislate requires representative to act as
a ‘practitioner’ who ‘pause or move through available subject-positional resources’, as
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Saward (2019, 287) proposes for liminal understanding of representation. Capturing these
resources through varied set of available modes of actions we can see how deliberative
representation sometimes rotate towards the deliberative side in the sense of ‘open-
mindness’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 22), with unfixed positions and opinions and
adaptiveness to existing ones. These can translate into resources that can be used as
persuasive means. Persuasion is facilitated through certain kind of modesty and humility,
features that do not mean that skills and knowledge should be hidden. However, appearing
as someone who holds all capabilities and wisdom to solve political issues is neither credible
nor appealing to one’s colleagues working alongside you in the committee. “If you barge in
from the door [MP lifts up sleeves and puts hands on waist], as in ‘so, now let’s fix this
social security system’, the other 16 [members of the committee] just stare: ‘Right…’” (II:
10: 23:26) To the extent MPs discern posturing and pretence seems to underline, yet again,
how your persona counts when it comes to interacting with others. On another note, another
MP claimed to steer with some questions
… in a manner that when coming forward with my own cause I would not come
out as tart, strict or inapt that I would prevent those being so-and-so [in a swing
position] from voting as I would hope them to vote. And it is a strength when
you know how to use it properly. (III: 17: 13:9:50).
The operative context endorses a deliberative mode I call strategic-deliberative, of
which this citation above illustrates well. Persuasive means in legislatures can be subtle and
they can take shape through prudence and moderate mindset. Essential for the representative
is to be mindful when it comes allocation of deliberation and sensing proper moments to
engage in persuasive efforts (also in Pekonen 2011). These accounts demonstrate a
combination of deliberative and strategic elements at play. For example, in these
interactions the realisation that changing others’ minds goes in vain prompts a strategic-
deliberative mode where ‘[i]nstead [of trying to change the minds of others] you need to
sense what are those occasions when you can argue for a change in a position and when
not. If you preach about everything, people will stop listening to you’ (III: 2: 1:11:35). The
prudence when it comes to refraining from engaging in all opportunities for deliberations,
for reason or another (e.g. persuasion, winning the argument, or opening new perspectives)
connects with the kind of practical wisdom to differentiate the situations when deliberation
can have transformative qualities in the first place. It may also indicate that such strategic
openness, contrary to sincerity demonstrated and somewhat expected in the affirmative
context (while exercising expressive-deliberative mode), may exclude and downplay
viewpoints that are available for the others in formulating opinions and making decisions.
From this perspective, then, the expressive-deliberative mode is more apt in facilitating
epistemic validity when pieces of information are more readily at hand. Where, on one hand,
deliberation does have this enlightening and informing function that is especially available
in the affirmative context, on the other hand deliberation needs to end somewhere.
The kind of result-orientedness of deliberative representation is apparent in the operative
context that the strategic-deliberative mode supports. Arriving at a decision is often a
highlighted feature in institutional deliberation that abides to institutional rules and
procedures. They also imply that in order to get somewhere, deliberative process must have
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an ending of some kind and conclude something. When MPs nod towards this direction in
their understanding of deliberation they are not completely off theoretically in this.
Democratic representation and democratic deliberation carry implicit references with
binding decision-making (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Parkinson 2006; Cohen 1997).
As shown in this subchapter, in practical interactions noting these institutional cues
relate to seizing deliberative moments available. These conscious decisions translate into
the ways representatives present themselves to others–how they represent to other
representatives, as an argument not irrelevant in regard also to theoretical applications of
political representation. However, this strategic orientation more aligned in the operative
context, or consequent strategic openness, does not bracket off deliberative stand. As
deliberative democrats now willingly accept, maintaining civility and showing respect to
others and their reasons can legitimately be done out of courtesy as a way to increase
sociality (Bächtiger et al. 2018, 4–5). The reasons for doing this may not be sincere, but as
demonstrating good manners shows, strategic action is difficult to discern or erase from
human action. These themes of tact and judgment invite the theme of agreement and
compromises, to which we will turn next.
ii Being able to agree and make decisions
Governing demands the ability to make compromises, and in democratic politics this
requisite is placed in the hands of elected representatives. Namely, it also reflects the
division of labour that the two-track model of deliberative politics by Habermas assumes
(see overview in Flynn 2004). Legislatures as ‘strong publics’ have the initiative to make
binding decisions. On this level what we can say that compromising is a natural response in
democracy when we cannot impose our will upon others, but we are still compelled to make
decisions. The perspective about the novelty of compromising and deliberation it
necessitates can be forgotten in the prevalence of party democracy. It has been thought that
the disciplining measures spelled out by party dynamics provides little room for deliberative
manoeuvres, thus signalling the end of the principle of trial by discussion (Manin 1997,
217). As Manin (ibid., 217–8) argues, compromises open up the avenue through which this
principle is to be explored.
Legislators and representatives are especially attuned for the necessity to compromise.
In the interviews it is linked to intragroup dynamics, as was referred in the previous
subchapter. This is especially meaningful when we consider the role of parliamentary
committees. When the committee sets out to work, inherently assuming the task of scrutiny
and writing of the committee report, compromising faculties and other ‘agreement-seeking
measures’ (Warren and Mansbridge 2013) are fused.
I will start here from the more general notion of compromise as an introduction to the
theme. Then I turn it into a contrary positioning on the limits and ‘the spirit’ of compromise.
This oppositional design is not exhaustive, but it helps to illuminate the differences in the
practices. Here compromise bridges the operative and the performative context, thus also
having undercurrents within the affirmative context, demonstrating their crucial empirical
overlap. More significantly, political compromises ‘can be captured only in a context-
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sensitive judgment’ as Gutmann and Thompson (2012, 49, emphasis added) argue. The
contexts articulate how democratic credentials of making a difference and influencing in
legislature require negotiations and compromises that are to be publicly discussed and
‘shown’.
The idea of compromise, even though it flows throughout the interviews, is difficult to
get a grip of since it radiates over many features regarding substance, time and participants.
Given the empirical and conceptual opaqueness the intellectual heritage of compromise
does not either have a clear home in the literature as Rostbøll and Scavenius (2017) note.
Now, when compromise is attached to democracy as the rule of many, then it is ‘the price
of democracy’ (III: 15: 20:30) since ‘no one decides alone in a democracy’ (III: 14:
1:12:17). ‘Dictatorships are different‘(ibid.). Or, ‘you can be a one-person party and agree
with yourself about everything’ (III: 16: 15:12). All things being equal operating in a
democracy renders a reflective character to it. As such, it forces participants to interact with
one another, and accommodating and being exposed to others’ perspectives. Recently
Rostbøll and Scavenius (2017, 5) define compromises as interpersonal phenomenon where
‘the practical question is with whom, when and about what to compromise’. In the case
compromise it is worth paying attention that it is not a democratic (deliberative) practice
belonging exclusively to one context. Here I want to raise the point and showcase how there
is a path-dependency with elements of opinion-making that manifest especially in
compromising.
Notwithstanding the fact that compromises are often interpersonal and take place
between participants and parties, the reflexive element of compromise should be considered.
Arguably, representatives first ponder elements regarding compromising among themselves
just as previously discussed in the affirmative context: they collect and put together the
building blocks that could constitute the compromise, and ideally put them into a test in
deliberation with others. Resolutions should be consequential also to a reflexive judgment
that goes on inside one’s head (Goodin 2000), thus also making compromises an
intrapersonal phenomenon. The idea of compromise is therefore not only framed through
the interactions with others but it consists also from a certain kind of mindsets and capacities
for reflection and judgment. Also Ankersmit (2002, 195, 205–6), who defended a notion of
representation that showcases the feature of (aesthetic) judgment, regarded compromises
important.
The way compromises are discussed in the interviews in terms of developing
compromises and negotiation reveals that that it is the (many) boundaries of representation
that is being negotiated. This interpretation taps into the liminal character of representation
(Saward 2019). Representation operates in a transitional manner thus appears to be in
constant movement. As such, it complicates indicating the counterparts of representation;
who and what they are. It also questions whether it is reasonable even to assume an actor-
centred approach to political representation, just as Pitkin (1967, 221) started to anticipate.
Therefore, it might even be that the theme of compromise can contribute to the emerging
systemic notion of representation. For the present purposes, however, the theme of
compromise is a workable framework that can connect with contemporary discussions on
representation (and not deliberation in which it is more commonly employed). Here the
vocabulary of representation does not cling to the common understanding on interests as
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distributable goods and values but instead MPs reflect these in terms of their own self-
understanding. The idea through which representative aspirations are projected, MPs acting
as parliamentarians and on the other hand as members of collectives, would readily be
turned into role orientation theories and representative roles. The problem with them is that
they assume somewhat ready set, fixed positions (e.g. of trustee, delegate or ‘politico’)
through which legislative practices are carried. In reality they are less fixed, but also that
the basic trustee-delegate model conflates elements that should be treated separately
(Rehfeld 2009; see also Mansbridge 2011), and therefore analytically truncates
understanding on political representation. But as argued before, we will benefit from a more
nuanced view on how practitioners negotiate these contextually dependent positions as
dynamic ways of staging the legislative performance. And perhaps more importantly, use
them as resources when interacting with each other.
This point is especially relevant with compromising. The resources that are indicated
through the idea of compromise assume that, as one interviewee put it, ‘an MP’s work is not
a solo sport’ (III: 11: 1:02:48): ‘in order to operate in any organised community, you must
be flexible in regard to your wishes and choose a group where there are as much similarity
as possible to your own thoughts’ (III: 16: 15:12). Practicing representative democracy
operates very much on the rules stated by party democracy. It relates to the centrality of
political parties to organise and stabilise the otherwise “flimsy” representational relationship
between the representative and the represented. In practice, however, this dynamic assumes
the PPG and the corresponding collective action. On a larger scale, the understanding that
MPs employ relates to some democratic ground rules that limit what is achievable and that
make it inevitable that compromise is the only way forward in some situations.
Underlining the kind of ethos discussed here justifies the use of party discipline and
makes it ‘indispensable’, since without it ‘the hardest decisions would not be made’ (III:
11: 1:02:48), amongst other similar comments that interviewees made. One interviewee’s
remark that ‘no parliament that works responsibly would do without having also some
amount of discipline’ (III: 19: 59:23) outlines the flickering nature of representation that the
standard account and the trajectory of sanctions and embraces. This point that ‘the system
cannot sustain’ (III: 5: 1:23:08), ‘nothing comes out from it’ (III: 9: 1:12:59) –especially in
terms of budgetary distribution–was vividly embodied also in animalistic terms, if MPs as
‘group of chicken that these 200 people form’ (III: 9: 1:12:59) would be ‘like wild rabbits
out there’ (III: 5: 1:23:08) or ‘flock of sparrows when we go the plenary’ (III: 1: 1:15:42).
But then again, representatives are very attuned with the conflicting feelings, to the
extent of being in pains with, and aware that urges to ‘score a point’ must be restrained.
Indeed, it portrays the internal tension in political compromise: at the same time democratic
processes ‘require politicians to resist compromise, and to embrace it’ (Gutmann and
Thompson 2012, 22). Similarly the ubiquity and ambiguity of compromise paints a picture
where it is seen in democratic politics simultaneously as a virtue and a vice (Rostbøll and
Scavenius 2017, 1–5). The trade-off is further elaborated by Gutmann and Thompson
(2012), who place the value of compromise in between democratic functions of governing
and campaigning.33 These two practices derive from two ‘mindsets’ (as Gutmann and
33 Even though authors pinpoint many of deficiencies in the governing–campaigning in the context of United
States, the main dynamics speaks also in Finland. Increasing political polarization and ‘money politics’ may
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Thompson call them) that representatives hold: of compromising and uncompromising. The
former, pivotal in governing, comprise from adapting one’s principles in favour for reaching
compromise and endorsing mutual respect. Similarly compromise combines mutual
concession and reciprocity (Rostbøll and Scavenius 2018, 1 –5), notions that are now
detected also by deliberative theory, orienting focus away from consensus-seeking
deliberation.
When consensus is not attainable clarification of conflict, arriving at a ‘meta-consensus’
(Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010)–a shared understanding on some issue that participants
disagree on–or different forms of bargaining as an agreement-seeking measure are viable
results of deliberative processes, given that coercion is kept in check. Coercion that is
invoked by mechanisms of party discipline is something that proves problematic to
deliberative democrats. Despite relaxing many of the elements relevant to ‘first generation’
of deliberative theorists the question on absence of power is still ‘unchallenged’ and
‘unrevised’ within the paradigm (Bächtiger et al. 2018, 4). The limits of compromise begin
to show when natural like-mindedness or cohesiveness ceases–and discipline and coercion
set in.
Sometimes representatives cannot compromise with others, thus cannot settle the
corresponding compromise that needs to be taken also with oneself (as compromise entails
also this internal aspect). The uncompromising mindset corresponds with sticking to
principle and not backing down. In the backdrop of competitive electoral politics,
compromises have an undertone that refers to ‘selling out’: selling out principles, interests,
and constituencies. Especially from the campaigning perspective dominating the
uncompromising mindset it is a sign of weakness and ‘surrendering’ by the representative
not to stand up or hold the ground for what she or he believes in or what is best for the
electorate. Instead of ‘principled tenacity’ he yields to others’ assumingly stronger opinions
or settle with a watered-down outcome. (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 74–85.) These
kinds of notions come to the fore in the interviews of Finnish MPs, although they are more
discernible in the performative context. Deliberative representation in the operative context
is not marked with such tenacity when it comes to showcasing general attitudes towards the
task of legislating. When legislation gets done, something that gives impetus to the
committee system, also indicates that the opinions that MPs operate and negotiate with tend
not to be fully carved in stone.
Importantly, compromise is a theme through which representation can be looked at. Both
mindsets of compromise and uncompromise are needed in vital democratic politics, but the
uncompromising mindset should not be overriding. Also the mutual mistrust that it endorses
is not a very suitable ground for constructive politics since it is also prone to hamper
respectful discourse and conduct towards political opponents who one disagrees with. The
novelty of treating compromises through the idea of mindsets, regardless of their somewhat
theoretical fuzziness, is that they extend over the temporal moment where compromises
practically take place. Instead of focusing on the ‘two-actor, one-moment’ approach to
legislative compromises, the conditions and circumstances of it spread out and are thus
highly context-dependent but also vulnerable (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 205–209).
not be as stark as in the US but regardless that Finland is defined as ‘consensual’ (Lipjhart 1999)
parliamentary democracy political parties are not immune to these tendencies.
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Similarly, they include, as the MPs describe, also what Warren (2017, 49) acknowledge as
‘two- and three-level games’: political actors operate from various representative positions
that can be overlapping and potentially conflictual.   Empirical scholars of deliberation
should not be agnostic about these as is especially the case with elected representatives
within institutional setting. Assuming representative positions and acting on them is
dynamic, thus being sensitive to inexplicit and contingent ways that participants endorse
representation is theoretically also central here (Saward 2010; 2019; Montanaro 2012)
Different contexts of representation invite and highlight these capacities but also
willingness to compromise by tapping into these prescriptions of collective dynamics in
myriad ways (and with different successful rate). While contemporary theorising of
representation evades from capturing political representation from representational
relationships–that the represented and the representative exist independently and outside the
‘act’ of representation–MPs make sense of their activities through these terms. These
relationships as well as the practices to be recognised and taken up within each
representative context relate also to compromises. When MPs discuss the many aspects of
compromises, the compromising and uncompromising mindsets introduced above are
detectable in the background. The significance of compromises is not only in its
concessional and distributive capacity, but more so in the interpersonal (and intrapersonal)
viewpoint of exercising the ascribed mindsets. Also, there is a significant demarcation
between the logic of operative and performative context. It is illustrated how MPs ‘keep
tabs’ on their colleagues: when judging and anticipating their actions and motivations. The
same logic of keeping tabs is present with the coalition government dynamics where
governing is a joint activity but when it comes to accountability governing parties are
assessed separately. The tendency of governing parties to start distancing themselves from
each other is seen when the next elections approaches–something that reflects also within
the committee work.
Also from intraparty perspective it makes sense to keep an eye out on what MP
colleagues are doing since MPs are relying on their capacities of judgment and reflection as
I also demonstrated in the previous subchapter. Informal norms and corresponding
discretion aim at restricting attempts for individual political gains that are in the interviews
interlinked not with governing but campaigning practices. However, here the idea is
endorsed where ‘one person scores, the team wins’ (II: 10: 34:52) underlining the notions
that democratic politics consists of cohesive collectives bound together through democratic
agreements. The idea also sees representatives as purposive, strategic actors that aim for
instant wins whereas constructive politics requires one to wait for the gains and sometimes
give way to collective compromise. As such, this mindset downplays the role of individual
wins, and ties their relevance only when they contribute to the scaled-up governing logic of
politics. However, this argument begs for more empirical clarification, and that is where we
are advancing next. In that I will offer a more detailed picture of how compromise takes
shape on the committee level. Piece by piece I will go through the respective deliberative
process that revolves around the practical work being done: drafting the committee report.
I first discuss the role of experts and the game of politics that they invoke. After introducing
the central building blocks of compromise and non-compromise that expert hearings are
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argued to constitute, I will return to the feasibility and urgency of compromises, discussing
first the limits and secondly, the spirit of them.
iii Game of experts and expertise‘Information is the weaponry, the ammunition of legislative battle’(Asbell 1978, rf. Bessette 1994, 49).
In the interviews the value of committee work is recognised from the perspective that
benefits not only individual representatives for providing them opportunities to accrue
expertise, but committees also benefit the entire legislature. A well-functioning and
committed committee system is proof that legislatures perform their tasks well in the face
of astounding asymmetry in resources for preparing and handling legislative issues.34
Defining committees as main spatial locus for the operational context of representation
is supported especially by one focal findings of previous research (Pekonen 2011): there is
a general inclination that Finnish parliamentary committees aim for unanimous reports.
Unanimous report is considered as a ‘strong report’ (II: 9-2) that states and reflects the
collective opinion of the Parliament. Achieving this parliamentary ideal means that when
the MPs set to work, in drafting of the committee report (or statement) they are engaging in
negotiation and developing compromise. Even though finding a common ground for
constructive politics may not ring a bell in consensual systems the same way it would in
systems defined by conflict and stark political polarisation, it would be a mistake to
undermine the relevance of the competitive nature of politics and campaigning logics. The
contingent nature of compromise is relevant also in consensual political landscapes (Naurin
and Reh 2018, 732).
Dynamics of deliberative representation are sensitive to these institutional cues
mentioned above but similarly important is the social perspective. Long incumbency of
committee memberships that last almost without an exception throughout the four-year
parliamentary term is prone to strengthen cooperation within the committee (Arter 2003;
see also Warren and Mansbridge 2013). It is not unusual that MPs prefer to continue in the
same committee if they get elected to the next term. Over time members learn to know each
other but more importantly, they learn to ‘play together’. For this reason these incentives
support the nurturing of relations that are founded on trust and mutual respect–features that
also invite compromise and settling the necessary bumps in governing. The institutional
setting ascribing to social characteristics, but also the expertise, is crucial as it allows
committee structure to perform not only efficiently but also credibly.
Essential elements of deliberative process–argumentation, persuasion and information
(Bessette 1994, 49–55)–are readily exposed also within this operative context. So, when
34 Finnish parliamentary committees have only one or two committee secretaries as civil servant staff
members, whereas ministries are manned by hundreds of officials. Committee secretaries are in charge of
practically writing the draft of the committee report to be then accepted alongside with the bill in the
plenary.
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committees scrutinise legislative bills through the process of external expert hearings and
deliberation that follows, elements involving compromising, agreement and finding
satisfactory results are available for further analysis. Therefore, we can argue in the
operative context in the case of committees that the prevailing attitude is adaptive. As such,
it entails a general and principled openness to argumentation by others despite that the
opinions are defined but not as transfixed as in other contexts. As we know, in many cases
the main lines (collective standings) are drawn in intraparty deliberations. However, these
initial positions are adaptable in the sense that while they most likely will not get overturned
completely, there might be considerable leeway resulting from reasoning that uses the
information available. On these assumptions, I argue in this research that we call to describe
prevalent style of deliberation in the operative context strategic-deliberative. Strategic
features are more present than in the PPG meetings, but communication lacks the most
disruptive partisan properties more at display in the plenary. Strategic-deliberative mode
captures the idea that deliberation orients towards decision-making and therefore also
invites agreement-seeking solutions. Being able to settle disagreements may require
strategic manoeuvring but it is, ideally, carried out more ‘deliberatively’ in the sense that it
seeks to adapt and accommodate different perspectives also by sorting and selecting relevant
pieces of information. For that matter the level of authenticity is also strategic in relation to
openness, as I will soon discuss.
As said, here we also find evidence for functional characteristics of representation that
in the case of committee orient deliberations towards a defined outcome: drafting of the
report that states the formal opinion of the committee. However, the extent government and
opposition members, or individual members for that matter, share this understanding on the
circumstances of the deliberative process varies. Elements of the affirmative context are
constantly at play especially when issue at hand is politically insignificant and when
opinions are not fully defined, but more in the making. In general, the way that context is
read when it comes to deliberation, negotiation and compromising affects acknowledging
the potentiality of these practices in regard to reaching a decision.
The guiding idea is that exposing legislation to ‘an acid test’, as one MP (II: 15: 41:32)
described the function of legislative scrutiny. This task highlights the role of experts and
expertise. However, they can become ‘collateral damage’ of political realities that are
projected in the outcome. The powers of committees can be thought to be reflected in the
statistics of legislative bills on how many are get modified annually. Throughout
approximately 40 percent of legislative bills are changed by the committees annually
(Ahtonen, Keinänen, and Kilpeläinen 2011). Even though it would be tempting to argue that
this is a clear signal of the willingness of the majority government members to foster a
compromise-oriented mindset in favour for the whole committee, the answer is not
completely uplifting. The study by Ahtonen and others (2011) noted that a large part of the
alterations to the paragraphs are mere technical or superficial. Committees also correct typos
and other procedural mistakes (errors in issuing dates, sums etc.) found in the bills. Similarly
their incompleteness and declining quality were criticised in the interviews.
Also my interviewees (in interviews conducted in 2015), when I showed them statistics
of bills changed by individual committees, many were surprised of the high numbers of
reports that altered paragraphs. Therefore, it seems valid that only a fracture of reports that
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proposes as a statement of the committee to alter the paragraph(s) are politically significant.
To state the obvious, it means that bills that the committees handle are prepared by the
government. And when they are prepared by a government in multi-party majoritarian
system, this means that bills usually represent a compromise as they come. This is especially
true with bills that derive from the government programme, which gets executed
accordingly. Bills can be also defined as compromise in the sense that they are coupled as
part of a larger compromise where different governing parties get their own ‘riders’
implemented through the proposed bills (Raunio 2011, 125–26).
This problematic path-dependency of compromises, when proposed legislation is
interwoven in a process that is in itself a compromise, is truly felt in the Parliament. There
is also another point to note underlining the long process of legislation on the ministerial
level. Task forces and preparatory hearings take note of various stakeholders and other
affected parties that are included in preparation of legislation, at least with major reforms.
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, some legislation can be ‘prepared by a limited
group’ (II: 3: 50:23). Therefore, among MPs there may be significant differences and
discrepancies when it comes to access to this prior knowledge regarding legislative
preparation done in the ministries. This is an essential point to which I will return soon as it
will demonstrate, again, how deliberative representation is connected to capacities to form
and articulate opinions as in reason-giving and justification.
Is it futile even to imagine in a legislative context altogether any circumstances where
opinions would not be defined prior, in earlier stages of the policy process? This point of
view about the opinion formation process seems to distract analytical soundness in this
research. In that I approach the question of evolution of opinions and preferences from not
defined to well-defined. We could argue along with Mansbridge and others (2010, see also
Mansbridge 2015) that opinion-formation (and its possible implications of transforming
them) in the deliberative process is taken as a ‘regulative ideal’. On the other hand, as
discussed, in democracy some preferences and opinions must be inalienable like democratic
and human rights are, therefore maintaining these principles are not matters of opinions or
pre-deliberative commitments. Notably, some issues are non-negotiable, and so the idea of
a deliberative process that would start out with a clean slate is out of the question. In
democratic politics prior opinions that are articulated during the electoral campaign are put
under the test in parliamentary politics, debated and deliberated. What I offer in this research
is a rough outline, a scenario where through the chosen contexts of representation these
elements of opinion-making and articulating are called out and operationalised. Only then
we can aim at providing a credible overview on how aspects of deliberation and
representation that I combine in deliberative representation play throughout the Parliament.
This take is contrary to approaches that would try to single out most favourable conditions
for ‘real’ and authentic deliberation, which the way I see it would end up treating these
essential practices in isolation and as atomistic elements.
This is the framework through which the process of scrutinising legislation by the
committees can be analysed. Also, the way it is structured offers significant triggers for
communicative interactions, gathering and sharing of information and deliberation, all
features that deliberative representation aims at distinguishing. Centrality of expertise and
knowledge referred in the beginning of this section as the weaponry hits the nail in the head
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as in the operative context it is the external expert hearings where such ammunition is
collected. The theme of experts and expertise was addressed at length by Pekonen (2011,
195–208; also Holli and Saari 2009; Holli 2012), but here I want to recapitulate some of the
key points and give an overview what constitutes the grounds for compromise when
operating on what Pekonen describes as ‘issue-based collaboration’ (ibid., 206). It also
opens the strategic field from which MPs can operate in. It shows how defining and adapting
perspectives and opinions are proportional to accrued information available through the
hearings.
Expert hearings35 affirm committee deliberations a forensic element that puts the
capacity for judgment and discretion into full use. Collaboration that is ideally issue-based
requires in the first place, from deliberative perspective, that the epistemic grounds are made
clear and equally available for all. Only then can matters upon which people agree or
disagree be legitimately put on display and argued for. The committee expert hearings also
provide this essential function since it lays down a common, equal grounding for reasoning.
In this, all members regardless of parliamentary stipulations of the government and the
opposition are equal since all have had equal opportunity to take part in the hearings
(something that not everybody actively make use of). One MP (III: 23: 21:45) describes this
epistemic principle in the following terms:
Respondent: The conclusion of the committee must familiarise itself to what has
collegially been heard. Not to what someone has read or got information
elsewhere. It must be based on that.
Interviewer: You cannot bring external information to the table?
Respondent: You can, but when many want to leave that mark and say that
they’ve been to this place and I know [this thing]. It just doesn’t roll. It is the
collegiality that is essential here. I learned to appreciate it. […] Then the
outcome must [be based on], preferably what collegially is heard or visited, or
specifically met some actors and hearing them out. Everyone can obtain that
same information. Because MPs come from so many different backgrounds.
According to the above, ideally, arguments that are not jointly heard and testified are
less credible and legitimate to be used in justification and reasoning. However, it goes
without saying that using one’s own personal expertise or what one knows (e.g. what are
the consequences of some past legislation in one’s own district), are surely considered, but
arguing for and against the matter is dominantly framed through expert hearings. Merely
appealing to one’s own expertise and know-how is not usually received well, and such
pedantic or pedagogical reason-giving is thought irritating. This notion differentiates from
being generally active which also pays off in the expert hearing stage of committee
work. Justifications of opinions and viewpoints are also explicitly reflected and compared
to the bill that always includes a lengthy justification.
Importantly, experts also fill in the gaps in information regarding prior preparation
process to which the committee hearings also supplement. The committee scrutiny then has
35 Approximately 5000 experts are heard yearly by Finnish committees. The number of invited experts have
more than doubled in thirty years. (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2012, 33)
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an important double-checking function. What it means is that in deliberation MPs seek after
epistemic validity through expert deliberations, hence they serve a kind of ‘truth-tracking’
function (see also Pekonen 2011, 196–197). However, this issue-based objectivity that MPs
highlight is still part of the politically oriented game of expertise. The way the role of
information that expert hearings provide is treated and used resonates with the further
distinction of information to educate, mobilise and most importantly, persuade as Bessette
(1994, 49–51) argues. Availability of information is judged according to its feasibility, thus
serving as strategical building blocks for political compromise and non-compromise. These
get articulated in the committee report, starting from the official decision of acceptance to
modifications, but wrestling can take over single choice of words.
In principle, the committee hearings ideally follow deliberative ideal of the all-affected
principle (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 128). It articulates the idea that all participants
whom are expected to be affected by the decision should be included in the deliberative
process. According to the interviews there is a sincere goal to include as wide as possible
range of affected parties, and in the usual situations members’ requests for experts are not
turned down (Holli and Saari 2009, 48; Pekonen 2011, 196). As discussed, deciding who
are all the affected parties or individuals, is a challenge especially when it comes to
questions relating to representation (e.g. Parkinson 2006; Näsström 2011a). The
representative application of this, then, is not only that getting heard would be warrant for
legislative effect–that the law would be changed according to the interest of the affected–
but instead it is up to the members’ judgment to decide who gets invited. What are the
perspectives and interests that the committee wants to make itself heard? It is an important
question considering how the range of perspectives and opinions delivered and represented
by the experts set the frame through which the committee deliberates and drafts the report.
According to the question above, epistemic validity in reason-giving is less falsifiable if the
piece of information comes outside the expert hearings–a point that makes the selection of
heard experts crucial since they determine which representations are placed on the agenda
to be discussed and reflected on. Especially those experts who can bring new viewpoints
and who are precise in their delivery are greatly appreciated (see also Holli and Saari 2009;
Pekonen 2011):
Especially those presenters who can bring something new, a new perspective to
the law or to the bill. […] That is welcomed. In that sense I always appreciate
those who can light a fire to the big picture, from a new perspective. Contrary to
those who merely repeat that ‘good proposal, good draft, yep we have nothing
to say to it. (I: 8: 8:21)
**
The expert says that this [legislation] does not work, this must be changed. The
impact of that expert is very considerable. Then there are those who come to
complain that everything is bad and wrong. One could say that it doesn’t lead
much anywhere. (III: 18: 1:14:13)
For this reason, it is not only the selection of the experts but also the way the information
they provide for argumentative purposes is a political question. For these reason presented
above Finnish committees have been described as a heresthetic space (Turja 2012, 38).
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Following Riker’s views on political manipulation, Turja argues that the strategic use of
experts can be coined with this practice when MPs invite experts to be heard who are
favourable to their own viewpoints. Especially with politically tense bills government and
opposition alike march in36 experts with known sympathies or antipathy towards the
proposed legislation. As one (III: 21: 19:25) said, members can ‘order opinions that are
shrouded in the clothing of experts’. Considering the focal meaning of expert hearings to
the expressed arguments in the drafting of the report it makes politically sense to pay
attention who the experts are and what they state as their formal statement, and how they do
it. But most importantly, there are strategic-deliberative orientation in the ways in which
experts are lured into bringing up and illuminating certain points of view.
Well, of course, they are prey to different political groups that you snatch from
those that kind of views you want to support your aspirations when making the
reports or statements. The best MPs are those who are curious of the whole
package, and listens to all, and tries to create a balanced report based on the
entirety. I would like to be that kind, but you have to, on the other hand, everyone
wants to be tactical to some degree, thinking that the majority of the committee
wants to push it some directions and you yourself want it towards a little bit
towards the other direction. Then there is the temptation to exaggerate in your
questions to the experts just those themes and put weight on those that pull
towards that wished direction. (III: 9: 21:10)
**
It has been important that experts represent different paths of life and
experiences and interests. And in a way make them discuss together. To me
that’s the best method for MPs can then perceive the “sore spots”, what it is
actually all about. That we find out what they disagree on. And then in a way
must steer them to discuss among themselves. But really MPs don’t present
opinions. But it happens all the time. Some are more enthusiastic than others.
The most common way is … your own question. Or you can formulate your
opinion into a question, and it’s not forbidden. But to a debate between MPs and
experts the working orders of Parliament don’t encourage. (I: 2: 4:53)
In addition to highlighting points of contention and clearly pinpointing the defects of
proposed legislation, there is a hope among MPs that those expert presentations prove
influential enough to be able to mediate a preferred revelation to the whole committee. As
the quotations bring up, ensuring that experts reveal a favourable point features the most
evident strategic-deliberative feature for deliberative representation in the committee: since
formally MPs are not allowed to engage in discussion with the experts, but only to ask
questions (despite lengthy prologues sometimes often precedes the actual question), the
questions are addressed to and formulated in a way that invokes the expert state a point
36 Filibustering or obstruction in the Finnish parliament is not very common, but it does occur and takes a
form also on the committee level. There is not known research about committee level obstruction (on
parliamentary obstruction in early Eduskunta, see O. Pekonen 2017).
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beneficial to what MP (or the PPG) advocates for. Efforts are made to balance the list37 of
invited experts by ‘inducing a different perspective’ in the case it turns out ‘one-sided’.
Remarks made by these experts are needed from the perspective of the opposition, ‘that it’s
always better in the protesting opinion that you can lean on what the experts have said in
the hearings’ (III: 2: 47:51).
While MPs place significant emphasis on the information that the experts provide as
‘factual matters’ they are not out of tune when it comes to distinguishing partisan experts
(i.e. lobbyists) from more impartial ones (i.e. researchers) (see also in Holli & Saari 2009).
Especially with straight-up interest group or organisation MPs are aware that they mainly
serve their principal’s interests, and as their agent their purpose is to make the position
known on the legislative issue. There have also been arguments put forward to allow
external expert hearings become public, also to mitigate the alleged power of the ‘usual
suspects’ visiting the committees frequently (Seo and Raunio 2017).
Finnish parliamentary committee members are also keen to raise a local perspective to
the agenda through the experts. However, this is diplomatically portrayed as means for
advancing individual members’ campaigning purposes (I: 10: 13:44; II: 9–1: 26:22; I: 8:
11:28; I: 9: 12:38; I: 11: 14:26), something that is ‘a source of common discontentment’ in
Parliament (I: 2: 4:26; also in I: 11: 14:26). Inviting your own potential supporters from
one’s own district, as a favour to them by allowing them to get heard on the highest
legislative level (also in Holli & Saari 2009, Pekonen 2011), can be read off to the
performative. In this situation the intended audience ceases to be other committee members
but member of the electorate that the expert in a way stands for. Since time is a scarce
parliamentary resource, careful consideration about the added value that each invited expert
can bring to the scrutiny of the bill is emphasised. Posturing, associated with these trophy
experts, diverts from the general ethos of the ‘real work’ being done in the committees.
Overall, the influence and impact of external experts seems to be linked to the feasibility
of their testimony. According to the interviews, it is often those experts who can deliver a
well-drafted and exact proposal to an exact part of the bill that they want to put emphasis
on are in better position than those who discuss the matter on a general level (see also in
Holli and Saari 2009). Usability is of essence to MPs, who are busy and have generally
relatively little time to dwell on matters. Therefore, it is cost-efficient to have the message
clearly formulated to enhance its implementation regarding the committee report draft. This
idea also indicates the results-oriented focus of the operative context that the committee
meetings exemplify, and what is in use of the strategic-deliberative mode.
Representatives in the committee, despite attempts to control engaging in deliberation
with the experts as such, try to challenge and induce these representative claims of experts
for political purposes and finding information outliers. Discrepancies are actively also
sought when it comes to representative relationships of the experts. For one, a tension in
executing a plain messenger role, as authorised by the interest group organisation, can
sometimes be detected in the expert hearings. It can be seen from their faces. It could be
that the expert does not agree with the position taken by the organisation one is there to
37 Expert hearings begin with inviting relevant instances and organisation to the committee (also in Holli and
Saari 2009; Pekonen 2011). The committee secretaries have what is called a ‘basic list’, a draft list of experts
that is presented to the committee.
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represent or, in the case of government officials, there is something discreet they cannot
disclose with the committee. Usually this information is available only to a trusted, limited
group within the governing parties. However, these hints can be as revealing as what the
experts state.
Representation here takes the analogy of perspectives, as discussed. Another tactic is to
operationalise detected internal discrepancy into a question that reveals the variety of
contingencies either within one expert’s statement or between the heard experts.38 On such
accounts, members’ aspiration for acquiring new information is led by strategic openness in
the sense that questions to be addressed to the experts are not sincere. They are targeted in
a manner that would induce a perspective relevant to the person posing the question. I want
to underline here, however, that many questions that committee members pose are also those
that are asked sincerely, because they want to find out more about the issue and get a
specification to a detail. Many MPs are active and curious, something that is also
appreciated by fellow members. This should not get confused with those who ask out of
courtesy and habit, something that irritates many. These are referred in the interviews as
‘occupational questioners’.
In sum, detecting any inconsistencies or knowing about them prior to the committee
hearing requires a considerate amount of expertise on the part of the representative. When
this expertise is combined with political tact underlines the general notion that ‘you need to
be tremendously active and enlightened’. This makes it possible to ‘seize the matter when
others are still wondering about it. Then you are one step forward when others have not yet
made it to their trenches’ (II: 9–1: 45:46).
When grand political dividing lines are tried to be pushed back and tend not to be
elaborated in committee deliberations, the sensitivity to political aspirations is projected
through the chosen experts and pieces of information they provide. As Pekonen rightly notes
by following former MP Erkki Pulliainen’s (2006) autographical account of parliamentary
work, in a parliament everything is political. In concluding remarks, Pekonen (2011, 208)
argues that while MPs in the case of expertise and experts grasp the overly politicised nature
of a given situation and not surrender their judgment accordingly, the testing of specialists
is left short-handed. Partly for this reason, refraining from engaging in critical deliberation
with the experts (something that the institutional norms in Parliament enforces) would
further test the legitimacy and authority of their representative claim-making.39 Also, the
38 The interviews bring up a procedural norm of trying to avoid inviting disagreeing experts into the same
hearing session. It is thought disrespectful and uncomfortable for the expert to give their expert opinion in
the presence of those who disagree with your view.
39 I want to make a short note on the political nature of factual knowledge from the perspective of
representation theory. We can see that how the idea of representation according to the constructivist turn
aims at presenting itself as coherent and rationally solid (yet plural and democratic). Take, for an example, a
carefully constructed representative claim, like any good argumentation, makes a proposal on how to
perceive reality. But what is important to note, and what I have briefly mentioned, is that epistemic
democrats’ (e.g. Landemore 2017b; 2017a) argument on making truth the priority of deliberative processes
is incomparable with representation theory. Importantly, tendency for coherence in representative claim-
making is not an indication for truth. If one would even like to discuss these with references to truth we
could argue that representation could be treated as a provisional claim about the truth but never the truth.
The latter would make contestation and debate futile and therefore destroy the very idea of democracy.
Following Ankersmitt’s (2002) reading of representation that resonates with recent discussions is that the
154
whole notion of expertise that would imply impartiality raises doubts among interviewed
representatives: ‘real experts’ are distinguished from partial ones.
This subsection has addressed the role of experts and expertise in the Finnish
parliamentary committees. I have argued that the ways in which perspectives, opinions and
facts constitute parliamentary oversight and scrutiny distributed to the committees, but it
also turns out to be a game of experts and expertise. In addition to collecting and gathering
relevant information about the legislative matter at hand and facilitating decision-making,
there are conscious attempts to frame the deliberations through the selection of experts and
operationalisation of their viewpoints and opinions. For such accounts, the strategic-
deliberative mode is in place.
iv The limits of compromise
I have shown how representatives ‘arm’ themselves with information and expertise. If
compromise is to be sought, it is built and arranged by using points, perspectives and
opinions that the experts bring to the table. Importantly, however, the government
programme and the political deals involved form the backdrop from which compromise can
begin. As such, it relates to how disagreements are discussed and dealt with. In this case,
the distinction between compromising and uncompromising mindsets articulated by
Gutmann and Thompson (2012) come in handy. While compromise is often sought there
are limits to compromise. In this section, I go over the elements that comprise to situations
where agreement cannot be made. I will discuss the reasons for not being able to
compromise and the way it shows during the committee sessions. Often these situations nod
towards the affirmative context, to the intraparty discussions. Managing disagreement
among coalition partners, something that contains ‘stalling elements’ (Bächtiger and
Steenbergen 2004, 7) when it comes to deliberation complicates the analysis when partners
who to compromise with are many.
Willingness and possibility to compromise is affected by path-dependency available in
the policy-processes that finalises in vote in the plenary. Therefore, we can safely argue that
when bills arrive to the Parliament, they are a compromise but they also portray a status
quo. However, the path-dependency turns around the setting in the positive implications of
compromises and failures or refusals associated with uncompromise: namely, within the
legislature, it is that the uncompromising mindset sustains the status quo. The principles that
are embedded in the piece of legislation are holding ground, whereas compromising alters
things (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 31.) This point about coalition dynamics leaves open
the decisive question posed by Pekonen (2011) about the extent to which opinions and
positions that committee members nurture and hold are elaborated and brought forward.
This question is relevant not only from the standpoint of deliberative representation that
seeks to understand parliamentary dynamics of forming and communicating opinions, but
essential when approaching compromising in committee deliberations.
political world needs to be left broken, rather than trying to seek unity between the representative
counterparts. Ultimately, ‘perspectives are all there is’ (Näsström 2006, 326).
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If we take that tenacity of principles and standing on them combined with mutual
mistrust characterise the uncompromising mindset, then we need to understand better
whether this ‘standing on principle’ is subject to reason-giving and articulation in the first
place (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 71, 85). In deliberative theory these elements are
discussed in terms of revealing of private information and demonstrating authenticity or
sincerity. Nobody would be willing to approve speaking untruths,40 since it would severely
harm mutual trust regardless of operating with an uncompromising mindset. Indeed, there
is a very high threshold for accusing an MP of lying in Parliament. However, withholding
information as a restrained sincerity is another thing. I have reason to assume that it is not
uncommon that with ‘big and difficult’ legislative bills governing parties, whose access to
background information eclipses that of opposition, sometimes withhold to disclose all
information to all committee members. Particularly information on the breakage on the
government party fronts is not willingly brought up during the committee session:
Those we don’t discuss really openly. […] Because [emphasised] if the
governing parties are disputing amongst themselves, we try to avoid showing
that to the opposition. Also from that the opposition might strike back, it brings
weapons to the opposition. So we try to keep those clamours amongst ourselves.
(II: 9–1: 56:43)
Counterfactual analysis here asks, would the outcome have been different if, during the
handling of the bill, governing party members would have revealed information, for
example, that the coalition disagrees internally? Most likely not. Also, prior information is
usually there also from the plenary session that appoints the bills to the handling of
respective committees. With conflictual bills this ‘referral discussion’ in the plenary is noted
and considered as to being sensitive to the perspectives upon which participants disagree.
In these cases it becomes known, at the latest, that there is friction between the coalition
partners, which is something that the opposition keeps close watch. This tender coalition
dynamics should be kept in mind in the last analysis chapter that would on the outset
undermine the relevance of plenary discussions as ‘deliberations’. For this contextual
interplay, the level of authenticity is more negotiated in the performative context whereas
in the operative context it is clearly strategic.
Hesitations to share and reveal those disaccording notes in the committee, however,
could portray that there is a genuine fear of alternative outcome, meaning that they would
open the door for transformative faculties that deliberation profoundly entails. Here
embracing expressive-deliberative mode to the extreme, demonstrating unrestrained
openness and expressing the potential conflicts either regarding factual base provided or
those among participants or even personal wavering in supporting the legislation, could put
in motion a progress that could, hypothetically, alter the outcome. This feature also relate to
the level of open-mindedness, to the extent participants can be affected by the deliberation
and opinions that are brought forward. It is reasonable to argue that many representatives
can and will detect an opportunity, an opening for the kind of deliberation that could bear
these transformative faculties. Instead of acting on them they choose to operate in a manner
40 In deliberative theory it has been pointed out ‘selling out’ the truthfulness criteria can expose the theory to
strategic behavior that violate the intrinsic value of self-actualization (Steiner 2012, 164–65).
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that rules out the possibility. Deliberative control, something I discuss later (in 4.3. section
iii) is exercised. Openness can be endorsed, but when the time for decision draws near, the
lines are united:
Sometimes we might engage in a very open general discussion based on the
report draft. In that pretty brave addresses were made where people detached
from the government and opposition lines. But tomorrow, when we have the
decisive handling, all rows are shot straight until tomorrow, so that it will be
taken care of. The government discipline and the opposition setting dictates
sometimes also very much in committee work. (II: 1: 1:45)
Government MPs ‘trust’ that disruptions are, as they are, immediately used by the
opposition. Hinting any signs of coalition instability proves the way in which information
is weaponry in political struggles. From the perspective of leadership of Government PPG
this would demonstrate a failure in maintaining commitment by the members, something to
be done beforehand. As discussed in the previous subchapter, these functions belong to the
domain of affirmative context where such hesitations should preferably be voiced and
pleaded for the purpose of getting the PPG to address and even share this concern explicitly
and officially.
Discordant notes do not go unnoticed in the committee. These surprising ‘rants’ get a
reaction so that ‘people turn on their chairs to look at their own party member, “now now,
calm yourself down” (II: 6: 59:24). Underlining the faculty of listening carefully and being
observant in order to detect that ‘ahaa, this is not such a unison thing’ (III: 6: 8:31). Another
describes: ‘I do pay attention to these people and how they react. […] In that sense listening
is tremendously important because it helps you to assess what it’s advisable to present our
group’s perspective at this point and what is sensible and how we best move forward. The
helping blow can come from completely other parties.’ (ibid.) The following illuminates an
example on how the opposition can strategically use a breakage on the government fronts:
Respondent: Then if there are political questions that are sensitive then the
opposition sees whether there is something that could dissipate the government
fronts.
Interviewer: How do you do that?
Respondent: It’s easy in that way that if you were that there is disagreement
within the governing group, then the opposition takes a stand for some governing
group. Agree with them. Then those disagreeing governing groups are put in a
difficult position. “Hey, we don’t have a majority in the committee anymore.”
Then disciplining measures are taken. “We don’t agree to changes. We go by the
book”. (III: 22: 43: 52)
Opposition starts making a row, and try to ‘drive a wedge in the works as much as
possible’, as one opposition member said (II: 6: 33:16) if they note that a governing
committee member might be wavering. Aiming for escalation of disagreement is used as a
persuasive measure to allure possible defector(s) to flip sides. With major bills, the situation
is difficult, as one stated (III: 6: 1:18:34): ‘Of course, the opposition seized on it to gloat
157
about “there, there how things are going poorly in the government”. And it was something
that we didn’t of course want to show any direction. And we really were in trouble’.
When motivations for actors are expected and somewhat anticipated, especially with
politically rigid tension-filled cases, it is worth noting how the mistrust as a particle of the
uncompromising mindset is not posited towards the opposition. Mistrusting them makes no
sense. In these cases the opposition will do what they do: bring counterproposals that are
voted (down) and an objecting motion (called as ‘minority reports’ in some political
systems) is left to the report. Therefore, the conception of mistrust is applicable only to the
extent that there is a motivation or a cause to trust the other actor in the first place. When
knowing for certain that opposition is not going to confer to any kind of compromising
solution due to disagreements on core values or principles that are unnegotiable, mistrust
bears no relevance. Instead, you trust them of doing what you expect them to do. Through
placing an objection or a protest the opposition gets a chance in the plenary to go public
with it– also something of a difficult balancing act. Compromises entail distributive
elements that are assessed through analysis of costs and benefits.
Trust translates into the deliberative ideal of reciprocity. But this reciprocity, in this
given situation between opposition and government, is not symmetrical (in relation to
power), whereas when we turn to the relations between the coalition partners it is. Resisting
compromise as a refusal to challenge the status quo indicates that in this case the
counterparts of compromise are not the usual parliamentary adversaries of government and
opposition. When uncompromising mindset is founded on mistrust as Gutmann and
Thompson (2012) argue, the true adversary is your coalition partner who you mistrust. Here,
and then, deliberation becomes the enemy to status quo as it entails the possibility of change.
In case coalition partners in the committee begin to unravel the issue at hand, something
that originates from a prior agreement stated in the government programme, differences in
opinions may resurface. Especially if participants engage to the deliberative process with
unclear opinions may lead to ever-deepening swamp of conflicts, as critically pointed out
about deliberation by Shapiro (1999).
For this reason, as we have seen, PPGs try to facilitate enough opportunities for
deliberation to establish coordination and cohesion, so that when the time for decision-
making comes up in the committee (and eventually in the plenary), everyone is ‘kept
onboard’. Disciplining measures may be enforced. Considering the argument that trust in
fact inhibits rather than induces deliberation (Mykkänen 2010) seems valid in this case. If
deliberation within PPGs have been satisfied with critical and adversary deliberation, then
these entrusted MPs might be less inclined to re-state those perspectives among political
adversaries, coalition partners included. Status quo may hold when deliberation is restricted
for reasons described above.
So, when MPs describe accounts and methods relating to developing compromises, they
do not occur only between the government and opposition but also among members between
the governing parties. For those legislators, as committee members and as governing party
members this is a difficult judgment: the question is not of compromising but an overlapping
judgment on undoing a compromise on an already agreed-upon issue. The path-dependency
of compromises mentioned earlier means that while some bills are compromises within
itself (political aims translated into bills are distributed between the governing parties), but
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some are products of larger bundle of compromise. Some bills enunciate the interests of one
coalition party, thus enforcing the whole coalition to back it up. So, if compromise is defined
by alteration to the status quo (when adversaries find mutually acceptable solution), what
takes place and gets uncovered when a compromise between political adversaries is undone?
Compromise changes the current situation while not compromising keeps it as it was;
this highlights the inter-party dynamics between coalition partners. It is certainly more
tension-filled than of those between the division of government and opposition. In the
interviews the ascribed roles of opposition and government members make this rough
division clear: the opposition wants to change the bill, while the government wants to secure
it. These motivations may bear important implications to the extent it is considered even
worthwhile to maintain and continue deliberation for the purpose of enhancing mutual
understanding (or forms of meta-consensus). According to the interviews, when the
opposition goes on making an offer and government rejects it, is not something that
members should get upset about. Operating on these role orientations of government and
opposition can also be a matter of collegial joking.
Compromises accord with notions of democratic rule. Formally, majority will always
rule over the minority. But institutional and procedural warrants, per se, never secure the
majority. The idea in parliamentary democracy is that the government, a majority one in the
case of Finland, must obtain and maintain the confidence of the parliament. But when the
parliamentary majority starts breaking down internally, and especially if the conflict or
disagreement is revealed in deliberative processes, the storyline might still turn out different.
In consensus system combined with parliamentarism in general, ‘the management of
disagreement is mostly “stalled” among coalition MPs’ (Bächtiger and Steenbergen 2004,
7). Indeed, in the light of operative context this is exactly true. It is also correct in the sense
that management of disagreements is rather distributed to the executive and handled in other
venues than the committee. Stalling elements have some implications concerning the
autonomy and authority of the committee, as well as the individual MP.
In addition to refraining from revealing internal discrepancies and differing perspectives,
there are two related institutional features present that deem deliberative representation in
the operative context such stalling elements. In the Finnish parliamentary context, the first
concerns a practice that inhibits compromising in the committee, and the second concerns
how the process unfolds when committee deliberations start showing, or are interpreted
politically as undoing a compromise (and not as endorsing compromise that makes the
original stipulation better). The first one is the by the book principle. It refers to an informal
but enforced practice41 where the bill is approved as according to the legislative proposal
included in the bill. The committee will not make (propose making) any alterations to it.
This expresses in the clearest way the urgency of decision-making that dominates in the
operative context. When the by the book procedure is followed, it serves as an assurance to
the government parties that what has been agreed upon previously is executed accordingly.
The path-dependency of ‘governing’ restricts any coalition party from turning on the
‘campaigning’ mode that is explainable also by the element of mistrust. Notably, this
interpretation is in analogy with what was discussed earlier in the affirmative context of the
41 By the book derives from a signed agreement among PPGs that states the ’rules of order’ in interparty
cooperation with governing parties (Wiberg 2011).
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PPG where compromising dynamic is similarly applicable. Collective efforts and issuing
public policies in a coalition system would not be possible without the ability to
compromise.
In the interviews, the theme of compromise is discussed in terms of necessity and
urgency but something that is not primarily a positive thing. Coalition government system,
especially in its ‘responsible party model’ and the internal compromises place an additional
layer that complicates the analysis and makes it challenging to try to provide a clear picture
at once. However, one thing is sure: when compromising everybody needs to give up
something. Consequently, it takes place in the backdrop of sanctioning and coercive
measures that have an effect on MPs judgment, as the MP admits: ‘[W]e are made to make
various decisions, especially budgetary and cutting decision sort of with biting our teeth
and a tear in our eye. And we go by the book when the governing parties have so agreed.’
(III: 11: 30:17). In the case of broad-based coalitions, this seemingly undemocratic and
troublesome practice of often secures the position of minority parties in the government, as
noted by one experienced MP (III: 3).
Limits of compromise are drawn in the framework of this path-dependency and
opposition of wills. Both outline the way participants of compromise can anticipate and
endorse motivations and expectations of others. What is at stake when the committee
prepares the report concluding to a decision, is the credibility of both (or many) parties
involved in the compromise. It is a question of judgment on what ‘matters most to the
compromising parties and those they represent’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 32):
whether issues on the table can be negotiated or should the procedure of ‘by the book’ be
initiated at once. One MP (III: 24: 1:13:13) replied to the significance of the principle in the
following way, while tentatively accepting that agreements should be held. However, there
is an internal tension embedded in it:
Respondent: Well, it’s good to have such a backstop, because the reality is that
[long pause] publicity and also different people, it can be enticing that you start
to seek a detail or an angle to change the bill in a way that is favourable to you,
or what you happen to have promised to your voters, so you begin chasing it. In
those cases it is good have that back-up […] “You cannot demand whatever and
if that is your opinion, then we go by the book. Then we do no changes, if you
cannot give in in this matter”. It’s good to have but if by the book is the first
response, I don’t like that.
Interviewer: Are there situations where it is followed so strictly?
Respondent: Yes.
Tension between governing and campaigning is what is decisive when exercising
judgment or operating with the compromising and uncompromising mindset. The latter
highlights the partisan incentives defying the status quo. Unlike campaigning, governing
demands prudence and resisting instant gains that can be achieved by detaching from the
collective. Yet, at the same time, MPs would need to stand credible towards their supporters
and find avenues to communicate reasons and justifications for actions and decisions taken.
This discussion will follow soon and take centre stage in the last analysis chapter that
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explores the performative context. For now, it is enough that we recognise how the stringent
nature of holding on to a compromise is vulnerable in reducing the operations of MPs.
Also the coalition setting complicates things further for the MPs. In the case of
governing party members, in the operative context their job, in the starkest sense that
especially affects the head of the committee group, is not so much a question of attempting
to advance the party interest but rather secure that of governing takes place efficiently.
Accepting bills as they are, without significant modifications that would be politically
decisive, is a manifestation that the government is responsive to its program. A government
is functional when it executes its programme.  According to the interviews, while seen
necessary that ‘all the most important decisions are made in the government programme’
(III: 20: 29:25, also in III: 22: 6:10, II: 9–1: 41:04, II: 14: 26:49, III: 2: 5:27).It functions in
the way that it ‘eliminates mistrust upfront’ (III: 12: 5:41) so that ‘government executes its
programme in an administrative manner’ (ibid.).
Consequently, execution of government programme lies practically in the hands of
governing party members who become those warriors of the party or ‘watchdogs’ who
‘shepherd the bills through’ (II: 3: 3:55). Rationalisation and justification in ensuring
responsiveness trickles down to all PPG members–something that many MPs from
government and opposition alike find conflictual not only in terms of bounded rationality
but also as PPG members. Another argued that ‘[t]hroughout my career as a politician and
MP I’ve been irritated by that the government programme is nowadays the Bible’ (III: 15:
48:33). ‘Changing it an inch’ (ibid.) is considered as a ‘hostile act’ (ibid: 50:31). All this
takes a toll on committee deliberations and frustrates members in those cases if committee
is nearing the conclusion that the bill needs to be changed. The frustration cuts through
government and opposition committee members alike. One interviewee put it as follows:
[I] do also understand that ministers have wrenched amongst themselves and
ended up with politically mutual understanding. But. In the committee we could
end up with another kind of mutual understanding exactly among governing
parties. But when we know that there has been that we give in on this and you
receive that. Arm-wrestling. I see it problematic since it frustrates the committee
work tremendously. Why are we sitting here if in the end we are told that you
cannot change a single comma? Whatever, we’ll let it pass. We could spend our
time better. Instead it is supposed to motivate for real, to seek a good from the
substance. (III: 13: 18:59)
‘Sticking to the plan’ has also a tendency to suppress and undermine a committee’s
capacity for judgement (see also Arter 2003). Many find it problematic, ‘since it tapers
committee’s possibility to influence, making the committee act for the government’s cause,
which is something that I don’t find completely correct’, was how one governing party MP
(II: 3: 3:55) put it. If committee deliberations take a turn towards the direction that actual
paragraphs are going to be changed, it even more emphasises the collective footing of the
entire committee. Here is where the other institutional feature in resisting intracommittee
compromising comes in: the cabinet member. Then and there, the committee is faced with
the cabinet minister, responsible to the policy sector in question, who is in swing position
on deciding whether the committee can propose the alteration. This is readily interpreted as
a question of authority on the side of minister who can be made to look weak. Also, the
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hypothetical escalation scenario would be that of putting in doubt the confidence of the
government (III: 4: 50:31). Those who had been holding cabinet minister posts had had the
opportunity to see this from the opposite perspective. It is not completely an insignificant
matter to the minister that their bill is changed by the committee. One learnt to think of
Parliament as ‘a chicane’42 when ‘the real decision-making takes place on the level of the
executive, and if Parliament changes it, it changes it for the worse’ (II: 13: 11:03).
Many kinds of solutions can take place. Proposed changes can be negotiated and back-
channelled in a way that minister does not lose face: ministries can modify the bill while in
committee process to align with committees wishes or even leave the bill to expire (III: 4:
20:54; III: 1: 1:09:31). A lot depends on the persona of the minister in question–some are
more willing and open to accept changes, while others may not (III: 22: 1:57, III: 17: 15:23)
and wish to remain ‘pig-headed’ (III: 22: 1:09:40). Same dynamics are assumedly present
among cabinet ministers who protect and defend their share of the government programme.
What is important here is that from the perspective of the committee cohesion, that
committee members from governing parties share an equal standing is crucial. This keeps
the dispute, and ultimately decision, in the hands of the committee, and does not renounce
its powers to ‘outsiders’:
Interviewer: This is what is really difficult to grasp, this […] paradoxical
situation that the committee finds a big problem somewhere and then the
minister says, ‘no way’.
Respondent: Yes. And in that moment, it is important that the government
parties are in unison in the committee. Because only if the committee is unified
and if the members of the governing parties hold opinion that it should still be
changed even though the minister thinks otherwise, then we can make the
change. But problem arises if we begin to disagree with each other. The problem
arises if we don’t find a solution in the committee, then it is forwarded to
[government] PPG leaders who don’t know horse s*** about it. And they are
not interested in it, either. Then the PPG leaders together and among themselves
discuss and then it goes so that when they know nothing about it, then they say
that we go by the book. So, the danger is that if we don’t come into shared
understanding then we go by the book. (III: 1: 22:01)
In all the mechanisms introduced above that try to reconcile agreements and
disagreements as well as compromises accordingly portray importantly how they push
deliberations away from the formal institutionalised venue of deliberation. In the last
example with government PPG leaders, what happens is that the deliberative autonomy
achieved through deliberative means is rendered to the hands of those who may lack similar
deliberative commitment but also relevant informational capacities. A deliberatively and
politically robust outcome goes in vain and the original stipulation of compromise in the
bill gets enforced. In these circumstances analysed from the perspective of deliberative
representation the authority relies on the idea of consensus. Surely, agreeing to a
compromise can be a consensual result but here it is projected through the discussed
42 A chicane is, by definion of Merriam Webster dictionary, an obstruction on a racecourse. It is not placed
due to geography but by institutional design for example for the purpose to reduce speed.
162
framework of undoing a compromise. One senior MP, while commenting on the dynamics
between the ministers and committees, took a more general perspective on the value of
holding one’s ground and resisting the pressure to compromise.
You cannot too much accept that there are these decision-making paradoxes
[expression that the interviewer used] because then you surrender yourself…
others use your power. In this house you must claim your own power and make
sure that no-one takes it from you. There are always people who try to do so, just
as in all power games. For this reason it is important that people hold their
ground against the minister in the committee. If you want to change the way
someone thinks, you cannot achieve that in other ways than by familiarising
yourself with the subject. And then win the argument with your own knowledge
and argumentation. You don’t get by with slack, but you need to get into the
substance. (III: 14: 53:35)
This subsection has illuminated how compromising have boundaries that appear in
practices and institutional mechanisms. As such, deliberative representation in the operative
context encounters limitations and stalling elements, especially when it comes to cross-party
and interparty agreements. Deliberative control is exercised, and alternative paths of
reasoning may not be opened or ventured. Legislative compromises facilitated by the
committees are also significant when considering the horizontal institutional relations
between the parliament and the government. Procedural mechanisms such as the by the book
principle seem to violate committee’s legislative autonomy, thus making them agents of the
(governing) parties and not the whole parliament. This ‘partisan perspective’ to
parliamentary committees (Mattson and Strøm 2004) frustrates the committee members and
undermines collective efforts in coming up with good policies. Also, for the MP as a
representative and assumingly informed about the policy field in question, it may necessitate
some level of resistance against the party collectives–something that is most likely more
probable with more established senior MPs. As also discussed earlier with the affirmative
context, the motivations of such manoeuvres are kept in close check: they cannot be
interpreted as campaigning measures.
v The (relative) spirit of compromise
The discussion of the many surfaces that compromises appeal to in the operative context
will continue in this section. I will explore how the presented strategic action logics do not
necessarily rule out deliberative aspiration and the ‘spirit of compromise’ (Guttman and
Thompson 2012). That said, the fact that elected representatives act politically is not big
news. However, one-sided assumption of the political drivers leaves out many other
pertinent perspectives about what goes on in the legislatures. There is also a significant spirit
of compromise to be endorsed, which benefits MPs who can master it.
A sense of collegiality is often portrayed when representatives address in the interviews
the actor of the committee: it is ‘we as the committee’. These appear in expressions like
‘shared understanding’, ‘shared view’, and ‘common perspective’ that are used when
describing committee work. Committee’s collective incentives are also important
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reflections of mutual respect that expresses ‘constructive attitude towards, and willingness
to engage in good faith with one’s political opponents’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 34).
Features of open-mindedness, readiness to hear each other out are willingly demonstrated,
thus making prevailing attitude adaptive (and not tenacious, as I claim the case to be in the
performative context). This adaptive attitude in the face of opinions that are closer to defined
than in the making affects the deliberative process so that it is marked by contingency. In
practice, the committee often aims at producing unanimous reports to which the sense of
commonality refers to. Surely some committees are more conflictual, something that can
depend on policy field and its political and budgetary relevance in the current political
climate and parties in government.
Let us use here a metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle to ideally describe the drafting process of
the committee report. Each actor takes a turn. Since the operative context concentrates on
goal-orientation and legislative trouble-shooting, representative deliberation outlines the
shape of the individual puzzle piece in terms of strategic-deliberative mode. Preferably, the
deliberation should be able to signal quite clearly the view that has been arrived at. However,
by doing so the rendered representation is simultaneously deliberative in the sense that by
offering enough a clear-cut formation it informs what shaped piece could possibly be fitted
onto it. Being sensitive and responsive to another’s point of view is connected to the general
idea of reciprocity, valued by many deliberative democrats. If a fit is not found at that time,
it is possible to move on to other parts of the puzzle. Sometimes the puzzle is finished by
all actors and sometimes not. If opposition (or individual representatives) withdraws and
sets about creating an alternative puzzle, missing pieces are quickly wrapped up by
remaining actors (usually the government). Many feel that trying to make others change
their minds goes in vain. In politically decisive questions persuasion is futile, it is a waste
of effort when knowing that no one will budge. When it comes to political, adversarial
settings, what might be more decisive in the long run is the ability of representatives to keep
an open mind when interacting with others and dealing with opposite perspectives and
opinions.
Notwithstanding the fact that committees as parliamentary actors do not always get to
do what they want, the niche for intraparty compromising still is more significant in
deliberative sense than one would assume. From the perspective of deliberative theory, the
novelty in the idea of deliberative negotiations is that it distinguishes more clearly what
agreement seeking procedures in real-world politics can be. As such, preference aggregation
is interwoven in deliberative negotiation. Unlike in Bessette’s account,43 compromises are
not only about ‘splitting the difference’ (Bessette 1994, 59) of ‘hard-headed calculation’
(ibid., 60) but also ‘deliberative negotiations’ (Naurin and Reh 2018; Warren and
Mansbridge 2013 Mansbridge et. al 2010).
43 Analysing numerous case studies, Bessette (1994) finds the role of bargaining tendered by group and
bargaining theorists less important in congressional decision-making from 1940 to 1970.
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Defining deliberative negotiation, according to Naurin and Reh (2018, 730), requires
… acknowledging the complexity of the social interaction space in which
negotiators exist, where different forms of relationships, assumptions
concerning common interests and underlying conflict structures, modes of
communication, and perceptions of oneself and the others are intertwined.
Deliberative negotiations can accommodate range of integrated and distributive
compromises. In their framework authors Warren and Mansbridge (2013, 94) situate
deliberative negotiation in between ‘pure deliberation’ and ‘pure bargaining’. Whereas pure
bargaining depicts an outcome of power-based compromise or zero-sum capitulation
(appropriation of all surplus) grounded on strategic demands, pure deliberation claims a
common interest and results in consensus or clarified and structured conflict. Deliberative
negotiation can accommodate distributive elements as in fair compromise (everyone gives
up something) claimed by acceptance of fair offer. Also, contemporary deliberative theory
now generally accepts bargaining to the deliberative toolbox especially with the case of
compromise. In the same account, side payments could be considered when meeting certain
conditions like transparency. (Warren and Mansbridge 2013, 113–114; see also Naurin and
Reh 2018, 731–2.)
If the puzzle is finished by all actors it denotes then a unanimous report. Namely,
constructive politics has been exercised either in the form of compromise or through other
agreement-seeking procedures. It should also be noted that many bills are accepted without
alterations. In those cases, central interests represented by the parties are ‘of interest to no-
one’, or instead are so general or technical in the sense that no one really opposes them or
there is nothing really to disagree on. Usually there are no financial benefits involved and
no goods to distribute. Here, ‘pure deliberation’ can indeed be accomplished when tangible
distributive elements are missing.
However, it becomes clear, as Pekonen (2011) suggests, that the spectrum of deliberative
negotiations is available and can be described what is happening in the committees. Even
though the undeniable starting point with politically significant bills is that they are left
often untouched, i.e. that the committee does not change the paragraphs, accommodating
and appropriation of perspectives are still brought forward and endorsed. Deliberative
representation in the operative context takes on the practice of reasoning and negotiation
where reciprocal statements are made, such as ‘I understand that as such, but could it
perhaps be possible to…’ (II: 1: 14:23). Overall referring to others’ viewpoints and showing
respect to them and those who present them is essential. Within those best circumstances
that also reflect a positive committee atmosphere ‘government-opposition line is tried to be
converged with a softening [articulations] and not just blurt that you support the other’.
This may take several turns to speak and ‘also the opposition member comes halfway and
we seek to overcome somehow these government-opposition lines’ (ibid.). As one former
opposition member (II: 8: 23:07) describes, opposition is kept on board so that ‘if we’ve
gotten some emphasis of our own there [in the report] then we, as if as compromise, might
refrain from making an objection. And it’s seen as a cooperative matter, as something
good… when thinking that those objections don’t really have much significance in that
sense.’
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One government MP describes the adaptability of the ways in which concessions and
mutuality can be accounted for when preparing the committee draft with others:
Yes, we also make changes to the draft, but of course, when we propose changes,
we already seek those things that others can accept. There needs to be a sense of
what the others think of that matter if you, for example present, something to be
added. In that situation either it’s not worth steering yourself in the opposition.
It’s not advisable to present such an alteration you know that the others will
never accept. Unless of course it’s a matter of a principle and you want to leave
your own handprint on it. Then you can do it, of course. (II: 15: 23:07)
The idea of a handprint mentioned above, or ‘fingerprints’, as Pekonen (2011) describes
them, bring out the fact that while committee reports could be discarded a mere case for
semantics, they entail an overall significance within the paradigm of compromise. Particular
wordings, choice of expressions and relatively small semantic things spell out the domain
that facilitates deliberative negotiations. It can, in theory, be a novel, completely new re-
presentation that is put out that no one has detected before. More probable, however, is that
the addition is of the modest kind. Having something stated in the committee report as your
fingerprint is relatively easy when there is a lack of particular political enthusiasm connected
with the bill. Namely, the reality could be that such compromising is easy when the stakes
are low or non-existent. Similarly sceptical perspectives on the significance of what is stated
in the report in comparison to the tangible committee decision (to accept, alter or reject the
bill) were brought up in the interviews. Formally, in accounts of judicial disagreements,
when the law is interpreted, the ‘law-makers intent’ can be checked from the committee
reports. They play a role in this exceptional yet official and judicial context. In that sense, a
particular choice of wording can make a difference. But there is a point missing here that is
important to acknowledge: reports can be treated as communication towards the ministries.
Committees can signal as cohesive entities and as parliamentary actors (as ‘will of the
parliament’) what they most likely will accept or not accept in prospect legislation that is
proposed by the cabinet. It is plausible then that the committee, when acting in unison, can
steer public policies with longer timeframes, when the committee influence extends over
that particular moment (also in Pekonen 2011).
Fingerprints on the committee reports can be antithetical to compromising and as such,
manifestations of holding on to principles (also a resource for campaigning purposes). For
now I will discuss this balancing act between the compromising and uncompromising
mindsets that entails cost-benefit calculations. This notion seems empirically valid
especially in the case with the opposition when Gutmann and Thompson (2012, 32,
emphasis added) write that ‘the cost depends on the difference between what credibly can
be achieved by compromise and what the status quo offers without compromise’. Since the
US context where Gutmann and Thompson place their argument does not recognise
coalition governments, in this research the practice compromise has been introduced to an
additional layer. In that status quo is already seen as a result of a compromise, and therefore
cultivating the uncompromising mindset secures the practise of governing.
While it holds true that in majority systems criteria for evaluating accountability of
opposition actors is perhaps less clear, opposition MPs give a lot of thought for where to
draw the line. In political systems that have majority governments opposition is stripped
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from legislative powers other than through formal procedures of minority reports (i.e.
objections and protesting opinions left in committee report in the former case and statements
in the latter), interpellations and raising a vote of confidence. On the other hand, particularly
in the Finnish parliamentary democracy for impacting legislation the committee level is
where the opposition have the slightest chance to do so (also committee chair positions are
allocated to opposition parties). For this reason, deliberative representation detects
willingness to compromise and more tempered and prudent attitudes while in the operative
context. Opposition committee members tie such questions to revolve around their political
credibility: if they conclude with the government committee members that unanimous report
is drafted, they are signalling that they agree with government policy. All committee
members who accept the committee report sign it. By doing that they become accountable
for their decisions, also when in opposition. Once the opposition (party) has not resisted the
compromise and gone along with the committee report and the government, there is no
going back to deploy a highly partisan mode and criticising the bill when the report is
handled in the plenary. Opposition is stripped from their weaponry. Objections to the
committee report are always presented and deliberated in the plenary when the report is
introduced on the floor.
What opposition members need, perhaps more critically than governing party MPs, is
the sense of what they are agreeing on if they go along with the report and the potential
compromise that is constituted and proposed. To put things bluntly, the government may
need fewer affirmative credentials, whereas ‘in the committee the true work is done by those
who disagree with the government policy’ (III: 4: 14:19). Underlining active processing of
judgment and discretion in the scrutiny of the bill is then, arguably, job of the opposition.
Here, we have a saying that it’s easy in Parliament when in government and
difficult on the turf [home district]. When in opposition it’s difficult in
Parliament but easy on the turf. It really means that, it’s true that you must go
deeper into the opposition when you make objections. When you start making
an objection, the process involves that you must think pretty hard what is the
clue here. […] Finding what is essential in that substance plus what is the core
[emphasised] of my stance. (III: 10: 23:29
**
It is life-threatening when a person who doesn’t know his opinion makes a
compromise [laughs]. I do underline that a good representative must be able to
compromise. It means that he has his own stand, own interest. He sees his own
leeway and makes such compromises that don’t have to be ashamed of when
meeting one’s supporters. (III: 4: 1:27:49)
Especially the latter citation raises the salience of self-interest, which also speaks to what
was discussed in the affirmative context. Engaging in deliberation about public policies
requires that participants are aware (or become aware) of the interests they wish to pursue
for them to become even considered in the first place. When the MP in the citation sees
compromising without realisation of one’s interests ‘life-threatening’ relates to the notion
that ‘[I]f members of the group speak only as “we” and not “I”, neither they nor the other
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participants may be able to discover what is really at stake and forge integrated solutions’
(Mansbridge et al. 2010, 73).
Next, we need to address the procedures of the process that are essentials in willingness
to compromise, and in upholding the fairness of procedures (Gutmann and Thompson 2012,
37.) I will first address how some notions of fairness are captured in the interviews and then
discuss the role of committee chair as the key actor in producing sense of fairness and
commonality. In the midst I will show how the ability to compromise is generally
appreciated and can be used as a resource but simultaneously it spells out the way in which
the spirit of compromise meets with the limits of it.
Acting in good faith might invoke to accept a compromise that is not fully satisfactory.
On the other hand, if the opponent it allowed to ‘play dirty’, then accepting a bad bargain is
out of question. Remember, fully integrative ‘win-win’ solutions, where everyone wins and
nobody loses, came rare in politics. Especially when there is a lot in stake. Nearly always
somebody needs to give up something, and the more you move towards the other end of the
continuum you will find ‘pure bargaining’ that can result in a zero-sum outcome (Warren
and Mansbridge 2013). On the other hand, majority rule can also induce arrogance of the
winning side, disregarding counter-arguments made by the opposition which is something
that is tried to restrain for the sake of commonality in the committee. Such dynamics, on
which social interactions also have an impact, elevate chances for conflict and turning down
any agreement-seeking solutions. From there, the disagreement is taken to the public that
also serves a crucial deliberative function for allowing ‘losers’ to know ‘what justifications
for existing decision they will need to counter if they are to argue themselves into the
majority’ (Naurin and Reh 2018, 735).
The importance of acting in good faith and in a spirit of fair play is something that comes
across strongly in the interviews. Despite its undemocratic underpinnings that the by the
book principle that stalls the committee deliberation, there is another aspect that MPs
recognise: it articulates fairness of practices and procedures. There are also some other
informal norms in the committee (like the one not using the temporary imbalance between
the majority and the minority and call a vote) regulating strategical incentives that restrain
the politicians’ power-mongering behaviour. Descriptions of committee work generally
underline the tendency to strip down politics and embrace issued-based collaboration
(Pekonen 2011, 206). The normative expectation seems to be that conspicuously partisan
behaviour should be avoided.
However, the argument about toning down the political and accounts described in the
interviews is somewhat mixed when we look at how opposition is engaged in the process of
working together towards a unanimous committee report. I illustrated this a bit earlier with
an idea of a puzzle. Apparently, the topic of when to call off negotiations is something that
has been under discussion in some PPGs (e.g. III: 2, III: 10). It has been discussed how far
one can venture into the negotiations about making a compromise, to back up the committee
report. For one, it concerns also something that is referred as ‘milking’–where the opposition
(or a disagreeing individual) tries to invoke too many concessions from the governing
parties. In some cases ‘these human factors appear, and people lose their nerve and
someone declares that “now we have given so many concession that now there are none to
come”. And the other demands. No more.’ (II: 1: 28:10) Opposition is brought along in the
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negotiations and then then the rug is pulled under one’s feet that ‘leaves a bad taste’ to the
others (II: 2: 28:10).
In defining what the boundaries of compromises are, to what each participant can
credibly chip in, statements that are upfront can be made. In those MPs state very clearly
what their position is when it comes to negotiation and dealing with the disagreement. The
second citation portrays a completely different take on negotiations.
Sometimes I declare early enough that it’s no use to try to submit a unanimous
[report]. There is too much disagreement. To me, it’s useless to waste time to
something like wresting and not showing your cards as if we’re playing a game.
Instead I say that now I disagree with this thing and I’m going to leave an
objection. But then there are some situations when I say that it would be better
if I remain in the background, but if it goes too far I’m not going to be part of it,
if this is what is going to be written in it. (II: 6: 6:50)
**
Discussion in the committee is just pretty much about that seeking, so that you
cannot shove all your cards on the table right away [amused], and then the game
is over. Instead you need to very much listen carefully and, in that way, find out
about other groups what is perhaps coming. And then knowing how to choose
the right timing for coming forward with your opinion. With that you must be
very [emphasis] careful. Politically it is extremely important that you can
perceive the right time to come out with something and in the right way. (II: 14:
6:31)
A somewhat neglected, yet powerful, point of deliberative democracy is raised: social
interactions and personalities impact the deliberative process. On the part of deliberative
theory, Parkinson remarks how ‘those who can show mutuality in a deliberative setting are
not only enhancing the legitimacy of their claims by making the effort to demonstrate ‘co-
performance’ (Parkinson 2006, 14). From the perspective of deliberative representation this
also relevant when these actors are given a better advantage than those who cannot
demonstrate such capabilities. This point is made throughout the interviews, on many
levels: the ability to compromise portrays well the novelty of deliberative representation in
action, but it is also a crucial resource when cooperating with others. Social conditions
matter tremendously when faced with disagreements:
You should remember to respect that person who has a completely different
opinion from your own. And when that person notices this. That way that kind
of, better atmosphere is created where a common solution is easier to be found,
that can usually be a compromise. But we try to deal with personal chemistries
here all the time. And it makes a tremendous difference. With other you sync
better than with some other, that is obvious. And often you cooperate with those
who you sync with, naturally. (II: 9-1: 47: 58).
**
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A good representative is compromise-seeking. It is so, and many times that good
representative, good politician is measured by whether they are willing to
compromise. Can they create them? And of course you must also think that she
must have empathetic ability to put herself in the position of the partner. Then
you are able also to find that compromise that satisfies both, or all three. (III: 12:
06:41)
What these citations above and on the previous page show us is that MPs endorse
different kinds of roles, also unconsciously, which ascribe to the varying capacities and
modes of operation. Why is this important? It is important because it affects representatives’
capability for reflection and judgment. This is linked to the ability to shape-shift, as
suggested by Sawad (2014). It means that representatives can read off from the contexts
(time, place, situation) whether shape-shifting is applicable. These examples above paint an
initial picture of ‘deliberative players’ who can advance the collective aim of the committee
by their ability to adapt and modify positions. By acting strategically this way they push
their own initiative but not at other’s expense. The interviews bring up is how ‘good
deliberators, like good negotiators’ or mediators, can often figure out what other people
want and help them to achieve their ends while also obtaining the ends they want for
themselves’, as Cameron (2018, 128) argue. It calls for interest as well as the readiness to
hear out what others have to say, but understanding the subject matter well enough to make
accommodating proposals (as a source of compromise) and perhaps most importantly,
respect and trust:
For example, from someone who is an opinionated expert in one’s own field,
you rarely end up with a joint committee report. But if there is someone else
present, someone who can come up with a wording that can be accepted by all,
that requires that you know your stuff. Then you can yourself think, “to what our
party can agree to and in what way this can be written so that these common
views can be brought up?” And we need them all. And then some of the
representatives, who don’t belong to any of these, withdraw in one way or
another from the discussion. (II: 7: 5:31)
**
Between other groups, trust is emphasised when making decisions. In committee
work, it is at present very, very, very, very clear. You can never emphasise that
enough. Indeed just to that making decisions are based on, that those who can
make cross-party collaboration and function with other people, they draw the
longer straw precisely with that, that they have discreet confidential relations.
(III: 27: 1:01:34)
**
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[…] when a negotiation becomes very tough, I say clearly in what I can partake
in and in what not, I simultaneously have an enormously strong constructive
[power]. If there are two extremes [opinions] and I am left in the middle, my
constructive power is bigger in that moment than my political mandate would
assume. I just want to find it, and have the guts to say it […] The committee
group [name withheld] would walked out many times if I hadn’t switched role
from quarrelling to negotiator, “now boys and girls, let’s try to reach a suitable
compromise”. (III: 20: 1:04:56)
We have seen how individual representatives can make a difference when the committee
works together in a way that displays commonality and constructive attitudes. It is also a
matter of good atmosphere when a committee can engage in constructive politics and deal
with disagreements in a reasoned and justified manner. It is also a matter of sustaining fair
procedures that committee chairs oversee. Here a good committee chair fosters compromise:
in nurturing the element of the compromise-based mindset that crystallises in upholding an
atmosphere of mutual respect. These figures can indeed represent the committee, also
building up committee credibility that showcases most importantly ‘a reputation for good
judgment’ (Bessette 1994, 117). Representatives who have been operating as committee
chairs are aware of their power to influence, despite that chair can be from the opposition
party as well.
Trust and impartiality towards everybody, and setting your own opinion aside.
It’s something that means respecting others in these cases. You cannot abuse
your status, that’s my opinion. Another thing is what you do in the drafting stage.
As a chair you can influence pretty much what kind of initial text is made in the
first draft. And as you know, we have representatives who pretty roughly dictate
what that draft should look like. I never went with that; we did the drafts in
cooperation with the secretary. We tried to formulate such wordings that would
pass with everybody. And would strike home. For me I don’t think it makes
sense to try to shove your own opinions by banging your head to the walls,
knowing that they will certainly not go through. It makes no sense. (III: 27:
1:33:36)
**
A good chair can manipulate. And manipulate in a way that the other doesn’t
notice. How should I say this? You calculate how far you can come to meet the
other party’s standing for them to accept the report. Then you take away their
eyeteeth [Finnish expression for canine sharp teeth, i.e. weapon] when they
come the Hall. If you can go as far as you can without altering the paragraphs
but taking there some motion [added into the report] or such. […] [a case
example withheld to maintain anonymity] In that moment I thought that I’m
damn good at manipulating. Not with ill cause but that we sought those… I
listened with a careful ear that ‘ahaa, this is important to them, and this is
important to you’ […] Then I used a lot of my, how should I say, my ability to
manipulate. But I did do it in such a way that I was still able to sleep at night. It
wasn’t deceitful, certainly nothing like that. But those were perhaps those
moments when you thought–this was a successful thing! We got a unanimous
report. Outsiders don’t perhaps understand how big of a deal it is for the
committee to say that we made it unanimous. (III: 22: 1:33:36)
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Committees that operate under a skilful chair can become powerful, also bringing them
to become credible counterforce to the government. From perspective of deliberative
representation in the operative context of the committee resonates with what Bessette is
describing when studying the portrayals of Congressmen. Combining ‘desire to earn power
and prestige […] was served by exhibiting the very qualities that promote good public
policy’ (Bessette 1994, 114–5, emphasis added). It is hard not to see it plausible in
Parliament for someone ‘developing a reputation for the kind of subject matter expertise,
hard work, openness to argument and persuasion, and thoroughness of analysis that was
necessary to produce sound legislation’ (ibid., 113–4, emphasis added). These qualities
were associated with the concept of parliamentary pride (eduskuntaylpeys in Finnish), as
well as the idea, discussed earlier, of parliamentarians being seen as refined representatives.
The quotations above are examples of the muddles that the role orientation theories lead
to if we would be trying to discern actual behaviour of legislators. Motivations, such as
aspirations towards common good, get enmeshed with other orientations that relate to
maintaining good relationships within the house (another feature available in Fenno’s work)
and gaining power (Bessette 1994, 108–109). When Strøm (1998) comes to endorse the
rational theory oriented perspective when seeing roles as behavioural strategies
distinguishable from sociological motivational explanations, I find here in the case of
committee chairs the argument not fully convincing. When someone has already attained
the goal of a legislative office, what is the analytical continuation when it comes to studying
acting in that office? When positional role is fulfilled, then what motivates MP’s action after
that? Legislative behaviour is clearly more contingent than the roles’ expectancy and
orientations assume.
To summarise this subchapter on the operative context some key points can be made. I
have shown that deliberative representation orients in this context towards seeing results
and guiding the deliberative process to an end. Unlike in the affirmative context, here we
have seen how MPs operate with more clearly formed preferences when reasoning with
each other for the purpose of legislative trouble-shooting and overall scrutiny. These
functions are aligned with the need to handle disagreements in a manner that mitigates
outright political overtones in exchange for expertise-oriented conducts. For the necessary
convergence of deliberative and strategic incentives displayed in the committee, I have
called the major deliberative mode ‘strategic-deliberative’. It is reflected in the ways the
reasoning, negotiations and compromising and decision-making are facilitated.
To illuminate the dynamics present in deliberative representation I have addressed the
question to what extent the ‘spirit of compromise’ is embraced in the committee, what
conditions it and what are the implications that coming up with an agreement have. I have
argued that when it comes to building compromises and settling disagreements, MPs value
adaptability and a certain kind of resilience. This means firstly that MPs can judge where
they stand and make decisions accordingly. One of the most important findings supporting
the strategic-deliberative mode is the observation that those who dig themselves deepest
behind the trenches of party lines and expertise, surprisingly, may not be those who can
influence committee work best. Now, despite these manoeuvres can also be tactical and
strategic, deception and violating trust that maintains the relationship with others can be
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politically fatal. When MP loses credibility and trust, one loses many of the resources for
getting things done.
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4.3 Performative context
Representation is not simply a product of what is done, by politicians andothers, but importantly of what is demonstrated or shown to be done.(Saward 2017, 75)
The performative context draws from the idea that democratic institutions need to be able
to operate and carry on the tasks and functions ascribed to it. These formal functions, as
legislating and deciding on the budget, need to be visible and ‘performed’. When it comes
to deliberative representation much of the work that MPs engage in is not perceivable from
the outside. The transparency and publicity enunciated by the performative context draws
from the very principles of representative government. Together with constitutional
principles the plenary sessions very much articulate foundation for the legitimacy of
representative rule. The performative context discussed in this subchapter addresses the
public side of parliamentary life, focusing mainly on the plenary sessions.
The plenary sessions are the enactment of the accountability function that parliament as
a representative institution grants to the public deliberations. As such, the checks and
balances that parliament is also functionally charged with often borrow from adversarial
notions of democratic politics. While performing these institutional tasks representatives
also compete for publicity and electoral support. ‘Campaigning and the uncompromising
mindset are in the DNA of the democratic processes,’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 214),
this is especially the case when we look at how deliberative representation occurs in the
performative context.
The expressive-partisan deliberative mode defines the performative context. It is
primarily demonstrated when there is no need for practical coordination to conclude
something, something that is necessary in the operative context. However, plenary debates
and discussions precede voting but by the time legislation has reached the voting stage
minds have already been made. Performative context is not the land for compromising. As
I showed, the strategic-deliberative mode aspires to contain the political and partisan tones
and convey them to expertise and expert knowledge. Committees, as I situated them in the
core of the operative context, work together in order to exercise legislative scrutiny on
behalf of the whole parliament. Neither is the performative context a forum for affirmation
and genuine insight when looked at from the perspective of plenary sessions–something that
it may once have been as hinted at in some of the interviews.
Alternatively, performative context can demonstrate other faculties that are equally, if
not most important in democratic politics. Individual MPs can plead for a particular cause
or issue, demonstrating skills and expertise in a chosen manner and to a chosen, particular
audience. For this reason, the performative context spells out how parliamentary politics is
not only about the collective game played by the coalitions, parties or PPGs. Acknowledging
the fact that united party fronts hold would seem to substantiate the unitary argument about
parliamentary actors. By endorsing the kind of actor-centred perspective, the performative
context discussed in the following sections show that the trajectory of unified strategic
incentives for parliamentary deliberations is somewhat misplaced. Although the ‘show-do’
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characteristics of performative representation argued by Saward (2017) are in action, the
interactions and communications between representative can be rendered to the deliberative
approach to parliamentary deliberations sought by Bächtiger (2014).
i Plenary sessions as the façade of democratic representation
Plenary sessions are, for better and worse, the epitome of parliamentary rule. What
deliberative representation is to do here is that it most clearly reminds us of the
communicative feature of representation. Deliberation endorses the partisan and adversary
position of political deliberation. So far, I have examined deliberative representation in
terms of reflection and deliberation within. I have viewed it from the perspective of
representing to other MPs in interactive deliberative encounters and engagements that
combines notions of compromises with operational efficacy. In both discussed venues, the
PPG and the committee, the question of audience has left the larger public somewhat intact.
Other MPs have been both the audience and the recipients of deliberative practices. The
plenary sessions illustrate most vividly how only a relative proportion of the work done in
the Finnish Parliament is visible to the public. It has been argued that the Parliament of
Finland is as open as the Vatican (Arter 2012). Most recently, Seo and Raunio (2017, 631)
have argued that the Finnish Parliament, partly also due to the ‘working parliament’ mode,
which favours scrutiny over debating, embodies a ‘lukewarm attitude’ towards democratic
innovations that would increase contact with the public. It portrays a challenge to the
principles of transparency and permeability of democratic rule, which is also a central
concern when talking about salience of legislatures.
This subsection concentrates what all this means to the conceptual idea of representation.
This perspective that springs from contemporary theorising on representation seems to
propose at least a partial but promising explanation worth considering when lamenting the
quality of plenary deliberations. Rehfeld’s (2006, also 2018) novel argument about the
function of representation connects the activity that representative is engaged in the
definition of the audience. When interviewed MPs are aware of the lack of visibility and
transparency raises theoretical and practical interrelated point that is cause of
misunderstanding on what representation is. To the former point on visibility and
transparency, practical paradox for the representatives is that many members of the public
do not know what elected MPs do.44 The purpose of national legislatures can be similarly
disputed. Therefore, for those represented a picture of what representation really is can be
argued to evoke mainly through plenary activities: through plenary addresses, debates,
question hours and voting. These accounts are the culmination of the processes handled
elsewhere–that is, in the committee and PPGs.
44  Many general misconceptions were brought up in the interviews. They were mostly relating to mistrust
and general hostility towards politicians that are also seen in the feedback MPs receive. One MP described
the amazement in the shift the day after receiving the representative mandate, finding oneself overnight
turned into ‘unreliable, seeker of self-interest and vile human being who is not to be trust and whose talk
cannot be trusted’ (III: 24: 21:26).
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Acknowledging the limited access to the other venues the plenary sessions are all the
public gets. Equivalently, this notion demonstrates the feasibility of endorsing also the
temporal notion embedded in the representative contexts: whereas bills can be scrutinised
over an extended time in the committees, plenary discussion are MPs’ ‘only shot’ for
representing for the larger audience, constituency and such. This notion of transiency also
becomes evident when we return to discuss the styles of deliberation and acclaimed
worsening deliberative culture of plenary.
My analysis supports Saward’s recent argument on the performativity of representation:
MPs indeed recognise how central the showing doing element is in representation (Saward
2017, 81). A similar account, albeit in different terms, was available with studied Flemish
and Belgian MPs (Severs, Celis, and Meier 2014, 630). Relating to the difficulty with the
lack of transparency of work done in the Parliament posits a heavy strain on the public venue
of plenary: activities get correlated to representing, while discerning that it actually ‘works’
as such. This is perhaps also due to skewed media coverage. Consequently, what happens,
partly, is that the plenary hall becomes a façade for representation. This presents a paradox
for representatives: the physical public and visible domain lays out a performative context
that they are hesitant to use. This is because being successful, by resorting to means that
seem to be accounted as ‘representing’ and proving that ‘things get done’ (or do not get
done), may mean losing credibility, respect and–most importantly–the capacity to exert
influence in other contexts. This view of deliberative representation puts emphasis on the
other less discussed perspective that while deliberative representation captures
communicating and interacting in the act of representation it is also the case among those
who represent. As argued many times, deliberative representation is not exclusively about
maintaining the representative–represented relationship and evoking constituencies as the
contemporary theorising informs. Additionally, the communicative and claim-making flow
should take note also of this horizontal perspective, that between those who represent, the
representatives that is.
This leads to a conclusion that the attitudes portrayed towards the plenary sessions
themselves, and the functions ascribed to it, are ambivalent. At the same time MPs
acknowledge the democratic functions of plenary, of public justification and reasoning on
legislation and public policies as inalienable democratic features of representative rule.
Some of these views were especially teased out in the two subsequent interview rounds
where I asked MPs to comment intentionally converse claims (see in Appendix ii) about
parliamentary work. Presenting the interviewees with the proposition that plenary sessions
are occasions for empty talk showcased some of the reasoning behind this interpretation. It
is ‘not completely untrue, but is problematic in many ways’ (III: 28: 1:23:37), but as choice
of expression considered it to be ‘too cruel’ (III: 27: 1:47:43).
For now, I will follow the argumentation started above, where plenary activities equal
to what representation is as representing (Rehfeld 2018). While consistently defending the
significance of the plenary sessions, this misconception about representing, that is partly
due to the limited access to the other venues of Parliament, is connected in the interviews
to discretion with participation to the plenary discussions. Many emphasised that they took
part only if they had something to say. Like the norms present in the operative context, being
mindful about the allocation with one’s own voice was repeatedly brought up. Empty talk
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is talk that is deficiently motivated. However, there is a constant tension with the
understanding that the plenary sessions are the key source for legitimising their formal
mandate and position as representatives, and that they are judged according to these
activities:
I had this attitude towards the plenary discussions that you didn’t go there as if
you’d go to a theatre. You took part in the discussion if there was something to
be discussed. Not that I need political lift. I discuss. And here’s the joke–that
I’m lazy [referring to the rankings of amount of speeches held]. Because it seems
that some of the MPs, I cannot know what is in their heads, some make sure that
they discuss sufficiently enough in the Hall. Continuously. And it is a signal that
they are diligent and hard-working representatives. Or whatever their message
is. I cannot interpret this any other way when I hear in the cafeteria when
someone says ‘I must go deliver a couple of speeches. And off they go, almost
as if to speak to the statistics. (III: 20: 41:44)
Distinctions are made between what MPs consider as good and bad plenary talk. In
distinguishing the incentives one of the most pejorative one was the ‘statistics speeches’.
Statistics speeches earn their name from the practice that tabloids sustain. They publish
annually tables and rankings showing the amount of plenary speeches held by each MP. The
headlines that follow often showcase representatives with no plenary addresses. Even
though these rankings were mostly ridiculed in the interviews, MPs cannot overcome the
framework set by the media. Rankings are posed as record for ‘slackers and hard-workers’,
an idea that consequently looms behind the rationalisation of talking in the plenary sessions.
Despite most MPs do not agree with the quantitative approach to speeches (as they claim to
argue for and support the quality), there is another point to be noted. The amount of speeches
bears relevance also from the competitive partisan perspective. What is often forgotten is
that while MPs tend to be measured in comparison to each other as representatives of the
people, there is also another level to be found: internal party competition. Within the
electoral district MPs compete against each other, and the fiercest adversary can often come
from the same party.
Respondent: Too many parliamentary speeches are written beforehand. Those
that are held because the media keeps count on speeches. If you have 50
speeches, well fine, but what if the other MPs in your electoral district have 100?
Then you deliver ‘parrot speeches’ just in order to get markings in the statistics.
For me this is the mockery of giving speeches, that you speak to the statistics...
I did that myself when I started [in Parliament]...
Interviewer: Why did you do that?
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Respondent: Because all the others did as well! It is said that here you must
deliver statistics-driven speeches. But then I started to think that I don’t speak
because of that to get a marking, when there is nothing to say. Or it is said that
you have to speak about the projects undergoing in your county even if there is
nothing about that there, and it isn’t related to the topic at hand, it is not handled
in the parliament but you go and tell that here in [city name taken out] we have
this and that. Nowadays this raises amused smiles when someone goes [...] Then
everybody says, that representative also has advanced our projects!
[exaggerated] But it distorts, that people deliver speeches for eye-service. [....]
(III: 22: 1:44:20)
These performances are after the competence and credibility of being a representative
that most representatives seek in the eyes of the represented. The show-do character of
representation comes up in statistical speeches that allow the representativeness of
representation to be measured in a quantitative manner. The more times a representative has
taken the podium, the better she or he is as a representative. To question ‘the correlation
between what you’ve been accomplishing’ and logic that does not fully hold ground since
‘the best measurement for your political activity is not necessarily the amount how many
times you’ve been venting in the great hall’. (III: 21: 13:03). When elections are near, it
becomes even more important for an MP to remind their constituents of the MP’s existence.
At those times, ‘we have these “evening sitters” who carry out this collecting’, as one MP
notes (III: 4: 1:21:17). Continuing on the deliberative style in question, the MP finds it
‘craziest that these who deliver these statistical speeches read out the summary of the bill.
“This is an important thing. Thank you’. And then asks for a new turn to speak. And it goes
on and on.’ (ibid.)
Representatives are subject to the ‘deliberative imperative’ (Pekonen 2011, 110). The
public can exercise their (negative) freedom to opt out from deliberation. As autonomous
subjects they have the right not to participate in deliberative process (see e.g. Rostbøll 2011).
However, it is an intriguing question to what extent this also relate to those who represent
us? In one way, MPs are entitled but also forced to deliberate on behalf of the represented,
to raise issues and grievances near and dear to them. One MP especially emphasised the role
of MP as a spokesperson, meaning that ‘the statute of MP enables raising issues for public
discussion that normal citizen cannot otherwise raise’ (III: 28: 2:54). For him, this was a
‘central practice’ in acting as a representative, even though this was not confined
exclusively to the plenary sessions. For Disch (2012), this is exactly her point that instead
of talking about representative’s responsiveness to the represented responsibility should be
considered. In this case then, it is the responsibility of the representative to bring up issues
and raise agendas relevant to the constituency (or those resonating with the representative
claim, as Saward would argue). MP initiatives are one institutional way to affect the
parliamentary agenda, to have a matter and a concern relevant to the electorate at least
discussed.
However, from this perspective it casts a certain doubt on those representatives, where
a constituent might hypothetically ask: What kind of a representative would not speak at
all? Talking in the plenary sessions signals, then, that something is being done, that
‘representation works’. Severs and others (2014, 632) look at this from a similar perspective
when they argue that the function of account-giving has an instrumental value that
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‘compensates the “invisibility” of their voters and facilitates a representational relationship
with them’.
For the current analytical endeavour, it would be unnecessary to say that plenary work
would lack any deliberative purpose or value. We cannot argue here that the sole purpose
for deliberating would be count-keeping,45 i.e. to engage in discussions with such strategic
pretences. However, with these addresses MPs are neither aiming to persuade each other
nor even addressing their speech to them. It is mainly a tool for communicating to the
constituency, sending a signal out to them. When concentrating on addressing the gallery
what is found problematic is the lack of dialogue between the MPs. This is also partly due
to the institutionalised format of plenary deliberations. It relates to practical reason how
plenary session addresses are distributed: at a certain time the speaker list is opened, and
MPs can reserve a place on the list. The distribution rule is based on first come-first serve
(excluding the PPG addresses that are placed on the top of the list). With hot topics, the first
set of speakers can extend over a hundred. This can often mean that those MPs on the list
get their turn very late in the night, especially if the Speaker allows spontaneous
commentary speeches and debates in between.46 This reality, according to the interviews,
lessens the willingness to take a plenary address. Then also, MPs can become frustrated
about the ‘temporal play’ available in the parliamentary politics and used also as a tool for
political manoeuvres by the government. Legislative agendas considered important, brought
up in the interviews, might have a slot in the plenary sessions in the middle of the night
when the plenary hall is ‘as empty as the tomb of Jesus on Easter morning’, as one MP (III:
4: 1:19: 34) put it. The galley, the plenary and the media are not there, and ‘salient issues
are handled’ (ibid.).
When a governmental bill is in handled in the plenary sessions–after the issuing
discussion when the bill is introduced to the parliament–the committee chair always
introduces the committee report, after which the floor is open for discussion. Most usually
the official standings of the parties are delivered by the head of the committee groups.
Combined with the fact that many speeches are pre-written and pre-planned that are
‘pending in line’ makes it that ‘it’s not very productive work’, as one MP (III: 11: 9:27)
argues. ‘And not many listens to them, really’. (ibid.) There seems to be deficit on listening
side. ‘When no one listens to no one, is the biggest thing in this house’, comments, former
well-known Speaker of the House Riitta Uosukainen (III: 30: 11:15) who acted in that
position almost ten years in around the turn of the millennium. ‘You really can’t say what
your pal next to you said. And it shows. It was like that then, and it is so now. It is sad’.
The problem of incoherence and pressure to represent disguised in ‘speech-milling’
seems to be worst with handling of the budget upon which the Parliament decides on. Here,
the argument that representation is tantamount to deliberation is linked to the lack of
discursive orientation. On the subject of budgetary addresses, one MP (III: 27: 1:25:45)
remarked:
45 In many instances one long-gone group of MPs, nicknamed ’the Bermuda Triangle’ were brought up
when referring to very talkative MPs. They used to dominate the plenary ’airspace’ in the late evenings so
that the plenary sessions lasted long into the night. Usually present were a few MPs and the Speaker.
Nowadays plenary sessions are normally scheduled to end by 10 pm.
46 Having a turn to speak in the middle of night, to an almost empty plenary was a relief for one MP (III: 7)
who recalled their first plenary address.
179
The subject motif was so vast and incongruous that I didn’t see even a hint of
sensibility in it. Why do we discuss so many days with such disarrayed arsenal
of discussion? You didn’t get any lead or clue. One is pulling that way, the other
that way. Everyone speaks arbitrary things in one’s own mandatory address. To
me it was such a theatre that didn’t have any script or director, but it happened
on the terms of the discussants. When I was often thinking to myself was that if
someone is following this discussion, they don’t get much wiser from this. Other
than “that person delivered a good speech, and that one didn’t say anything.”
This tension of these mandatory speeches and the acclaimed insensibility and
condemnation of empty talk is something that all MPs need to come in terms with
personally. In the logic of the performative context, ‘talking is doing’. What has been
accomplished and getting done in the operative context needs to be shown. But the
prevailing mindset, perhaps due to the dominance of the operative context that MPs readily
endorse in their daily work, does not recognise the plenary or associate it with tangible
results that can be seen. One MP (III: 11: 11:36) reflected on this challenge of with the
following:
The thing is, when you give a speech in the plenary sessions, does it lead to a
concrete political decision? Very rarely. But, of course, parliamentary plenary
sessions are an important forum of political discussion, and valuable in itself.
But a wrong image shouldn’t be created to the citizens that ‘there they now
decide about these matters’.
From what we have seen so far, and what the quotation shows nicely, is that
representation facilitates different functions that are also connected to spatial and temporal
contexts. The fact that representation refuses to be a one thing but translates and collapses
into many functions and practices deem representation a difficult target to judge and
evaluate. I take that the argument on the liminality of representation that mainly refers to
the criticism of strict electoral and non-electoral distinction includes the idea of practical,
functional multitude. This can be seen when Saward (2019, 282) writes that ‘political figures
seek and hold these statuses or enact these practices are best seen as liminal figures,
negotiating transitional or ambiguous zones of practice’. For this reason, what
representatives do, is that they take on many practices that travel across the contexts of
representation. What they aspire to do in each respective context is not the same. Empirical
inquiry resonates here with theoretical arguments (Saward 2014; Bächtiger and Beste 2017)
by showing that representatives indeed shift according to these functions, as does their
deliberation.
When connecting the idea of representatives as ‘liminal figures’ mentioned above, we
are in a better position to understand how the functions of the affirmative and operative
context are not recognised in the performative context. This is partly due to the audience in
question–to whom the deliberative performances are addressed to–but more importantly to
the functions. In the case of the plenary sessions, this is linked in particular to the shared
notion that these sessions are not a venue for opinion-making, decision-making and
compromise–and that the small amount of actual decision-making that remains in the
domain of the committee. Campaigning urges are to be toned down and softened, as all
members who are part of the compromise are expected to hold their ground in public.
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Therefore, what we can argue is that the communicative power in question becomes more
dispersed and less discernible. I will return to these notions soon when I discuss significance
of the parliamentary tension as democratic practices of deliberation in the performative
context, but at this point I want to continue examining the individual partisan perspective.
Parliamentary deliberations are often fleeting. For that reason the impermanence of
show-do character of performative representation means that it requires constant sustaining
and maintenance. Notably, however, on the large scale the institutional setting can help
achieve in maintaining.  Discussions and debates are often built on the adversary relations
between the governing and the opposing parties. Adversarial political deliberation can help
clarify political disagreements and conflicts which also then help fight back fragmentation
of public sphere (Manin 2017). One showcasing example of overcoming the temporal
character is writing a bulletin or a memo to be sent out after delivering a speech in the
plenary sessions. The representative performance gets reproduced through this practice. The
reality seems to be that only the very devoted members of the constituency watch every
plenary to catch their representative give a speech, perhaps supporting their cause.
According to the MPs, writing a bulletin and sending it out is an efficient and handy way to
maintain communication with the constituency, keep them informed and convinced that
they are doing their job and performing in it.47 Naturally, these bulletins are also sent to the
media. This practice demonstrates some of the ways representatives try to wrest control of
the political agenda from the media.
Especially for MPs from small rural districts sending dispatches to their local news
media is a viable way of penetrating the opaqueness of their work in the Parliament. The
possibility of getting a news piece made is much bigger there than in the nation-wide large
newspapers. These small papers keep track on their districts’ representatives by underlining
the accountability and responsiveness function of representation (similar with the speech
rankings and records). They may also publish lists of how their representatives have been
voting on matters that are consequential to the district. In the interviews some considered
writing these bulletins and newsletters very dated considering the force of social media
avenues. But then again, electorates differ, and not all are keen on using social media
platforms.
These practices described above can be seen as ‘spin-offs’ of representative activity,
where the plenary sessions constitute for the faculty of re-making representation. What is
worthy to note here is that this re-making needs to be validated and, more importantly,
legitimised. The plenary sessions do just that. The opinion, perspective or claim carries less
democratic credentials if presented and brought up elsewhere. Commenting on the
constituency communication that bulletins and weekly newsletters facilitate one MP states
that ‘[I]t’s natural to come out with it that you’ve said something. The plenary is a natural
place to refer to or cite’. (III: 15: 1:37). Considering the mixed notions about the
significance of the plenary talk, MPs are uncomfortably aware of the need to state matters
47 When discussing constituency work and how to keep your supporters in the loop some have a weekly or
monthly bulletin sent out to their support group mailing list. In them MPs tell about the activities they have
been engaged in, positions they have taken, etc. In general, constituency work has not been vastly studied in
Finnish context (Raunio and Ruotsalainen 2018), nor in Nordic countries since recently (Arter and Raunio
2018). This is somewhat surprising considering the fact that our electoral system highlights individual
candidates. It would assume that maintaining close relations with the ‘home turf’ would be important.
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in the plenary sessions and not elsewhere. What this, in its limited part, tells us is that the
plenary sessions have not lost its democratic appeal in the minds of representatives.
Another important aspect that draws together the meaning of seemingly isolated and
temporarily impermanent speeches is that all utterances in the plenary sessions, even
heckling are recorded and filed in parliamentary archives. This electronic archive is open to
the public almost instantly after each plenary session. This brings us to another point that
demonstrates that speeches that could be considered as ‘empty talk’ have value for
deliberative representation. Parliamentary work, especially plenary discussions (from which
the transcripts are available unlike from the committee sessions held in camera), leaves
behind a traceable record. This opens up vast opportunities for all kinds of follow-up
purposes for the represented and representatives alike. We have already covered part of this
idea, touching on the issue of statistical speeches where the judgment on the effectiveness
of representing is grounded more on quantity. They hid a less menacing motivation to ‘make
a mark’. As in the previous examples, the position is better secured and, more importantly,
legitimised if it has been stated in the plenary sessions. It gives those claims a different of
kind of authority of positions. Transformed into textual accounts representing is validated
in good and bad.
When taking the podium some consider it relevant from the perspective of ‘speaking to
the history books’. When democratic representation at large can be thought to be series of
sequences stretching over time, marking a position by giving an address can be seen as an
attempt to fight back the inconsistency of politics. It is a powerful, responsive claim or
justification in politics to be able to show retrospectively, for example, ‘I was already at that
time holding this position. It was right then, and it is right now’. This relates to the
‘principled tenacity’ of the uncompromising mindset that testifies that the drivers for
representation have neither ceased nor changed (Gutmann and Thompson 2012). The
consistency in claim-making can also be thought to enhance the features necessary to
selection-model (Mansbridge 2009; 2016): selecting intrinsically motivated representatives
whose interests communicated as representations (or representative claims, if you wish) are
aligned also over time. These demonstrations are therefore not only snapshots of certain
timepoints but can be seen to form an extended temporal claim on representing.
Accumulated track-record feeds the favourable characteristics of selecting these gyroscopic
representatives (Mansbridge 2003; a similar point about relevance of selection is made by
Fearon 1999).
Retrospective perspective of speaking to the books and all plenary deliberations that
leave a traceable track-record can be turned into political ammunition. This is done when
accusing your opponent as unreliable. In hypothetical words: ‘You (and your party) took
this position then, and now you are saying something else. You have given up your
principles’. These retrospective argumentative grounds as means of ‘politicking’ (Palonen
2003) were defined in one interview (III: 21) as ‘a treasure box’ for somebody who has
enough energy to go through plenary transcripts. Wary of this political weaponry MPs seem
to be mindful of statements made in public.
Some means of ‘making a mark’ and securing a position are institutionalised. One such
account that illustrates the logics of performative representation is the legislative initiatives
of MPs. Like the amount of speeches, they are also easily quantified measurements for how
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well a representative is representing. Also, smaller districts’ local newspapers keep count
on their representatives’ initiatives (as well as on budgetary proposals), how many there are
by each local MP. And there are many: approximately 350 MP initiatives are raised per
parliamentary term.48 While the initiatives are tangible cues highlighting the general impact
and result-oriented viewpoints of, plenary speeches and initiatives do not get things done,
as discussed earlier. In reality this is true with legislative initiatives: only less than one
percent is passed in the Finnish parliament (Solvak and Pajala 2016; Pajala 2014; see also
2012). The rest never advance to committee proceedings but get buried under other more
urgent legislative matters handled in the committee, and get expired when parliamentary
term ends.
Why, then, propose legislative initiatives if their impact is close to null? The
perspectives on this differed among MPs who the subject came up in the interviews. Where
it is possible to see them as being conducted under false pretences, as with the previously
mentioned statistical speeches, they are also ways of getting a small discussion out of it and
making the case public. Within this backdrop it should be remembered that Finnish political
agenda is very much government-led. Although the committee system of Finnish Parliament
ranks relatively high (9 out 30 parliament) in international comparisons when it comes to
defining committee autonomy (Mickler 2017), the overall agenda-setting powers, especially
with committees are limited (Mattson and Strøm 1995; 2004). Practically, however, it is but
non-existent, since regrettably Finnish committees lack independent rights of legislative
initiative.49
The nihilist interpretation on the relevance of the MP initiatives draws again to the
contrast with the operative context. For those who prefer seeing the focus of representative’s
task as actually pushing matters forward, in the framework of influence, then the plenary
sessions and the performative context lacks this feature. Also referring to acquiring enough
influencing power through statuses one interviewee bluntly stated (II: 10: 46:33) that ‘if I’m
forced to do initiatives, I’m not doing my job well’. I would be inclined to argue that the
same understanding would be associated with those who put a large amount of effort into
preparing for the plenary sessions. It testifies again how the ‘ecology’ of Parliament as a
working community takes different perspectives to deliberative representation and the idea
of distributed deliberation in the contexts discussed in this research. It also tells us that
representatives nurture and defend very different ways of acting as a representative.
On these assumptions presented above, I am using the term ‘expressive-partisan’ to
describe the deliberative mode in use in the performative context. The orientation is partisan
and not ‘deliberative’ in the sense that it would try to mediate matters between participants
or seek affirmation and assurance. Instead deliberation orients at articulating and
communicating with the constituency not only in substance but also in form. What I mean
here is that performative context urges representatives to appear in public and take a stand
(through speeches and other procedural practices as discussed initiatives) as means of
48 The amount of MP initiatives has dropped one thirds in the past decade (from 558 in 2010 to 312 in 2018).
49 The general initiative rights expanded in 2012 when citizens’ initiatives were introduced. They allow
putting issues on the parliamentary agenda and therefore to be discussed in the plenary sessions. As with MP
initiatives, citizens’ initiatives don not necessarily lead to an impact. At the time of writing, only two such
initiatives have been passed.
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expression. Through plenary speeches MPs may seek to set up and claim a particular agenda
in addition to legitimise and verify an opinion that can be used in other contexts. We will
advance this argumentation further as this subchapter unfolds.
Next, we begin to look at the dynamics of the basic parliamentary tension that facilitates
many of the central democratic practices of deliberation. They revolve around the
government and the opposition, but again, in accordance to what is argued in this research:
individual MPs negotiate their roles which ‘are not areas for action confined to set or fixed
[…] institutionalised positions’ (citating Parkinson 2015, Saward 2019, 286). These
positions of governing MP and opposition MP, however, are able further to allow discussion
on the performative context.
ii Structuring and maintaining parliamentary tension
The institutionalised parliamentary style of political speech underscores the basic setting
where the viewpoints are debated from opposite perspectives. The parliamentary ideal, and
one of the principles of representative government, is that political matters are settled by
‘trial by discussion’ (Manin 1997). The government (or, more specifically in the Finnish
case, the coalition government) defends and justifies the bills and policies that go along with
them. The opposition is against them, demanding better justifications and offering
alternative options and solutions. The performative ‘show-do’ character of representation is
embedded in the parliamentary form of ‘pro et contra’ talk (Palonen 2008) that endorses
adversary yet reasoned argumentation where the other side gets heard. Deliberative trial in
the context of political deliberation distances itself from the idea of impartiality. Contrary
to the judicial trial, members in political deliberation are expected to embrace their
partiality. They should not escape their involvement in the conflict that is embedded in the
confrontation. (Manin 2017, 39–41.)
Hearing the other side, facilitated by adversarial political deliberation, has many virtues.
Firstly, criticism has epistemic credentials. Decisions that have been surrendered to
criticism tend to be better. Secondly and thirdly, whilst adversarial deliberation clarifies the
positions in terms of comprehension of choices, it fights back the fragmentation of the public
sphere (see empirical counterargument in the study of Mutz 2006). And finally, dynamics
of arguing for and against establishes respect to the minority. (Manin 2017, 42.)
In what follows, I will rely on Manin’s perspective when discussing the aforementioned
virtues. In doing so, I will also continue to connect proposed expressive-partisan
deliberative mode presented in the performative context: through argumentative practices
that are founded on adversary and positional logics of deliberative representation that
focuses on the partisan perspective. The elementary feature of parliamentary tension, that
between the government and opposition, is applicable also in the committee but it is most
evident in the plenary sessions. Here I illustrate how the principle of trial by discussion
manifests throughout the parliamentary institution, and in the case of the performative
context I argue that the expressive-partisan mode of deliberation effectively captures these
political and adversarial features and dynamics.
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As outlined previously, from the very practical perspective of MPs the plenary sessions
mark a minor but essential formality in the process of democratic representation. That is
where the legislative process comes to an end, when the vote decides the matter.
Importantly, however, it should not be conflated with the view that it is where political
decision-making takes place, even though legally and formally it is so. It goes without
saying that the plenary sessions bear other, inalienable functions when it comes to
democratic rule. For one, the government–versus–opposition division spells out the main
frame through which the ideals of accountability and responsiveness are checked. Looking
from the perspective of understanding representation as praxis, how these practices of
accountability and responsiveness are played out differently depending whether one looks
at things from perspective of the government of the opposition.
Minority plays an essential democratic role. Considering the tenacity in attitudes
portrayed in the performative context (when it comes to the well-defined and possibly
refined opinion-formation), opposition challenges the performance of the government.
Notably, ‘the majority should be checked’ by pluralist counterforces (Manin 1987, 361).
The goal of this dynamic is ‘not equilibrium; it is deliberation itself’ (ibid.,). These
viewpoints regarding the general idea of political deliberation blend into the accountability
function in two ways. First is the way in which the legislature, as a whole, is accountable to
the represented. These were the ‘people have the right to know’ type of justifications
expressed in the interviews. ‘As long as you are breathing you need to talk, and even after
that when you have ended in the minority and been defeated, the issue has to be declared to
the public’ (III: 4: 1:19.)
The second notion, more evident in the quotations below, portray how it is in fact the
opposition who performs the accountability functions on behalf of the represented. The
process of judgment that is granted to the represented (as an audience) can be thought to
entail two overlapping levels: first is about judging the original representative claim offered
by the government, and the second judgment, perhaps more critical, is about judging the
credibility of the rendition that the opposition has created of the representation made by the
government. These observations are made in the following citations:
It has an effect. Yes, plenary talk makes a difference. This is something that I
didn’t realize when I came to the parliament in xxxx [year removed to maintain
anonymity] but now I do. [….] Every time, in a way, there is a mental battle who
is right. There could be a gallery that gives points. And even if there isn’t one, a
kind of mental combat is held about who here is right? And it has an impact on
what the government does. Or what the governing parties do. Never there have
been so many bills that have changed in Parliament than during this government.
Quite a few things, when they have been questioned here, with a great publicity
or discreetly they have been forgotten or changed. (III: 19: 43:51)
**
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But the opposition has ‘speech power’ in the sense that in fact government
must in advance consider what the opposition is going to say. Based on that the
talk has an anticipatory effect], in one way. Let’s assume that the opposition,
moving now to the plenary sessions, speaks in one way. In that case you must
make certain kinds of proposals that would not be attacked from this and that
exact perspective. (III: 10: 10:37)
Adversary political deliberation, discussed in this study through the idea of expressive-
partisan deliberative mode, assist in structuring and clarifying the horizon of conflict. Partly
due to what was described as ‘consumer-friendly’ there has been a push towards increasing
debate format in the plenary sessions. Evidently, politically the plenary sessions bear more
meaning to the opposition than it does to government. This is because, for the opposition,
the plenary sessions are the only venue to ‘exist’. Since opposition lacks much of the
legislative power compared to the government, their influence within the operative context
is limited. Drawing on this their ‘show-do’ character in the performative context is
consequently much more limited. They have less to ‘show’. However, according to the
interviews, governing parties cannot disregard the counterclaims that the opposition will
most likely present during the plenary debates. Acknowledging this point assigns
deliberative work to be addressed in the affirmative context, as was discussed in the case of
PPG meetings taking place only among the same party members.
According to what we know, opposition, when operating skilfully through their MPs,
has avenues to impact decision-making. But as was discussed, they don’t get ‘things done’
in the same way the government does.
Being in the opposition incentives expressive-partisan deliberation differently than
being in the government. This point was brought up earlier in the text when arguing that the
‘true work’ is done by those who oppose. They are forced to find counterarguments and
weak points in the policies that are, or should be, credible enough to be taken seriously.
Consequently, the hackneyed view of opposition politicians merely ‘yapping’ obscures an
inalienable democratic function that eschews it and thus highlights the deliberative stance.
Without the ‘pluralist counterforces’, as Manin (1987) put it, majority may be less inclined
to engage in a deliberative process that would reveal sources of opposite viewpoints.
Alternative paths of understanding would not be induced, also within the majority. This
perspective, a negation of opposition functions, is made visible in the following:
When we were in the government, in all honesty, it led to a point that you became
a bit lazy sometimes. There was no pressing need to start elaborating the bills
and their justifications, because they would pass regardless. That perhaps leads
to becoming a bit passive. (III: 21: 14:15)
It may also be so that when the disagreement has been found unsurmountable in the
committee, the mutual reasoning and argumentation is not continued. This observation
demonstrates the urgency of maintaining political deliberation. Inter-related dynamics
between the affirmative and performative context, and operative and performative context
helps illuminating why, in this case, being in the opposition ‘forces the PPG to take
parliament work seriously in a different way’ in comparison to governing PPGs (III: 21:
14:15). To put it in a more striking manner, one MP (III: 10: 23:29) illustrated how ‘one
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gets by easier’ in the government where one ‘manages by finding the green button in the
plenary debates’. ‘It’s easy to find–always pressing the green button’. Moreover, relevance
of plenary and attending the roll calls satisfy the function that ‘there are more green dots
and red dots’ (III: 25: 17:19) on the voting board. In other words, for the government, while
being able to make a difference by enacting preferred policies, may not constitute legitimate
representation by itself. Giving an account as in justifying policies and initiating and taking
part in plenary deliberations may become less prioritised. This again, for me, speaks for the
need to distinguish the contexts of representation to get a better grasp which functions are
taken on accordingly. The idea of deliberative representation and the way I treat it lends a
hand to explore these accounts where criticism towards (deliberative) practices is being
presented.
For the majority, the governing PPGs and their MPs, more effort may be put on the
operative context, not to mention the affirmative functions in the PPGs, while less
consideration may be given on the performative counterpart. When governing requires the
ability to compromise but the locus for demonstrating that ability is not in the plenary
sessions, the justifications and arguing for and against are to some extent reliable on the
activity of the opposition. I am not arguing that governing would automatically suggest
disregard towards such democratic practices of deliberation but in all fairness, there may be
less inherent incentives to engage in deliberative process–especially if the policy at hand is
conflicting and MPs are collectively and individually torn. On these accounts the level of
authenticity is negotiated.
Before we advance, I will briefly mention another institutional mechanism that sustains
the accountability function in the performative context. That is the question hour (or period,
as in many parliaments). According to the interviews it has become more and more a tool
for the opposition MPs to challenge and demand answers from the cabinet in a more timely
and current manner.50 Here, very explicitly showing respect to the minority through
providing an answer is institutionalised. According to some, however, in these replies
condescending and arrogant attitudes are sometimes portrayed. In any case, question hour
allows targeted opportunities to underline the ways in which government is responsible for
its legislation to the parliament (see overview in Martin 2011). Relating to reasons discussed
earlier–that plenary activities count as important partisan cues for representing–getting a
turn in question hour is highly wanted. This is also due to favourable media coverage. The
weekly parliamentary question hour is broadcast live on national television. In contrast to
earlier days, nobody except the Speaker of the House did not know who gets a turn to ask.
Notably, it was suggested in the interviews that PPGs are gaining more and more say in who
50 According to the interviews, new ministers can fear the question period. Referred as ‘the minister test’,
question hours reveal what ministers are made of. Even though one can anticipate potential questions only
by looking at the parliamentary political agenda and preparing accordingly, there is never any kind of
certainty of the focus or range of the questions coming up. The cabinet members need to be able to respond
to critical and pressing questions that aim at questioning and weakening the legitimacy of decision-making
as well as the whole legislative process prior to parliamentary handling. Albeit sometimes tricky, the
ministers are always substantially better informed about upcoming legislation and e.g. know background of
drafting of the law in the ministry and in the preparatory working groups. This information is not available
to all thus easing the burden of providing a sufficient answer.
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gets to pose a question hour question.51 Some PPGs rotate equally the question hour turns
but it is evident that internal hierarchies can affect also to whom questions are allocated
within the PPG. Also, in the PPG meetings question hour strategies can be discussed and
planned–underlining their tactical purpose.
A debate format, a recent procedural development that induces and structures the
adversary setting, has been more and more initiated in recent years. It demonstrates a more
up-tempo format of plenary discussion. In the interviews it was thought that the reason why
the Speaker’s council has wanted to add debate format is that it alleviates the unstructured
nature of plenary discussions. Addresses do not refer to each other or form a dialogue. They
merely follow one after another, isolated, as was discussed earlier. Political deliberation
when used in such a manner that can articulate the ongoing disagreement engages people
into the deliberative process. From this perspective, here then the role of the Speaker, as a
conductor or a playwright for maintaining the tension in the plenary sessions, is central.
Regardless of their neutral position as guardians of overseeing that everything in the plenary
sessions goes according to the rules and procedures, they have substantial amount of power.
This power is symbolic and practical. Former Speaker Riitta Uosukainen (who wanted to
appear here with her own name) came up with the analogy of the Speaker as a conductor
who ‘orchestrates’ the plenary sessions. Excluding the pre-reserved turns in the normal
plenary format, she can note a momentum for a debate and rather freely decide accordingly
who gets a turn to speak (Eduskunta 2018). Uosukainen (III: 30: 1:00:15) continues with
the figurative illustration:
When the plenary work goes well, it’s like being a conductor. You can reserve
space for that kind of discussion when you know that that person and that person
is good. And you make sure that the whole orchestra resonates and sings. You
really feel joy when you allow people to shine.
However, in order to be able to make this happen it is necessary that the Speaker has
skills and knowledge, to have a finger on the ‘pulse of Parliament’. She needs to know and
‘feel’ the Parliament and its members: their formal and informal position within the PPG,
their committee placement, their interests and apparently, their oratory skills as MPs:
It is a bit like… writing a script for a play. You need to have a little bit of sense
of where this tension is, where lies that interesting issue. Who knows this issue?
Who talks about it? It is not that easy, when you think of it, to distribute turns to
speak, that they are only distributing turns to speak. When you have the situation
that you can give that turn to almost 200 people, then it’s decisive that you give
it to a person who can light up the discussion, who can simplify it. But it wasn’t
the only criteria. And the order of the turns also matters. (III: 19: 33:15)
51 In 2016, there was uproar when it emerged that the leader of the Social Democratic Party parliamentary
group, Antti Lindtman, had provided the Speakers lists of MPs who would be most suitable in their group0
for posing questions during the question hours. According to the news, the practice had extended also to
other plenary discussions, like the debate, and that the Speakers had been unaware that such a practice had
not been agreed among the PPG members (Helsingin Sanomat 2016).
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As mentioned, the Speaker often tries to learn about who the MPs are. Uosukainen
describes how ‘the Speaker sees and hears everything’, which extends also to knowing those
MPs who leave after the cameras are turned off (17:55). ‘You really see the whole “gang”,
including the parties and the message coming from them. I followed closely the happenings
of parties, to what kind of a position one has, and how one knew to behave there’ (23:08).
What the Speaker is capable to do, in a debate, is that by choosing who gets a turn to
speak he can critically tap into the constructivist feature of representation. Most simply, the
plenary debate itself can be seen as a representation that is created by and through
deliberation. Alternatively, it is a claim, or, in line with Ankersmitt, a re-presentation, a
rendition of how things are, and how they should be. All this is conducted in a debate
through which perspectives are positioned against which others. A skilful Speaker(s) know
who and how can set the debate ‘on fire’.
The MPs who have acted in this position acknowledge the responsibility and in general
seem aware of the impetus they can have over structuring the debate and discussion. It is a
well-respected and impartial position, suggesting features of representation that allows
arguing that the Speaker represents the whole of Parliament as an institution. Despite the
notions that Speakers can be seen as embodiments of legislatures that form a link to Manin’s
description of adversarial political deliberation, the deliberation in question here is managed
and administered. Political deliberation is not completely free-flowing; as in any
institutionalised setting, turns to taken in the presenting of arguments in favour of and
against a given issue. When explicitly asked about the temptation of ordering and framing
the debate towards a certain preferential direction, one interviewee admitted that such a
temptation is indeed present. Leading this playwright role allows to induce tension or other
adversary features in the debate. It can also be used, or be tempted to, to give a debating
turn to some MP whose opinions are thought ‘foolish’ or generally known to be overly
passionate. This would highlight the senselessness of that position or perspective in that
given context. Here, I underline that these qualifications play out only in a given topic-
related context, and not generally. MPs have unrestricted freedom of speech, and by this it
is meant that different viewpoints (and groups of people) deserve to be represented. For this
reason, definitions relate to the nature of representational relationship that the MP in
question subscribes to. Some may be known for their differing positions vis-à-vis the party
represented, or some may have strong and specific constituency commitments.
When bringing up this constitutive or constructivist character in the role that Speakers
assume, at the same time it was pointed out that those who become Speakers are most often
experienced and respected parliamentarians. Through these acquired features, often by long
incumbency, these people are thought to be able to assert judgments fairly and impartially.
But this balancing act required is not an easy task, and feedback is always sought and
received, as one member of the Speakers’ council describes (III: 12: 51:10):
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The Speaker, she is like a “dictator”, in quotation marks, when she does her
work. It’s not an easy task despite you’d think that it’s just a mere ceremonial
position that calls for sitting muscles, to only endure. It calls for that as well.
Hour after hour you sit and listen to the addresses of those who compete in the
amount of addresses [laughs]. It calls for one and another thing! It’s a balancing
act when it’s the question hour or some other fierce debate, that you are impartial
and at the same time you can maintain a tension all the time. In the discussion
there needs to be a tension all the time. Government against the opposition. Or
that these duels appear, combats are created between the representatives. You
must orchestrate it such a way that you can maintain this tension, but at the same
time, secure that the whole plenary is brought along. A certain even-handedness
is preserved. Not in terms of time but from a wider angle. Even-handedness
always needs to be demonstrated within some timeframe.
Debates are ‘user-friendly’ from the citizen perspective: with a short glimpse you get a
sense of the different positions around the issue at hand. If we endorse the idea that politics
is profoundly about settling disagreements in a democratic manner, then the problem with
normal plenary format with pre-reserved addresses is that they can fail in clarifying what
the disagreement is about, and who the disagreeing parties or views are. In here we see in
an important way how the dynamics of the operative context again resonates with the
performative: the reason why the government often wants to include the opposition into the
unanimous report. Sustaining this compromise downplays and reduces the adversarial
deliberative element available in the plenary sessions. You really cannot, without losing all
mutual trust, begin to elaborate counter-arguments and criticise the bill if your signature is
on the report. A similar de-politicising tendency can also be a strategic choice for political
parties. Maintaining a workable responsible party government in the case of large coalition
governments necessitates that the campaigning function is kept in check.
The dominance of expressive-partisan deliberative mode, and the adversary political
deliberation that it invokes also by structuring the plenary debates have also a less discussed
downside. Deficit of the so-called Socratic reason (Chambers 2004)–that reasoning is poor
and shallow–is one thing but the exclusiveness it invokes is another. If in the debate most
extreme perspectives and opinions are intentionally sought, and a feature that the media
elevates, the discussion ends up being rather exclusive. This is to the dismay of some MPs
who consider themselves ‘moderate’ or even prudent, and who do not associate themselves
in either end in debating on a topic. Surely, this could be interpreted as defect in oratory
skills on the part of MPs (or unwillingness to shape-shift) but a democratic impediment
appears if the middle-ground get no say, so to speak. One interviewee (III: 17) pondered
that in order to get a debating turn, should one steer away from the grey middle? Here I have
been demonstrating how the institutional structuring of the plenary discussions induces the
kind of expressive-partisan mode. Then, at the same time, representatives question and defy
to the extent they surrender to the setting or frame that the adversarial back-and-forth
situates them in.
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iii Deliberative control and ‘means of survival’
So far, I have been discussing how the performative element is institutionally spelled out in
the plenary sessions. The plenary in many is the representation of representative rule. The
paradigm of representation, and its linkage to deliberation, becomes perhaps more
negotiable in public than it is in other discussed contexts. Deliberative representation may
have less ground to roam when it comes to, for example, re-consideration and reflection.
Instead it takes on other functions relevant to democratic politics. This section discusses this
point how representatives deal with questions of coercion and group cohesiveness: when
agreement-seeking solutions are brought forward to be deliberated in public.
To connect the foregoing with earlier discussions of affirmative and operative contexts
of representation, I now turn to the theme of deliberative control. In the performative
context, opinions are presented as well-defined and the attitude that MPs generally endorse
is tenacious and rigid. While making this argument it can also imply that when engaging in
the practices of deliberation, justifications and adversary debate over the reasons behind the
proposed policies and such, the reference point for those opinions and stances is stated in
the agreement that is presented in the compromise, if there is such. In those cases
representatives might not agree on the policy they defend or oppose in the plenary.
Participants to a compromise may not fully embrace or commit to the compromise, yet they
yield to it. If, then, the committee report is not unanimous and the opposition is not with it,
the setting is often clearer and comes down to the watershed of debate between the
government and opposition. Regardless of which case is currently predominant, it comes
down to an intrapersonal deliberation of judgment and discretion by representatives. In that
they seek to balance virtues in both ‘governing’ (legislating, attaining ‘good public
policies’) and ‘campaigning’ (e.g. re-election, constituency communication). (Gutmann and
Thompson 2012.)
Therefore, deliberative control often manifests in the level of openness that varies
accordingly. In the PPG there is a certain expectation to demonstrate candidness when it
comes to opinions and perspectives. This articulation of sincerity and expression by the MPs
promotes not only the individual, but also–and more importantly–the collective opinion-
formation process. Criticism and hesitations should be voiced out also when it comes to
sharing of information. Additionally, promotion of self-interested argumentation help
illuminating what is at stake to each participant therefore benefitting to intraparty
deliberation and forming of collective stands (Mansbridge et al. 2010).
The operative context speaks to the settling of democratic disagreements between
political adversaries. Deliberative control is exercised more, and portraying authenticity in
the sense of sharing information and perspective becomes more strategic, especially in the
case of governing parties who need to maintain relations with their coalition partners spelled
out in the compromises. Obligated by prior deliberations within the affirmative context MPs
commit themselves to compromises. This requires sometimes zipping one’s mouth.
Considering the spectrum of forms of deliberation now accommodated relatively
smoothly into deliberative theory, still a few rather absolute restrictions are in place (Dryzek
2010a; 2000; Bächtiger et al. 2018; Mansbridge 2015). One of them is use of coercive
measures, and the other is lack of respect. Posing threats for the outcomes for (any part of)
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deliberative process ultimately affects and fundamentally diverts decision-making.
Additionally, they can also function as preventative for even bringing up certain themes,
opinions or point of views to be discussed and put on the agenda. Further, this tendency
enunciates the relevance of responsibility over responsiveness when MPs take part in the
formation of democratic agendas (Disch 2012). As the constructivist turn in representation
argues, preferences and interests of the represented are connected to the representative
agency. The fact that deliberative representation in legislatures is subject to such a thing as
deliberative control makes it suspect in this regard.
In representative democracy, however, coercion is inbuilt and institutionalised. By and
large, elections can be seen as the ultimate coercive measure that incentivises
representatives’ actions in the likely ways: on one hand, seeking electoral support from their
voters and on the other, acting in ways that would secure democratic governance as it
currently stands. It is difficult as well as redundant to envision legitimate democratic
representation that did not entail electoral sanctioning as coercive measure for removing
bad or otherwise unfit representatives out of office.52 Sanctions are positive (e.g. gaining
leadership positions) or negative (e.g. getting suspended from the PPG) in nature. The last
mentioned positive and negative sanctioning are though relevant when turning to the
overture of legislative roles: MPs behaviour and role endorsements can be motivated by
gaining leadership positions either within the party (i.e. party office) or the legislature (i.e.
legislative office). (Strøm 1998, 160, 167–71.)
Constructive deliberative representation throughout the deliberative processes in a
legislature invoke communication between the representatives and represented. It helps
strengthening the epistemic grounds for allowing judgment to work by revealing what
opinions representatives hold, how they justify them, but also allow them to give an account
of their decisions especially if they collide with those who they claim to represent.
Performative context places many of these practices out in the open. Compared to the other
context the rules of the game seem to change somewhat significantly, yet the deliberative
control persists and gets perhaps amplified. New aspects relating to transparency and
publicity rise when the audience changes. This setting can be understood from the
perspective of the functions of representation–what to do with representation? What can be
done with it?
In the case of performative context, as the interviews illustrate, representatives and the
parties they represent cannot fully exchange campaigning for governing in the plenary
sessions, although this view is available in the reasoning of the MPs. Signals of disapprovals
and disagreements are often thought of as ways to deviate from the party line.
Representatives are seeking individual lift for their public demonstrations of principledness.
52 On a more philosophical note, Mansbridge (2015, 36–37) rightly points out that power relations cannot
fully be erased from any human action. We all insert some power-based expectations towards each other
either through personal interactions or through larger societal structures while being subject to them
ourselves simultaneously. Here Mansbridge uses an example of use of language: when operating with a
language that is not your mother tongue you risk being misunderstand and ridiculed. Secondly, yielding to
threats connected to use of coercion is always relative. Also, what counts as consent to power authority and
to what extent can we resist it as a source of our autonomy?
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There is a significant level of deliberative control at play in the performative context, but it
is unable to fully dictate what MPs are to do (nor should it). Also, the power of the media
adds to this relative unpredictability and precariousness.
This section addresses mainly the question how the elements of compromises and
collective representative efforts are reflected in the public venue–when the balancing of
campaigning and governing are made visible and observable to the public and the media. It
implies also that deliberative control is exercised. All this affects to the ways in which MPs
rely and resort to the various roles they assume. The tensions with shape-shifting (Saward
2014) can be tangible when it comes to institutional structures allowing (and not allowing)
them to do so. Some roles, like the committee chairs and party leaders, are institutionalised,
restricting considerably the ability of those representative agents to shape-shift. As the
structures imply, as in the case of the plenary sessions, there are certain rules of the game
that MPs cannot afford to be ignorant of.
The power of media adds a flavour to the interpersonal perspectives that highlights the
salience of cooperation and coordination within the Parliament. Namely, it is an uneasy
marriage between the MPs and the publicity that the media ensures and elevates. In
contemporary democracies the performativity of representation does not really function
without the media. It is a double-edge sword for the MPs. On one hand, they cannot
completely shrug away from enabling and enforcing transparency into one’s line of work,
something that translates the permeability of the entire representative institution (see IPU
guide for good parliamentary practise, Inter-Parliamentary Union 2006). On the other hand,
representatives must seek attention of the media to some extent. According to the interviews,
this is especially true with those MPs who do not stand in the media limelight as cabinet
ministers, for example, do. For many, it seems to be true that ‘the media has perhaps taken
too big a role’ (III: 21: 11:27) when it comes to assessing the practical significance of the
plenary about matters that are considered important.
Even though corresponding deliberation are sequenced or distributed as per the context
at hand they speak across the contexts. Confining oneself fully to the media logic that looms
behind the expressive-partisan deliberative mode may not be a successful strategy for a
representative who wants also to strive within the parliament. They also need to immerse
themselves in scrutinising legislation and manage deliberative representation the ways in
which that were discussed in the other contexts. The ‘halo’ of these contexts reflects into
the performative context. In the case of operative context, that compromise-seeking
measures were successful and common decision was achieved with reasons everyone
accepts for their own varied purposes, also strategic kinds, it restrains deliberation in public.
If the deliberative process has reached its end and resulted in compromise at the committee
level, the decision is not re-opened in the plenary sessions. Stances and opinions are
presented instead as definite and tenacious. Even though functions of representation changes
from negotiating and ‘issue based’ reasoning, as Pekonen (2011) defines it, to justifying and
arguing for and against, representative cannot risk their credibility as a rectified colleague
and plausible coalition partner in the eyes of others. The compromise gets defended and
reasoned in the plenary sessions, even though not all (or none) embrace it with an open
heart. On the contrary, if in the committee level the disagreement remains and the committee
report is not unanimous, there is less need for such deliberative control.
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However, when it comes to the exercise of deliberative control, something that
representatives are rarely completely free from, the case of achieving compromise is more
intriguing here. It illuminates some of the dynamics of representative practices when
exploring the idea of sequenced deliberation. For one, the ambiguity in claiming
representative achievements comes up, again, in the theme of compromise. It was discussed
earlier how one single MP can at times make a tangible impact in the committee. Battles
can take place over wordings, as a compromising solution for finding agreement and
reaching a unanimous committee report. Issuing ‘fingerprint’, getting a certain favourable
wording included in the report, can be used, if wanted, as a trophy and a token of your
‘representing’. Not to mention a significant change (which are rare). These achievements
can be declared to one’s home turf.
What representatives meticulously emphasis and jealously defend is that operative
context should exclude publicity. Remaining outside the public glare would sustain the
focus on the matter since, as argued, representatives can be very covetous for publicity.
Specifically, they underline that in making a difference, budging a change into something,
should kept within the boundaries of the legislative institution itself. Trying to get something
done by going through the media is a mission often doomed to fail. It is though as a means
for gathering media points for building up a public image of an efficient and principled
politician. Instead, one should accept that when acting collectively, you are just a name
among other names:
Yes, if you cannot do it [compromise], you are left alone pretty quickly. It has
to be accepted that if there’s something that you came up with and you get your
group along, and you decide that as a group this is to be moved forward, then
you don’t inform the papers that you’ve taken care of it. Even though you are
the father of that idea. It’s a different thing if someone from the group says that
this is put forward on the motion of representative xx [name of the representative
removed]. You must accept that your name is in the row alongside with other
when it’s put forward (III: 24: 1:52:22)
**
If you begin hoarding for yourself that glory for something that is collectively
achieved, others start feeling the same pressure. In the worst case, in the end,
nothing comes from it. If someone is thinking that ‘now that one took all the
glory, then why in the first place let this pass’? (III: 16: 28:02)
Performativity, portrayed in claiming an achievement as your own, seems to call for
considerable amount of restraining. Deliberative control is exercised by the representatives
when the origin of an idea or viewpoint is hidden, and matters are articulated in collective
terms. On the other hand, when it comes to representative profiles, regarding the general
style of advancing and influencing matters, MPs assume different ones. One rejected the
whole idea of fingerprints as unfitting to his profile: ‘My voters would think, what the hell
is she bragging with a single sentence?’ (III: 9: 54:44).
Regardless of the representative profiles that many ascribe to more or less consciously,
some institutionalised positions are such that calls for more consideration regarding
deliberative control. In the performative context, this is even more so due to its public
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nature. But at the same time, it offers representatives strong incentives to stand out. When
it comes to formal positions that are defined in the working orders, as the case with Speaker
and the chair of the committee, there are no further instructions, or very little on how to
carry out these tasks ascribed to these positions. Considering the democratic inclinations of
the performative context, the question about actual practices and the informal norms guiding
them is ambivalent.
The restraints regarding deliberation come up especially in these leadership positions.
As discussed, the role of committee chair is significant. They have a tangible impact on the
working atmosphere in the committee. Nurturing balanced and fair procedures–‘being
mindful of the hygiene’, as one claimed (II: 9-1: 17:06)–has an effect in reaching unanimous
committee reports. It often calls for various compromise-seeking solutions, e.g. inclusion of
above-mentioned fingerprints or statements (obligating the government to act in the future).
When the report, in the case it represents a compromise, is handled in the plenary sessions,
representatives are expected to stay in line accordingly. It gets reasoned based on the matter,
without elaborating too much about the distributive details on ‘who got what, where and
when’. However, what needs to be remembered is that a big part of bills is considered as
‘bulk’. A remark has been made that Finland is one of the most productive countries when
it comes to legislating, but we lack more current data on this argument (seemingly the only
reference is from almost 20 years ago; see Wiberg 2000, 164). In any case, it is still safe to
say that not all bills and committee reports that scrutinise them raise political passions and
get fiercely debated in the plenary sessions.
Generally, in the performative context, MPs manage two (or three) overlapping roles:
that of the committee member and that of the PPG (and coalition) member. The third role
that of representative of the constituency, is consequent and assumed by the committee and
PPG memberships. By inhabiting the position of a committee chair brings about one more
role. I briefly approached this point with those MPs who had been or were currently acting
in that position. It is worth remembering that the Finnish committee system allocates
committee chair positions also to the parties in opposition. When communicating the report
in public the chair needs to be able to distinguish the roles currently she or he is managing
and operating from. Presentation of the committee report, a task reserved for the committee
chair should be kept as a technical reference of the report, and not i.e. as a party or
government manifesto. This presentation represents the committee as a whole and the chair
speaks in their name:
The chair has a big role when coming out with the committee resolution. It is of
great significance how the chair is able speak with the mouth of the committee–
not with one’s own or the party’s. Not everyone can do it. (III: 24: 58:45)
A chair who fails in speaking with the collective voice, deviating from the internal norms
of balanced presentation and refraining from partisan cues, signals a lack of deliberative
control on one’s part. For example, revealing discreet details on committee deliberations or
critiquing the overall legislative credibility and performance of the committee would be
badly received. A likely consequence would be that the chair loses trust of the committee,
at least to some degree. In the case of committee chairs wanting to bring up a certain point
that is not applicable in the presentation address due to its partisan or strategic nature must
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take a turn to speak in later parts of the plenary discussions. Sometimes, explicit reference
is made to the position from which a committee chair is speaking. One with experience in
chairing a committee (III: 11: 57:46) stated that
it’s not very advisable to seek those situations where you are forced to represent
two different opinions. And if you are, then it’s good to declare that this is our
committee’s stand but I perhaps myself think about this more towards this way.
This kind of negotiation that the above quotation assumes is most striking perhaps with
party leaders. They need to take an official stand and represent the collective. Their leeway
in avoiding the possible conflict is more congested. Again, here, my data is limited but
regardless it allows us to make some observations. As one with experience in party
leadership positions (III: 2: 33:57) claimed: ‘It is true that the hands of the party leader are
tied the most [makes a physical gesture]’. It requires also the critical ability to form the party
stand on the go. Such representations or representative claims result from extrapolation: a
projection of potential perspectives and scenarios. This internal process taps into the
Habermasian idea on ideal-role taking. ‘The party leader needs to think of the line of thought
of the party, line of thought of the different people in the party - - it must be placed in the
background what representative xx [name withheld] from xx [voting district name withheld]
would think, but what the member and the supporter of the party [withheld] think’. (ibid.)
Generally speaking, the practice of articulation of any opinion within the legislative context
strongly presumes and anticipates deliberation as a dialogical communicative action (with
various participants in contemporary democracies).
What this short illustration can show is that unlike in the affirmative or the operative
context, the performative context cannot afford much relaxation to the tenacity of attitudes.
As pointed out, plenary transcripts are available and can be used for strategical purposes.
Another brief observation with the discretion of the party leaders and deliberative control
further relates to particular plenary practices. Another interviewee (III: 3), with experience
of party leadership positions, brought up how s/he sometimes decisively pulls out from
plenary discussion. This is done to increase the likelihood of their other party members
getting turns to speak. There are certain general rules stating the preference order for
speakers (Keskuskanslia 2018). These favour party and committee leadership, and relate
also to the subject matter at hand, giving priority to committee members involved in
handling of the bill but also to seniority. The presence of the party leader in the plenary
discussion may take too much ‘airspace’ from other PPG members. This is also due to the
practice that if an MP is named–usually in a critical way–they can should be given a chance
to respond immediately. The named representatives are often members of the party
leadership.
On these assumptions, when it comes to the performative context, some representatives
possess more representative capital in order to give it away. Deliberative control, taken to
the extreme of abstaining from deliberation completely, formulates a promising theoretical
compound to play with. Such extreme demonstration of control may take a toll on one’s
electoral control. It may not be severe in the cases illustrated above very briefly since party
leaders usually are never really forgotten in the public eye. However, as was touched on in
the interviews, the Speakers and especially the deputy speakers can be vulnerable to it in
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this regard. In their case, the control is institutionalised. The Speaker never takes a vote, but
neither it is expected from them to take strong political, party-affiliated stands. Some
mentioned that they have encountered situations where they have been faced with
accusations from voters about their limited presence and overall political ownership.53
At this point, I re-connect this discussion with what I described earlier as decision-
paradoxes. Whilst they can be individually and collectively menacing in other explored
contexts as well, the performative context stands out differently. The reasoning is best
illustrated in a quotation where practices elsewhere are secondary when it comes to the
plenary sessions. What one does there is decisive, regardless of what one says or does in the
PPG or committee. The theme of compromise is always present, and in the following
citation it becomes portrayed in terms of loyalty:
Who are you loyal to in the end: to your PPG or your voters? Your goal is to get
re-elected so most likely you are more loyal to your voters than your PPG if
[emphasised) your goal is to get re-elected. They don’t necessarily rule out each
other but sometimes they do. […] Here I think that a good team player’s ability
to compromise, nothing comes from it if you only advance your cause with other
parties. It is constant compromise-making, it’s nothing more than the art of
compromise the work done here. (III: 10: 47:27)
As discussed earlier, compromising and non-compromising mindsets are grounded on
calculations on the prospective gains. Although some proponents of deliberative democracy
inform us of the principles that should be given priority–that is, that matters should be
decided based on the balanced reasoning about the subject-matter itself (e.g. Bessette
1994)–it is impossible to erase distributive and strategic elements from settling
disagreements in politics. Sometimes locating the smallest common denominator, as a form
of meta-consensus (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010) or economy of moral disagreement
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996), might be enough.
People commit to democratic decisions for different reasons, and in politics this point is
illustrative. In the interviews, MPs constantly returned to the theme of pondering the worth
of yielding to a compromise. In summary, what is at stake is glory, integrity and trust, when
lending a look from the inside of the legislature. This constant weighing is embedded in the
affirmative context, becomes a practice in the operative, and is decisive in the performative
context. Representatives become conflicted. Situation when they are caught between a rock
and a hard place are handled and solved in different ways in different contexts of
representation. It was implied that conflictual sentiments could be felt the hardest in smaller
PPGs. In contrast, in bigger groups representative tasks and responsibilities become
differentiated, thus in a way representation becomes ‘surrogated’ by the organisation of
trust-based relations. Paralleling to what has been already argued, what it meant for one MP
(III: 17: 35:25) when analysing past performances is that ‘when in a small party you are
53 In the Swedish parliament, the Riksdag, this contingency in constituency representation is resolved by the
requirement that the representative who is elected parliamentary Speaker (‘talman’) must give up their
mandate for the duration of their time as Speaker and a new member stands in as a replacement (Sveriges
Riksdag 2019).
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forced to follow up on everything, your conscience may start disturbing you with all
matters’. Reflecting the theme of reasoned congruence and accountability in relation to
decision-making and past performances is ‘a question that cannot be solved’ (ibid.) It was
also implied that in sufficiently deliberated matter and in the case MP has won (the majority
of) the PPG on one’s opposing side, the group takes the stand collectively. They protect the
representative from being labelled as a defector.
Notwithstanding these unresolvable questions regarding ‘the torment’ (tuska in Finnish)
there exists something that is called ‘means of survival’. They relate not only in the
compound of ‘red and green dots’ on the voting chart but also to the deliberative control
that MPs exercise. These accounts relate also to the roles prescribed by the parliamentary
tension of opposition against the government. Coalition governments necessitates holding
on to compromises despite the cost of selling out a principle. People feel uneasy:
Our group were exhorted that why aren’t our people defending these bills in the
plenary sessions. The plain answer was that we don’t feel them as our own or
the kind that we could defend them … even the committee members couldn’t be
holding harangues for it when they knew the torment‘ (III: 13: 18:59)
In the Finnish parliament, as I assume in any other legislature as well, there are some
rules dealing with cases when an MP decides to resolute one’s torment by voting against
the party line. An MP with experience in being in a leadership position explains: ‘We held
discussions beforehand. We suggested that if it’s a difficult vote, should you take part? Or
if one must vote, could we agree so that you don’t at least comment on it and go bad-
mouthing your own group’. (III: 2: 1:18:59.) Means of survival are an informal yet
institutionalised responses to the decision paradoxes. With them, MPs try to get out of the
situation with dry feet and with dignity. Such means, mentioned in the interviews, include
being absent from a decisional vote in a committee or plenary by being away (i.e. stuck
elsewhere as in an elevator, meeting, or calling in sick). When being elsewhere your name
is not included in the decision, allowing not take political responsibility for the decision.
However, as representatives argue throughout the interviews, living with the torment for the
exchange of governing (and getting something in return) is mandatory.
Dodging the decision-making momentum by not being available is the last resort when
not wanting to openly go against one’s party–to which plenary activities are analogical.
Sometimes severe discontent with the party line manifests in a form of protest. As described
in the interviews, a representative shows up in the plenary vote but does not press the button.
This course of action infuriates the party leadership, whereas to the citizen–by not being
present–it gives the impression that the MP has merely been absent from the vote.
As we see, deliberative control discussed here entails the tendency to extend beyond the
act of deliberation, thus underlining a closer linkage to representing. Institutionally
speaking, voting as a democratic practice is always decisive and therefore gets priority vis-
à-vis deliberation. It is a matter of judgment on the part of the represented whether they see
the politically incentivised deliberative control over the justifications and reasoning about
the decisional vote, fit and proper. Theoretically speaking, these cases also point out to an
interesting detail in the Rehfeldian understanding of representation. What Rehfeld (2018) is
rightfully arguing is that while the interest-and-responsiveness account (IRA) provides a
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necessary (but not yet sufficient) evaluative criteria for democratic representation, it fails in
distinguishing particular activities that constitute representing. This allows us to discuss
cases of ‘non-responsive representation’ instead of seeing them as cases of not representing
at all.
From this perspective, it is instructive to explore accounts where a representative
purposefully does not engage in a specific and particular activity that is in the repertoire of
wielding the social power–as defined as the first sense of representing–of being an elected
member of a parliament. When she refuses the vote or remains absent? Curiously, when
representatives are absent of the vote, as in ‘being stuck in the elevator’ raises a question of
representing in the active sense. Taking the elevator, or ‘Tom swimming in Barbados’ as
Rehfeld uses in his various examples, are not activities that normally would constitute
practices for representation. But in the passive sense representative remains a representative:
she ‘represents’ even while taking the lift.54
In contrast, when means of survival are examined through the active sense, but in
negation, of not doing what she would in normal instance be doing, like in exercising her
prerogative of voting, the line of analysis is different. This is a kind of anomaly: to my
understanding we have a case where through an arbitrary and random activity presents itself
in terms of representing (Rehfeld 2018, 13). In this example, a representative may trade
‘representing’ by not taking the vote to ‘representing’ by riding the elevator. But as said,
final judgment on the evaluation on the responsiveness is left to the voter, a representative
may represent one’s electorate, be responsive to them, when acting in the ways that the
means of survival suggests. This line of analysis includes also the exercise of deliberative
control as completely refraining from deliberation or tuning it down considerably. A
completely another question is to what extent, when and where representatives provide
reasons and justifications for such actions where deliberative control is apparent.
iv Sailing close to the wind: negotiating the rules of the game
In this section I take on the general claim about the low deliberative standard that prevails
in legislatures. These viewpoints highlight the assumption that politics is rarely noble, in
which case I will additionally address the democratic implications of this assumption. Also
from this perspective the actors that inhabit representative institutions are not only corrupt
but also keen on using forms of communication that are aligned with ruthless power-plays.
The idea of performative representation situated in the performative context can partly be
seen to yield these interpretations that also tap into the competitive nature of electoral
politics. Here we deepen the argumentation about how the democratically necessary
performance that, on one hand, legitimises the rule of the people. But on the other hand, the
54 An enlightening example of this discussion was the case of former Foreign Minister Timo Soini, who
participated in an anti-abortion candle vigilance during his state visit to the US. The case was discussed
publicly, since the government’s official standing supports women’s right to abortion. Finally, the
Chancellor of Justice, after being asked to give an opinion, articulated that activities and occasions that
ministers attend as private persons are considered public. The theoretically aligned verdict was that Minister
Soini could not resign from representing in the passive sense the Finnish government when being physically
present in an occasion as that. (Helsingin Sanomat 2018)
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dynamics of the performative context display the difficulty of to what extent ‘governing’
can be exchanged to ‘campaigning’. This is a setting, again, that MPs need to come to terms
with, when they reflect and balance these two objectives. I claim that contemporary
representatives must constantly negotiate the rules of the game when it comes to their
exercise of expressive-partisan mode.
In the previous section I discussed how especially the debate format sets an enduring
structural frame that can induce polarisation and elevate the role of dexterous and catchy
word duelling. The debate also favours artful rhetoricians, those with oratory skills–
something that not many interviewees claim to be, despite quite a few saying they enjoyed
discussion and debate in the plenary sessions. Representatives spice up their deliberation
rhetorically when intending to address mainly their own constituencies. This is also
facilitated and becomes motivated by grabbing media’s attention.
These tendencies were explicitly noted by the former Speaker of the House Paula
Risikko in her speech in the closing ceremony of parliamentary term in April 2019. She
illustrated this with an allegory about the deliberative atmosphere where representatives
look at each other the way that a hawk looks at a sparrow. ‘The other party member, and
sometimes one’s own, may have be considered more as prey than the same kind of person
as oneself,’ she says and continues: ‘Things get exacerbated, and the words of others are
deliberately misinterpreted’ (Yle 2019).
In the MP interviews when the overall deliberative culture and claims of its declining
quality came up, many admitted, some hesitantly, to have tactically come up with stingy
puns and catchy ‘one-liners’. They are most used for attacking and ridiculing the adversary,
thus seeing them as prey, as Risikko illustrated. The national papers often have dialogue
boxes reserved for quotations from the plenary debates. Knowing that the media is sitting
in the gallery and if the topic is important for you ‘must come up with more provocative
perspectives or new perspectives, and hope you get a line in the Helsingin Sanomat. That’s
a hugely important and valuable thing. That’s why you might sit there and talk’. (III: 1:
48:34). To continue exploring this reasoning, more perspectives are highlighted. For now,
in the case of one-liners we can take them as examples of ‘set piece performances’ (Saward
2017, 78) that mark prevailing or ‘winning’ in the face of overwhelming quantity of plenary
speeches. Just as one MP put it (II: 11: 1:02:50): ‘If you give one speech from which one
sentence is remembered afterwards, you’re a winner’. Some of the one-liners and the like
are remembered even many years later, and thus can either embellish or diminish an MP’s
reputation for the long term.
Some of the senior MPs interviewed–some of whom had held office for over a decade–
noted a slow but steady decline in the deliberative culture of the plenary sessions. Overall,
the political cleavages and subsequent polarisation has potentially acted as a catalyst for
hardening tones in public discourse especially when large value-based matters are
discussed.55 But, more importantly in the context of the Finnish Parliament, disrespectful
55 None provided a systematic analysis of possible causes, but I would argue that the breakdown of the party
array traditionally governed by three large parties (Social Democrats, National Coalition party, the Centre
Party), making room in 2011 elections to conservative right-wing True Finns –party (officially now The
Finns Party) has had an impact. All this can be seen to be in accordance with the rise of populist parties in
Western democracies: political agenda themes dodged by some other (ruling) party have now been put on
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blurts are a signal of lack of judgment on the part of MPs that also bears implications. We
can draw two line of analysis from here. The first one is the most obvious as it applies to
democratic principles and the role of legislatures nurturing those principles. The second one
links the discussion to the inherent constitutive idea of representation that includes multiple
audiences. It takes into account the ways in which deliberative practices endorsed by the
MPs are understood as signals and translated into representative currency. Both lines of
analysis progress towards a conclusion where representatives get less out from the
deliberations in the performative context. Spelling this out furthers the attempt to understand
why this context might be most vulnerable to the pejorative features of democratic politics,
thus mitigating potentially harmful deliberation.
Deliberative deficit, when demagoguery runs rampant in the plenary sessions, exhibits
how the democratic principle of respect is treated in the representative institutions. In
deliberative theory, the principle of respect is still prevailing and perhaps less complicated
than the principle of non-coercion. Surely, as with non-coercion, we could claim that some
representatives would feel that common courtesy or politically correct framing restricts
what it is possible to say. However, respect is inalienable in the way that it warrants dignity
and recognition of seeing individuals as capable of self-determination. Therefore, it bears
profound democratic credentials not only for the life in the polis but also for the cornerstone
of democratic representative institutions that legitimately insulate and encapsulate political
conflict. Adversary political deliberation, encouraged by Manin (2017) for reasons
discussed earlier, is necessary in a well-functioning democracy. Deliberative dynamics that
the parliamentary setting ensures is that majority should be ‘checked,’ as Manin (1987) puts
it, but not destroyed. Extreme and manipulative rhetorics, ‘plebiscitary reasoning’
(Chambers 2004) can be harmful in the way that it mitigates capability of judgment of
autonomous subjects. In the process, the majority or the minority may lose touch with
demonstrating reciprocal trust and recognition the opponent as a worthy adversary.
These claims of respect are also constitutionally based. Section 31 of the The
Constitution of Finland, on ‘Freedom of speech and conduct of Representatives,’ states that
representatives must conduct themselves ‘with dignity and decorum’ ‘and not behave
offensively towards another person’. Only the first part of the above was mentioned in a few
interviews alongside with the reminder that representatives have the unrestricted right to
speak in the Finnish Parliament. Taking part in provocative and extreme deliberations that
are motivated mainly by media attention has larger implications to the integrity of
representative institution. I discussed in the beginning of this analysis part how many MPs
seem to share the former Speaker’s worry about the disgrace the deliberative culture of
Eduskunta. If representatives misbehave, it puts the respect and integrity of the
representative institution in jeopardy.
These notions about the plenary sessions, which seem to shed some light on what is
going on within the Finnish Parliament as a whole, illustrate how stretching the boundaries
of acceptable speech has become more of a rule than an exception. In one way, the kind of
negotiation and discretion resonates with the following view of Goodin: ‘Players in
parliament are invariably ‘gaming the system,’ sailing as close to the wind of the formal
debate. It has raised formerly neglected themes on the public political agenda to be discussed.
201
rules as necessary, in order to secure their own particular objectives as best they can’
(Goodin 2008, 191 citing Goodin 2000; emphasis added). A similar point, but in terms of
trust as an institutional norm, is made by Mykkänen. He argues that MPs’ ability to navigate
in delicate situations where discretion is called for defines the thin line between
trustworthiness and untrustworthiness of those MPs (Mykkänen 2010, 221). The style of
deliberative representation that MP endorses and enacts is always also a portrayal of the
representative herself, and more specifically, about her judgment and discretion.56 Formally,
all representatives are equal in their mandates given by the electorate–an undercurrent theme
in the interviews–but success in passing legislation also depends on the personal ability and
capacity whether one strives in legislatures or not.
To remind ourselves, this is explicitly noted by Cameron (2018) in his idea of the
Aristotelian ‘wise practitioner,’ but it was something that was also very briefly mentioned
by Pitkin (1967, 219–22). Namely, she noted how great complexities are at work when it
comes to considering practices and legislative behaviour. Pitkin concludes that there might
be something external to the three forms of representation she develops in her book. When
emphasising the substantive view that links representation to an (responsive) activity she
notes that there are elements that exceed this view. Representation, in action, takes place in
an actual setting that include human interaction, internal rules and practices as well as
procedural factors that need to be considered.
Regardless the tendency of offering one’s plenary addresses towards the gallery and
using them for various avenues for constituency communication, representatives cannot
control the receiving audiences. This point is especially relevant in the performative context
of representation. The representative claim-making view rightly notes, audiences can be
numerous even though the claim might try to address only a particular one. The view of
representing that connects with the function of practices makes deliberation in plenary a
purposive performance. For this reason, if this is true, and representatives perceive their
deliberative task through the adversary setting, the expressive-partisan mode of deliberation
prevails. Striving in legislatures necessitates proper navigating, sometimes as close to the
wind as possible. Moreover, what it means that, for example, use of strategic-deliberative
mode more prone in the operative context, does not meet the objectives of the performative
context. Solutions, agreements or understanding are not the faculties that are sought in the
deliberation that seemingly takes place between the representatives.
What the interviewed MPs inexplicitly underline is the ability to differentiate which
context is being used and taken advantage of. For this reason, strong language or even
mockery is part of the show, not something to get upset about.57 To illustrate the contextual
56 It was pointed out by several interviewees when asked what kind of speaker they see themselves as that
they were not the best person to ask. In a way, this kind of modesty is curious, since most politicians are
masters in self-reflection in the sense of being able to choose the best (in relational terms) course of action,
e.g. being constantly aware of surroundings and feelings.
57 Heckling is a curious case, as it has an anti-deliberative purpose, being aimed at derailing and distracting
the speaker. However, they are an inherent part of the parliamentary tradition. Their temporal context as a
‘set-performance’ (Saward 2017) is limited to a specific moment in time, and the function is to in an instant
support or weaken an argument posed in the plenary sessions. Spontaneous as they are heckling is often
meant to disturb and confuse the speaker, and because often invoke counter-heckling, their deliberative
intentionality is weak. Rather than trying to seek any kind of dialogue, heckling are often attacks that serve
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shift from the operative context to the performative, this MP (III: 13: 1:09:17) describes
how the argumentative practices change:
When arriving to the hall, the party harness is immediately put on. Why I defend
and why I’m intended to have this opinion, and I can denounce you since your
group always has that opinion and you don’t get this. The whole thing
completely changes. The exact same people who have been around the table just
a moment before‘.
However, again, what is imperative is that one differentiates which context is in
question. One MP explains this curious dynamic:
Of course, in the Hall you tell somebody off, and try to make that person look as
unreliable as possible. Afterwards you go to the cafeteria and are the best of
friends. It’s part of it. It is completely different that you don’t comply with it,
where it belongs and where it doesn’t. You start jumping over, slandering in the
cafeteria. Well it happens also that if up front one would say what is said behind
your back, then politics would not be impossible. -- But there are invisible
boundaries that are so clear you cannot cross over them. You must be able to
cooperate even though it sounds inconceivable to those unacquainted, that those
[boundaries] are followed. If boundaries are not complied, then you lift yourself
to the other side of the fence. You cannot get back, it’s hard to get back in the
game. (III: 29: 2:36:55)
These quotations state the rather obvious line of analysis that plenary deliberations are
subject to different deliberative practices than other contexts discussed so far. Expressive-
partisan deliberative mode demonstrates that deliberations are not impartial and often
deliberators prescribe to their partisan ‘roles’ accordingly, if they wish to do so. The chosen
style of deliberation features expressiveness as well as partisanship, something that supports
the democratic functions embedded in the performative context: pro et contra debate and
justifications corresponding to the sides being taken.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the uncontrolled Nietzschean will to power
demonstrates that the representative in question is ready to use all available resources. It
was often brought up in the interviews how adversaries who target each other in the plenary
leave the together only to share a cup of coffee in the upstairs cafeteria. Contrary to what
the general public may think when watching the debates, many of the adversaries are friends
in real life. But there were some mentions (made without names) of occasions and general
tendencies when in the plenary discussion an MP ‘gets under your skin’ (II: 10: 8:55). Due
to demonstrated ruthlessness, red flags may be raised among the representatives. This
analysis applies not only to the performative context. Representatives who are
hyperpartisan, to borrow a definition from Cameron (2018), and end up losing trust are in
trouble. A point that arose repeatedly in the interviews is that both in politics and daily life
in the Finnish Parliament, one cannot achieve much alone. Without cross-partisan networks
no greater purpose than often humorous trouble-making. Some MPs are seemingly dedicated to preserve the
heckling culture, also seeing it from a gender perspective as most of the industrious hecklers are men.
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to cooperate with and assist in advancing a cause, life in the legislature can become difficult
for a solitary member of parliament.
The informal norms that apply also to the plenary make it difficult to criticise those who
advance their cause with means that are considered questionable. Describing how MPs deal
with colleagues who have acquired a bad reputation offers an insight into how the contexts
of representation operate. Knowing that
with the volume of speech and “twisting the screw” that person is pursuing their
own agenda makes the situation more manageable, observable and open to
criticism within the committee system or in a smaller group than in the plenary
hall where you are yap open to the Finnish people, and everyone seeks to score
those points with their speeches’. (III: 17: 16:29)
It is not thought credible or even legitimate to criticise such an MP, since ultimately
everyone is pursuing some agenda or other to some degree. What differs is that personal
partisan agendas should be–in the logic of party representation and the way representing is
informally following norms in the ecology of the parliament–incorporated in collective
agendas. To representatives this is perhaps the most sensitive matter of all: maintaining
collective efforts but not getting one’s own causes, their significance depending on the
representative, trampled or overshadowed by it. Advancing this partial argument asserts that
the impetus of different electoral systems is recognised. Therefore, the question posed
before, in the words of an interviewee–‘to whom you are ultimately loyal’–makes it so that
MPs cannot disregard the PPG, but lack of a party list enables much more leeway in
negotiating these dynamics.
Navigating rhetorically in the performative context, and resorting to resources that are
available for advancing preferred objectives, has implications that resonate in other settings
and contexts as well. In this section I’ve shown that MPs take their cue from their
colleagues’ utterances in the plenary also as signals of their capacities for judgment and
discretion. Crossing some invisible boundaries in the sense of how performative
representation translates into questions of reliability and trustworthiness of that
representative. As such, it might critically hinder their status when collaborating and
planning joint ventures, or refuse associating altogether with such representatives.
v Why deliberate?
We can draw the assumption that public life, its venues and decision-making they entail, is
a setting that inherently invites demagoguery. This final section turns to the democratic
question about the reasons why deliberate in the public and as such, arrives back to the
beginning of this subchapter that discussed the deliberative imperative of MPs. From the
perspective of the contexts of representation and sequenced deliberation, the persistence of
demagoguery makes sense: the plenary is not meant for settling or overcoming of
disagreements. Deliberative representation takes on other democratically essential functions
of arguing for and against, making claims and articulating grievances as well as raising
agendas. The kind of understanding and hearing others out is not necessary or even expected
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in the performative context. The underlying function is not about cooperativeness or
affirmativeness. The democratic practice of deliberation in the performative context is to
argue for and against for it in order to highlight and clarify the political conflict and the
opinions participants disagree upon. Most importantly, however, the performative context
legitimises the disagreement and the perspectives and views going along with it. As Mill
(2008, 82) famously notes, the value of plenary debate is in that ‘every interest and shade
of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded’. It also means that
different opinions ‘have the right to become publicly heard, they can become publicly
defended and they require a public response from the government and in presence of other
interests and opinions’ (Pekonen 2011, 114; emphasis in the original).
As discussed throughout this analysis, representatives seem to struggle with the initial
idea of performative context. It articulates the dualism embedded in the public reason-
giving: on one hand, representatives acknowledge the democratic merits of establishing and
facilitating discussion. On the other hand it is seen shallow and prone to strategic use. Partly
this is due to the way the media gets incorporated into the picture, something to which this
research at hand cannot extend. The merits of the plenary are portrayed through its
institutionalised significance. According to the interviews, this comprehension appears
clearest when operating from the opposition. In the government it was important to ‘move
things forward’ but time spent as an opposition MP
you start respecting this institution and see the significance of procedures and
that matters go through thoroughly and systematically. At first it felt a bit
frustrating, when you were very subject-oriented and wanted results, that then
you still need to discuss them. Sometimes it felt like a waste of time. (III: 19:
5:49)
Admittedly, deliberation has theoretical inclinations towards decision-making, which is
why governing MPs might be less inclined to take part in the plenary deliberations. This
reality encompasses the deliberative process to a foreseen closure, and in the case of the
plenary the process is closed. Plenary deliberations precede voting, but in the Finnish
example, in extreme cases the decision taken by the committee gets overturned in the second
handling of the bill in the plenary session. It is reflected in the ways that deliberative
representation in the performative context lacks the transformative element that is echoed
also in the interviews: ‘nobody seriously expects to be able to change any other MP’s mind’
(Goodin 2005, 40). When the deliberative desideratum of changing preferences is eased and
turned into a notion of open-mindedness (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 22), the question
still remains. In deliberative theory authenticity of deliberators has been a thing that is
difficult to discern, empirically or otherwise. However, the way I read deliberative
representation in the performative context to function is that the level of authenticity is more
negotiated. From this point, the reluctant attitude on the part of governing MPs to engage in
full-fledged plenary deliberation is this: the performance conveyed as the compromise, to
which coalition partners have committed, can be fickle. Therefore, the correct answer to the
question in the heading, ‘why deliberate?’, is not that someone would decide in that moment
suddenly to oppose the piece of legislation after hearing the discussion. The answer relates
to reluctance about the depth of reasoning in defending the legislation. To MPs, this is
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discernible, and to whom the kind of justifying and reasoning would not likely be credible
in other discussed context (given the strategic openness of the operative context). But the
question about the audience is another.
Asserting that legislatures are ‘strong publics’ as per Habermas–able to serve their
function as a ‘context of justification’–it is worthwhile to be aware of the argumentative
styles in which audiences are addressed (Flynn 2004, 440). People are not mobilised and
motivated by reason only, as the critique of deliberative democracy has showed time and
time again, but they are moved also by emotions and feelings. As we know, consequences
depend on whether representatives tap into them in a constructive manner or invoke darker
undertones of human sentiments. Here, Chambers (2004) argues that there is nothing
intrinsically wrong with rhetorical appeals. However, if justifications and reasoning of
arguments become shallow or false, we are dealing with ‘plebiscitary rhetoric’. Plebiscitary
rhetoric is the outcome of the dynamic where the Socratic and democratic elements are
pulled to opposite directions. As such, the inevitable plebiscitary character of public speech
should be contained since it crucially undermines the democratic capacities of the citizens
to judge democratic politics. Paradoxically, plebiscitary rhetoric can be also seen to some
extent as a product of differences in epistemic capacities. But as any constitutive
phenomenon it does not only feed off from them, it can create and enhance collective
sentiments of, for example ignorance and prejudice. When representative relationships are
fused and forged in such a manner, the question of deliberation in public can be linked with
will-formation processes in democratic societies, something that deliberative theory should
also consider (Chambers 2009, 2012). Consequently, it enables the plenary to act as a
vehicle for these tendencies that worsens democratic rule and harms its credibility and
accountability:
Ok, well, I think that the plenary sessions could be done away with altogether.
They’re just a nuisance. There should be another mechanism to facilitate voting.
A discussion that paints a distorted and ludicrous picture of the Eduskunta only
harms democracy, I think. I think that we could think about whether the plenaries
could be abandoned in their current form. On average, it gives the impression of
MPs being more foolish than they really are. (III: 9: 36:42)
There is a worry among representatives that they are reduced to mouthpieces or
facilitators who are not interested in engaging in insightful discussion. According to a few
senior MPs, in the past plenary addresses often contained something one could learn from.
In addition, a political vision was often presented where the perspective was far in the
horizon. There seems no place for political analysis. One blamed the retrospective
argumentative strategies, of ‘digging up the past’ as an evidence for that fact that parties
don’t have anything to say about the current times or the future. There is no ‘art of the
possible’ to define democratic politics, and to which the performative context gives keys
(for better or worse). I draw from this that everyone seems to be gaining less from the
deliberations. The burden is on the representatives, as one MP remarked: ‘If you want to
emphasise the significance of the plenary sessions, then it means that you personally must
be able to have the kind of conversation that matters about issues that matter’. (III: 21:
11:27)
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As Pekonen (2011, 111) notes, in the interviews there are evaluative criteria that
representatives use to distinguish between ‘true work’ and ‘contrived acting’. True or real
work that parliamentarians do takes place in the committee, outside the public glare to which
the feature posits. There seems to be a genuine fear that people are unable to detect a
plebiscitary reason used, thus fusing representative relationships as discussed above.
Performative representation seeks to move and affect people (Saward 2017, 82). What the
performative context does as portrayed here is that ‘performed claims invoke and render
visible and audible the very notions of representative, represented, and a sense of the
dynamic or relation which simultaneously distinguishes and unites the two’ (Saward 2017,
80–1).
Drawing on Nietzsche and Arendt, Pekonen (2011, 111–5) provides an insight into the
defence of seeking parliament in theatrical terms. This is relevant when seeking to defend
the accounts of deliberative representation in the performative context. These perspectives
highlight the making of representations from aesthetic and ethical standpoints. Importantly,
they facilitate the faculty of judgment–re-presentations or representative claims, to be
regarded as such, presume the reading by the audiences. For the representative claim to be
accepted, that the elements of the claim have the necessary constitutive character, takes the
receiver to be active and not just a passive observer. Overall, the unpredictability in
succeeding with a ‘performative call’ makes the whole process of representative claim-
making contingent (Saward 2017, 84-5). Further, the fundamental constitutive character of
representation, depicted in the many theatre metaphors present in the interviews, sets out
also the electoral and competitive nature of claim-making (see also Pekonen 2011, 114–15).
It is not therefore completely mistaken to describe the dynamics of deliberative
representation described here as ‘deliberative Schumpeterianism’ (Goodin 2005, 194).
Deliberation in the performative context also serves the function where ‘parties propose and
electors dispose’ (ibid., 193).
Seeing representation in terms of performance and performativity entails the themes of
casting and scripting. Throughout this subchapter we have entertained the discussion with
these, and showed how representatives discursively place themselves in the ‘play’ acted out
in the plenary sessions. We have encountered the governing and the opposition MPs, party
leaders and committee chairs as well as the head of the committee group. I have shown how
the institutional casting puts MPs in different roles that impute to them particular
argumentative practices when it comes to debating and discussing in the plenary sessions.
The way the debate format that has been incorporated more and more into the plenary
sessions also structures and maintains the parliamentary tension. If thought of as a script,
one that the Speaker can also influence, the adversarial setting helps the represented to
differentiate and distinguish different representations that are offered and claimed.
Representatives also defy the roles, as assumed by the idea of shape-shifting, and seek ways
to re-arrange them.
207
The way I think of it is that it is fair play in a certain sense, where the good ones
succeed after all. You learn the rules of the game. The cleverest there realise that
you, in fact, need to cross the boundaries in order to succeed. Those who think
of it the least, who don’t succeed, are those who go deepest in those roles. It’s
completely anti-intellectual just to be that ‘everything is lousy and going to hell’.
Or, on the other hand, compliment everything. It is anti-intellectual–everyone
sees through it. I somehow trust the recipient in the end. That’s why I think it’s
fair. (III: 10: 20:46)
**
If it appears that the parliamentary work is only or mainly about representatives
taking their roles, and acting the pre-scripted play from those roles, then it surely
crumbles the trust in legislative institution and in democracy, in general. I think
that aspiring for intellectual honesty in parliament work is in the long run better
for democracy. Based on my experience and in fact in practice, this kind of
impartiality and intellectual honesty also helps to push issues through. However,
it doesn’t mean a straightforward manner that the parliament handles a bill in the
plenary sessions, and you consider to have delivered an impartial speech and all
of the sudden the decision changes into something else. It means that when a
colleague, regardless of their party affiliation and regardless of the government-
versus-opposition setup, hears you trying to argue balance-based and rational-
based and basing on some objective evidence, that kind of style is pretty much
respected, at least in my own experience. (III: 28: 36:45)
These citations address the same notion, but are democratically consequential in other
ways. The first reflects the perspective of the audience, of the people who judge these
representative performances. These are also others who do not imply the kind of
underestimation of the represented to have the capacity to differentiate and judge the
performances accordingly. Trusting that the receiver sees through ‘anti-intelligence,’ as
described above, were supplemented with corresponding statements: ‘The electorate know.
We may say that they don’t, but they do. Dry leaves fall off, in time’. (III: 30 Uosukainen:
59:00) or ‘the voter is king’ (III: 19: 5:49). In order to complete the argument we would
need to have evidence from the other side, that is how people respond and resonate with
plenary deliberations. Ultimately, however, the performative context is one avenue for the
constituency to observe and assess the legislative performance, regardless that it does not
give out the full spectre of deliberative representation in parliaments.
The question about a representative’s connections with the public can read into the
constructivist turn in representation.58 Here, the deliberative feature of the constructivist
58 The question of who the actual voter, constituency and electorate seems to unclear to the interviewed
MPs. The same notion was brought up in the research of Severs and others (2015) with Flemish and Belgian
MPs. Those few who were asked about it in the interviews, when it fitted the situation, many still have a
vague sense of who they might be. One MP explained the role of a MP to be, as translated from Finnish, a
representative of the people. It means that MP should be ‘an interpreter between legislation and sentiments
of the people’ (III: 11: 3:22). To the question whether one can represent one’s constituency ‘makes it a bit
hazardous expression because who knows exactly who votes for you and what they think about’ (ibid.). In
the same breath, MPs underline their extensive citizen contacts. In addition to receiving countless e-mails
from people (some claiming to be ‘constituent,’ something that can thought to imply urgency and relevance),
MPs meet in person a lot of people more or less frequently when partaking in various events and such.
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conception is referred to in the study of Severs and others as to when the representation
process takes on the form of an extended conversation (Severs, Celis, and Meier 2014, 619).
Despite that they bypass the conceptual distinctiveness that deliberation can offer, they
describe further how the two-way communication between the representative and the
represented fosters ‘trust, recognition, and accountability’ which are typical of democratic
relationships (ibid.).
According to Severs and others, however, the optimism embedded in the indirectness of
representation in contemporary theorising could be short-lived. The ascribed deliberative
virtues in Belgian and Flemish MPs’ practices do not take the electorate as ‘genuine
interlocutors’. This position is expected in the constitutive conception of representation.
Instead, MPs retreat to the contrary ‘electoral conception’ that prescribes them an authorised
position to act on their behalf, also as a moral obligation. For this reason, the researchers
describe their studied MPs as ‘electoral trustees’ (ibid., 624). Regardless of the close
association with electoral programmes and government platforms, ‘political artistry’ is not
completely non-existent since they understand the way the represented need to be mobilised.
Although MPs’ self-conceptions have been widely studied, they do not rely on
contemporary theorising on representation (ibid., 619).
Difficulties in merging these discussions of accounts of representing further tell us about
the mismatch between the empirical and theoretical scholarship on political representation.
It may be, as the current theoretical standing holds and what MPs seem to unconsciously
grasp, that democratic representation is not only a matter of who or what is represented, but
also how they are represented. To some extent, however, we must assume that the question
of how is deducted from the former, hence cannot be discussed without the linkage to the
question of who and what. It also would be too hasty to make far-reaching assumptions
about the relationship between the representatives and the represented on the given premises
that the constructivists advocates. This is regardless of the fact that there are many aspects
that the Finnish Parliament could do better in terms of permeability and transparency, as
well as dialogical communication with the public (Arter 2012; Seo and Raunio 2017; see
also Raunio and Ruotsalainen 2018).
Considering the complexity with these representative standings to what extent is the idea
of accountability practically applicable? We can approach accountability in terms of
deliberative accountability (Mansbridge 2009). Most plainly, it highlights the activity of
giving an account. We can expect our representatives to provide public reasoning and
justifications of their doings, and we also have reason to expect that the whole institutional
structure resonates with this democratic ideal.
In some interviews, the theme of accountability was automatically linked to the making
of electoral promises. According to them, it is all too easy to make concrete, specific
promises, e.g. to provide a particular benefit to the district or the hypothetical electorate
(such as repairing or rebuilding a road in the district). The reason is purely strategical. It
may be wiser not to promise ‘any fun to anybody’, as one interviewee put it (III: 9: 5:01),
for fear of not being able to live up to the promises after election. Courting the populist vote
might severely backfire if it proves difficult to keep those promises once in power. Sources
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for accountability should therefore be kept less evident and clear. Instead of particular
interests, general interests could be advanced. Promises, if any, are better linked to the party
platform accordingly. MPs themselves rarely support the idea of ‘promissory
representation’ (Mansbridge 2003). Curiously though, they still can detect that form of
representation among some colleagues. Empathetically, if someone has come to the Finnish
Parliament ‘with promises that are half too big’ (III: 11: 38:03) deems that a representative
has profiled themselves as a dedicated proponent of some cause. Such MPs are especially
vulnerable to the discussed torment in the face of inevitable decision-making paradoxes.
Ultimately, all this comes down to the ways in which representatives are forced to
negotiate in the riptide of expectation, pragmatic and normative alike. Some resort to the
party representation and the role-taking they prescribe to. This can also swing to the extreme
thus appear unconvincing. According to a few existing surveys about Finnish MPs (Esaisson
2000; Bengtsson 2014) neither party representation nor ‘individual’ or ‘geographical’
representation stands a chance against MP making up one’s mind by oneself. If this is true,
then what this MP (III: 7: 35:45) explaining one’s viewpoint about accountability, might
articulate some of the points that others may feel as well. For now it must be taken as a very
tentative argument. It does, however, turn into a question of judgment and self-reflection –
attributes that hopefully prevail in democratic politics.Interviewer: Did you think of this kind of question of accountability?Respondent: No. Pretty early on I understood that there are just too many...If one starts to think that what do they think of this then you would just belost. I have somehow very strongly thought that I follow the voice of myconscience and vote and be angry and vote against. Against whoever. WhenI compromise, I can somehow justify what they serve, so that they havesome meaning or have been decisive. I’ve been very content that during allthe years, it has felt the only way to know what to do is to follow what youyourself think. Participating in NGOs, organisations and activities, of courseit affects, those people, to your thinking. Clearly you are not in a vacuum.[…] In the beginning you noted that so many odd questions come by thatyou just can’t treat those issues in any way through your voters or yourelectoral campaign. You haven’t even understood anything about them. Andyou must make decisions. I think that it is more of this kind of issue of trustand identification who you vote for.
Clearly, what is referred here is gyroscopic representation, along the lines of Mansbridge
(2003), and I am relatively convinced that may representatives would share this perspective
at least to a certain degree. Importantly, it likewise stands in support with the selection
model of representation (Mansbridge 2009). In democratic politics, it seems rather
insensible and counterintuitive to base our understanding about representation solely on
sanctioning. This what the MPs quote above seem to be saying. Similarly overlooking the
features that initiates, facilitates and sustains representation are equally important, if not
even more. The selection idea of representation outlines a durable frame through which
representation can be explored. This exploration supported by useful conceptualisation of
representation can be done also without adopting the language of responsiveness, as Rehfeld
(2018, 9) notes.
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For this reason, it is imperative to outline a framework that helps in seeing how
deliberation is invoked and restrained, and what constitutes for such actions in democratic
settings. When claiming that representation can be addressed without references to
accountability and responsiveness, it does not mean they would be irrelevant. Importantly,
to summarise, what these central concepts do is that they provide an evaluative standard to
which accounts of representation can be measured against. What they do not do is constitute
representing, as Rehfeld (2018) argues. Representatives in the Finnish Parliament very
much recognise their mandate and how it ensues them to act as a representative of the people
in the first place. Secondly, despite that assumption that there is a lack of clarity in
distinguishing the exact constituency enacting this mandate, MPs are aware, some even
painfully, of termination of it. Partly could be for this reason why the idea of accountability
manifests in a perverse way when collecting points and keeping up appearances with
gratuitous speeches.
Some of the friction comes from the fact that in contemporary democracies there are
other methods and avenues of communication for maintaining relations. They bypass the
locus of plenary sessions, where the audiences are multitude, unstable and contingent. More
targeted or restricted communications may even be more deliberative in the sense that the
quality might be more salutary. Many interviewed MPs refer to their support-groups that
they keep regular contact with. MPs also host a wide variety of guests and groups that
advocate and lobby for a particular cause (these were extensively covered in the first set of
interviews, marked I). Social media accounts also provide these avenues. Importantly, what
this means is that plenary sessions are not necessarily needed to put forward their political
message. The supporters and constituencies can be reached through other venues with a less
cost than spending hours waiting for a chance to address the plenary sessions. From this
perspective, for some MPs plenary discussion become redundant, or a necessary evil.
To summarise, this subchapter has discussed how deliberative representation operates
in the performative context. The main finding, resonating with the study of Pekonen, is that
the performative context invokes the essentials of representative rule, especially in the
electoral sense. Interviewed MPs struggle with this domain of representing due to the self-
evident democratic credentials it bears but then at the same time, many misuse the forum.
Expressive-partisan deliberative mode exercised here seems to take the turn to worse when
it comes to the quality of deliberation, something that many notice. Deliberative
representation explains here how public contestation and testing political adversaries is
required thus allowing justifications and partisan perspectives to be expressed. While doing
this MPs need to be able to stand out as principled and credible representative actors.
Simultaneously they must confine themselves to the implicit rules of collective action. The
interviews illustrate how these judgments relating to such questions are constantly made,
being aware of the possible consequences and thus actively weighing options. Deliberative
control is sometimes exercised, implying also to the negotiated level of authenticity when it
comes to acknowledging the path-dependency inherent in political compromises and
agreements made with coalition partners or with adversaries. Within this framework, the
expressive-partisan deliberative mode is perhaps internally most conflicted than the other
discussed modes.
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5 What can be gained from deliberative representation?
Three objectives were set for this research. While I go through the relevant observations, I
will also discuss some implications that are methodological and theoretical in nature. Since
research that takes such an approach to the Finnish parliamentary landscape is scarce, I will
additionally make some short remarks about the Parliament of Finland.
Firstly, I wanted to examine, as my first research question, a prospect of deliberative
representation as something that could provide a better grasp of the convergence of two
related concepts, political representation and deliberation. Here, my attempt has been in
narrowing down the sphere of inquiry by pursuing an analytical idea of deliberative
representation. Crucially, it is also a response to the call for arms by Gutmann and
Thompson (1996, 131) when they declared that deliberative democracy needs to search for
‘modes of representation’ also within legislatures that would support ideals of deliberation.
Not many have answered this call. As I have shown in the theoretical chapters, deliberative
theory has over the years referred to some questions that relate to political representation:
themes of power and interests, inclusion and selection, dynamics of representation as
principle-agent model have been discussed. These discussions, which connect to varying
degrees with the constructivist turn in representation, make the idea and concept of
representation more complex and fluid. As such, they welcome attempts that would seek
ways to make use and benefit of both strands of theory.
Deliberative representation adopts its features and substances from the understanding of
deliberative democracy. It is the aspirational and analytical quality of deliberation–that of
deliberativeness– that makes deliberative representation appealing and meaningful. This is
especially so when thinking of its empirical applicability. Seen this way, this research can
be seen as an open invitation for further work that revises, focuses and specifies the idea of
deliberative representation. To keep pushing for a horizon of finding dialogue and bridges
across the scholarships of deliberation, representation and legislatures, attempts like the one
here are needed.
Taking conceptual liberties that the study of parliaments from the deliberative angle
arguably calls for, seems to be fitting to the newer deliberative paradigm that already looks
well past set criteria in defining ‘real’ deliberation. Also, there is little to contribute to the
general discussion about deliberative systems, if we would lose hope on legislatures and
ignore them altogether from deliberative analysis. Within this framework, which remains
contested, we could consider deliberation as a spectrum, as Mansbridge has suggested.
There situations and settings are ranging from little or none of the features of deliberation
being present to full-fledged inclusive and non-distributive deliberation where all ideals are
present (Mansbridge 2006, see also Warren and Mansbridge 2013).
Most recently, Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019) have also argued for such an approach,
looking into deliberation in summative terms that make deliberativeness a feature that is a
product of dynamic interactions. These interactions are sensitive to contextual and
functional variations just as I have been describing in the analysis. Deliberative
representation seeks out the ‘deliberative timbre’ in representation. As Bächtiger and
Parkinson (2019, 7, 10) argue, deliberativeness is something resonating here and there in
the events of democratic politics, but nonetheless in a distinctive way. In my treatment of
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deliberativeness in representation, a few key elements have been distinguished through
which deliberative representation can be analysed. What I have made central to my analysis
of the developing scholarship is an examination of the practices of deliberative
representation, activities that entail deliberation and representation, through the idea of
functions. We have seen that different contexts in legislatures host and induce, for example,
of practices of debating, disagreeing and compromising, reasoning and reflection in
different ways. I have also concentrated on the overall deliberative process and, within that,
have pinpointed features of open-mindedness, opinions and preferences and authenticity.
Tapping into these features helps locate action logics available in parliamentary work and
offers an overview what goes on in a legislature when representation is in action. First and
foremost, what can be gained from a proposal of deliberative representation is that these
ideas together enable looking at actual empirical accounts of representative activities.
The idea of deliberative representation highlights the role of context. This was the
objective of my second research question. Through uncovering the idea of contextuality,
something that is only gradually being focused on in the literature, I have empirically shown
how practices of deliberative representation occur in the different contexts of representation.
This research has detected three major contexts: affirmative, operative and performative.
In addition to showing how certain functions mainly draw from respective contexts, I
have argued that their relevance lies also in the way these practices are reflected throughout
the contexts. The contextual approach has made it possible to generalise about how the three
contexts provide resources for practices and orient the incentives of representatives. The
analysis offered in this study provides a response, albeit not an exhaustive one, to Goodin’s
claim that there are ‘interactions between different deliberative virtues, and across stages of
the deliberation, which must be considered in sequencing the deliberative virtues’ (Goodin
2005, 193). We see that representative institutions are forced to distribute deliberative tasks
within, highlighting also the efforts for accountability and performing well. These
objectives derive from enabling and prompting resources for reflection, expertise and
specialisation, and reasoning. Adding to Goodin’s description on spatial stages of legislation
the contexts of representation provide much-needed analytical depth to what happens inside
parliaments.
Overall, the chosen contextual and functional treatment of deliberative representation
speaks to the ‘problem-based approach’ of democratic theory (Warren 2017). Theorists
should consider the extent to which political practices can solve democratic problems.
Along these lines, this research has shown, with an illustration of the Finnish parliament,
how organising collective decision-making, as one of the democratic functions defined by
Warren, takes place through practices of deliberation and representation. Finnish
scholarship prior to this research was characterised by a somewhat reserved attitude to the
deliberative features of legislative processes, not only regarding which interests are given a
hearing in the parliamentary committees (Holli and Saari 2009), but also regarding the
overall role of speech in the Parliament of Finland (Pekonen 2011).
Institutional and procedural settings provide important resources (which also guide and
restrict action) for representative actors and induce deliberation in various ways. However,
what I have attempted to demonstrate with the idea of deliberative representation is that
there is more to it–arguably, all representatives in their activity of representation recognise
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the three-part ethos of affirmation, operation and performativity. Claiming that this
argument includes legislators and non-institutional actors alike suggests that the contexts
argued here resonate also outside the parliamentary setting. Since accounts of representation
differ from time and place, deliberative representation may not be linear or similarly
traceable through particular institutionalised deliberative processes like the ones presented
here.
This sequenced and distributive character embedded also in deliberative representation
is a challenge that the deliberative systems approach is also up against. Through contextual
examination of one specific legislative venue this research can contribute to thinking
‘systemically’. As the overall picture of deliberative systems is getting clearer, it is
becoming increasingly necessary to revisit the so-called institutional and empirical turn in
their focus on, for example, representative institutions (Bächtiger et al. 2018: 18, see also
Dryzek 2017; Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019). These studies may be hit by limited
communication between political theory and empirical political science, something that is
endemic especially within deliberative democracy (see Dryzek 2007; Thompson 2008;
Elstub 2010). Recently the differing ontological perspectives have reached also the concept
of representation (Fivaz and Bühlmann 2016; see also Sabl 2015).
Although Thompson (2008) argues that normative theory of deliberation has the ‘upper
hand’, this does not mean that empirical research should not test the claims made by political
theorists. It can profoundly illuminate what representative democracy can and cannot do,
thus implying favourable conditions for such democratic practices as deliberation and
representation. For this reason, a normative democratic theory must indicate the extent to
which trade-offs between actual democratic processes and normative theory should be made
(Elstub 2010, 256).
The emerging empirical research on deliberative systems also calls for a wider
methodological programme (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 14, 75). Bevir and Ansari
(2012) summarise the dilemma that the empirical turn in deliberative theory is facing: the
‘modernist approach’ that is endorsed in contemporary political science maintains that
structures and institutions have priority over the actor’s perspective. This bias makes the
approach ‘ill-suited to identifying and explaining deliberative democracy’ (Bevir and Ansari
2012, 2). On the contrary, the actor-centred perspective is endorsed by interpretative
political research, which accommodates the ‘multiplicity inherent in political life’ when it
comes to varied and overlapping interpretations by many actors and participants (Ercan,
Hendriks, and Boswell 2017, 199).
Interviewing elected representatives, as done in this research, shows how the
interpretative approach can be applied to parliaments (Bevir and Rhodes 2006; Geddes and
Rhodes 2018). As such, parliaments are seen as particular deliberative ecologies.
Interviewing can ‘provide important insights into what deliberative systems look like from
the ‘inside’ but also enable a stepping stone that can ‘help to inform ideas about how
interactions and interconnections between components of the system can be steered, in order
to achieve more inclusive and reflective deliberation at the larger scale’ (Ercan and al. 2017,
204, emphasis added).
On the other hand, fully committing to interpretative research may necessitate
abandoning ‘some of the explanatory ambitions’ (Bevir and Ansari 2012, 3). A similar
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worry is presented with purely qualitative approaches where, in the case of deliberative
systems, studies might become ‘blind to complex dynamics and transmissions’ (Bächtiger
and Parkinson 2019, 141). For this reason, although my research provides only a limited
look at public deliberation and to the prevailing question about deliberative transmissions
across the sites within a deliberative system, it does show how policy-makers engage with
deliberative processes in a legislative context. Future research could supplement the
approach proposed here with participant observation–doing research in Fenno’s (1986)
methodological style of ‘soak and poke’. In any case, there is a need for an overarching
research programme to tackle these methodological complexities, and mitigate the
unnecessary division between empirically and theoretically oriented scholars.
**
The empirical analysis presented here points towards how contextual features inform the
conditions in which representatives encounter each other. Hence, deliberation is not a virtual
act but a physical occurrence between two or more people. Curiously, this relevant
democratic perspective available in interactions (that are also staged in physical
surroundings) has been eschewed by democratic theory (Parkinson 2012, 6). For this reason
the deliberative stance embedded in deliberative representation is inherently ethical. By this
I mean, as proponents of deliberative systems argue, that ‘to deliberate with another is to
understand the other as a self-authoring source of reasons and claims’ (Mansbridge et al.
2012, 11). My aim has not been to pursue the ‘ethical-evaluative’ approach (Schäfer 2017),
but instead to acknowledge the elements that the perspective of interactions spells out.
However, the kind of ethical evaluation discussed here is done implicitly by the
representatives themselves. This is the feature of mutual respect. What many of the
interviewees stated is that despite fiercely disagreeing with their political opponents in some
cases, the opponent and what they represent should always be respected. This principle also
draws on the premise that every representative has an equal mandate to represent. However,
there are some indications in the interviews that a few polarised agendas are found so
fundamentally different that some struggle with the principle of respect.
More generally speaking, this ethical perspective of democratic politics orients more
often towards how representatives conduct themselves in different situations and contexts.
The kind of ethical reinvigoration has also recently been argued by Cameron (20018) in his
theoretical pursuit for legislators as Aristotelian ‘wise practitioners’. The internal
perspective of the parliament that I offer in this research relates to more specifically to the
question of how one represents. Again, this articulates the deliberative stance in
representation. Ultimately, what matters is how representatives negotiate and handle various
situations that they come across daily.
Accounts of judgments are not the only indications that representatives seek to sail as
close to the wind as possible in the performative context–to steer on the borderline of being
articulate and rude and disrespectful. However, these abovementioned relate to main
genealogy that can be traced when approaching my final research question of how
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deliberative acts are facilitated. To indicate these dynamics, I formulated three deliberative
modes, namely the expressive-deliberative, strategic-deliberative and expressive-partisan
deliberative mode.
If one would summarise the overall findings, it would be about crucial consideration
regarding controlling the starkest urges of strategic action. There is also another point to be
made here: strategic behaviour does not always refer to the pejorative single-minded
partisan aspirations and publicity-seeking stunts. The analysis pinpoints occasions where
strategic action contributes to the aspiration to hear out various perspectives and seeking
solutions in that moment. Strategic action, when used wisely, can enhance cooperation,
solidarity and commonality. But the strategic-deliberative mode highlights the ability to
engage in political negotiations (and to know when to call them off) or propose an out-of-
the-box solutions. Assumingly, representatives who succeed in these functions demonstrate
that the incentives for re-election, gaining respect within the house as well as pursuing good
politics can appear side by side (Bessette 1994, following Fenno’s work).
While it may not appear credible that political actors would condemn acting politically
in a legislature, there is another discernible aspect in their reasoning. This relates to the
integration of functions and the discussed contexts. For example, the way representatives
argue curbing outright political conducts is that it makes no sense to operate with an
expressive-partisan mode in the committee: that is, to deliver long and eloquent persuasive
speeches or endorse a fully adversarial position on the issue on the table. If opinions are
well defined to begin with, and the compromise or solution to the disagreement between
parties turns out to be futile, then the committee handling and the corresponding process is
formally taken to the end (this point is also made in Pekonen 2011). Majority wins and the
minority will take up their case later through other means. The time and place to unravel the
disagreement is elsewhere. Such demonstration of deliberative-strategic mode displays the
practical orientation in getting pass political differences that slows down the process in the
operative context. As one interviewee stated: ‘Best speeches to the Hall!’
However, plenary discussions are marked by superficiality and epistemic redundancy
that draws the analysis that everyone seems to be getting less out of them. Excluding the
general democratic merits of public reasoning and debate raises a worry shared by Pekonen
(2011): how can we ensure that decisive political disagreements are reasoned and justified
to the fullest within the legislature? Unless we resort to solving matters simple by voting, it
can turn out to be a democratic problem if the democratic function of collective decision-
making undermines such deliberation. Many virtues relating to constructive politics are
demonstrated in the operative context where partisan-oriented, plebiscitary reasoning is
generally shunned. Consideration about the merits of policies and what is thought to imply
general good is reflected through the expert hearings in the committees. Expert hearings
now take up most of the committee’s time, which is thereby taken away from time spent
deliberating. The sheer amount of legislation in Finland makes committee work often
congested, therefore decreasing their deliberative capabilities and potential.
Also, as I have shown, parliamentary party group (PPG) meetings can facilitate
deliberation, depending on the size of the group and the number of items on the meeting
agenda. Deliberative culture, the kind of discussion where perspectives are tested and
reflected, fostered by the PPGs makes a difference. Given that representatives engage with
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what I have been calling expressive-deliberative mode, affirmation about a personal or party
position is produced. But does the process of reasoning and justification, practices that do
not belong only to textbooks but exist in reality, travel across the contexts of representation?
Here Mykkänen (2010) makes a fair yet distracting point that goes against the general
assumption of deliberative theory. He claims that contrary to what is assumed, the way trust
operates in parliaments actually inhibits deliberation. Trust facilitates intraparty bonding
that encourages keeping matters ‘in the family’ and to appear loyal to the outside. While it
is true that committees and especially the PPGs, in the best scenario, form an enclave
surrounded by mutual trust and shared expertise that induces authenticity. I have also shown
that committee members and PPG members can exercise deliberative control. They
withhold from offering their informed reasons when it comes to the question of revealing
overlapping conflicts and other such matters that could be politically decisive. However, we
also have to consider the opposite perspective: within a PPG where intraparty trust is low,
would we be seeing more of those who publicly go against the party and not only when
voting? Would low intraparty trust enhance the kind of deliberation described here?
From this it follows that the deliberative principle of reciprocity, where reasons are
recognised also through their mutual acceptability (Gutmann and Thompson 1996), is
incompatible with how participants aim for compromise in the committee. To increase
acceptability of presented reasons representatives as party members may withhold or
restrain from sharing all details. But this violates the reciprocity and the embedded
fundament of respect, according to the view by Gutmann and Thompson. Weinstock (2017,
647) is correct in pointing out that norm of intelligibility should be preferred rather than
mutual acceptability or ‘shareability’ to elude the theoretical ‘duplicity’ when it comes to
question of authenticity of deliberation. I have shown that, in the PPG meetings at least, a
certain level of sincerity is expected in order to contribute to collective opinion formation
and testing of arguments, whereas this feature becomes more negotiated when advancing to
the performative context and the plenary sessions. This argument also connects with the
question of who the interlocutors are, whether intended audience is one’s own group,
committee members or the whole parliament as well as and the electorates and media.
In the interviews, several interviewed MPs emphasised the readiness to take a stand in
all situations, as this is expected of them. But when functions of opinion-building and
expression and contestation are explicitly encouraged in the affirmative context, it may very
well be that they remain there. Origins of disagreements and the corresponding perspectives
presented in the PPG may not be shared with committee members when legislation is
scrutinised. This has effects on the nature of compromise in a legislature.
What we can conclude from this is that the urgency of political compromise lies in its
deliberative virtues displayed at that moment when the compromise is made. Consideration
of the perspectives and stands of the participants of compromise are not explicitly visited
after the agreement on the compromise is made. If compromise is defined in terms of giving
up or abandoning (at that time) some positions or objectives, then the ‘notion of reciprocal
concession’ (Weinstock 2017, 650) articulates a certain path-dependency. Elements of
compromise are held throughout the legislative handling. Similar deliberative virtue in
articulating the ‘nuts and bolts’ of compromise, that may take place within the committee,
do not exist when the legislative process moves on to the plenary stage. The political and
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epistemic credentials discussed above should regardless be at display also in the
performative context. A working parliament, such as the Parliament of Finland, puts more
effort into ‘governing’ and law-making, and not so much into debating.
In addition to the abovementioned observation about dealing with disagreements raises
another concluding point that takes a completely different view to them. My analysis
suggests that the centrality of compromise in democratic politics seems to take for granted
that there are, firstly, issues that are in conflict and, secondly, that legislators have a sense
of what they are. Only the former argument holds ground, while the latter is plausible. When
Bessette (1994, 54–55) discusses the role of persuasion in the US legislature he makes a
point worth considering: it is not so much about changing but making up minds. Among
other things, the focus on legislative contexts of representation has offered a way to unfold
and discern the prospect of preference change. This feature that early deliberative democrats
held central can now be perceived in terms of open-mindedness (Bächtiger and Parkinson
2019) that allows a better look at how opinions are made and how political actors are making
up their minds. We can argue that based on the analysis offered in this research we can agree
with Bessette (1994, 51) that information works indeed as a resource for persuasion and
educating representatives. Here it is noteworthy to underline how scrutiny of legislation in
committees toggles accordingly between the operative context and affirmative context. The
former expects a rather uncomplicated, straightforward decision-making oriented
manoeuvres, whereas in the latter positions and perspectives informing those manoeuvres
are less constrained. As such, they need affirmation and validation.
It is very plausible that representatives do not always have a clear sense of what their
personal position is in the face of massive amount of legislation. Therefore, the reality also
may be that representatives do not often profoundly know the subject matter on which they
are deciding. However, the division of labour that takes place–and is supported and
structured by the institutional setting–mitigates what here seems to be a democratic deficit.
This research has shown how representatives can rely on their colleagues for validation and
better judgment–curiously hinting at an intra-parliamentary surrogacy representation of
some sort).
Again, all this highlights the paradigmatic role of the performative context.
Representatives should also individually display the range of their skills and capacities as
representatives. Importantly, since contexts overlap significantly it also implies that the
practical virtue–how to represent–appears differently in each context. Quite obviously, not
all participants share understanding about what purposes deliberative processes might serve.
Representatives may choose to treat passing moments and situations differently. However,
it is often the case that implicit norms orient and set expectations for communicative action
in those moments. This could be one way to think of Burke’s (1774) much-cited passage
about how representatives ‘owe their industry’ to the represented: the knowledge of and
capacity to navigate in a legislature requires familiarity with norms, formal and informal
alike, as well as great deal of judgment and tact. It necessitates the ability to detect when an
agreement can be made and when to resist compromise; when to be bold and raise an issue.
We could argue that a practically wise legislator is able to succeed in all the contexts:
genuinely affirming and reflecting issues and working them out with others. When the
practices of deliberative representation are rewarded differently in different contexts of
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representation can also be a problematic thing. We are faced with an unresolved question:
how can democratic politics nurture and educate legislative practices that help in selecting
as well as in rewarding constructive political practitioners, especially when much of the
parliamentary work is done outside the public venue? PPGs partly do this by advancing the
career paths of reliable MPs within the Parliament, but sorting out ‘wise practitioners’
cannot be left in their hands only. Making the committee sessions public is one plausible
option. However, as the majority of interviewed MPs argue, this action would introduce the
campaigning and posturing dynamics to the committees. Therefore could be a flawed
remedy in this respect.
When we arrive at the question of overall performance of representatives and conditions
enabling and restricting representative functions and deliberative acts, we can make a few
final remarks. What can be drawn from this research is that not all elements in deliberative
representation in a legislature are equal in terms. When thinking of the argument of MPs as
shape-shifters that modify and adapt their activities and aspirations, the willingness to
shape-shit is one thing but structures ‘allowing them to do so’ is another (Saward, 2014,
728, emphasis added). I would argue that while Saward seems to assume that structures for
shape-shifting are enduring (as they are in cases of institutional structures) some other
structures are negotiable and flexible. For this reason, the shape-shifting quality of
representation may not equally be available for all but are in fact subject to hierarchy that is
drawn from the informal structures of institutional norms. Senior MPs have more leeway
when it comes to deliberative representation. Also, for them, from the intraparty perspective,
it may not be similarly politically harmful to go across the floor in a vote or defy even
publicly one’s party on some policy matter.
A completely different matter is the incentive for re-election, the ultimate strategic
consideration in legislative behaviour. I will draw two examples from the interviews. First
was already brought up in the expressive-partisan mode dominating the plenary. Apart from
the debate format that institutionally guides who is given a turn to speak, if my analysis is
correct, there is nothing in performative context that would block or restrict endorsing a
more moderate, mediating deliberative mode that could also aspire for far-reaching political
envisioning. The only thing that formally restricts this is that it can affect, critically I am
afraid, the incentives of MPs to engage in this kind of deliberation. Another reading would
suggest a yearning for nostalgia, or refer to an ideal that never existed. In any case, the
functional overlap of affirmative and performative contexts is small when it comes to
plenary sessions. This is not to suggest that MPs should pour their hearts out about personal
uncertainties about political decisions or other (potentially political) details backing up the
legislation. But we tend to see too little of the kind of pondering and reasoning that would
not only be engaging and appealing but also reflective and constructive.
What connects these features is the idea of listening and the overall democratic
transmission between the representatives and the represented. Just as Bächtiger and
Parkinson (2019, 101), accompanying Ankersmit (2002), put it, representations are never
‘the thing itself’; they are proposals and claims made and rendered to judgment of others.
The show-do characteristics (Saward 2017) of the performative context, despite its
fundamental democratic underpinnings, tend to reduce the kind of elusiveness that appears
necessary to deliberative transmissions. The affirmative context and the corresponding
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expressive-deliberative mode articulate exactly these features where the participant
implicitly asks, ‘did I get this right, is this how these things would work out?’ (to use the
example of Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019). In a more striking way, to engage in deliberative
process in the first place displays the willingness for listening and affirmation. I would lay
down the argument that, among other things, we need more public articulation of these
reflective and reflexive aspects in democratic politics without political practitioners
appearing weak, incompetent or indecisive. This is the likely case when considering how
the media tends to frame parliamentary deliberations.
Finally, these abovementioned questions can be perceived from the perspective of
legislature and through the theme of ‘de-parliamentarisation’. Representative institutions
and elected representatives have fewer formal powers to influence policy-making in general.
In more detail, due to the influence of government platform policies that are
programmatically issued and accepted, leaves less room for legislative aspirations by
individual MPs. In accordance with Holli and Saari (2009) and Pekonen (2011), influencing
should take place prior to the bill reaches the parliament. From the perspective of simple
interest aggregation, this kind of ‘output representation’ might be preferred. When being
suggested that instead of initiating a formal and democratic procedure of putting forward an
individual MP initiative, and if one wishes to see a result and be effective in a matter, the
issue should be taken up privately with the minister or the cabinet. Evidently, when the kind
of back-channelling comes into question, the parliament and the public deliberation it ensues
becomes by-passed. This is one of micro-mechanisms that relate to Beetham’s (2011)
diagnosis of parliaments getting trampled by more effective avenues of political influence.
On another note, committees of the Parliament of Finland have a considerable amount
of legislative potential. Some of the reasons include the institutional design of long and
steady incumbency, vast access to expert-knowledge, and overall accumulated expertise and
‘institutional memory’ (that experienced committee secretaries also stand for). Together
with demonstrated public spiritedness, aspirations to strive towards good policies, as many
interviewed MPs claimed, constructive politics is possible. Given that the power of lobbyists
are kept in check, it is worth considering granting rights of legislative initiative to the
parliamentary committees of the Parliament of Finland. This could mitigate and control
some of the features that impoverish present-day legislatures.
Evidently there is a struggle for parliamentary power over the executive, and more
urgently, in a larger sense, struggle over parliament’s legitimate existence (Beetham 2011).
For such, it is not only representative institutions in terms of institutional representation that
is called into question (Judge and Leston-Bandeira 2017; Judge, Leston-Bandeira, and
Thompson 2018). Parliamentarians also need to find ways to justify their position and
significance in a narrowing operational field. And presumably on a global level, with
lessening impact. Better oversight, visibility and ‘permeability’ have been called in the face
of comparisons of Finnish parliament being as open as the Vatican (Arter 2012). Not only
would increasing transparency of parliamentary practices induce the ‘civilising force of
hypocrisy’ but also make visible the decision-making processes of parliament.
‘Transparency of process’ would ensure that through cross-cutting publicity of
parliamentary practices the accountability principle can be redeemed (Mansbridge 2009).
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Proposed originally by Mansbridge (2009), distinctive from processual transparency is
‘transparency in rationale’ which reintroduces the traditional reading of accountability as in
giving an account in order to be informed and to ‘rule’. Democratic hazards present in the
lack of transparency, however, may not be mitigated if the rationale is not genuine (Warren
and Mansbridge 2013, 108). In hindsight, when matters contributing to the decision are not
available, or especially if the impact of interest group lobbying is not made visible, then
transparency in rationale seems less appealing. All this relates to what I have argued about
the role of representatives in the democratic landscape. There is an overdue need for
discussion of the purposes of democratic representatives, and of how legislatures as
representative institutions can host various representative practices. And not only that, the
ways in which functions of representation change over time when looked from the viewpoint
of contemporary legislatures need more focus. Deliberative representation, and the range of
deliberation it accentuates and explains by drawing from the function and context-sensitive
perspective, is a good beginning.
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APPENDIX
i List of research interviews
Total amount of research interviews n=65.
INTERVIEW SET I
18 interviews (conducted and transcribed by Anne Maria Holli and Milja Saari), 2008
1. 29 May 2008
2. 16 June 2008
3. 23 May 2008
4. 9 June 2008
5. 11 June 2008
6. 10 September 2008
7. 23 September 2008
8. 8 October 2008
9. 7 November 2008
10.  4 November 2008
11. 11 November 2008
12. 9 October 2008
13. 5 November 2008
14. 1 October 2008
15. 11 June 2008
16. 1 June 2008
17. 16 June 2008
18. 19 June 2008
INTERVIEW SET II
17 interviews (interviews conducted and transcribed by Jenni Rinne), 2008–2009
1. 4 December 2008
2. 12 December 2008
3. 17 December 2008
4. 18 December 2008
5.  30 December 2008
6. 20 January 2009
7. 22 January 2009
8. 3 February 2009
9. 5 February 2009 (9-1) and 18 February 2009 (9-2)
10. 20 February 2009
11. 25 February 2009
12. 17 March 2009
13. 18 March 2009
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14. 20 March 2009
15. 24 March 2009
16. 17 December 2008
17. 26 November 2008
INTERVIEW SET III
16 interviews (conducted and transcribed by Jenni Rinne), 2015
14 interviews (conducted and transcribed by Jenni Rinne), 2016
Interviews conducted between 24 June 2015 and 29 June 2016
Exact dates of the interviews are removed for securing the anonymity of the
interviewees. Codes (III: 1-29) have been shuffled.
1. xx.xx.xxxx
2. xx.xx.xxxx
3. xx.xx.xxxx
4. xx.xx.xxxx
5. xx.xx.xxxx
6. xx.xx.xxxx
7. xx.xx.xxxx
8. xx.xx.xxxx
9. xx.xx.xxxx
10. xx.xx.xxxx
11. xx.xx.xxxx
12. xx.xx.xxxx
13. xx.xx.xxxx
14. xx.xx.xxxx
15. xx.xx.xxxx
16. xx.xx.xxxx
17. xx.xx.xxxx
18. xx.xx.xxxx
19. xx.xx.xxxx
20. xx.xx.xxxx
21. xx.xx.xxxx
22. xx.xx.xxxx
23. xx.xx.xxxx
24. xx.xx.xxxx
25. xx.xx.xxxx
26. xx.xx.xxxx
27. xx.xx.xxxx
28. xx.xx.xxxx
29. xx.xx.xxxx
30. 22 May 2016, former MP and minister, Speaker of the House Riitta Uosukainen
wanted to appear with her own name in this research.
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ii Framework fort the semi-structured research interviews
INTERVIEW SET I, 2008
Semi-structured interview frame (translated from Finnish)
1) Recruitment to the committee
1.  Recruitment for committee membership: did you yourself wish to be a member of
this committee. If so, why (or if not, why not)?
2. What kind of position do you have in the committee? What are your tasks?
3. How would you describe your career path in committee work? Has it been
progressing to tasks of increasing responsibility within one committee, or “lateral”
progression, for example transitioning from a rank-and-file member in one committee to a
committee responsible, chair etc.?
4. How typical do you assess your committee career to be in this respect (in comparison
to other MPs)?
5. How does the selection of MPs into different committees happen within your PPG?
Which criteria dictate who gets to go to what committee? How about leadership positions?
2) Changes in committee work
6. In what ways do you estimate that the committee work has changed since the mid-
1990s? What factors have been influencing these changes?
7. How has Finland’s EU-membership affected committee work?
8. How is the reform of basic rights (1995) apparent in committee work? How about
the strengthening of human rights internationally and in Finland?
9. How are gender perspectives strived for into the mainstream apparent in committee
work?
10. How has the increased number of female MPs affected committee work in general?
11. How do you assess the committee’s working: harmonious, quarrelling, amount and
effect of differing opinions, something else? How has this changed, and what factors affect
the committee’s working and routines in your opinion?
12. Is there, for example, collaboration between different groups, with
whom, on what grounds (party, agenda-specific interests…)?
13. Do you yourself have this kind of collaboration across party
boundaries, with whom, in which matters?
14. What things/changes have eased or disturbed committee work in your opinion?
3) Representation
16. Which groups, which interests are best/worst represented in the
committee, if we are considering this specifically from the point of view of the entirety of the
committee?
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17. The so-called quota act (1995) is not applied to the line-up of the
committees. Has this ever been discussed in the parliament or in the committee, or have the
possible effects of gender balance been considered?
18. Are the different gender distributions in different committees apparent
in their work?
19. How do you assess the women’s network and its influence in the
parliament – on committee work in general and on this committee in particular?
20. Do the male MPs have similar groups, which look after men’s interests
and/or bring male perspective into the work?
21. In what ways do other groups and identities become
visible/represented among the members of the committee and in their committee activities?
22. In what ways are party membership, social class, and
employer/employee/agriculture confederations visible/represented among the committee
members and in their committee work?
4) Experts
23. How are experts chosen? Who proposes experts, who doesn’t, and on
what grounds?
24. Is a person or an interest group proposed? Is ever a woman or for
example minority group representative (NGOs) demanded to be invited as an expert? Are
there any problems associated with this and if then what?
25. How do you estimate the gender distribution of the experts in your
committee to be? What factors explain it?
26. How do you assess the versatility of the experts your committee uses
in general?
27. What principles guide the hearing of the experts? Is the aim for
example to fill gaps left there during earlier preparation, is there coordination with preceding
preparation process?
28. Individual experts: who are chosen, from where, on what grounds?
Are experts from women’s studies or critical study of men utilized and if, in what matters?
29. How do you assess the effectiveness of experts – in general and by
interest groups? Are there differences in the importance of experts or groups and if, then on
what grounds? Are there changes to be noticed (for example ministries, unions, NGOs?)
and to what direction?
30. How is the attitude towards experts in the committee work – in
general and for different interest groups?
- Are members present?
- Are they only politely listened to, are they taken seriously?
- Are questions being asked, discussed, or matter-of-fact?
31. How do the experts’ views influence the committee’s stance—are there
differences in relation to experts/groups?
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5) Influence
32. How do you estimate the influence of committees to have
grown/diminished in general? In relation to the amount of government bills
33. The importance of different committees has been seen to be different.
How do you estimate this hierarchy between committees has prevailed/changed?
34. Have changes happened in this committee’s position within the
aforementioned hierarchy? If, then why? How about new committees’ position in the
hierarchy?
35. How is the influence distributed within this committee? Who has
power/influence, on what factors is this based on? (position, party, government/opposition-
constellation, seniority, expertise, individual properties, age, gender etc…)
37. Whose opinion has influence–on others’ opinions, how about the end
result?
- chair, secretary, committee responsible person etc.
- relationship between head of committee group /PPG
- head of committee group position in their own party
- position of a rank-and-file MP, new MP?
- position of female/male MP–is there a difference?
38. Who are active in committee work? Is this related to influence?
39. Are there core groups and cliques and outsiders, and on what basis?
40. What do you see your own influence as being based on?
INTERVIEW SET II, 2008-2009
Semi-structured interview frame (translated from Finnish)
GENERAL
1) Is it possible to have influence in the committee and if so, then with what kind of talk?
à Yes: how and with what kind of talk can you influence?
à  No: what are the arenas and forums for influencing talk in the parliament? (parliament
group etc.)
2) Is it a common practice that compromises are made, improved and argued in the
committee meeting, or does it happen in some even smaller constellation?
3) How does the common goal of the committee—a unanimous report—affect talk in the
committee or does it have any effect?
4) By whom is the common view formed?
5) Can you remember speeches that were important for you or other participants?
1. PARTICIPATION IN THE DISCUSSION:
(1) Activity in the committee in general?
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(2) In the end, how much are topics discussed in the committee?
(3) Does everyone participate, or most, or always only the same few?
(4) What is the discussion like?
(5) How would you in general describe the practices of talking in the committee?
- Things are discussed thoroughly, so that different points of view are
debated (to what extent are they heard)
- Things are argued and disagreed without giving much justifications
- Some smaller things or details are negotiated
- There is exchange over some things, e.g. “if you […], then we in
turn..”
- bargaining
àIf all of the above, then where is the most weight?
(7) To where are things developing in this respect in your opinion? Why?
2. PRESENTATION OF VIEWS AND TAKING A STANCE
(1) How actively do the committee members take a stance and present their stance on
present topics?
(2) Do those participating in the discussion present only the views of their own party
and/or their own views on the active topics?
(3) What formulations do they use when presenting their views: “I”, “we”, “the
parliamentary group”, “the party”, “the field”, “the supporters” or what?
(4) Is it usually everyone, some, or few that present their views on the active topics?
à what could be causing the differences?
3. REASONING
(1) How is one’s own stance argued for?
(2) Direction of the argumentation, internally or externally? How are the party’s or the
MP’s own views argued?
(3) How would you describe the atmosphere and goals of talking and arguing: is it
discursive, negotiative or debate-driven?
(4) To whom is the talking directed to? Is the talk directed in a way more to the committee
chairperson and/or committee secretary than to the rest of the committee members?
4. TAKING THE OTHER SIDE INTO ACCOUNT
(1) Are those taking part in the discussion really ready to listen and understand—even if
they would not change their opinions—the opposing arguments, and do they in this regard
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respect the other discussants?
(2) How well do the different sides (government vs opposition, other parties) in the end
really understand the other side and their arguments?à Are they ready to acknowledge
their value, even if they would not agree? Are the opinions and argumentation of others
genuinely respected?
(3) Attitude towards colleague, and respect? Are there possibly differences between the
parliament and other forums?
(4) How equal are everyone in the committee and how does this affect practices of speech?
(5) Taking others into account and respecting them as one side: how would you describe
the direction that the act of taking others into account has taken? Why?
5. THE MEANING OF SPEECH
Are the views presented by others genuinely respected?
(2) What is the attitude towards counter-proposals and differing views?
(3) Is it as if the views of the speakers were decided in advance, or can views change?
(4) Can party or governing-opposition boundaries be crossed? How often?
(5) Can you think of any situations and occasions, where “something new” would have
emerged as a result of open discussion and exchange of ideas, for example a new point of
view or an interpretation, upon which e.g. a compromise (as a temporary mutual
understanding) as a unanimous report could be built?
(6) Are there these “committee personalities” to be found, who may quite often engage and
initiatively take part in the discussion? (picking up on things in the discussion in such a
skilful, aggressive way, or because of their formal position?)
(7) How strongly is the committee work and discussion in the committee defined by MPs’
individual qualities (or is party politics and PPG resolutions still the more dominant factor?
(8) What is this expert talk and what are its political possibilities and boundaries?
Finally:
Do you have anything to add to the discussion had here or possibly something on your mind
that would be important to remember or notice, but that has not been addressed here, or has
not received enough attention?
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INTERVIEW SET III, 2015-2016
Semi-structured interview frame (translated from Finnish)
I BEGINNING AND CANDIDACY1. Please go through in short your MP history, how did you end up being a representative?
a. What issues and things are important to you in your work?
b. Did these change while in office? Why?
II REPRESENTING IN MP WORK
1. What did you like the best in being an MP? What the least?
2. (to those who gave up seat) Did something in representing or in the work affect your
willingness to give up your seat? Could something have changed your mind?
3. What is the task of an MP? Is there something that is generally misunderstood? (these are
handled when asking to comment claims in section VI)
a. How did you perceive your MP profile? Did you ever think of this and in what kind
of situations?
III PLACES OF REPRESENTING
1. When you think about representing in your representative work how does it relate to the
following places; what meanings do they bear (what kind of ”representation” goes on in
these forums)
a. The plenary
b. Committee sessions
c. Parliamentary party group (PPG) meetings (weekly)
d. Committee groups (within PPGs)
e. Informal parliament (cafe, sauna, clubs)2. How is your assessment and consideration bounded and guided by these previously
mentioned forums?
a. Differences in being in the governing / opposition parties?
è Have you planned your representative work in relation to these forums?3. What kind of a meaning does publicity and media have to your representing? How does it
differ in relation to these forums of representation?
a. Follow-up question about the lack of transparency of MP work in relation to
constituency
IV SPEECH AND DELIBERATION AS TOOLS FOR REPRESENTATION
1. Can you remember a meaningful situation where you have felt that speaking has made a
difference? How was it?2. What kind of role do the following arenas have for your opinion-formation?
a. The plenary
b. The committee
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c. The committee group
d. Parliamentary party group
3. To what extent does the idea of accountability affect your work? (How does relate to if one
happens to change one’s opinion in the light of new information?)4. What kinds of experiences do you have from disagreeing with your own group?5. What are the good and the bad sides of the unofficial principle of ‘by the book’?
V THE ROLE AND STATUS OF THE PARLIAMENT
1. How do you perceive the role of the Parliament in the Finnish political system? Has it
changed?
2. Citizens’ initiatives can be seen as a way to strengthen direct democracy. How do you see
their role?
VI CLAIMS (asked to mark in scale 1-10, open questions, are to be discussed)
”Representatives have estranged from the people.”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
”Parliament should be a mirror-image of the people.”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
Edmund Burke (v. 1774) Speech to the Electorates of Bristol
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile
interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against
other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one
nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local
prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general
reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen
him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
”The plenary is a place of ’empty talk’”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
”The real work is done in the committees.”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
”Individual representative cannot influence decision-making.”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
”You cannot influence decision-making with talk.”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
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”The most important decision has been made in advance.”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
”It’s no use to talk at length if the matter has been decided.”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
”The Finnish Parliament has too little real possibilities to control the government.”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
”A good representative (a good team player) needs to be able to compromise.”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
”Party discipline is mandatory/needed/inevitable.”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
”In the elections the toughest competitor comes from the same party.”
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
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